


The "New Wittenberg"



—Photo by Jenny Robb, Courtesy of the Wittenberg Archives

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Editor's Note:

The 1989 staff of the Wittenberg History Journal would like to dedicate this volume to Dr. Cynthia Behrman for her contributions and dedication to the Wittenberg History Department. Due to her commitment and determination, the History Journal is being published for the first time in three years. Without Dr. Behrman's support, this task would not have been feasible. Thank you.

We would also like to thank the rest of the Wittenberg History Department: Dr. Ortquist, Dr. O'Connor, Dr. Celms, Dr. Hayden, Dr. Huffman, Dr. Taylor, Dr. Cutler, and Dr. Chatfield.

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Walter Gropius: Architect and Educator

Steve Smith, a senior History major, wrote this paper for Dr. O'Connor's History of Europe in the Twentieth Century Fall term 1988.

The early twentieth century witnessed revolutions of many types; political, scientific, artistic, and literary. Most people are aware of Einstein's contributions to physics, Freud's to psychology, and Picasso's to art, but the revolutionary fervor of the early twentieth century touched many other areas as well. Among the most visible yet underappreciated revolutions occurred in the field of architecture. Led by such men as Le Corbusier, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Walter Gropius, the revolutionary transformation of architecture touched almost everyone and established trends that still assert great influence over the field of architecture today. Walter Gropius was a key figure in the new urban architecture and influenced the training that embodied itself in the Bauhaus school. In this paper, I will examine Gropius the architect, study his influence on architectural thought, analyze his mark on modern architecture, and discuss his legacy as an artist. Walter Gropius was born in Berlin in 1883. Both his father and great uncle were architects, and early in life the young Gropius gained a deep appreciation for the discipline. During Gropius's youth in the nineteenth century, Berlin was undergoing massive impersonal urban growth. Gropius deplored this development and perceived the need for a new style of architecture. His early impression of Berlin influenced architectural beliefs later in life. In 1903, Gropius studied architecture at the University of Munich, and from 1905-1907, he studied at Charlottenberg. It was immediately after his university training in 1907 that he joined the firm of Peter Behrens, an event that would mature him as an architect and introduce him to a new realm of study shaping his artistic and intellectual future.

In 1907 the "Deutsche Werkbund" was founded in Munich, Germany. This movement called for the coordination of all artistic disciplines into large scale enterprises. A revealing sentence in its constitution states: "The aim of the League is to raise the standard of manufactured products by the joint efforts of art, industry, and craftsmanship." [1] Through his

identification with the "Deutsche Werkbund," Peter Behrens became known as a "one man Werkbund," and it was under Behrens's tutelage that Gropius began his professional career. [2] By 1910 he had become Behrens's chief assistant, a major accomplishment considering that he was chosen over other soon-to-be famous young architects such as Ludwig Mies (the later Ludwig Mies van der Rohe) and Le Corbusier who were also working in Behrens's office at the time. Of Behrens, Gropius would later write; "I owe him much, particularly the habit of thinking in principles... moved more by reason than emotion." [3] In Behrens's office Gropius was also exposed to many of the problems inherent in the new wave of industrial and urban architecture—problems he would address, through education and writing, later in his life. When he left Behrens's practice in 1910, Gropius had clearly begun to develop the intellectual and artistic ideals that would shape his career as well as the architecture of the future.

Gropius's first major design of consequence came in 1911, the year he actually joined the "Deutsche Werkbund" and one year after he established his own private practice. In cooperation with Adolph Mayer, he designed the "Fagus Shoe Last Factory." This building was revolutionary for two reasons. First, it made use of cantilevered construction which allowed the corners of the building to stand without the aid of structural columns. Second, Gropius and Mayer made extensive use of a glass facade which gave the building a sense of openness from within and the appearance of modernity from the outside. This building was the first example of the "International Style," characterized by extensive use of glass and modern construction materials. Gropius and Mayer followed the "Fagus" success in 1914 with the "Deutsche Werkbund Exposition" which once again made use of these new approaches.

As with most other emerging movements of the day, architecture fell victim to the First World War.

Unlike some other movements, it reemerged after the war as strong as it had been in 1914. Walter Gropius, having survived a wound sustained while fighting for Germany, was there to lead the way. World War I had a profound impact on Gropius. He realized that a new age had dawned on Germany and the world. As he would later say; "This is more than just a lost war. A world has come to an end. We must seek a radical solution to our problems." [4] Gropius's answer to his own call for radical new solutions was the Bauhaus.

Created in 1919 in Weimar, Germany, after the merger of Saxony's academy of art with its school for applied arts, the Bauhaus was to be Gropius's greatest and most influential contribution to architecture. In the Bauhaus Gropius integrated all of his values into a school for aspiring designers. The basic tenets of the Bauhaus called for the unification of sculptor, painter, and architect "with the specific object of realizing a modern architectonic art, which like human nature was meant to be all-embracing in its scope." [5] Testimony to his commitment to total integration of the arts was his employment of such famous artists as Lyonel Feininger, Marcel Breuer, Wassily Kandinsky, and Paul Klee to teach almost every imaginable art form at the Bauhaus. Gropius also realized the importance of machinery to modern design and taught that while machines could be harmful, they were an inevitable consequence of modernization that had to be mastered by the architect. [6] The most important aspect of the Bauhaus, however, was not the technical or artistic fields that were taught, but the intellectual and social principles that Gropius formulated and passed on to his students.

In keeping with his belief that quality architecture was the result of the coordination of all of the arts, Gropius required all of his students at the Bauhaus to take introductory classes in ceramics and design in order to give them hands-on experience with the basic material of construction. Gropius also stressed the importance of teamwork. While a very non-political man at the macro level of society, Gropius was a firm believer in true socialism at the micro or group level, to the extent of sharing ideas and perpetuating the attitudes of idealism and fraternity. He also saw the architect as a social leader, not a servant of his client, believing that only the architect had the discipline to design with the future in mind, whereas most non-architects were "satisfied with duplicating the tastes of their parents." [7] He felt that the artist should ignore tradition and concentrate on individual inspiration and original design when creating a work of art. [8] A good example of this ideological contrast with tradition came when

Gropius submitted an entry to the Chicago Tribune Tower competition in 1922. Gropius designed a building that incorporated many of the modern trends of design. Eventually he was rejected in favor of Howells and Hood, who designed a gothic-like structure that incorporated an exterior facade reminiscent of European architecture of several centuries earlier. By examining these two entries, we can see that Gropius was clearly looking towards the future while Howells and Hood were seeking inspiration from the past. It is clear that many clients were not yet ready to accept Gropius's form of architecture, but it would not be long before cities were to be transformed by his modern style.

In 1925, under the growing conservative pressure of Weimar, Gropius moved the Bauhaus to Dessau into the famous "Bauhaus" building which he designed. Employing the architectural techniques he had perfected, "The Bauhaus" building in Dessau epitomized his commitment to modern architecture. The building made efficient use of space, was built with modern material, and was designed with an emphasis on contemporary techniques. [9] The Dessau Bauhaus continued to serve as a school for design, still ignoring technical training in structural architecture, but continuing to encompass the creation of modern furniture, lamps, and tableware, to make modern living as pleasant and convenient for as many people as possible. In 1927, an actual Bauhaus school of architecture was established in Dessau which finally gave Gropius the opportunity to educate students in technical architecture as well as the arts.

In 1928, as a result of rising German nationalism in Dessau that was becoming intolerant of the Bauhaus and its members, Gropius resigned as head of the school and reentered private practice in Berlin. [10] The Bauhaus continued to operate under the leadership of Hannes Meyer (1930-1933), until 1933 when it was forced to close under pressure from the Nazis. In 1934, a year after Hitler's rise to power, Gropius secretly left Germany for England as it became obvious to him that the Nazis would not tolerate his type of thinking. A major period of Gropius's life had drawn to a close. Unlike most victims of the Nazis, however, Gropius was to continue his brilliant career in architecture in other countries, most notably the United States.

Immediately after leaving Germany, Gropius took up residence in England for a brief time, and in 1937 he set off for the United States where he became a professor of architecture at Harvard University. Within a year he was chairman of the department and exerting his direct influence on

American students for the first time. Despite the fact that he was teaching in an unfamiliar environment, he did not "bring about any change in his methods of approach," but did respond to the "living and educational patterns of the U.S.A." [11] For fifteen years, until his retirement from Harvard in 1952, Harvard's students were treated to the finest in architectural education from the master. Even as he taught at Harvard, Gropius continued to involve himself with outside programs and projects that helped to shape the face of advancing architecture both technically and intellectually.

