

1994 Cover Design by Brian J. Koch – Graphic Design Student

“I see history as a compilation of layers and elements that make up a whole with an interactive, cyclical aspect. Viewing time as transparent layers, solid separate parts, or as a complete entity are all plausible historical interpretations, and these same views can also be translated into most artistic images.”

THE WITTENBERG HISTORY JOURNAL

Wittenberg University • Springfield, Ohio

**Volume XXIII
Spring 1994**

Editor's Note:

The 1994 *History Journal* is dedicated to Dr. Albert A. Hayden in recognition of his retirement after teaching at Wittenberg from 1959 until 1994. Dr. Hayden has specialized in British and Irish history and has published one book, *New South Wales Immigration Policy, 1856-1900*, as well as numerous articles, essays, and reviews. He has also served as managing editor of *Studies in British History and Culture*, a monograph series of the North American Conference on British Studies. Dr. Hayden has served for over two decades as Wittenberg's pre-law and graduate school advisor. Highly regarded on campus as a demanding yet deeply caring teacher, Dr. Hayden has become particularly well-known for his reading colloquium, *The Irish Question*. Dr. Hayden's contributions to the historical profession earned him the Distinguished Service Award from the Ohio Academy of History at the 1994 spring meeting. The *History Journal* staff similarly would like to recognize his contributions to Wittenberg by dedicating the 1994 *Journal* to him.

Finally, a few notes of appreciation: I would like to thank the members of my staff for their insights, hard work, and support. This journal would not have been possible without the dedication of such an outstanding group of people. I would also like to thank Carol Kneisley in the Publications Department for her hard work and patience in the production of the end product. Finally, I thank Malykke Bacon and Dr. Charles Chatfield for their guidance and support.

Molly Wilkinson

History Journal Staff

Editor	Molly Wilkinson
Senior Editor	Malykke Bacon
Staff	Julie Carpenter Pamela Ehresman Kathy Fargey Susan Klump Seth Martin
Faculty Advisor	Dr. Charles Chatfield
Cover	Brian Koch

Table of Contents

Cesar Chavez: Trampling Down the Vintage, 1965-1970.....	1
by Kathy Fargey	
Scandal Strikes Charles Stewart Parnell: The Fall of the Irish Leader.....	3
by Pamela Ehresman	
Fritz Fischer: The "Traitor" from Hamburg	8
by Barry Jackisch	
The 1969 CBS Walkout: The Means Justified the Ends	15
by Malykke Bacon	
Education in Occupied Japan	19
by Laura Sponseller	
John C. Calhoun's - <i>A Disquisition on Government</i>	25
by John Bennett	
How the Shah Won: The CIA's Role in the Iranian Coup of 1953	28
by Pam Ehresman	

Address correspondence to:

Editor
The Wittenberg History Journal
History Department
Wittenberg University
Springfield, Ohio 45501

Cesar Chavez, Trampling Down the Vintage, 1965-1970

by Kathy Fargey

Each year, three senior history majors are chosen as finalists for the distinguished Martha and Bob Hartje Award and asked to write a narrative historical paper. The papers are judged by the faculty of the History Department. Kathy Fargey received the 1994 award for this paper.

The grapes of wrath were growing in the vineyards of Delano and other parts of California. From September 1965 to July 1970, Filipino and Mexican-American agricultural laborers were on strike against California's vineyard owners. The workers endured conditions like those described in Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath*: low wages, malnutrition, poor housing, lack of medical care, long hours, and exposure to heat, chemicals, and dust on the job. They were also denied the legal right to bargain collectively. (1) Nonetheless, the workers carried out a strike under the organization of the United Farm Workers (UFW) Union, directed by Cesar Chavez. The strikers demanded a raise from \$1.20 per hour to \$1.40 per hour, higher incentive wages for extra boxes of grapes picked, and the right to union recognition. Five years later, the longest agricultural strike in California's history ended after the UFW won recognition and contracts from twenty-six of California's major grape companies. (2) Cesar Chavez highly influenced the course of the strike. He developed important UFW policies and tactics and took a very active part in organizing and seeking support for the strike. His leadership is an important part of the story of the grape strike.

When the strike began, Chavez announced a UFW policy of nonviolence, telling strikers, "No union movement is worth the life of a single grower or his child, or the life of a single worker or his child." (3) Chavez invited civil rights activists from the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the Congress of Racial Equality to help organize pickets and encourage nonviolence. (4) Chavez was also active in organizing picketing, "church meetings, marches, and sing-ins." (5) Sometimes he joined picket lines himself, such as those in Coachella, where he once organized about thirty vehicles to block vineyard entrances. (6) Chavez put his and the UFW's focus on action into words: "Most of us in this movement get turned off by rhetoric. We're an action movement. We keep moving night and day." (7)

Chavez kept moving, developing new tactics and

responses during the strike. He personally decided to implement an important UFW tactic: a boycott, which involved convincing customers nationwide not to buy California table grapes until vineyard owners settled with the UFW. He first directed the boycott against Guimarra Corporation, California's largest grape producer, then ordered the boycott extended to all California table grapes when Guimarra used other labels. (8) Chavez also publicized the UFW policy on nonviolence. When the President of the California Grape and Tree Fruit League, E.L. Barr, accused the UFW of sponsoring terrorism, Chavez responded in an open letter in *The Christian Century*. His letter stated that strikers were committed to "militant nonviolence" although some of them had been victims of violent attacks. He wrote of the strikers' struggle to "overcome . . . not by retaliation or bloodshed but by a determined nonviolent struggle carried on by those masses of farm workers who intend to be free and human." (9) In February 1968, when tensions between strikers and vineyard owners were rising, he began a twenty-five day fast against violence. This fast attracted publicity, and a "tent city of sympathizers" grew around the Delano gas station where Chavez stayed during the fast. Robert Kennedy and over 6,000 farm workers joined Chavez for a Mass held at the end of the Fast. (10)

Throughout the strike, Chavez actively sought support for the UFW. He traveled to Stanford and Berkeley to ask college students to help organize the strike and to picket. (11) In December 1965, Chavez gave Walter Reuther, head of the United Auto Workers (UAW), a tour of the picket lines around Delano, allowing Reuther to carry the UFW banner. In return, Reuther gave the UFW \$5000 a month from UAW funds. (12) Chavez also courted church support, maintaining "a close association with the Roman Catholic Church (he [received] holy communion each morning) and excellent relations with California's liberal Protestants." (13) In June 1970, Chavez addressed two hundred church leaders, including Catholic priests and nuns, Migrant Ministry workers, and "representatives from Episcopal,

Congregational, Presbyterian, Methodist, Lutheran, and other Christian groups" in a UFW hall in Delano. (14) He expressed gratitude for church support in building the UFW and asked for continued support for the union. (15)

Chavez's efforts paid off when twenty-six of California's major grape-growers signed contracts on July 29, 1970, recognizing the United Farm Workers, raising wages to \$1.80 per hour plus 20 cents per extra box of grapes picked (and promising specific wage increases for 1971-72), and providing 10 cents per hour for a UFW

medical fund. (16) Chavez took a very active and important part in the grape strike, making important decisions regarding nonviolence and the grape boycott, encouraging support from various quarters, and personally organizing strike activities. He proved to be a man of nonviolence, action, and hard work. Through the years, he continued to work on behalf of farm workers. His funeral procession in April 1993 included about 25,000 people shouting UFW slogans such as, "Viva la Causa!" ("Long live the cause!") and "Viva Cesar Chavez!" (17) For many of California's farm workers, his truth is marching on.

Endnotes

- ¹ Information about the conditions faced by California's grape pickers can be found in these sources:
 Richard Tobin, "'The revolution is not coming. It is here.'" *Saturday Review*, 17 August 1968, 13.
 Martin Duberman, "Grapes of Wrath," *The New Republic*, 2 December 1967, 24.
 James P. Degnan, "Monopoly in the Vineyards: The 'Grapes of Wrath' Strike," *Nation*, 7 February 1966, 151-152.
- ² "Labor: Victory for Cesar Chavez," *Newsweek*, 10 August 1970, 56.
- ³ Tobin, 62.
- ⁴ Andrew Kopkind, "The Grape Pickers Strike," *The New Republic*, 29 January 1966, 13.
- ⁵ "California: Cesar's War," *Time*, 22 March 1968, 23.
- ⁶ "Seething Vineyards," *Newsweek*, 8 July 1968, 62.
- ⁷ "Labor: Victory for Cesar Chavez," 56.
- ⁸ "Seething Vineyards," 62.

- ⁹ Cesar Chavez, "Letter from Delano," *The Christian Century*, 23 April 1969, 5.
- ¹⁰ "California: Cesar's War," 23.
- ¹¹ Kopkind, 13.
- ¹² Ronald B. Taylor, "Huelga! The Boycott That Worked," *The Nation*, 7 September 1970, 167-168.
- ¹³ "Perseverance and Purity Pay Off for Chavez," *The Christian Century*, 12 August 1970, 3.
- ¹⁴ Robert Cleath, "Rendering Unto Cesar," *Christianity Today*, 3 July 1970, 32.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁶ "Chavez: One Battle Ends, Another Begins," *U.S. News and World Report*, 10 August 1970, 49-50.
- ¹⁷ Gary Fields, "'Great Affection,' 25,000 - strong, for Chavez," *USA Today*, 30 April 1993, 3.

Bibliography

- "Bishops Support Cesar Chavez." *America*, 30 May 1970, 3.
- "Breakthrough for La Huelga." *Time*, 27 June 1969, 18.
- "California: Cesar's War." *Time*, 22 March 1968, 23.
- Chavez, Cesar. "Letter from Delano." *The Christian Century*, 23 April 1969, 4-5.
- "Chavez: One Battle Ends, Another Begins." *U.S. News and World Report*, 10 August 1970, 49-50.
- Cleath, Robert. "Rendering Unto Cesar." *Christianity Today*, 3 July 1970, 32-33.
- Degnan, James P. "Monopoly in the Vineyards: The 'Grapes of Wrath' Strike." *The Nation*, 7 February 1966, 151-154.
- Duberman, Martin. "Grapes of Wrath." *The New Republic*, 2 December 1967, 24-26.
- Fields, Gary. "'Great affection,' 25,000 - strong, for Chavez." *USA Today*, 30 April 1993, 3.
- Kopkind, Andrew. "The Grape Pickers Strike." *The New Republic*, 29 January 1966, 12-14.
- "Labor: The Black Eagle Wins." *Time*, 10 August 1970, 10-11.
- "Labor: Victory for Cesar Chavez." *Newsweek*, 10 August 1970, 56-57.
- "Perseverance and Purity Pay Off for Chavez." *The Christian Century*, 12 August 1970, 3.
- Salandini, Victor. "More Grapes of Wrath." *America*, 17 August 1968, 104-105.
- "Seething Vineyards." *Newsweek*, 8 July 1968, 62.
- Taylor, Ronald B. "Huelga! The Boycott that Worked." *The Nation*, 7 September 1970, 167-169.
- Tobin, Richard. "'The revolution is not coming. It is here.'" *Saturday Review*, 17 August 1968, 12-15+.

Scandal Strikes Charles Stewart Parnell: The Fall of the Irish Leader

by Pamela Ehresman

In 1875 Charles Stewart Parnell first championed the cause of Irish Home Rule in Parliament and soon became the "uncrowned king of Ireland" — nearly fifteen years later his followers had abandoned him and Home Rule lay dying. The complex, curious, and speedy downfall of such a revered political figure hinges on the public discovery of his love affair with the wife of a colleague. Eventual condemnation by most of his own party, by the English Liberal party, and by the Catholic Church slipped a choke hold around Parnell's neck, strangling the once indomitable Irish leader — all because of his moral transgression.

Charles Parnell was elected to Parliament at the age of 29, and in the next few years rose to national prominence as the leader of the newly formed Irish Nationalist party, also known as the Irish Home Rule party. He developed a parliamentary obstruction campaign which infuriated the House of Commons and awarded political power to the Nationalists. Parnell avoided violence in his movement for Home Rule and tenants' rights, adopting a boycott strategy in which farmers would shun anyone who evicted a tenant. Beginning in 1885, he required each member of the Nationalist party to vote with the majority, thereby playing the Liberal and Conservative parties against one another. His major accomplishments included forming alliances with the Catholic Church in Ireland and with the Liberal party in England, led by Prime Minister William Gladstone. Persuaded by Irish agitation, Gladstone had become committed to the principle of Home Rule. Both of these alliances were devastated following the reaction to Parnell's relationship with Mrs. Katharine O'Shea.

Parnell's leadership of the Nationalist party was complicated with paradoxes: he was an aristocrat leading a mostly middle-class party, a Protestant leading a predominantly Catholic movement, and a landlord leading a campaign against landlordism. In addition, public leadership did not seem to come naturally to him; he disliked public speaking, noise, or large crowds and has been characterized as "solitary" and "mysterious." (1) An Englishman described him as "cold and uncommunicative," having none of "the characteristics of an Irishman." (2) Yet Parnell was profoundly passionate about two things: his power, which he would fight until the end to uphold, and Katharine,

whom he would never relinquish.

Unfortunately, Katharine O'Shea, wife of Captain William O'Shea, belonged to the English ruling class that the Irish despised. Mr. and Mrs. O'Shea pursued an untraditional marriage, with Katharine residing at her estate in the country and her husband living in London. Katharine, or Kitty, met Mr. Parnell when she solicited his support for her husband, an Irish candidate for Parliament. Described as love at first sight, their secret love affair continued for ten years, from 1881 to 1891. Throughout this period, the O'Sheas enforced a sort of political blackmail on Parnell, manipulating him to support the Captain in Parliamentary elections in return for the Captain turning a blind eye on the love affair. Parnell performed this service — despite O'Shea's insistence on openly denouncing Parnell's Nationalist causes — so that he could stay with the Captain's wife. In fact, Parnell took up residence with Katharine at her country estate, and she bore him three children. Parnell considered her to be his wife and wanted her to divorce her husband so they could marry. Unfortunately, no matter how estranged they were, neither Katharine nor her husband would consider a divorce as long as Katharine's elderly Aunt Ben remained alive. Aunt Ben's wealth promised a sizeable inheritance for the O'Sheas; accordingly, they kept up the appearance of a married couple (the Captain visiting Kitty on weekends) in order to please the old woman. One biographer of Parnell, F.S. Lyons, argues that because Parnell acceded to Kitty's wish to have both him and her Aunt's money, this meant conducting a secret love affair with a married woman for ten years, leaving himself "vulnerable to attack in a way no responsible leader . . . should ever have done." (3)

After eight years of Katharine's extramarital affair, her Aunt Ben finally died at the age of 96, leaving all of her money exclusively to Katharine. The Captain, therefore, had waited all of those years, overlooking his wife's affair, for nothing. He joined her brothers and sisters in contesting the will, and since there was no longer any gain in continuing his "faux" marriage to Kitty, he introduced a petition to divorce her. Most importantly, Captain O'Shea named Parnell as co-respondent in the divorce. Always the opportunist, O'Shea offered Kitty the chance to divorce

him, but only if she would pay him £20,000. Unable to get her hands on that much money, she could not play his blackmail game. Therefore, the original divorce petition stood as filed in December 1889 by the Captain, (for purely financial reasons.) The trial date was scheduled for November 15, 1890, nearly a full year later.

Parnell took advantage of this lapse of time to assure his colleagues that the divorce case would have no bearing on his honor or continued leadership of the Nationalist party. Fellow party members in turn assured the press that they would stand by their leader, regardless of what occurred in the divorce court. Most made this pledge because they believed Parnell's assurances that the case would not taint him. Parnell genuinely thought the affair could never damage his career because of his belief that a man's private life should be kept separate from his public life. (4)

The length of time before the trial also gave Mrs. O'Shea the opportunity to file countercharges against her husband, accusing him of having an affair with her sister. These countercharges have been called "foolish and wicked," and Katharine "quick tempered and sharp-tongued . . . a primitive female fighting with her claws." (5) Her countercharges alienated public sympathy from her side and made her seem like a spiteful woman in the eyes of the world, for the whole world was watching as the scandal unfolded. Because of Katharine's countercharges, her counsel held only a watching brief, and Parnell, choosing not to defend himself, was not represented at all. This situation provided the Captain with the opportunity to present his side of the story without any cross-examination to point out its fallacies. His account was dramatic: he played the part of the trusting husband, deceived by his scheming wife and her lover. He and his lawyer spun tales of Parnell's aliases, disguises, secret trips, and most damaging of all, the "fire escape episode." This story detailed how Parnell, staying at Kitty's home, slipped out onto the rear fire escape when Captain O'Shea unexpectedly appeared for a visit. The press zealously covered the court proceedings, causing the general public to view Charles Parnell as a deceitful, immoral man. (6)

Because Captain O'Shea was not cross-examined, the whole question of his connivance in his wife's affair never surfaced. Most historians agree that the Captain knew about the affair and in some cases even encouraged it for his own political and financial benefit. Politically, as discussed previously, he received Parnell's influential support in election campaigns. The deal between the two men emerged blatantly at Galway in 1885 when Parnell pressured his party members to withdraw their candidate in favor of Captain O'Shea, a man they knew would vote against the party. Financially, proof exists that Parnell paid the Captain £600 per year, which biographer Joan Haslip interprets as a method of keeping O'Shea quiet concerning the affair. F.S. Lyons summarizes his view on the Captain's innocence: "we can show that to remain ignorant of [the affair] for 8

years required on his part a capacity for ignoring unpleasant facts so superhuman as to be beyond belief." (7)

The public, however, did not hear this evidence on Parnell's behalf and observed only the portrayal of a man who took advantage of his colleague's hospitality. Immediately after the trial, many Irish MP's were ambivalent. On the one hand, they felt deceived by Parnell because he had spent a year down-playing the damage the divorce would inflict on his character. The radical Irish leader Michael Davitt never forgave Parnell for misleading him as to the outcome of the divorce case and condemned him on moral grounds. On the other hand, Parnell was their king, their brilliant leader who had transported them a long way on the journey to Home Rule, and they did not wish to abandon so great a man.