Throughout his life, Gropius had been concerned with producing affordable housing for the masses. By 1909 he had "grasped the essential principles of the factory-produced house." [12] He saw these prefabricated houses as the answer to the masses' need for quality living. Although he realized this problem at an early age and experimented with prefabricated options for much of his life, in 1943 he took his greatest step in the advancement of this type of production by becoming a member of a company known as "General Panel Construction." It may seem that by advocating the development of prefabricated housing Gropius was contradicting his belief that each man should have a unique home of his own. However, he was addressing a greater social need that demanded good shelter for all people while following his belief that the architect must exert control over technology, and not the other way around:

The true aim of prefabrication is certainly not the dull multiplication of a house ad infinitum.... But industrialization will not stop at the threshold of building. We have no choice but to accept the challenge of the machine in all fields of production until men finally adapt it fully to serve their biological needs. [13]

While clearly realizing the dangers of prefabrication, Gropius also realized the importance of exploiting technology responsibly and not allowing this type of housing to be built with no concern for the individual or the community. Rather than creating massive communities of identical houses, he wanted affordable choices of prefabricated housing that would promote diversity within individual developments.

In 1944, soon after joining "General Panel Construction" Gropius became a United States citizen. Two years later, in 1946, Gropius and six of his former students formed The Architects Collaborative (TAC). Taking the principles of the Bauhaus and transferring them to the professional level, The

Architects Collaborative was Gropius's way of allowing architects to express individualism while at the same time promoting the free exchange of ideas. TAC contracted to design buildings world-wide: The Harvard Graduate Center, the U.S. Embassy in Athens, The University of Baghdad, and the Pan Am building in New York. While drawing on a wide pool of talent, Gropius was the clear leader of TAC, but typically, he never claimed or accepted the credit he deserved. He remained a devoted member of TAC until his death in 1969.

In his book *Walter Gropius*, James Marston Fitch summarizes Gropius's intellectual life in three distinct areas: as an educator, an architect/designer, and a social critic. [14] I can think of no better way to examine his impact on society and architecture, in particular, than by looking at these three areas and the influence Gropius exerted over them.

As an educator, Gropius was clearly at the forefront of twentieth century architecture. The Bauhaus school was his greatest contribution in this area. More than just the school, however, the new style of education he promoted was revolutionary for the time. Instead of encouraging strict artistic individualism and exclusive service to the wealthy elite, he taught that cooperation and interaction were important for the architect and that society demanded that artists serve the masses. Many modern architects attack Gropius for being "anti-individualist" and "soul-destroying." [15] In reality, though, he just saw group interaction as a way to promote fraternity and to draw the best talent out of the individual. Gropius also believed that artists should seek inspiration from within themselves and avoid looking at the past or to teachers for ideas. Although few architectural students today appreciate the contributions of Gropius, everyone educated in that discipline has been taught, at least in part, by professors who use elements of the Bauhaus idea.

As an architect, aside from his contributions to prefabricated housing, Gropius is most famous for his unique designs of buildings such as the "Fagus Shoe Factory," his Chicago Tribune submittal, the "Bauhaus building," and the Pan Am building. It is in his work as an architect however, that his legacy is most distorted. Gropius is often blamed for the "concrete prisons" and "glass cages" that dominate most cities today. [16] While he was among the first architects to make extensive use of glass in modern buildings, he nonetheless hoped that future buildings in urban areas would be sufficiently different from one another so as to avoid the creation of identically crafted neighborhoods. [17] Unfortunately, in many cities this is exactly what has happened. Gropius can

also be called a father of the modern, indistinguishable suburbia that developed outside most major American cities, but I disagree with this accusation. While he did promote prefabricated housing, he never intended for entire communities, such as Levittown, N.Y., to be constructed with the same fundamental design for every house. He realized that in these types of communities "the individual becomes a mere number." [18] This is not the direction he intended mass-produced housing to take. Thus, while Gropius developed many revolutionary buildings and supported inexpensive housing for the masses, he is often blamed unjustly for the cold, faceless cities and suburbs that we live in today. These cities are the result of efficiency-minded or profit-seeking developers who are not conscious of the social importance of urban development; not the result of Gropius, whose belief it was that each building should be designed with its greater social implications in mind.

This leads to the third legacy of Gropius's intellectual life, that of social critic. The effect of architecture on society is a major one. As the historian Peter Gay says, it is "the most emphatically public of all the arts". [19] Gropius realized this fact early in life, and dedicated much of his professional career to a commitment to the social principles of architecture. He believed that the arts do more than please the senses of the viewer, they touch the person morally. As he said, "the creation of love and beauty not only enrich man with a great measure of happiness, but also bring forth ethical powers." [20]

Through his architecture and teachings he promoted the idea of designing all art with these ideals in mind. Gropius was also a critic of the societies he lived in. Having been a victim of the Nazis in Germany, he spoke of the dangers of totalitarianism, and having lived in the United States, he condemned racial segregation. [21] He was a man who loved both countries despite their social problems and a man who worked to improve both societies through architecture and education.

Walter Gropius's architectural and intellectual legacy is a continuing one. His buildings still occupy many major cities, and his beliefs still influence the study of architecture today. Students of architecture must remember, however, that while Gropius would want them to recognize his accomplishments, he would not want them to copy his style of design. Of Frank Lloyd Wright's students he wrote that their works expressed "the vocabulary of their great master," thus condemning Wright's method of teaching where the students subordinated their creative impulses to his. [22] Artists' inspiration should come from within, not from the influence of history or other great artists. He further stated, "The autocratic approach cannot be called creative, for it invites imitation; it results in training assistants, not independent artists." [23] The architect's responsibility is to himself and society, and that responsibility is to create with a blind-eye to the past and with the concerns of society in mind. This is the legacy of Walter Gropius.

Notes

(1) S.Giedion, *Walter Gropius: Work and Teamwork* (New York: Reinhold Publishing Corp., 1954), 21.

(2) Peter Gay, *Art and Act* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 115.

(3) Walter Gropius, *Apollo in the Democracy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 166.

(4) Gay, *Art and Act*, 122.

(5) Walter Gropius, *Scope of Total Architecture* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1955), 7.

(6) Gideon, *Walter Gropius*, 25-26.

(7) Gay, *Art and Act*, 111.

(8) James M. Fitch, *Walter Gropius* (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1960), 13.

(9) Gideon, *Walter Gropius*, 54.

(10) *Ibid.*, 36.

(11) *Ibid.*, 56.

(12) *Ibid.*, 74.

(13) *Ibid.*, 76.

(14) Fitch, *Walter Gropius*.

(15) Gay, *Art and Act*, 134.

(16) *Ibid.*, 135.

(17) *Ibid.*

(18) Gropius, *Apollo in the Democracy*, 80.

(19) Gay, *Art and Act*, 111.

(20) Gropius, *Apollo in the Democracy*, 4.

(21) Fitch, *Walter Gropius*, 29.

(22) Gropius, *Apollo in the Democracy*, 169.

(23) *Ibid.*

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
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The Men of Myers Hall; Formal and Casual Attire (1914)



—Photos by Jenny Robb

MacArthur and Truman; A Conflict of Interest

Jon Stewart is a senior History major. He wrote this essay in Dr. Chatfield's history of American foreign policy.

On April 10, 1951, after a series of differences with Douglas MacArthur over how to conduct the politically delicate war in Korea, President Harry Truman felt compelled to relieve the general of all of his commands. The array of commands MacArthur handed over to Lt. General Matthew Ridgeway were impressive indeed: Supreme Commander, Allied Powers; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander in Chief, Far East; and Commanding General, US Army, Far East. Having presided as America's preminent military official in the Pacific region for over fifteen years, MacArthur was abruptly reintroduced to civilian life despite his enormous popularity among citizens of the United States. The immediate reasons for MacArthur's dismissal were many, but the ultimate cause of his fall from power was the voicing of his opposition to Harry Truman's Cold War tactics, which MacArthur felt were defeatist. In his desire to actively pursue the military defeat of communism in Asia, Douglas MacArthur failed to fully grasp the political implications of his actions. As a result, he was removed from the scene of international politics.

The Korean conflict began on June 25, 1950 as North Korean troops dashed across the thirty-eighth parallel in a well planned surprise attack on the unsuspecting South Korean army. As the North Koreans rolled down the peninsula, the United States was put in a difficult position. American strategy for the containment of communism in the Pacific region specifically left Korea out of the defense perimeter, as it was generally considered wisest not to become embroiled in a conflict on the Asian continent. MacArthur himself had once stated that anyone who advocated such a conflict "should have his head examined."^[1] The official US policy, stated by Secretary of State Acheson and supported by MacArthur, was that Korea was not vital to the interests of the United States.

With the invasion, however, President Truman

had to regard Korea in a different fashion. Perhaps the peninsula was not of significance in the military sense, but politically there were a great many frightening implications to a communist defeat of a US backed "democracy." There was to be considered the kind of message the free world would be sending the communist world if this act of aggression was not met with force. There was recent historical precedent to draw from, as Spanier notes, "since President Truman and his advisors saw in the North Korean attack an uncomfortable resemblance to the Nazi and Fascist aggression of twenty years earlier."^[2] There was a great fear that if the communist challenge were not met with force, the nations of the free world might be assuring a third world war. Of equal importance was the impact a failure to take action might have on America's Asian allies. In these days of strict bi-polarity, what free nation in Asia and elsewhere would not be disheartened by an easy communist victory so near to the American stronghold of Japan. Such an eventuality would be a serious blow to American prestige.

With these considerations in mind, Truman and his advisors decided on June 30 to authorize naval and air force bombings of suitable North Korean targets and blockade the entire Korean coast. General MacArthur was also authorized to commit a limited number of ground troops to assist the South Koreans. With a rapidity which must have even surprised the policy makers themselves, the United States had reversed its strategy completely and committed all three branches of the armed services to action in Korea.

In a politically fortunate circumstance of history, the United States was able to legitimize its entry into a conflict between two armies of an artificially divided nation through the aid and support of the United Nations. The Soviet Union, whose delegation was boycotting the UN over the issue of Communist China's denied entrance to the UN, missed its

opportunity to veto a resolution on July 27 calling on all member nations to furnish assistance to South Korea in her effort to repel the North Korean invasion. The UN sanctioning of military aid to South Korea also elevated the reputation of Douglas MacArthur. On July 14, he was officially named Commander of United Nations forces.

MacArthur's role in foreign affairs had already been quite political for some time as he presided over Japan's affairs, but his selection by both the US and the UN to lead their combined military efforts in the tense Korean conflict made him even more popular. As the *New York Times* editorialized, MacArthur was "asked to be not only a great soldier, but a great statesman; not only to direct battle, but to satisfy the Pentagon, the State Department, and the United Nations in the process."^[3] MacArthur, realizing full well his political and military status, would voice his opinions on the direction US foreign policy should proceed quite vigorously. In the end, his desire to make opinions known would prove to be the undoing of his political as well as military career.

Upon his entry into the fray, the prospects for the allied forces looked dim. The North Koreans had control over all but a small portion of the Korean peninsula around Pusan. Not much progress was made in repelling the invaders until the early morning hours of September 15, 1950, when MacArthur implemented a daring landing at the port of Ichon. Within a week, Seoul was liberated, and by September 30 nearly half of the North Korean army was trapped while the rest were sent reeling in retreat. Even as MacArthur planned his invasion, one question weighed heavy on the minds of American policy makers - how far should the North Koreans be pursued? The initial intent of the American commitment was to repel the North Korean invasion. Should the US forces now pursue their retreating opponents into enemy territory? If not, how could South Korea be guaranteed safety from future attacks? If the Allies did continue the chase across the thirty-eighth parallel, should the North Koreans be pushed back to the Chinese and Soviet borders? If so, would either be likely to intervene? These were questions which had to be carefully considered before the President make his decision on the matter.

One prominent political advisor who was opposed to crossing the thirty-eighth parallel was George Kennan, the author of containment. Kennan's chief concern was that further advances would spread allied forces too thin and might provoke intervention by either the Communist Chinese or the Soviets or both. He pointed out that "the Russians are terribly terribly sensitive where foreign territory comes very

close to their important centers."^[4] Secretary of State Acheson and General Marshall supported crossing the parallel, but only as a means of crushing the North Korean army, not for the purpose of uniting the peninsula.^[5] There is no doubt as to MacArthur's opinion on the matter. "I intend to destroy and not merely drive back the North Korean forces...." he declared, "I may have to occupy all of North Korea."^[6] The final decision, however, rested with President Truman, and when he did declare policy on September 11, he actually left the decision up to the communists. Significantly, Allied forces were permitted to move into North Korean territory so long as neither the Chinese or the Soviets threatened the situation. Truman did make clear that allied forces were in no way to cross into or to bomb Chinese or Soviet territory. Along with this, only South Korean forces were permitted to make the final approach to the Yalu river.^[7] Given conditional permission to carry the fight into the North, however, MacArthur proceeded to take large segments of North Korean territory.

What happened next presented the US with its most difficult and sensitive situation since the Berlin blockade. On the night of November 25, approximately 300,000 Chinese troops staged a counter-offensive against the approaching allied forces. This time it was the unprepared US forces who were sent reeling into retreat. Before the allies could regather from the onslaught, they had been pushed right back to the area around the thirty-eighth parallel, from where the war had begun and from where either side would make any more significant advances.

With the Chinese intervention, the differences between the intentions of MacArthur and the Truman administration were blatantly exposed. This conflict in interest was but one of several disagreements that had occurred between the two. Despite the administration's clearly stated policy that it did not wish to throw its support behind Chiang Kai-Shek's ambitions of re-taking mainland China, MacArthur had prepared and published a speech which was to be read at a VFW convention in which he glowingly praised Chiang's anti-communism and criticized those who thought otherwise. Angry at MacArthur for issuing a statement so completely contrary to official policy, Truman ordered MacArthur to retract the speech even though it had already been published. This controversy eventually passed. Later, MacArthur complained incessantly about Truman's refusal to allow bombing the bridges over the Yalu river. Citing the strategic importance of these bridges, MacArthur still was forced to find another means to cutting the North Korean arms supply. Now that the Chinese had entered the Korean conflict, it was clear

that MacArthur and Truman were once again involved in a struggle for power.

Douglas MacArthur was a soldier molded in the tradition of the "old school." War and conflict were to be in absolute terms. Compromise was not tolerated. Believing America to be the greatest industrial and economic country in the world, MacArthur asserted that the evil of international communism had to be destroyed if the United States wished to enjoy future prosperity. Furthermore, the idea that the US was not the protector of the free world was beyond MacArthur. As Spanier puts it, Douglas MacArthur firmly believed that "any policy which admitted that the United States could not defend every place in the world was tantamount to appeasement."^[8] Thus America should fight communism everywhere and anywhere, anytime. Moreover, MacArthur detested the idea that Europe should be the prime concern of the United States. He complained on December 26, 1950 that "this group of Europhiles just will not recognize that it is Asia which has been selected for the test of Communist power and that if all Asia falls Europe would not have a chance."^[9]

As the Allied forces were in the midst of a terrible pummeling at the hands of the Chinese in the winter of 1950, MacArthur made crystal clear his opinion that the time for taking the fight to the Chinese had come. By entering the war, according to MacArthur, the Chinese had identified themselves as enemies of the United States and as such they could not be spared the full might of the American war machine. The general proposed to the Joint Chiefs that the US commence bombing Chinese supply bases and other suitable targets. He also called for a naval blockade to be imposed along her coast. He also advocated assisting the Nationalist Chinese in an invasion of the mainland in order to open a second front. To the argument that such actions on the allied part would bring the Soviets into the conflict and so initiate a general war, MacArthur adopted a wait and see policy. Who knew what the Soviets might do in any event, so why not go ahead and show them the US wasn't afraid of them anyway? Besides, he argued, our nuclear capabilities far exceeded theirs, so we were in a better position to win a general war. Finally, to the argument that expanding the war would drive US allies from the battle, MacArthur replied that the US could not afford to subscribe to their policies of appeasement. It was the Chinese who attacked us, he insisted, and the time was now to finish the fight.

Whereas MacArthur's strategy was out front and military, the strategy of Truman and his advisors was

more subtle and primarily political. First, they asserted that a limited war could and should be pursued in the case of Korea. MacArthur complained that the idea of permitting the Chinese to maintain privileged sanctuary in China went against all logic. Yet, the administration realized that the US had a privileged sanctuary in Japan. If the US began bombing bases in China, Japan would surely be subjected to bombing as well. Second, MacArthur underestimated the importance of the allies to the interests of the United States. Without the support of our allies in our most basic foreign policy, the US would be isolated and more vulnerable than ever to a Soviet attack. Third, MacArthur's insistence that Korea be unified as an example of rolling back communism was not reasonable. Korea, which had lately been deemed worthy of a limited war, was certainly not worth the risk of a third world war. Militarily, according to the Joint Chiefs, MacArthur underestimated the effort which would have to go into an effective war on China. A naval blockade on the long Chinese coast would drain the US naval capacity world wide, especially since the allies would almost certainly not participate, and the airpower necessary to inflict any meaningful damage on a country as large as China would significantly weaken US air power in Europe and even in America.