Most of the Nationalist party met at Leinster Hall on November 20, 1890, three days after the divorce trial, to proclaim its unanimous support for Parnell. Some members attempted to link the divorce case to past political conspiracies against Parnell, namely the Phoenix Park murder case in which Parnell was connected to the murderers through a letter that was printed in the newspaper. In court, it had been revealed that the letter was a forgery and that Parnell was innocent. Perhaps, some thought, this matter with the O'Sheas was another political conspiracy, another attempt to destroy their powerful leader. Other members supported Parnell solely because they predicted that the English would reject him. The Irish MP T.P. O'Connor asserted, "It is for the Irish alone to choose their leader . . ." Expressing the view that Parnell had sacrificed so much for the Irish that they could not turn around and forsake him, O'Connor also stated:

Mr. Parnell had done too much for the Irish people to go back on him now. I declare that the whole Irish people will support the envoys in upholding Mr. Parnell, and there is convincing proof that Ireland is socially, enthusiastically, and fiercely on the side of the Irish leader. (8)

Yet, Haslip argues that many of the men who spoke in favor of Parnell at Leinster Hall had loyalty only "skin deep" and would support him only as long as Prime Minister Gladstone remained silent. Indeed, Parnell had ignored the fact that one man exercised a greater spell over the people than even he did, and this man was William Gladstone. (9)

At first, Gladstone did stay silent. The Liberal Prime Minister chose to leave the matter of Parnell's future to the Irish, contenting himself with observing detachedly. However, a meeting of the Liberal party at Sheffield (on the day after the Irish met at Leinster Hall) changed his mind. The Nonconformists, regarded as the backbone of the Liberal party, used this meeting to denounce Parnell as the "most infamous adulterer of the century." (10) The Nonconformists believed that if the Irish chose to support Parnell, then Ireland would be unfit for self-government.

John Morley, Chief Secretary for Ireland, was moved by the Nonconformists' denunciations and returned to urge Gladstone to break with Parnell or else accept the demise of Home Rule. Gladstone heeded this warning and reluctantly agreed that the Irish leader must be sacrificed in order to save Ireland. One Conservative MP believed that Gladstone was unnecessarily frightened by the Nonconformists and stated: "Cowardice — sheer cowardice — was the cause of Parnell's overthrow." (11)

Yet political realities forced Gladstone to consider the consequences that Parnell's publicized love affair would have for the future of the Liberal party. The Grand Old Man worried that Liberal victories would disappear and that the Conservatives would dominate. For their part, the Conservatives were eager to use the divorce scandal as a political weapon against the Liberals who were allied with the ignominious adulterer. Lord Salisbury, the former Conservative Prime Minister, proclaimed, "Kitty O'Shea deserved to have a monument raised to her in every town in England." In fact, one writer suspected that the divorce petition was the result of Conservative involvement, citing Captain O'Shea's connections with Joseph Chamberlain. Although isolated facts support this speculation, no conclusive evidence exists. (12)

Due to the outcry at Sheffield and to fears of Conservative ascendancy, it became clear to Gladstone that remaining attached to the brandished Irish leader would impair not only the Liberals' continuance as the Government in power but also seriously damage the whole cause of Home Rule. Therefore, Gladstone wrote the famous letter which included the critical passage:

... notwithstanding the splendid services rendered by Mr. Parnell to his country, his continuance at the present moment in the leadership would be productive of consequences disastrous in the highest degree to the cause of Ireland The continuance I speak of would not only place many hearty and effective friends of the Irish cause in a position of great embarrassment, but would render my retention of the leadership of the Liberal party, based as it has been mainly upon the presentation of the Irish cause, almost a nullity. (13)

Nearly all of England and Ireland interpreted this statement, taking into account Gladstone's usual circumlocution, to mean that he would resign his leadership of the Liberal party if Parnell did not retire.

Gladstone addressed the letter to Morley and intended for him to show it to Parnell before the Nationalists met to elect a party chair. In a sort of comedy of errors, however, Parnell could not be found. Therefore, the Nationalist party entered Committee Room 15 to decide the fate of its leader without knowledge of Gladstone's ultimatum as expressed in the letter. On November 25, the party took a vote and reelected Parnell as sessional chairman. Richard O'Brien, a

contemporary of Parnell, argued that this action "affirm[ed], in effect, that his public life should not be cut short by his private transgressions as exposed in the proceedings of the Divorce Court." (14) However, his public life could be cut short by opposition from Gladstone. Upon leaving the committee room, the Nationalists were besieged by Liberal members, asking, "Do you realize what you have done?" It was then that the Irish learned of Gladstone's letter.

The Irish members split in their reactions to the powerful and momentous letter. One group viewed it as an ultimatum which demanded a choice between Gladstone and Parnell, between England and Ireland. Seen in that light, these men did not hesitate to choose Ireland, regardless of the moral issue involved. They would not allow an English leader, not even Gladstone, to dictate to them. Besides, the whole basis of the Irish movement had been self-reliance: "Why, it is notorious that all which Ireland has obtained from England has been obtained not by a policy of alliance, but by a policy of defiance." This position created somewhat of a dilemma because the party had spent years persuading the Irish to trust Gladstone in order to achieve land reform and Home Rule. How could they now ask their people to repudiate him? Yet these men, the Parnellites, truly felt that if they did not support Parnell, Ireland would not display self-reliance and therefore would not deserve its freedom. (15)

The other faction of the Nationalist party, known as the anti-Parnellites, believed that Gladstone's letter presented a choice not between Gladstone and Parnell but between Parnell and Ireland. These members reasoned that securing a Home Rule Act depended more on Gladstone's continued leadership than on Parnell's. Supporting Parnell, they believed, would result in Gladstone's resignation and subsequent Conservative rule, wrecking Home Rule's chances for success. Therefore, to support Parnell and break with Gladstone seemed "sheer madness." (16)

Some anti-Parnellites later explained that they voted for Parnell on November 25 only with the understanding that he would immediately resign. Parnell, however, refused to retire gracefully and bow to the wishes of those who would follow Gladstone. Instead, he assumed a fighting stance, writing a reply to Gladstone's letter in the form of a Manifesto which ruthlessly attacked the Liberal party and its leader. After he read the Manifesto to fellow party members, they declared that they disapproved of every word. The published Manifesto, which alienated even more of the Nationalist party from Parnell, has been called a "death-warrant to his political career" and "the brutal and abrupt reversal of the whole trend of Nationalist policy; Parnell had become politically impossible." (17) F.S. Lyons takes a different view of the Manifesto, arguing that Parnell was clever to have written it because it diverted attention away from the moral issue of the divorce to the political issue of the alliance with the Liberals. Whatever Parnell's motivations for writing the Manifesto, it is inarguable that it was "so bitter and uncompromising as to make any hope of

reconciliation between him and his former allies impossible." (18)

As for the second alliance, the Nationalist-Catholic alliance, all seemed well — at first. The Irish Catholic Church remained silent for two whole weeks after the scandal broke. Archbishop Walsh had made up his mind not to speak out against Parnell's immorality because he assumed that the Irish people would support Parnell, and he did not want to fight the people. Ideally, Walsh wanted the Nationalist party to reject Parnell on its own, without any overt influence from the Church. Observing the first week's events in dismay (Leinster Hall, reelection of Parnell), he realized that pressure had to be applied to the Nationalists, but he wished to deal with it privately rather than publicly.

Despite Walsh's wishes, many clergy, fellow bishops, and especially Cardinal Manning put immense pressure on Walsh to publicly condemn the adulterer. For instance, the Bishop of Ardagh wrote to Walsh: "Is it not the duty of us, Bishops, to speak for our people, and to tell the Freeman and our MP's that God's commandments must be respected and that HE cannot be ignored." (19) With the advent of Parnell as political leader, the Nationalist party had risen in power over the Irish Catholic Church. Manning viewed the Parnell affair as the perfect opportunity for the Church to reassert its power over Ireland. Walsh, therefore, did not only have to consider lay politics but also had to contend with ecclesiastic politics as well, including the influence of Rome. Walsh wrote that the Pope "had a personal dislike somehow, to Parnell, and was not pleased with me for having constantly defended him." (20) Only after Parnell penned his Manifesto and it became clear that most of his party would desert him did Walsh finally resolve to add the Church's weight against the Irish leader, pleasing his clerical colleagues. On December 3, he sent a telegram to the Nationalist party which read: "Mr. Parnell unfit for leadership, first of all on moral grounds, social and personal discredit as a result of divorce court proceedings, also in view of inevitable disruption, with defeat at elections, wreck of Home Rule hopes, and sacrifice of tenants' interests." (21)

The Catholic Church condemned Parnell on moral grounds, as expected, but what about the rest of society? The value system of Victorian England regarded divorce as almost taboo, yet extramarital affairs were not uncommon. Affairs were tacitly accepted as long as they remained clandestine; but as soon as the lovers broke the eleventh commandment — that is, "don't get caught" — they were severely punished. According to F.S. Lyons, "Involvement in the divorce court, especially, was assumed to be fatal to any public man." (22) As evidence of Lyons's statement, Charles Dilke, a Liberal MP, had recently been ruined by a divorce scandal in 1885. In his account of Parnell's life, O'Brien quotes an old Fenian leader on the double standards of British Victorian morality: "These English are the most extraordinary people in the world. You never can make out what is virtue and what is not virtue with them,

except mainly that virtue is always on their side, whatever their side is." (23) In Parnell's case, English virtue censured his affair with Katharine O'Shea, partly out of political considerations. When the English considered Home Rule, they wondered how Ireland could rule itself when its leader was a deceitful man. As a result, moral and political issues merged; according to Lyons: "conveniently, moral indignation and political expediency alike seemed to point to the exit of the Irish leader." (24)

Accordingly, after locking themselves in Committee Room 15 for several days of intense deliberations, most of the Nationalist members walked out, abandoning Parnell, in effect ruining him. But he would not give up easily. In the next few months, he married Katharine and campaigned for three candidates in by-elections in Ireland. The Nationalist newspaper *Freeman's Journal* stuck by him to the end, but the *Pall Mall Gazette* demanded his retirement. The Catholic Church launched a major campaign against him, garnering the support of the anti-Parnellites. As a result, all three of Parnell's candidates lost their elections. Always a sickly man, he died shortly afterwards on October 6, 1891, less than a year after the divorce.

After Parnell's death, the Nationalist party split three ways and never regained its effectiveness. Gladstone continued his crusade for Home Rule, introducing a Home Rule Bill in 1893, but the bill failed to pass the House of Lords. Home Rule, then, was pronounced dead for the century. The whole episode (Parnell's fall, Home Rule's expiration) caused Irish youth to become disillusioned with having a parliamentary party and finding a constitutional means to self-government. Their discouragement may go a long way in explaining the turmoil in Ireland today. The historian A.N. Wilson writes, "Had that aunt been either more broad-minded or longer lived, it is conceivable that we should have peace in the streets of Belfast today." (25)

Like Wilson, it is fun to play "what if" with history, no matter how futile. So, what if the Nonconformists had not fussed over Parnell's adultery, or even if they had, what if Gladstone had paid them no attention? It is probable that Gladstone may not have written the letter that triggered a rearrangement of political allegiances and eventually Parnell's Manifesto, which in turn resulted in denunciation from the Catholic Church. But perhaps the whole issue could have been avoided if Katharine had not filed countercharges against her husband, saving Parnell from the embarrassment of the divorce court. Some may condemn him for conducting a love affair with a married woman, but it must be remembered that he truly loved her and found happiness in her company. He clearly did not ruin a healthy marriage, for it was ailing long before he met Kitty. However frustrating to Parnell, Aunt Ben's fortune, Captain O'Shea's opportunism, and the curse of divorce all compelled her to remain married.

The code of morality in Victorian England condemned public exposure of extramarital affairs. Yet, are today's standards of morality for public figures much different from

those of the Victorian era? We still believe that our political leaders should be moral leaders because their private lives figure into our public trust, just as Parnell's private love affair affected how Englishmen thought about the feasibility of Home Rule. Although we can point to actions (or inactions) that could have prevented public discovery of

Parnell's immorality, once the scandal was revealed to the world, his chance of survival in a society steeped in rigid values was slim. His love affair with Katharine O'Shea can be seen as equaling that of Anthony and Cleopatra, (26) and his downfall can be seen as more of a tragedy than Shakespeare ever could have imagined.

Endnotes

¹ Francis Stewart Leland Lyons, *The Fall of Parnell, 1890-91* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), 32.

² Quoted in Richard Barry O'Brien, *The Life of Charles Stewart Parnell, 1846-1891* (London: Smith, Elder, and Co., 1898; reprint, New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), vol. 2, 161.

³ Lyons, 309.

⁴ Joan Haslip, *Parnell: A Biography* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1934), 154.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 368.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 372-373.

⁷ *Ibid.* 192-193; Lyons, 54.

⁸ Quoted in O'Brien, 240.

⁹ Haslip, 376, 366.

¹⁰ Lyons, 80.

¹¹ Quoted in O'Brien, 270.

¹² Quoted in Haslip, 384; Lyons, 66.

¹³ Quoted in O'Brien, 248.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 249.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 276, 254.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 271.

¹⁷ Haslip, 380, 382; Lyons, 109.

¹⁸ Lyons, 105.

¹⁹ Quoted in Emmet Larkin, *The Roman Catholic Church in Ireland and the Fall of Parnell* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 218.

²⁰ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 224.

²¹ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 229.

²² Lyons, 81.

²³ Quoted in O'Brien, 253.

²⁴ Lyons, 82.

²⁵ Jules Abels, *The Parnell Tragedy* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 385; A.N. Wilson, *Eminent Victorians* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1989), 127.

²⁶ Abels, 103.

Bibliography

Abels, Jules. *The Parnell Tragedy*. New York: Macmillan, 1966.

Barker, Michael. *Gladstone and Radicalism: The Reconstruction of Policy in Britain 1885-94*. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1975.

Foster, Robert Fitzroy. *Charles Stewart Parnell: The Man and His Family*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: The Harvester Press Limited, 1976.

Hammond, J.L. and M.R.D. Foot. *Gladstone and Liberalism*. England: English Universities Press, Ltd., 1952.

Haslip, Joan. *Parnell: A Biography*. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1934.

Hurst, Michael. *Parnell and Irish Nationalism*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968.

Larkin, Emmet. *The Roman Catholic Church in Ireland and the Fall of Parnell*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1979.

Lyons, Francis Stewart Leland. *Charles Stewart Parnell*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.

_____. *The Fall of Parnell, 1890-91*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960.

O'Brien, Richard Barry. *The Life of Charles Stewart Parnell, 1846-1891*. Vol. 2. London: Smith Elder, and Co., 1898; reprint, New York: Greenwood Press, 1969.

Wilson, A.N. *Eminent Victorians*. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1989.

Fritz Fischer: The "Traitor" from Hamburg

by Barry Jackisch

Comprehending modern German history has never been an easy task, especially if one happens to be German. For many years, a divided Germany served as a constant reminder of the mistakes of the past and left its citizens to answer the painful question: "How did it happen?" In contributing his own answer to this question, a Hamburg historian named Fritz Fischer caused a revolution in German historiography and initiated a heated debate that transcended academic discussion, calling into question the very tolerance of West German democracy. Using three of Fischer's most important works: *Germany's Aims In The First World War*, *War Of Illusions*, and *From Kaiserreich To Third Reich*, this examination will demonstrate how Fritz Fischer's structuralist interpretations, coupled with his unwavering commitment to revisionism, devastated many of the long-cherished precepts of conservative, Neo-Rankean German historiography.

Fritz Fischer was born on 5 March, 1908, in Ludwigsstadt, Germany. His father, Max, and his mother, Emilie, raised him in a conservative, Lutheran environment. From 1926-28, Fischer attended the University of Erlangen and then moved on to the University of Berlin where he received his doctorate in Theology (1934) and completed his education with a Doctor of Philosophy degree in 1937. While still at the University of Berlin, Fritz Fischer served as an assistant professor of church history (1934-39) and was eventually promoted to assistant professor of history (1934-42). From 1942-73, Fischer taught at the University of Hamburg and has remained in Hamburg since his retirement. Fischer was also directly influenced by the Second World War in his capacity as a reserve and active-duty member of the German Luftwaffe (1939-45). He was eventually captured by the American army and detained as a prisoner of war from 1945-47. Fritz Fischer has served as a visiting professor and guest lecturer in numerous countries and has received three honorary doctorates and several other prestigious awards. (1)

After reading through such an impressive resume, one might ask how such a "well decorated" scholar could be so harshly criticized, even called a "traitor," (2) by several prominent members of the German historical community. All of these accusations were directed towards Fischer for

his role in the debate centering on German responsibility for World War One and his assertion that a continuity existed between the policies and attitudes of Wilhelmine Germany and those of the Third Reich. In order to gain a clear understanding of this debate, the most important in post-World War Two German historiography, an examination of "pre-Fischer" German attitudes concerning the role of the historian and his craft must be presented. With this background, the truly revolutionary nature of Fritz Fischer's assertions can be best realized.

In an examination of modern German historiography, John A. Moses states that:

Nineteenth-century German historiography was so intimately bound up with the movement for national unity that it became virtually the 'science of the national state' . . . Before 1870 they [historians] spoke of Prussia's vocation to unite Germany whereas afterwards they preached Germany's vocation to assert herself on the world stage. . . . Thus a doctrine of state veneration became the hall-mark of most significant German historiography. (3)

Indeed, during the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, German historians had maintained a strong connection to nationalist political tendencies and found a basis for their philosophy in Germany's profound influence on the development of historiography. This justification of their discipline was firmly rooted in the theory and tradition of Leopold von Ranke.

The Neo-Rankean school, which took hold after unification in 1871, adhered quite closely to many Rankean ideals regarding the nation-state and the primacy of foreign policy. Prominent historians such as Gerhard Ritter believed that all history which followed Ranke's example was essentially political in nature (4) and therefore required a concentrated focus on the nation-state as an individual entity possessing unique features that could be readily recognized in relationships with other stronger or weaker "entities." In effect, a nation's own identity was greatly influenced by its position in the overall "inter-entity"

conflict. If a nation were to grow and prosper in this environment, it had to expand its own "moral energy" (5) and push towards an ever greater role in the balance of power.

For the Neo-Rankeans, this theory was embodied in the growing conflict among the great European powers around the turn of the century. Many Neo-Rankeans felt that Germany was being denied its rightful position as a true world power and believed that unless Germany asserted itself against the imperialist intentions of countries such as Britain and Russia, Germany would soon lose any chance of wielding meaningful international power. In a very real sense, it seemed that Germany was being forced to assert itself in order to preserve its existence against the aggressive drives of its perceived adversaries. The Neo-Rankeans fully supported Germany's "noble quest," characterized by the "Sonderweg" (6) development of German culture, to become an "equal among firsts" (7) in the European power structure. It was exactly this belief that caused many leading German historians, even after the Treaty of Versailles had been signed, to excuse Germany's actions in the First World War as essentially defensive, thus preserving the image of the Wilhelmine period as a noble, honorable stage in German cultural and political development.