The risk of war with the Soviet Union was a whole different argument unto itself. The Soviets and the Chinese had only recently signed a pact of mutual defense, and share a very long common border. Thus, the probability of the Soviets being provoked into action was much greater than MacArthur supposed. While it is true that the US possessed a far superior nuclear capacity, it was also true that the Soviets maintained a superior conventional force in Europe which, Atom bombs notwithstanding, could probably overrun Europe. Furthermore, US contingency plans for war with the Soviet Union called for the complete evacuation of Korea, so why risk war with them over Korea?

In terms of long range foreign policy, the last thing the US wanted to do was intensify the Chinese war effort. Though a long, drawnout stalemate was the last thing the US public wanted, it was also the last thing the Chinese wanted since such a struggle only increased their material dependence on the USSR. This would be unpopular with China since it was a nation seeking to establish an identity, and it would be unpopular with the USSR because of the drain on the already strained Soviet economy. The combination of these two factors could only serve US interests in the long run since they could possibly forge a split in the "monolithic" structure of international communism. Yet, in reality, uniting the

two powers against the US would push the USSR and China only closer together.

In an effort to keep these kinds of disagreements from surfacing to the public, a directive was issued on December 5 requiring any statements of policy to be cleared by the Department of State and Defense. MacArthur ignored this directive on March 24, 1951 when he asserted that since he had stalemated a larger Chinese force despite being hampered by the administration's policies, he had so far defeated the Chinese. By essentially calling on the Chinese to admit defeat, he assured that they would not do so any time soon, effectively sabotaging any peace talks which were being discussed. Then, on April 5, Republican Minority leader Joseph Martin read in Congress a letter from MacArthur expressing his afore mentioned conviction that Asia should be the first concern of any American defense policy. This was the last straw. Five days later, General MacArthur was forced into retirement.

The tumultuous public acclaim to which MacArthur returned to the United States is evidence of the kind of popular support a get-tough-on-communism-policy engendered. MacArthur was feted and tickertaped and cheered all the way back to Washington where he bade an emotional farewell to his public life. He then took part in a Congressional inquiry concerning the circumstances surrounding his dismissal. When this investigation was completed, MacArthur solidified his heroic image and Truman retained his villainous aura. History has vindicated Truman, however. South Korea remains an independent nation to this day, the acceptance of limited war by both superpowers has prevented any large scale wars, and a rift was indeed created between the Chinese and the Soviets. Yet, MacArthur's image is not really tarnished. He retired with a fantastic record for victory, and he was relieved of his duties fighting for what he believed. Honor certainly belonged to Douglas MacArthur. It is comforting to know, however, that the concept of civilian authority over the military withstood this very trying test.

Notes

(1) John W. Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1965), 17.

(2) *Ibid.*, 29.

(3) James Reston, "As UN General, M'Arthur Faces New Tasks," *The New York Times*, 9 July 1950, p. 3(E).

(4) John Gaddis, *The Long Peace* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 98.

(5) Spanier, 89.

(6) Robert Donovan, *Tumultuous Years* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1967), 270.

(7) Gaddis, 99.

(8) Spanier, 225.

(9) Gaddis, 9.

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The World's Best Hope: Eleanor Roosevelt and Her Struggle for Human Rights

Jennifer McConoughey, a senior History major, submitted this essay as a candidate for the Distinguished Writing Award in Women's Studies.

What I can't understand is why so many newspapers and magazines and even the general public have been attacking the UN instead of boosting it. Doesn't everybody know by now that the UN is our last big hope for peace in this world? [E.R. 1946][1]

This quotation by Eleanor Roosevelt captures the essence of her commitment to world peace. ER starts by expressing her dismay in the media and the general public for neglecting the importance of the United Nations. She then states her belief that the UN is the necessary instrument for attaining world peace. Eleanor Roosevelt was not, however, a starry-eyed idealist. Nor were her words idle propaganda. She felt deeply that world peace could only be obtained through a realistic approach to global justice. She initiated this philosophy by struggling for domestic harmony. Roosevelt stands as a twentieth-century model for realistic application of the ideals of moral responsibility for humankind.

The twentieth century has been a period of mistakes, realizations, and learned lessons. This century marks the establishment of a truly interrelated world. We have witnessed two world wars, the development of a new world system quartered into North-South, East-West "spheres," and an increasing realization of moral responsibility for our political, economic, and social actions. Through her work in the area of social reform, Eleanor Roosevelt has earned the title of "First Lady of the World." This label, however complimentary, implies a lack of independent professionalism in ER's works. Yet, her role as a diplomat in the United Nations, her influence as an American internationalist, and her devotion to educating and cultivating the public's knowledge of political and social issues greatly influenced American foreign policy.

ER's greatest contribution to the struggle for human rights involved her position as one of the five American delegates to the United Nations from 1946

to 1953. She served as US representative to Committee 3 (the Human Rights Commission) for the six-year term and chaired the committee from 1946 to 1948, during which time the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was drafted. This shall be discussed in depth later. It is amazing to think that a woman in the mid-twentieth century came to achieve and successfully use political power and have the ability to influence politics. It is even more amazing to think that a woman out of the privileged upper-class would feel compelled to not only have compassion for the deprived but to devote her entire life to the cause of social issues both in the United States and in the world community. Eleanor Roosevelt's background provides valuable insight to why she was successful and what motivated her toward the cause of human rights.

Eleanor Roosevelt was born in 1884 in New York into a traditional Victorian family. Although ER was born into a family of wealth and prestige, she suffered a very painful and lonely childhood. Eleanor was orphaned by the age of ten and spent her early years being passed from relative to relative. She married her handsome and promisingly successful cousin, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in March of 1905. However, her life continued to be filled with hardship. She loved Franklin deeply, but her constant competition with a domineering mother-in-law dampened their relationship. Eleanor coped with Franklin's crippling polio by nursing him and constantly encouraging him to pursue a public life, often at great sacrifice to her own personal ambitions. She also raised her five children only to have them exclude her from their lives. Eleanor's personal life never did reap great joy, but she found friends and activities which filled her life with meaning and satisfaction. Through ER's trials of loneliness and disappointment, she became sympathetic and sensitive to the deprived people of the world. In Tamara Hareven's biography of ER, she describes this dichotomy in Eleanor's life by stating:

The pressures under which she found herself, the absence of love in her early life, and her sense of inferiority could have made her into a retreating, introverted, hostile, and neurotic person. Instead, she transcended the preoccupation with herself and focused her interest on the needs of others. Self-pity turned into compassion, restlessness into service, a need to receive into a compulsion to give.[2]

Eleanor developed her feelings of responsibility to society early in her life through the teachings of her uncle, Theodore Roosevelt. Her sense of public service and her belief that one should contribute to society emerged from her family background. In her life, ER devoted much time toward the advancement of the less privileged in society. ER concerned herself largely with struggling for human rights and saw the greatest hopes for future peace in what she called "world understanding and the development of a global community." She viewed our youth as the force for the future. Thus ER emphasized social reform and education as the two greatest investments for world peace.

With this historical background in mind, ER's career in politics comes out of the experiences she had before FDR was elected President of the United States. As the first lady (1932-1945), ER served as an influential consultant to her husband and, through those years, increasingly enjoyed a political career independent of Mr. Roosevelt. "Through her trips, speeches, and writings, she developed the unique position of a semi-official link between the administration and the public." [3] ER travelled around the country campaigning New Deal ideas and "feeling out" public opinions on various issues. She was allowed to perform this job largely because of FDR's failing health and inability to travel. ER delved into many social issues, sharing the compassionate ideals of reform held by her husband. She wrote a daily column, entitled "My Day," which was eventually syndicated to 135 newspapers. The column originated as a diary of ER's daily activities and was filled with trivial details which appealed to the apolitical reader. Yet, over the years it gradually became weighted with political and social issues. She used the column to voice her opinions and even allowed her husband to use it upon occasion "to launch trial balloons for new political programs." [4] Another area of her political career began in 1920 when Roosevelt earned the position of legislative coordinator of the League of Women Voters. This not only boosted her into a political and social arena disconnected from FDR, but introduced her to influential social and political activists, many of

whom, Elizabeth Read and Ester Lape for example, became lifelong friends. In this position, Eleanor strengthened her skills as a leader and expanded her awareness of the domestic and international issues of human justice to which she would eventually devote her life.