The attention directed towards the "noble" qualities of German culture and politics during the Wilhelmine period became decidedly more focused in post-World War Two German historiography. Many of the conservative, Neo-Rankean historians, even though they were not party members, survived the Nazi period with their academic careers still quite intact. In an attempt to understand the nightmare of the Third Reich, and in part to reconcile their own roles in Nazi culture, many Neo-Rankean historians began to explain Adolf Hitler and the Nazis as distinctly "un-German", a gigantic political "accident" that certainly had nothing to do with the true and honorable German spirit embodied in the "noble quest" that characterized Wilhelmine Germany. As Ritter explains:

...Hitlerism was something radically new in German history, appearing just as unexpectedly and unpredictably as fascism did in Italy and bolshevism in Russia. ...it is a mistake to claim that Hitler's rise to power was "inevitable" ... (8)

In short, conservative Neo-Rankean historiography had supported Imperial Germany's struggle to safeguard its position as an "equal" world power. It defended Germany's honor after the First World War by absolving Germany of any significant responsibility for its role in the hostilities, while preserving the veracity of the "Sonderweg" theory. After the Second World War, the virtue of Wilhelmine Germany was brought to bear against the detestable un-German nature of the Third Reich in an attempt to contrast and condemn the Nazi legacy. For the Neo-Rankean school, there could be no continuity between German policy in the

First and Second World Wars, for Germany had been driven by drastically different pressures in each case.

Although he was well aware of the conservative apologist theory in German historiography regarding Germany's responsibility for the two World Wars, Fritz Fischer's early academic pursuits focused on the dominant role of Protestantism in Prussian culture. (9) In 1953 however, the West German government released a wealth of Imperial German documents that included a great deal of previously classified information dealing with government policy before and during the First World War. This new information greatly interested a new generation of German historians, particularly Fritz Fischer, for its potential significance in reassessing Germany's participation in the First World War. A short time later, a well known Marburg historian named Ludwig Dehio published a book called: *Germany And World Politics In The Twentieth Century*. This work was significant for its acceptance of German war guilt and its departure from the idealized images of the conservative historiographical establishment. As Dehio asserts:

But even though others may have different hopes for the future, the prerequisite for any really creative German response after the period of the two World Wars is the unconditional recognition of the terrible role that we have played. We were last, and the most daemonic, power to exercise hegemony over the declining old continent of Europe. (10)

Strongly influenced by new opportunities for a reevaluation of Germany's past, and impressed with Dehio's assertion concerning German war guilt, (11) Fritz Fischer began the immense task of carefully researching the newly released government documents in order to gain a clear understanding of German involvement in the First World War. This time-consuming process resulted in the revolutionary work entitled *Germany's Aims In The First World War*, which was published in 1961. (12)

Reflecting on the controversy sparked by *Germany's Aims*, (13) Fritz Fischer observes that:

For German historians the pre-Hitler era was a period that has been treated sufficiently, and there seemed no cause to reopen the debate. The soft pillow on which satisfied and conservative Germans had hoped to sleep was rudely removed from under their heads. (14)

This "soft pillow" was indeed removed as Fischer's revisionism assaulted two critical assumptions of conservative, Neo-Rankean theory. First, Fischer asserted that Germany was indeed responsible for the First World War and that the German government was quite prepared to utilize the conflict to promote its own imperialistic "grasp"

for world power. (15) Second, Fischer stunned the conservative German establishment with the statement that his book served as, "...a contribution to the problem of continuity in German history from the First to the Second World War." (16)

In *Germany's Aims*, Fischer indicates that the ages of imperialism did not end in 1914, but reached a "climax" in Germany's expansionist plans to create a gigantic "Mitteleuropa" empire dominated by Imperial Germany. (17) The "September Program" (18) of 1914, which carefully outlined this grandiose scheme, is of crucial importance for Fischer, as is the political program of its author, German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg. But in an important departure from the Neo-Rankean emphasis on foreign policy, Fischer examines the impact of powerful domestic forces on governmental decisions and views Bethmann Hollweg as ultimately subservient to the greater political pressure of his time.

With the benefit of a thorough knowledge of the newly released government documents, Fischer traces the imperialistic ambitions of the German government, formed primarily by the policies of Bethmann Hollweg, from the July crisis immediately preceding the outbreak of the First World War to the very end at Versailles. Throughout, Fischer shows that the "September Program" and its concept of a German dominated "Mitteleuropa" remained a prime influence on German war planning even as Germany faced the prospect of a long and costly conflict. According to Fischer, Germany did not haphazardly "fall" into the First World War. Instead, it was driven into the conflict originally by Bethmann Hollweg's political ambitions (heavily influenced by annexationist demands from German industrialists) (19) and later, after Bethmann Hollweg's dismissal, by the almost dictatorial power of Generals Hindenberg and Ludendorff and the military high command (the OHL) (20) in an attempt to achieve final German victory and recognition as a dominant world power.

In Fischer's explanation of Germany's defeat, the theme of continuity (or the possibility of it) between the two World Wars becomes quite clear. Fischer concentrates on the widespread belief in the "stab in the back" (21) theory as the prime agent that perpetuated the idea of German superiority even after its defeat in the First World War. He also blames the defensive war "myth" which prevented Germans from accepting the fact that Germany pursued war aims which, if realized, would have completely destroyed the European balance of power. (22) Fischer concludes by stating that:

Above all, in recent years of impotence and humiliation imposed, as the nation felt it, by Versailles the two illusions of the stab in the back and the purely defensive war nurtured a running score of resentment against the order of 1919 and a faith that Germany would again rise to the rank of a world power. (23)

It was evident that Fritz Fischer had shaken German historiography to its very foundations. The lines became quickly drawn and in a relatively short period of time, historians both for and against Fischer's startling thesis issued their assessments of this work. A brief consideration of some of the most intense assessments of *Germany's Aims* will reveal the extent to which the controversy over this book affected the academic and political climate in West Germany.

With his article, "A New War Guilt Thesis?" (24), Gerhard Ritter established himself as the most ardent critic of Fischer's work. Ritter attacked Fischer on all fronts, accusing him of misinterpreting information concerning Germany's role in the pre-war balance of power to such an extent that Ritter denounced Fischer as being "blind" to historical fact. (25) Ritter went even further and enlisted the help of the president of the German Historians Association, Karl Dietrich Erdmann. Together on 17 January, 1964, these two prominent German historians sent a secret letter to the German Foreign Minister, asking him to cancel Fritz Fischer's upcoming lecture tour in the United States on behalf of "all German historians." (26) Amazingly, Fischer was denied permission (the official reason was lack of funding) until several prominent German historians in America caught wind of the situation and filed a formal protest. As Fritz Fischer finally began his lecture tour, he was welcomed at various American universities with this similar introduction:

What Germany did or didn't do in 1914 is history and not of immediate concern to us; but if the Germans in 1964 shun an open discussion of these questions, this is highly political and of great concern to us. (27)

To be sure, there have also been many scholars who strongly support *Germany's Aims* and have come to Fischer's defense. John Moses believes Fischer "...smashed a broad path through the entangled forest of German academic historiography..." (28) and forced a critical reassessment of the historian's task. Konrad Jarausch blasted Fischer's conservative critics by describing them as "Emotionally incapable of admitting German guilt and methodologically mired in Neo-Rankeanism..." (29) Considering both positive and negative responses, it is evident that Fischer's revisionist interpretations in *Germany's Aims* had a truly profound impact.

In pursuing (and providing further support for) the primary themes established in *Germany's Aims*, Fritz Fischer researched and completed a second work in 1969, entitled *War Of Illusions*. (30) This book examines the powerful forces which drove Imperial Germany to its participation in the First World War, and discusses the continuity between Bismarck's policies and those of Wilhelmine Germany directly before the war.

A vigorous transition to an imperialistic policy will give Germany the space it needs... An unsuccessful war can do no more than set Germany back, although for a long time; England it can destroy. As victor England will for a while be rid of an awkward competitor; Germany will become what England is now, the world power. (31)

Fritz Fischer begins his book with this quotation from a German newspaper dated 17 May, 1913. (32) This attitude is the basis for Fischer's assertion that in the years preceding the First World War, German preparation for the inevitable conflict between European powers was based on the "illusions" of German might and the almost neurotic desire to secure a permanent position for German power on the world stage. This book clearly conveys Fischer's structuralist examination of the powerful influence of domestic pressures on German foreign policy and demonstrates that even on the eve of the First World War, the German government was quite prepared to use an international conflict to vault the nation to its "rightful place" as a *Weltmacht*.

The "War Council" of 8 December, 1912 (33), is an important piece of evidence in Fischer's indictment of the militarism that characterized Wilhelmine German policy and indicates a continuity with the political attitudes of the Bismarck era. This meeting between Wilhelm II and five of his closet cabinet officials (including the army Chief of Staff - Helmuth von Moltke, and the Secretary of State for the navy - Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz) consisted of an open discussion about Germany's ability to wage war in the near future. To von Moltke's dismay, Tirpitz requested a brief waiting period to fully prepare the German navy, but in the end, all present agreed on the necessity for urgent war preparations that would allow Germany to "defend" itself when the time came. As von Moltke put it, "I believe a war to be unavoidable: and the sooner the better." (34) This discussion concluded, however, that all elements of the German public would have to be mentally prepared for the war if German aims were to have any hope for success. In this assertion, Fischer sees the crucial importance of domestic influence on official policy.

Fischer traces this process of domestic "preparation" throughout much of his book and devotes an entire chapter (35) to the close relationship between German industry and government. In this chapter, Fischer points out that:

The close contacts which existed between the army and the politicians, between the industrial and commercial leadership and the government made the fear that Germany would not be allowed to expand universally accepted. The government was now under increasingly strong pressure from various interested groups. (36)

War of Illusions was not so harshly received by

Fischer's contemporaries as *Germany's Aims* had been. That it received a smaller, more positive array of views and assessments was due in large part to the fact that the "bomb" had already been dropped in 1961. To a large extent, many other German historians were much more prepared to accept the idea of continuity in German policy from Bismarck to the First World War than the "unthinkable" continuity that Fischer suggested in *Germany's Aims*. However, in 1979, Fritz Fischer published a work that fused ideas taken from *War of Illusions* and *Germany's Aims* with new insights regarding German history from 1871-1945.

The full title itself, *From Kaiserreich to Third Reich: Elements of Continuity in German History, 1871-1945*, (37) indicates Fischer's belief that certain common characteristics existed within German history during this period. In his introduction to the English translation, Roger Fletcher gives an excellent appraisal of the essence of Fritz Fischer's thesis. Fletcher points out that, for Fischer, the basic continuity in German history from 1871-1945 "was provided by the agrarian-big business alliance" which in times of crisis, "resorted to domestic repression and external aggression." (38) Fischer consistently pursues this thesis by analyzing its impact on Germany's changing political fortunes during this period. Most interesting is the final chapter, "Tradition versus Democracy," in which Fischer demonstrates that the industrial/agricultural power elites did not merely survive the First World War and the Depression during the Weimar period, but retained sufficient power to play a dominant role in Hitler's rise to power. (39)

Although Fischer does point out several critical factors (i.e. the violent nature of political repression and the Holocaust) that were unique to the Third Reich, he concludes that:

...however singular the criminal and inhuman features of the Hitler dictatorship may have been, it would be an inadmissible truncation of historical reality to contemplate the "Third Reich" exclusively from such a vantage point. What is no less necessary is analysis of the on-going structures and enduring aims of the Prusso-German Empire born in 1866-71 and destroyed in 1945... (40)

With all three of his major works, Fritz Fischer has profoundly altered the course of German historiography. He is credited with replacing the historicising Rankean question "Wie es eigentlich gewesen?" (How it actually was) with "Wie es dazu kommen konnte?" (how was it possible for it to come about). (41) For Fischer, the historian's task is to establish fact and to clarify, as best as he can, "the assumptions, conditions, decisions, and actions" in history with the aid of rational judgment and solid historical method. (42) It was with these "tools" of historical interpretation that Fritz Fischer carefully reexamined

modern German history in a structuralist, revisionist vein. The great uproar caused by his conclusions (particularly those in *Germany's Aims*) was a powerful indication that Fischer had challenged the basic framework of conservative, Neo-Rankean historiographical theory and had deeply offended many older German historians whose careers and academic integrity had been tied to the very events which Fischer called into question.

Fritz Fischer's bold revisionism opened up many new possibilities for those who followed in his path. Many students of the "Fischer School," (43) most notably Imanuel Geiss, have pushed Fischer's ideas even further, developing new, even more critical assessments of Germany's past. Fritz Fischer's work is irreplaceable as much because of its

own impact as it is for the legacy that carried his ideas to the minds of a new generation of historians. As a historian and a German citizen, Fritz Fischer has submitted an essential answer to Germany's most complex question, "How did it happen?"

Fischer's work is an eloquent declaration that the historian's highest loyalty should not lie in an irrational dedication to patriotic sentiment but rather to humanity as a whole, a lesson which could be profitably taken to heart by many writers and teachers of history today, not all of whom by any means live in West Germany. (44)

Endnotes

¹ *Contemporary Authors—New Revision Series*, vol. 2, "Fischer, Fritz 1908-," (Detroit: Gale Research Co., 1983), 168-69. Fischer received honorary doctorates from: University of Sussex (1974), University of East Anglia (1981), and Oxford University (1983). He was a visiting professor or lecturer in Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, England, France, Holland, Japan, Poland, and Switzerland. Fischer also received the Bundesverdienstkreuz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in 1974.

² Fritz Fischer, *Hitler was kein Betriebsunfall* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1992), 21.

³ John A. Moses, "The Crisis in West German Historiography: Origins and Trends," *Historical Studies* 13, (April 1969): 446.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ John A. Moses, *The Politics of Illusion* (London: George Prior Publishers, 1975), 15.

⁶ The Sonderweg ("special course") development refers to the belief that Germany's cultural development towards modernity was independent of, and superior to, Western democratic and Marxist accomplishments.

⁷ Dr. Hans-Heinz Krill, *Die Ranke-Renaissance* (Berlin, 1962), 196, quoted in Moses, *Politics*, 24.

⁸ Gerhard Ritter, *The German Problem*, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1965), 198.

⁹ Fritz Fischer, *Moritz August von Bethmann-Hollweg und der Protestantismus: Religion, Rechts- und Staatsgedanke* (Berlin: Emil Ebering Publisher, 1938), found in *Contemporary Authors*, 168.

¹⁰ Ludwig Dehio, *Germany and World Politics In The Twentieth Century* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), 37.

¹¹ Fischer, *Hitler*, 18.

¹² Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims In The First World War* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1967). The book was originally published in Germany under the title: Fritz Fischer, *Grigg nach der Weltmacht* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1961).

¹³ From this point on, I will refer to this work as *Germany's Aims*.

¹⁴ Fritz Fischer, "Twenty-Five Years Later: Looking Back at the 'Fischer Controversy' and its Consequences," *Central European History* 21, (September 1988), 209.

¹⁵ The power of Fischer's original German title, (trans. "Germany's Grasp for World Power") better reflects this assertion.

¹⁶ Fischer, *Germany's*, xxii.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ See "Bethmann Hollweg's September Programme" in Fischer, *Germany's*, 103-06.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 164-73.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 399-401.

²¹ Theory that blamed German "home front" mismanagement or cowardice for undermining German military victory on the Western Front, particularly in 1918.

²² Fischer, *Germany's*, 637-38.

²³ *Ibid.*, 638.

²⁴ Gerhard Ritter, "Eine Neue Kriegsschuldthese?," *Historische Zeitschrift* 194, (June 1962).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 655. Ritter says: "Er scheint dafür blind zu sein" (He seems, therefore, to be blind).

²⁶ Fischer, "Twenty-Five Years..." 208.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Moses, *Politics*, xvi.

²⁹ Konrad H. Jarausch, "World Power or Tragic Fate? The Kriegsschuldfrage as Historical Neurosis," *Central European History* 5, (March 1972), 74.

Endnotes - cont.

30 Fritz Fischer, *War of Illusions* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1975). This book was originally published in Germany under the title: Fritz Fischer, *Krieg der Illusionen* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1969).

31 *Ibid.*, front leaf.

32 *Ibid.*

33 *Ibid.*, 161-69.

34 *Ibid.*, 162.

35 *Ibid.*, 439-458. "State and Economy As Partners".

36 *Ibid.*, 443.

37 Fritz Fischer, *From Kaiserreich To Third Reich* (London: Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1986). This book was originally published in Germany under the title: Fritz Fischer, *Bündnis der Eliten* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1979).

38 *Ibid.*, 10.

39 *Ibid.*, 81.

40 *Ibid.*, 98.

41 Moses, "The Crisis...", 452-53.

42 See Fischer, *Hitler*, 7. and Fischer, *Germany's*, xxi.

43 A.J.P. Taylor, "Fritz Fischer and His School," *Journal of Modern History* 47, (1975).

44 Moses, *Politics*, 126-27.

Bibliography

Contemporary Authors—New Revision Series. Detroit: Gale Research Co., 1983.

Dehio, Ludwig. *Germany And World Politics In The Twentieth Century*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959.

Dorpalen, Andreas. "Historiography As History: The Work Of Gerhard Ritter." *The Journal of Modern History* 34 (March 1962): 1-18.

Evans, R.J. "From Hitler To Bismarck: 'Third Reich' and Kaiserreich In Recent Historiography. Part I." *The Historical Journal* 26 (1983): 485-97.

_____. "From Hitler To Bismarck: 'Third Reich' and Kaiserreich In Recent Historiography. Part II." *The Historical Journal* 26 (1983): 999-1020.

Fischer, Fritz. *From Kaiserreich to Third Reich*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1986.

_____. *Germany's Aims in the First World War*. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1967.

_____. *Hitler was kein Betriebsunfall*. Munich: C.H. Beck, 1992.

_____. "Twenty-Five Years Later: Looking Back at the 'Fischer Controversy' and Its Consequences." *Central European History* 21 (September 1988), 207-23.

_____. *War of Illusions*. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1975.

Geiss, Immanuel. *July 1914*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967.

Hillgruber, Andreas. *Germany And The Two World Wars*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.

Iggens, Georg G. *The German Conception of History*. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1968.

Janusch, Konrad. *The Enigmatic Chancellor*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.

_____. "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914." *Central European History* 2 (March 1969), 48-76.

_____. "World Power or Tragic Fate? The Kriegsschuldfrage as Historical Neurosis." *Central European History* 5 (March 1972), 72-92.