As ER became more and more interested in international politics, she swiftly applied her husband's ideals of democratic social reform to the newly developing world order. With the outbreak of World War II, ER took the stand that fascism, and such leaders as Hitler and Mussolini, threatened the world and had to be conquered. So, even though Eleanor opposed war, she believed the United States could not morally take an isolationist stand.[5] Combining her work in the women's movement with her desire for world peace, she called for women to become more involved in the war effort. Here her column "My Day" really began to inform the readers of the political issues of ER's choosing. She saw the greatest hope for world peace in the establishment of the United Nations, but realistically viewed the eradication of the causes of war, poverty and hunger, as the ultimate solution for a lasting world peace.[6] ER believed fascism rose out of weakness and desperation caused by hunger and suppression. She therefore felt her greatest service to the goal of world peace was found in committing herself to the "improvement of the human condition." [7] From this point on in her life, Eleanor's travels, in the US and abroad, became more focused on her own curiosity and desire to become well informed of the realities of inequality and human injustice. Unique to this first lady, Eleanor's career in domestic and international affairs fully developed rather than abruptly ended upon the death of her husband in 1945.

ER's career in international relations began as a diplomat under President Harry Truman, FDR's successor. President Truman realized the significance of ER's dedication to the struggle for human rights and her faith in the United Nations as the agent for the ultimate goal of world peace. He appointed her as one of the five American delegates to the first United Nations conference in 1946. In this position she represented the United States in Committee 3 which dealt with humanitarian, social, and cultural issues.

ER's success as an international leader of diplomacy earned her great respect throughout the UN and the international community. She took her assignment seriously and "was one of the hardest working and best informed UN delegates." [8] Her worst critics were fellow American delegates who treated her with "lofty condescension." [9]

Originally, her appointment to the Human Rights Committee was viewed as insignificant by the Truman Administration because this committee was thought to be fairly insignificant and thus safely represented by ER. However, the Human Rights Commission became increasingly controversial and important; it developed the human rights issue into a discussion of fundamental freedoms, social progress, and world development. Ironically, it was the poor judgement of our country's leaders which permitted ER's work in the UN, and specifically the Human Rights Commission, to prove her ability as a diplomat. Chafe states that "her name became synonymous with the efforts to compose a declaration of human rights embodying standards that civilized humankind would accept as sacred and inalienable."^[10]

ER proved her leadership qualities as well as her sensitivity to cultural issues when she was unanimously elected into the position of chair for the Human Rights Commission from 1946 through 1948, after which she resigned in order to allow other countries the opportunity to lead.^[11] ER's role as chair demanded of her what Ralph Martin called "diplomatic fencing,"^[12] wherein she impartially guided the committee through the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights amid the representation of moral, ideological, and cultural diversities. ER has been described as the "super mother" of the committee and ran meetings efficiently with a firm, yet tactful, manner.^[13] She reached her personally set goal, the completion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights before the end of 1948. The Declaration was, subsequently, approved by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948. To show their acknowledgement of her leadership, the UN gave ER a standing ovation in 1948.^[14]* Whether the ovation was in recognition of ER or the work of the committee, it nevertheless demonstrates the public recognition that she received for her work on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This declaration stands as Secretary General U Thant put it a "Magna Carta" for all mankind.^[16] It states a common standard for human rights crossing all national borders. The document was purposefully worded in a simple fashion to facilitate its translation into the five official languages of the

*Some sources attribute the final approval of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the intended recipient of the standing ovation, not ER (Cook, 113). Young does not directly connect the standing ovation with the Declaration; he acclaims it to ER (Youngs, 218). Further, William Chafe notes that the standing ovation was directly for ER sometime after the Declaration was passed (Chafe, 23).

UN.^[17] It consists of a preamble and thirty articles. The declaration encompasses both fundamental freedoms and economic and social rights. The first twenty-two articles deal with political and civil rights such as: freedom of thought, freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of legal representation, freedom of marriage, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of social security, freedom from discrimination, freedom from torture and freedom from arbitrary arrest. Articles 23 through 30 incorporate the "obligations of the human community to ensure the free and full development of personality"^[18] and are expressed as freedoms of employment, standards of living, education, socialization, and cultural expression.^[19]

The Human Rights Commission was originally set up with three goals for the International Bill of Human Rights. The first, the International Declaration of Human Rights, states the fundamental principles of human rights. The declaration is not legally binding and serves only as a moral ideal for all nations.^[20] The second document was to be a covenant viewed as an international treaty and ratified by each of the member nations of the UN; this covenant would act as an international law. The third document was to deal with the "machinery for enforcement" and methods of implementation.^[21] Although the initial declaration was approved in 1948, the covenants were not completed until 1961. As they stand, the covenants are divided between civic/political freedoms and social/economic freedoms. The United States has yet to ratify either.

ER's role as chair of the Human Rights Commission dealt mostly with drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Her most difficult task was steering the many texts into a compromising and agreeable final draft.^[22] The major conflicts within the commission were East-West ideological differences, semantics (being clear about the meanings and not just translations of words), and cultural differences which created rifts not only in communication, but also in definitions of fundamental human rights as seen through different religions. ER's skills of diplomacy successfully curbed the many arguments which arose in the committee meetings. Often she would bridge gaps through informal gatherings at her house with only a few delegates at a time.^[23] ER had an innate ability to bring the intellectual abstract ideas down to a simple concrete discussion and to harness those abstract ideas into coherent and meaningful statements. Her desire to achieve success in her "crusade for human rights," as so many have called it, guided her through the constant struggle within the Human Rights Commission. This allowed her to be, as Youngs states, "exceedingly practical,

and even tough, though in an outwardly dreamy and idealistic way.”[24] She demonstrated qualities of true leadership in the commission, but her “crusade” was not only on the international level. As stated before, ER’s greatest difficulties, worst criticism, and hardest work were domestic in origin.

During ER’s tenure as US delegate to the UN, the United States experienced waves of strong isolationist and anti-communist sentiments. The pressures of the Cold War also fed into a general fear of binding the US into a UN-based world system. In her frustration at the country’s hesitance toward supporting the UN, ER proclaimed that without the UN:

our country would walk alone, ruled by fear instead of confidence or hope. To weaken or hamstring the UN, through lack of faith and lack of vision, would be to condemn ourselves to endless struggle for survival in a jungle world.[25]

Because of ER’s commitment to human rights during the period of McCarthyism, she was accused of being a communist. Some of her closest colleagues were actually detained by the US government.[26] Amid all of this criticism, however, ER pushed on. She refused to be stopped by the foolish insensitivity to reality which was, in her eyes, based on ignorance. In order to combat this ignorance, she lectured, wrote articles, and started a second syndicated article entitled “Turn Towards Peace.”[27] Even though she devoted limitless energy and time, ER’s vision of global equality and human rights never achieved acceptance in the Senate during her lifetime. With the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952, ER was not reappointed to the UN. Thus, her official career as a US diplomat ended in 1953. The value she saw in global equality did not end, however. In 1953 ER moved into the next stage in her struggle for human rights. This stage focused on domestic policy and international awareness.

In 1953, at the age of 69, ER became a full-time volunteer at the American Association for the UN in New York. This position allowed her speaking and writing income to support her.[28] The organization also provided her with connections to continue her commitment to human rights. ER travelled in the US and around the world in support of peace and human rights[29], continuing personal diplomacy. One of her most notable achievements during this period was her establishment as an internationally acclaimed journalist. This allowed her to meet by invitation such political leaders as Marshal Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia in 1953 and Khrushchev of the Soviet

Union at his villa in Yalta in 1957, and at Hyde Park (ER’s home) in New York in 1959 and 1960.[30] In addition, ER accepted numerous invitations from other world leaders. Prime Minister Nehru invited ER in 1952 to visit India. Along the way, she travelled in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel. This experience exposed her to Eastern culture. Through these travels, she obtained a greater understanding of their people and culture. In her lifetime, ER traveled the world over several times. ER broadcasted both in the United States and in Europe, conducting interviews and speaking in French, German, Spanish and Italian. In 1959, she accepted the position of visiting professor of international issues at Brandeis University. ER truly devoted her energy to the cause of human rights by informing the public through the media and by educating the youth of the world.

In retrospect, although ER never actually made foreign policy, she did mold the ideals of universal human rights and practically applied them as no other in the twentieth century. ER believed strongly in the possibility, and necessity, of world peace. Although world peace is, at least at present, an ideal not realistically attainable, ER placed faith in the UN as having the greatest potential of achieving world peace through a new world order. She maintained that a person could make a difference and took this as a personal philosophy as well as direction in life. She understood power and knew how to use it to obtain her goals of peace through the struggle for human rights.

ER acted in society with sensitivity and intuition. She saw voids in the system and realistically went after the voids she could affect. When she saw an ignorant American public, she strove to inform and educate them with newspaper articles, broadcasts, and lecture tours. This, in turn, shaped the leaders’ policies in Washington. They felt the impact of ER as she hosted important guests at her house and as she lobbied through the newspapers and in Washington for improvements in the system. ER shaped American social reforms and led America to a new global view of respect for other cultures and ways of life. In this way, Roosevelt affected our American government’s foreign policy toward emerging developing countries.