Joll, James. "The 1914 Debate Continues." *Past and Present* 34 (July 1966), 100-13.

_____. *The Origins Of The First World War*. New York: Longman Inc., 1984.

Kehr, Ekhart. *Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

Mommson, Hans. "Historical Scholarship in Transition: The Situation in the Federal Republic of Germany." *Daedalus* 100 (Spring 1971), 485-508.

Mommson, Wolfgang. "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy before 1914." *Central European History* 6 (March 1973), 3-44.

Moses, John A. "The Crisis in West German Historiography: Origins and Trends." *Historical Studies* 13 (April 1969), 445-49.

_____. *The Politics Of Illusion*. London: George Prior Publishers, 1975.

Bibliography - cont.

Ritter, Gerhard. "Eine Neue Kriegsschuldthese?" *Historische Zeitschrift* 194 (June 1962), 646-68.

_____. *The German Problem*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1965.

_____. "Zur Fischer-Kontroverse." *Historische Zeitschrift* 200 (June 1965), 783-90.

Schekewitz, Jorgen. ed. *Geschichtsschreibung-Epochen, Methoden, Gestaltung*. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1968.

Taylor, A.J.P.. "Fritz Fischer And His School." *Journal of Modern History* 47 (1975), 120-24.

The 1969 CBS Walkout: The Means Justified the End

by Malykke Bacon

On Thursday, December 5, 1968, two Black students from Antioch University entered North Residence Hall on the Wittenberg campus to pick up their dates for the evening. A resident, assuming that they were intruders, notified the housemother, who, unable to check the situation herself, told the resident to contact campus security officers. After a verbal exchange with the strangers, the officers called the city police. When they arrived at the dormitory, the police officers questioned a Black Wittenberg student who was using the lounge phone in North at the time because the officers were told that that particular student had been involved in the original confrontation between security and the Antioch students. The Wittenberg student denied any guilt in the matter; however, perhaps because police officers often deal with people who profess innocence, the Wittenberg student was taken to police headquarters with the Antioch students. The Wittenberg student was Ronald Woods, a popular senior. (1) What occurred within a week after his arrest would shock the very conservative Wittenberg faculty, the students, and, most of all, the administration. The university's administration would be forced to change the way the university had previously been operated. Furthermore, the results of the arrest of Ronald Woods would bring the concerns of the Black students at Wittenberg into the spotlight for a very dramatic two months.

Within days after the arrest, Black students staged sit-ins to protest Woods' arrest; the sit-ins were held in Recitation Hall, the campus administrative building. Eventually, the charges against Woods and the Antioch students were dropped at the request of the university. However, the sit-ins and the incident as a whole made the Black students more aware of the racist conditions that existed at the university. They felt compelled to make changes in university policies which were subtly racist. This compelling force led the Black students to create a list of demands which they felt would remove these discriminatory policies. The thirteen demands covered a variety of areas:

1) that Wittenberg issue a statement deploring racism on campus and vowing not to tolerate such racism; 2) that the level number of Black students

be raised to 12 percent of the student body, with 50 percent of these coming from the inner city, and under financial aid from Wittenberg; 3) a similar 12 percent quota of Black faculty members; 4) an increase in Black managerial, clerical, and stenographic staff members; 5) a Black counselor; 6) more Black oriented courses in every department; 7) holidays on Martin Luther King's assassination date and Malcolm X's birthday; 8) Black cheerleaders; 9) separate Black facilities for meetings, socializing, and learning; 10) increased exchange programs with schools of all-Black student bodies; 11) immediate acceptance of two Black students who have applied for entry; 12) allow student contributions toward Upward Bound scholarship aid; 13) a recruiter for Black students. (2)

The black students referred to themselves as the Concerned Black Students (CBS) and signed the letter containing the demands as such. CBS said that unless the administration met the demands by January 13, 1969, the students would leave the campus.

At the time, the university was in the midst of a search for a new president. To temporarily fill the gap, a committee consisting of Dean A.O. Pfister, who served as the chairman, Vice President Reck, and Vice-President/Treasurer Roland C. Matthies handled all administrative matters. The demands were presented to the university officials only a few days before the beginning of the Christmas break. This meant that the administrators had to deal with the ramifications of the CBS demands while the student body enjoyed its vacation. In a memo to directors, parents, alumni, pastors, friends, and members of the campus community, dated December 9, 1968, the administrative committee stated:

While some of the steps requested by Concerned Black Students may at first appear impossible of achievement, at least within the time stipulated, they should — and we are sure they will — receive full consideration with a view toward

doing as much as possible as soon as possible. (3)

However, in an article in the *Torch*, student Doug Pinkerton reported, "Dr. Reck and Dr. Pfinster both... expressed little hope that any of the demands could actually be met by the CBS-set deadline of January 13, 1969." (4)

The administrative committee tried to obtain as much background information on each of the demands as possible. On December 12, 1968, Manfred Holck, Jr., the director of personnel, issued a memorandum to the administrative committee regarding Item IV of the demands. The memo stated that, "...as of December 10, 1968...of approximately 200 full-time non-academic personnel, 64 are black (32%)." (5) Student Senate began to investigate the demand both for a Black cheerleader and for a provision allowing students to contribute to the Upward Bound scholarship, which earlier had been started by the university to educate individuals of different educational backgrounds. (6)

The first demand, the Wittenberg-issued statement deploring racism, seemed very confusing to the administrative committee. As white men, they appear to have had some difficulty understanding how racism could be a part of the Wittenberg campus. Perhaps they believed racism to mean only overt discrimination and acts against people of a particular race, instead of the more subtle discrimination that is also a widespread problem. A memorandum from Vice-President Reck to Dean A.O. Pfinster dated December 23, 1968, epitomizes the confusions of the administration: "...before any statement is attempted I think that we should 'demand' specifics; ...what are the white racist situations which allegedly exist on campus?" (7) His ignorance to this situation illustrates not only naiveté but also gives a hint of sincerity, in that he really did not seem to understand how racism could, and did, exist at Wittenberg. Even though this naive sincerity seemed genuine throughout the entire resolution process, the administrative committee still seemed fearful, or uncertain, of what conceding to the demands would mean. They may have felt that a concession to the demands would mean a drastic change in the day-to-day activities of the university.

On Tuesday, January 14, 1969, one day after the deadline for the recognition of the demands, a final meeting to attempt to reach an agreement between the administrative committee and CBS failed. In reaction, the Black students walked, with suitcase in hands, from Recitation Hall to the Student Center, where they packed into cars and headed to the Afro-American Institute at Antioch University in Yellow Springs, Ohio. The students pledged to remain there until an agreement was reached. The 37 Black students taking part in the walkout represented nearly 85% of the total Black student population.

Parents, faculty, and students had mixed reactions to the demands and to the walkout. To support the CBS protest, 15 students at the Hama Divinity School began to

boycott their own classes. (8) Faculty, staff, and students held several formal and informal discussions around the campus to discuss the complexities of racial issues. An anonymous letter to the editor of the *Torch* from a parent stated, "If the demands of the CBS were met by the committee, the quality of education now offered at Wittenberg could be endangered. I'm all for racial equality, but not for racial preference." The parent further stated, "If you or your parents have not responded to the Administrative Committee on the demands of the CBS, you should do so right away." (9) In another letter to the editor, parent Russell Leasure said, "What is demanded by CBS is illegal, immoral, and unwise, and should be denied and quickly." (10) In response to this unfavorable reaction, another *Torch* letter by Wittenberg student, Lois Schrag, responded:

The letter from the aforementioned unknown parent suggested we might adopt an American Legion sponsored slogan 'America: Love Her or Leave Her.' I suggest...we adopt... 'America (Wittenberg): Fix It or Forget It.' ...we should commend the CBS for the mature manner in which they have met the unsatisfactory answers to their demands. (11)

How did other people react to the CBS demands? In a survey conducted by the administrative committee, sixty-one percent of Wittenberg students and seventy-two percent of Wittenberg faculty felt that the number of Black students should be increased. (12) Overall, those closest to Wittenberg, i.e. the students and faculty, expressed the most concern for the plight of the Blacks at Wittenberg, probably because Wittenberg students and faculty had personal relationships with the Black students; these personal relationships helped foster a sympathy and concern for the Black students.

The Black students returned to the campus on Saturday, January 18, 1969. (13) This was so eventful that the editors of the *Torch* released an extra edition to make the announcement public. They returned after serious talks between the administrative committee and CBS. Though not all of the demands had been met, one action of the committee proved to be key in persuading the students' return: the administrative committee invited the Civil Rights Office of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to evaluate Wittenberg's civil rights position.