We must keep in mind that it is impossible to judge ER’s impact on society and government by today’s standards. Forty and fifty years ago, women did not enjoy the right to choose careers and were not considered equals to men. With this in mind, ER’s role especially in the UN as chair of the Human Rights Commission is only now being fully realized and appreciated. In addition, her personal efforts in

meeting with top world leaders as an independent international diplomat, informing the public, and educating the youth all exemplify how she devoted her life to the improvement of the human condition. Roosevelt's many accomplishments prove that she

- (1) Ralph G. Martin, "Number One Citizen," *The New Republic* (August 5, 1946): 139-40.
- (2) Tamara K. Hareven, *ER: An American Con*

succeeded in obtaining the goals that she set for herself. Moreover, her work continues to influence individuals and governments through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and through her thought-provoking writings proclaiming a new world system. Eleanor Roosevelt rightfully stands as an example of the joining of human rights to human responsibility.

Endnotes

science (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1968): 262.

- (3) *Ibid.*, 43.
- (4) *Ibid.*, 44.
- (5) Blanche Wiesen Cook, "'Turn toward Peace:' ER and Foreign Affairs," Joan Hoff-Wilson and Marjorie Lightman, eds., *Without Precedent: The Life and Career of Eleanor Roosevelt* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984): 111.
- (6) Eleanor Roosevelt, *Tomorrow Is Now* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963): 46.
- (7) Edna P. Gurewitsch, "Remembering Mrs. Roosevelt: An Intimate Memoir," *American Heritage*, vol.33, no.1 (December 1981): 16.
- (8) J. William T. Youngs. *ER: A Personal and Public Life* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1985): 210.
- (9) Cook, "ER and Human Rights: The Battle for Peace and Planetary Decency," Edward P. Crapol, ed., *Women and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987): 107.
- (10) William H. Chafe, "Biographical Sketch," *Without Precedent*, 22.
- (11) Hareven, 232.
- (12) Martin, 139.
- (13) Youngs, 216.
- (14) Joseph P. Lash, *Eleanor: The Years Alone*

(New York: WW Norton and Company, 1972): 79.

- (15) Cook, *Women and Foreign Policy*, 99.
- (16) Youngs, 220.
- (17) Clark M. Eichelberger, *UN: The First 15 Years* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960):58.
- (18) Cook, *Women and Foreign Policy*, 100.
- (19) Eleanor Roosevelt and William DeWitt, *UN: Today and Tomorrow* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953): 217-223.
- (20) Youngs, 219.
- (21) Eichelberger, 57.
- (22) Hareven, 232.
- (23) *Ibid.*, 233.
- (24) Youngs, 214.
- (25) Hareven, 246.
- (26) Maurine H. Beasley, *ER and the Media: A Public Quest for Self-Fulfillment* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987): 177.
- (27) Hareven, 243.
- (28) Beasley, 179.
- (29) Cook, *Women and Foreign Policy*, 114.
- (30) Beasley, 181.

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
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Myers Hall - 1914



—Courtesy Wittenberg Archives

Myers Hall - Today



—Photo by Jerry Robb

The Wall


You stand broken, three toy soldiers
staring through metal eyes
at the names of your dead
brothers of war


Forever staring,
faces desperate,
hopeless,
and groups of old men with old eyes
stand before you
snapping photographs

Bigger than I imagined—
the half-circle of names
on and on and.....
so many sons...
lost in a useless war,
countless


Mothers make rubbings
with ragged, desperate strokes
crying over scraps of paper
bearing their names

One man muttered, "Crazy"
crazy it was....
still is....





Virginia Mohlere is a sophomore Russian Studies major from Charlotte, North Carolina



—Photographs by Doug Buchanan

A Pledge of Loyalty from a Different Era.



—Photo by Jerry Robb

The Benefit of Hindsight

William Edwards, a senior History major, wrote this paper for Dr. Huffman's History of Modern China.

On the morning of March 26, 1926, New York City was preparing for yet another high-pressured working day. If you were to have purchased a newspaper from a local vendor, the headlines that Wednesday would have related the death of John Calvin Coolidge, father of the acting President. Central Park renovations were to begin the following Friday, and a local patrolman had foiled an attempted robbery in lower Manhattan. For the serious reader, Wayne B. Wheeler would describe the "inside story" of the Prohibition fight.[1] These were the top stories in the *New York Times* on March 20, 1926.

These were the stories that would sell newspapers.

Several thousand miles away in Guangzhou, China, a key power struggle was taking place within the Guomindang political party. Forced to work together as a result of recent Japanese hostilities, the Guomindang and the Chinese Communists co-existed in an aura of continual tension. This uneasy atmosphere exploded into open conflict on March 19, 1926 when Chiang Kai-shek staged a successful coup in Guangzhou. Suspicious of the comings and goings of the gunboat Chung-shan, Chiang seized the boat, accusing the Communists of formulating an assassination plot against his life. Chiang then proceeded to declare martial law in Guangzhou, disarming the Communist-directed workers militia, and detaining several top Communists. By acting without the consent of his superior, Wang Jing-wei, Chiang Kai-shek had aggressively expressed his desire for power.

Historians point to the Chung-shan gunboat incident as a very important event in Chiang Kai-shek's quest to control China. While Ranbir Vohra describes the event as "notorious,"[2] C. Martin Wilbur emphasizes the fact that many people do not appreciate the implications of the March 19 coup.[3] These "many people" included the Soviets, the Japanese, and the entire Western world. On

March 26, 1926, the *New York Times* printed an eight-line AP wire report describing the possibility of a minor coup d'état in the city of Guangzhou. The emphasis of the report (four lines) centered upon the fact that eight Russians had been killed in the process.[4] Faced with the pressure to sell newspapers, the editors of the *New York Times* most likely felt that a "minor coup" in southeast Asia would not be appealing to an isolationist America. Moreover, by reporting on the death of John Calvin Coolidge instead of the Chung-shan gunboat incident, a higher profit could be expected for the newspaper. *The Japan Times* makes no mention of the March 19 coup. Preoccupied with Chinese problems in Peking and Tientsin, the Japanese must also have viewed the Chung-shan incident as miniscule. Furthermore, the editors of *The Japan Times* were careful not to place too much emphasis on Chinese affairs for the reason that China was Japan's main rival in Asia. To cover the Chinese extensively might suggest a state of inferiority on the part of the Japanese. Consequently, China would only be covered by *The Japan Times* when Japan was involved.

Unlike the journalist who is motivated by the expectation of high profit, the historian is guided by the rules and regulations of high scholarship. As a result, each student of history must adhere to the prescribed guidelines of proper historianship. These guidelines reduce the threat of sensationalism which often occurs in newspaper reporting. Furthermore, the historian is forced to view an issue from every possible angle available. While the journalist can afford to report from a biased perspective, the historian must strive to explore all sides of an issue before establishing his personal interpretation.

By analyzing the Chung-shan gunboat incident, one can see the great advantage that hindsight offers to the historian. Although the editors of the *New York Times* and *The Japan Times* measured the appealing nature of a story for profit, one could assert that the

importance of the Chung-shan incident could not be immediately realized by any journalist. As a result, Chiang Kai-shek's coup was placed under the category of "local disturbances" in China by many writers in 1926. Sixty-three years after the Chung-shan incident, historians can look into the past with a

better understanding of the vital importance of Chiang Kai-shek's seizure of power in Guangzhou. Although March 20, 1926 was just another day for the reporters of the *New York Times* and *The Japan Times*, it is a day that would help determine the guidelines for future Chinese domestic conflict.

Notes

- (1) *New York Times*, March 26, 1926, 1.
- (2) Ranbir Vohra, *China's Path to Modernization: A Historical Review from 1800 to the Present* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1987), 131.

- (3) Martin Wilbur, *The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1945* Boston: Cambridge Press, 1983), 123.
- (4) *New York Times*, March 26, 1926, 4.

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The Progressive Era: An Overview

Denise Bauschard, a senior History Major, wrote this paper for Dr. Chatfield's History of the Progressive Era during Fall term 1988.

Eric Goldman's *Rendezvous with Destiny*, along with the writings of many progressive reformers, presented the view that the major American reforms of the Progressive Era (as well as those taking place before and after the period) were brought about by the efforts of the reformers, including the so-called "muckrakers." These people were interested in un-covering corruption and correcting it in the interests of the common people, and one of their favorite targets was business, including the trusts. From this perspective, Progressive Era reform came essentially from and for the people, aimed against business and the special interests. It sought justice and relief for the suffering and the poor, and to give everyone in society a fair chance. Government reform, thorough organization and legislation, was perceived as liberal and innovative—and again, in the interests of the people.

Gabriel Kolko's book, *The Triumph of Conservatism*, presents an extremely different point of view. He acknowledges that changes took place during the Progressive Era, but feels that they were brought about largely through the work of business interests, which were in reality the beneficiaries of the new legislation. Rather than a group of angry reformers forcing through new laws to protect the downtrodden, businessmen encouraged new laws that actually protected, not threatened, their interests, by helping to give them a more positive image and preventing what would have been much stricter state legislation. Kolko argues that since Progressive reforms actually helped to protect the businesses and the system in which they functioned, it was actually a period of conservative action.

The writings of other thinkers during this period, including businessmen and the socialists, shed further light on the varying perceptions of reform. While some leaders, such as Andrew Carnegie and William Sumner, rejected the reformers' views (at least to an extent) in so far as they felt that giving the people too

much would destroy the work incentive and the future possibility of self-improvement in American society, the socialists presented yet another view. They went beyond most reformers' hopes for government protection and regulation to argue for government ownership of the means of production in the country. This was an extension of the concept of cooperation for the good of all which most reformers encouraged. Instead of seeking to reform the capitalist system, the socialists sought to abolish it. Moreover, rather than perceiving the Presidents as supporters of these goals seeking a better society for all, the Socialist Party declared the Democrats and Republicans to be in the service of the capitalists (a view Kolko also holds). Although the socialists were opposed to the views of such thinkers as Sumner and Carnegie, they all agreed that the actions of the "muckraking" type of reformer, seeking a limited amount of government action for the sake of the people, did not provide a good solution to the problems of America.

John D. Hicks noted the Populist reforms that were actually carried out and Lincoln Steffens pointed out that the people could actually fight graft and corruption in their cities, creating an image of reform by and for the people. However, the opposing argument holds that little was accomplished by the people (certainly, if anything was, it was not in the economic sphere). The famous "trust-busting" approach of Henry D. Lloyd, Walter E. Weyl, and others can be seen in contrast to both Kolko's picture of businessmen seeking federal regulation that actually supported their goals and to the socialists who viewed trusts as a natural and unavoidable step in the development of an economic system and simply sought to replace them with popular ownership.

Kolko focuses, of course, on an economic interpretation of the Progressive Era, and is not clear whether or not he would feel that there was some

social reform that benefitted the common man (or even whether the people may have gained something from business legislation, despite the fact that business itself encouraged it). In any case, he refutes the belief that government legislation was pushed through by reformers to put limits on business against the will of the businessmen.

In *The Triumph of Conservatism*, Kolko analyzes in detail the various business and banking reforms carried out under Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson. He goes beyond a simple discussion of the legislation that was actually passed and considers the legislation that might have been passed, the various individuals and groups who supported or opposed it, and the effect the new laws and organizations really had on America.

Kolko also covers a variety of bills and laws considered during the 1900-1916 period. He creates an image of the government, including the Presidents, as showing little tendency to attack the foundations of business or the trusts. Indeed, Kolko declares that the contrary was true: "The views and desires of Wilson and business were virtually identical." [1] A conservative desire to preserve the basic status quo of the economic system prevented any radical changes. As Kolko describes it, the Presidents tended to view the business leaders as admirable and trustworthy, seeing their goals as essentially honorable and believing their claims of just action.

Many of the big business interests, Kolko notes, were under a variety of pressures. For example, meat packers were not forced to clean things up simply because of public outrage. Rather, they faced financial loss from European bans on their unhealthy meat; furthermore, Americans could look for the best and healthiest produce. Meat inspection laws, Kolko argues, were supported, not hindered, by the members of the industry. The inspection laws, instead of hindering business, actually helped the meat industry by ensuring that the packers turned out a healthy product that would be trusted and accepted by the consumers.

Government legislated banking reform was another business triumph. Kolko describes the inefficient system of banking during the Progressive Era which made financing in large amounts difficult for businesses. However, banking reform helped to make the system more efficient and wassupported by the bankers.

Kolko also frequently notes that the individual states were often quite hostile to business and trusts,

and that the national government was sought as a more friendly source of regulation (rather than the most efficient means of controlling huge corporations, as many Progressive reformers believed). Regulation also could help prevent excessive competition. *The Triumph of Conservatism* notes that business benefitted in a variety of ways:

Big business wished to have federal incorporation or a commission, or both, to escape from burdensome state regulation, to stabilize conditions within an industry...., to create a buffer against a hostile public and opportunistic politicians, and to secure those conditions of stability and predictability.... Small businesses...sought the right to create and enforce price and output Agreement—to end the burden of competition [2].

Federal detentes, Kolko further notes, allowed companies to avoid some of the potential dangers that legislation might bring. As already stated, the Presidential attitudes tended to be more trusting than not, and business was generally given warnings and assumed innocent in many instances.

Again, this all contradicts the picture of government legislation concerned with "trust-busting" and protecting the public interest from the evils of the giant corporations. Theodore Roosevelt, of course, stated his opposition to excessive government assistance directed at the poorer elements of society in such writings as, "How Not to Help Our Poorer Brother" and "The Strenuous Life." Even if government did get involved in legislation and regulation, it should not yield too much to the people or make life so easy that the incentive to work would be lost.

A number of other writers shared Roosevelt's fear on this point. Andrew Carnegie saw opportunities open to the young people of America if they worked hard. He also argued that starting out poor was the best way to begin—the children of the rich would be lazy, with no incentive to work hard. William Graham Sumner seemed even more opposed to giving too much to the people. In "The Forgotten Man" he praises the ordinary hard-working individual and disclaims responsibility for the unproductive members of society, noting that drunks in the gutter belong there. Those who worked hard should reap the benefits, while those who did not, should not.

These views, while making sense in relation to Kolko's book, which advocates that the basic capitalistic economic system is conserved, join that work in opposing the policy of "Progressive" reform which urged the need for greater compassion and aid to the

poor who were victims of a corrupt system, unable to make it through their own efforts.

This view (supported by Henry George, Henry D. Lloyd, and many others) was expressed forcibly by the socialist thinkers of the period. The Socialist Party saw itself as the representative—the ONLY representative party of the people. As already stated, they extended the view of power and relief for the people, and the concept of a cooperative effort. The socialists aimed at the nationalization of all means of production under the control of the government—or, in actuality, under the control of the people.

As already stated, the socialists had a somewhat different view of the trusts as well. Some argued that the trusts were a natural step in the movement toward a socialistic economy, but that ownership of trusts should pass from the hands of a few individuals into the hands of the people. This was one aspect of the way society would be organized—as a whole unit rather than as a mass of competing individuals. On the other hand, Morris Hillquit argued that it would be socialism and not capitalism that would lead to true democracy and individualism, since the capitalist system turned the working class into one homogeneous mass.

For the Socialists, the efforts at mild reform taking place within the government were not enough. Even William Graham Sumner, in "Legislation by Clamor," stated that many of the reforms passed by the government had not actually had any effect, in practice, they merely created the impression that something was being done to solve the problems and thus gave the people a sense of having accomplished something. The Socialists, too, felt that the current system, and the established parties, were not the answer to the real problems of the American economy.

An important theme in Socialist thinking, expressed in the "Socialist Party Platform of 1912" and in Eugene V. Debs's "Speech at Indianapolis," was the idea that both the Republican and the Democratic Parties (actually, any political party except the Socialist Party) were working to keep the capitalist system strong and were thus opposed to the true interests of the working people. This attitude, of course, is directly in harmony with Kolko's views of the situation. He states at one point, "Roosevelt was consciously using government regulation to save the capitalist system...." [3] For men like Debs, the working man and woman's only hope lay in the Socialist Party, which represented their true interests. The Socialist Party declared, that this class would gain power and economic control, which was its right.

Although much of their platform was radical, many of the reforms sought in the 1912 platform, advocating an end to child labor, women's suffrage, and the referendum, were enacted into law eventually.

Edward Bellamy's novel, *Looking Backward*, seemed to project a very optimistic view of future progress. The sense that socialistic reforms were the only answer, and that change was not only desirable but inevitable, was brought out in a novel that looked back on a disorderly, suffering world of 1888 with amazement and some disbelief. The question of why the people had not used their votes to bring about change beneficial to themselves meant asking why they were not doing so—and saying that there was no good reason why not. The novel furthermore presented a world free of strife and economic suffering—ALL of the people had reached a very high standard of living and of culture as well. This argument—that socialism would in fact bring benefits to ALL members of society, including the business interests was an important element brought out by William English Walling. To these thinkers, it was merely a matter of time before socialism, obviously a positive and reasonable system, arrived.

All in all, the question of the Progressive Era appears increasingly complex and multi-sided. While Goldman and many reformers viewed the period as a time for liberal legislation, government regulation of the economic system for the benefit of the common people, and as an era that achieved many positive reforms—Kolko and the businessmen, as well as the socialists, viewed things quite differently. While Kolko saw it as a conservative period, with business actually influencing and coordinating economic legislation to their own advantage, the socialists noted and despised this trend, hoping for government influence and nationalization of business which would lead to collective ownership of the means of production. While each side (business and socialism) had very different goals, they both presented an image of a system that was NOT, in fact, giving greater power and justice to the ordinary people. Rather, it displayed a conservatism that the businessmen approved and the socialists resented—not the liberalism that so many would-be reformers saw and applauded.

Notes

- (1) Gabriel Kolko, *The Triumph of Conservatism* (New York: The Free Press, 1963), 278.
 (2) *Ibid.*, 179.

(3) *Ibid.*, 130.

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Review of *Splendid Isolation*

Jenny Robb, a sophomore History major, wrote this review for Dr. Hayden's History of England II during Winter term 1989.

"Splendid isolation," in reference to Great Britain's foreign policy from 1890-1914, has been the subject of much debate among historians. Many maintain that Britain followed a policy of "isolation" from other countries, especially other European countries, particularly under the leadership of the 3rd Marquis of Salisbury (1886-92 and 1895-1902). Christopher Howard, confirms the view held by other historians that the phrase had many meanings and that it does not accurately describe Britain's or Salisbury's foreign policy.

Howard points out that the term "isolation" generally had a negative connotation in the 19th century. It implied weakness and "an embarrassing lack of friends among other powers on whom reliance could be placed for support in case of need." [1] According to Howard, the phrase "splendid isolation" originated in Canada and was not used by Salisbury or the foreign office to describe their policies. It was used primarily by politicians and the press who reflected a popular attitude in the last few years of the 19th century. He offers evidence that Britain was bound by alliances that had been made in the past, showing that she was not completely "isolated." He suggests that Salisbury's reputation for following a policy of "isolation" was a result of his last two administrations during which he often declared his inability to make alliances on constitutional grounds. Moreover, Howard also cites other evidence showing that this was not a strict policy followed by Salisbury and that his contemporaries would not have singled him out in this way.

Howard makes use of substantial evidence for his conclusions. The use of many primary sources, both archival and printed, serves as the basis of Howard's discussion. Howard also makes extensive use of dispatches and minutes from the foreign office, Parliamentary debates, public speeches, and the daily press during the period under discussion. He relies on secondary sources that deal with the issues of foreign

affairs. Although the book is short, Howard's dedication to the thorough examination of available evidence is reflected throughout his study. Unfortunately, his conclusions, especially with regard to Salisbury, are sometimes ambiguous. In Howard's defense, his ambiguous conclusions seem to come from the evidence. As Howard points out, it is possible to arrive at several different conclusions depending on what one considers an alliance or a policy of "isolation."

Howard's critics have differing opinions of his book. Bernard Semmel, of the State University of New York concludes in a brief review of Howard's book, that Howard "does not attempt to come to serious grips with the questions or to suggest why they might be important ones to ask; the result, consequently, is less an analysis than a lengthy footnote." [2] Max Beloff of All Souls College and Zara Steiner of New Hall, Cambridge give the study more credit. Beloff states that even though the conclusions are not startling, the book will help in bringing people to realize that British administrations should not be given credit for a policy which was not even theirs. An unsigned review in *The Economist* is the most complimentary of all, saying that the survey was "impeccably conducted" and that Howard "displays a heartening regard for ascertainable facts." [3]

I am in agreement with Beloff: Howard's study is important in so far as it carefully examines the evidence and shows that the many myths surrounding Britain's so-called "splendid isolation" can no longer be accepted as fact. The idea that "splendid isolation" was not the policy of Britain or Salisbury is not original to Howard, but he shows its validity through extensive research into documents of the time.

Notes

(1) Christopher Howard, *Splendid Isolation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 1.

(2) Bernard Semmel, review of *Splendid Isolation*, by Christopher Howard, in *Political Science Quarterly* 85 (September 1970): 513.

(3) Review of *Splendid Isolation*, by Christopher Howard, in *The Economist* 226 (30 March 1968): 53.

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Review of *An Encore for Reform— The Old Progressives and the New Deal*

Becky Sittason, a senior History major, wrote this review for Dr. Ortquist's Reading Colloquium:
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal during Fall term 1987.

An Encore for Reform is the first of five books Otis Graham has written concerning reform and American political history. Graham was a professor of history at the University of California Santa Barbara when *An Encore for Reform* was written and published. He is presently a professor of history at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Graham received his B.A. at Yale(1957) and both his M.A.(1961) and Ph. D.(1966) at Columbia University. Born in 1935 in Little Rock, Arkansas, Graham associates himself with the Democratic party.[1]

An Encore for Reform was written in the late sixties during a time, according to Graham, when the Left was dealing with problems that the progressives either ignored or could not change such as racism and poverty. Graham suggests that at this time a welcome new perspective of the progressives was beginning to form. The left no longer ignored the shortcomings and conservatism of the progressive movement. However, Graham does emphasize that one cannot deny the difficult struggle that the progressives had to overcome to gain each bit of reform.

Graham did not take a direct stand for or against the New Deal, but examines the discontinuity between the progressive reform and the New Deal. He also used criteria to analyze why the majority of the progressive reformers opposed the New Deal even though these movements shared common goals of social justice and anti-unrestrained economic power.

The progressive party was heterogeneous and individualistic; therefore, attempts to make generalizations concerning progressive beliefs are futile. The progressive movement fragmented between the years of 1912 and 1933 especially in light of the New Deal. Graham examined a sample of one hundred and sixty-eight progressive men and women who lived through the turn of the century, World War I,

and at least into the first part of the New Deal. He analyzed and systematically categorized the attitudes and actions of the progressives into supporters of the New Deal and opponents of the New Deal. The remaining two categories involve progressives who withdrew from the political arena and those that held beliefs more radical than the New Deal. Within these categories, Graham researched the topics of family background, age, and education to assimilate his assumptions and conclusions about the progressive behavior.

Graham concluded that those who opposed the New Deal did not agree with its national interests and economic policies. The opposition generally feared Franklin Roosevelt's power and the unintelligible disorganization of the New Deal. The progressives were men who were more intellectually organized than Roosevelt and accustomed to the logical examination of issues and the synthesizing of set goals to accomplish reform.

Overall, there were less progressive supporters of the New Deal than opponents(Graham's data was 40 to 60). Graham found that pro-New Dealers usually had some sort of urban background and were most likely involved in social or municipal reform. He characterized them as most likely either flexible or pugnacious. Graham believed that some supporters were liberals who saw the New Deal as their last chance for reform.

Graham also examined five progressive men who Theodore Roosevelt referred to as on the "lunatic fringe" of the progressive movement.[2] These men were primarily writers and intellectuals who dedicated themselves to social justice. These "radicals" were skeptical of the New Deal liberalism and did not take it seriously.

Of the ten men who completely secluded

themselves from political concerns after the mini progressive movement and the New Deal years, Graham suggested that the intellectual, psychological, and financial strain of reform severely drained these men. Most were disillusioned and disappointed, feeling like George Norris that nothing they wanted for America would ever be.[3]

Graham conducted an admirable amount of research to write *An Encore for Reform*. He presented the habits, thoughts, and behaviors of the progressives in a human and captivating way. Although one's previous knowledge of the progressives may be limited, it will be easy to follow Graham's analysis and to learn a great deal about the movement and its aftermath. I found it intriguing to read how New Deal contemporaries, who were not directly involved in it, criticized or supported a reform that was not their

own. Graham encourages the reader to sympathize with the progressive reformers who more or less lost their progressive identity at the onset of the New Deal. Perhaps this impression arises from Graham's own affinity towards the progressives—which often results after intense research on any particular subject. I did not detect any other biases in Graham's writing. However, I was expecting to find a liberal slant due to his democratic affiliation and to the time the book was written.

Overall, I consider *An Encore for Reform* an exceptional educational book in so far as Graham explains the topic in an organized manner. I think that one who reads this book will gain a clear understanding of the various positive and negative associations of the progressive reformers to the New Deal.

Notes

(1) *Who's Who*, 1986-87 ed., s.v. "Graham, Otis."

(2) Otis Livingston Graham, Jr., *An Encore for Reform-The Old Progressives and the New Deal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 129.

(3) *Ibid.*, 164.

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