A press release issued January 19, 1969, by Tracy H. Norris, Wittenberg's Director of Publicity, outlined some of the agreements reached by the committee and the students. In response to the CBS demand for an increase in the number of Black students to twelve percent of the student body within a three year period, the faculty recommended that the university search for Blacks who would not require financial aid. They further suggested that the university expand the search for motivated Black students less

academically prepared who need financial and supplemental assistance. In addition, they suggested that a Black person advise the Black students and assist in the recruitment of Black students and that one of the then-present admissions staff members concentrate on this recruiting of Blacks. The faculty also encouraged the admissions staff to make more visits to integrated high schools in large, mid-western cities, the East, and the Deep South and also encouraged more visits to major junior colleges to seek Black transfer students. A policy of waiving the \$15 application fee for disadvantaged students was also suggested. (14)

In response to the demand regarding the increase of Black faculty, the faculty executive committee recommended that department chairpersons contact predominantly Black institutions for possible candidates among graduate students or the current staff. The committee encouraged department chairs to consider individuals who have had excellent undergraduate academic records and who had the potential to be effective teachers. They also suggested that departments expand joint appointments and exchanges between Wittenberg faculty members and Black faculty at other institutions. (15)

How were the other demands of CBS met? In response to the seventh demand, the press release stated that the university administration would not officially close the school to commemorate the anniversaries of Martin Luther King's assassination or Malcolm X's birthday because the university officials did not recognize the birth or death of any other national or religious leaders with a school closing. (16) It is interesting to note that the administration recognized X and King in the category of "national or religious leaders." In response to the demand for separate Black facilities for meetings, socializing, and learning, students also conceived the idea of a Black Culture House, providing that the facility be available to all Wittenberg students and be treated as an extension of the Student Union. (17)

With these demands addressed, the impending study from the Civil Rights office of the HEW promised, and further study of the remaining demands guaranteed, the Black students felt that their demands had been met, and they returned to the campus.

Even after the students returned to campus, the administration continued to take their demands seriously. For example, a memo from Dean A.O. Pfinster to Dr. Heusinkveld, dated January 30, 1969, stated that a black counselor-advisor, Miss Mabel Jackson [now Dr. Jackson], a professor at Wittenberg, had been appointed, a decision agreed upon by both the administrative committee and the CBS. Miss Jackson's appointment would be temporary pending a larger search for someone who could devote more time to the position and all that it would entail. (18)

Within two months after the walkout, the Civil Rights office of HEW issued the following recommendations after their study of the Wittenberg campus:

- 1) that the university should make its equal opportunity policy available to prospective students, students, and the general public; 2) that the university should be careful that it abide to its policy of assigning rooms without regard to race, color, or national origin; 3) that all off-campus housing be available without regard to race, color, or national origin; 4) that the university ensure that student organizations do not discriminate on the basis of race, color, or national origin; 5) that the university create a Human Relations Council to investigate allegations of discrimination. (19)

The actual demands and the walk-out process were very effective. The Black students were organized in their actions, and this showed their deep concern. They specifically laid out their demands and gave the university a deadline. This gave a sense of immediacy to their struggle and required the university's attention. Their form of protest was also peaceful; this showed the maturity of the students and the respect which they had for their colleagues and educators. For these reasons, the CBS walk-out was a success.

All of the Concerned Black Students' demands had not been met, but they did capture the attention of the community, if only for a brief two months. The effects, however, of those very dramatic two months have been long-lasting. Today, the Concerned Black Students build on the foundations laid by the past members in trying to conquer racism and to promote a true sense of community at Wittenberg.

EPILOGUE

The January 31, 1974, edition of the *Torch* included a full-page article, entitled "1969 CBS demands, 1974 University response." The article outlined how the university had responded to the demands in the five years that had passed since the walkout. A statement was issued deploring racism. The number of Black students enrolled at Wittenberg totaled 144 in the 1973-1974 academic year, as opposed to 45 in the 1968-1969 academic year, with 126 receiving some sort of financial aid. Black faculty had been added where appropriate, but the number of faculty totaled 138, which was down from 155 in the 1968-69 school year. The number of Black, full-time faculty had risen from two in 1968-69 to three. Although non-academic employment had been reduced from 34% since 1968-69, minority positions had risen from 16.5% in 1968-69 to 21.4% in 1974. The position of Black counselor was created in the winter of 1969, and Mrs. Margaret Coleman filled the position in the fall of the same year. In 1969, Black students only recognized 4 courses that recognized the Black experience; by 1974, that number had tripled. The demand for holidays to commemorate the birth of Malcolm X and the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. was later rescinded.

The 1968-69 Student Senate created a new policy to select cheerleaders. There were no Black cheerleaders in the 1973 football squad because no Black students tried out, and there was a single applicant for the 1973-74 basketball squad, but she was denied. Prior to this article's press time in 1974, however, Blacks had been represented on each squad. The Black Culture House was established in the winter term of 1969 and was viewed as an extension of the Student Center. Because of a lack of interest on campus, the

demand for educational exchanges with all-Black student bodies was tabled pending increased student interest. The demand regarding the acceptance of the two Black students who had applied for admission was resolved in 1969 when both students rescinded their applications. The Upward Bound Scholarship fund was renamed the Wittenberg Community Scholarship fund. Since 1968, 20% of financial aid moneys have been earmarked for Black students. (20)

Endnotes

¹ Memorandum from Dean A.O. Pfinster to Wittenberg faculty regarding the CBS demands, 9 December 1968.

² Doug Pinkerton, "Administration Studies CBS Demands...", *Wittenberg Torch*, 17 January 1969, 1.

³ Memorandum from Wittenberg's Administrative Committee to Directors, Parents, Alumni, Pastors, Friends, and Members of the Campus Community regarding "What's happening at Wittenberg?," 9 December 1968.

⁴ Pinkerton, 1.

⁵ Memorandum from Manfred Holck, Jr. to the Administrative Committee regarding Item IV of the CBS demands, 11 December 1968.

⁶ "Senate to study two CBS demands," *Wittenberg Torch*, 17 January 1969, 1.

⁷ Memorandum from W.E. Reck to Dean A.O. Pfinster regarding an administrative response to Item I of the CBS demands, 23 December 1968.

⁸ "Hamma Boycott Underway," *Sun*, 16 January 1969, 1,4.

⁹ "Parent reacts," *Wittenberg Torch*, 17 January 1969, 2.

¹⁰ Russell Leasure, "Firm reply," *Wittenberg Torch*, 17 January 1969, 2.

¹¹ Lois Schrag, "Fix or forget," *Wittenberg Torch*, 24 January 1969, 2.

¹² Memorandum from Dean A.O. Pfinster to Wittenberg faculty regarding the CBS demands, 9 December 1968.

¹³ "Black students end walkout," *Wittenberg Torch*, 20 January 1969, 1.

¹⁴ Press release submitted by Tracy H. Norris, Wittenberg Director of Publicity, regarding the CBS and university agreement, 19 January 1969.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Memorandum from Dean A.O. Pfinster to Dr. Heusinkveld regarding the CBS demands, 30 January 1969.

¹⁹ Billy Barron, "A History of the Concerned Blacks at Wittenberg," internship paper, 11 October 1991, 16.

²⁰ "1969 CBS demands, 1974 University response," *Wittenberg Torch*, 31 January 1974, 6.

Bibliography

Barron, Billy. "A History of Blacks at Wittenberg," internship paper, 11 October 1991.

"Black students end walkout," *Wittenberg Torch*, 20 January 1969, 1.

"Hamma Boycott Underway," *Sun*, 16 January 1969, 1,4.

Leasure, Russell, "Firm reply," *Wittenberg Torch*, 17 January 1969, 2.

Memoranda and statements from the former university Vice-president, W.E. Reck's files.

"1969 CBS demands, 1974 University response," *Wittenberg Torch*, 31 January 1974, 6.

"Parent reacts," *Wittenberg Torch*, 17 January 1969, 2.

Pinkerton, Doug, "Administration Studies CBS Demands...", *Wittenberg Torch*, 17 January 1969, 1.

Schrag, Lois, "Fix or forget," *Wittenberg Torch*, 24 January 1969, 2.

"Senate to study two C.B.S. demands," *Wittenberg Torch*, 17 January 1969, 1.

Education in Occupied Japan

by Laura Sponseller

When Japan surrendered to Allied Forces on August 15, 1945, it was a country in shreds. Cities and industries had been bombed to rubble. The Japanese people were exhausted and starving, drained after years under a totalitarian regime that used potatoes to concoct airplane fuel while the masses went hungry. Their world had been turned upside-down. The Emperor, the supreme symbol of the state and the focal point of worship, had surrendered to foreign troops. In the face of such devastation, the Occupation forces had a formidable task in trying to rebuild shattered Japan.

The Japanese educational system was no different from the rest of the social and political structure in Japan: it was in tatters. The ravages of war had brought 18 million students, a half million teachers, and 40,000 institutions of learning to a standstill. (1) The schools were in ruins.

The objectives of the Occupation were democratization, demilitarization, and reconstruction. Obviously, rebuilding the education system would play an integral part in achieving these aims. During the six and a half years of the Occupation, the Americans diligently sought to reform Japanese education. However, a significant number of their reforms did not endure, as "during the 1950's, the original orientation of early postwar education disappeared from most schools." (2) Many of the educational reforms instituted by the American Occupation did not last, but the underlying aim of democratization of the Japanese educational system was ultimately realized.

The intentions of the Americans in remaking Japanese education were benevolent. The Constitution of 1946 (written by an American committee and translated into Japanese) states that "the central aim of education is defined as bringing up self-reliant members of a peaceful and democratic community with a respect for human values." (3) A member of the Education Division of SCAP wrote that education in Japan "...must somehow be transformed from a system adapted to a totalitarian society into one which could operate to serve its useful function in a society that as yet was to attempt to become democratic in nature." (4) The goal was to do away with elements that had allowed Japan to be a militaristic machine and to introduce elements that would encourage democracy.

Kazuo Kawai wrote that "the general assumption, among Japanese as well as among foreigners, is that the prewar system of education in Japan had been a notorious instrument for propagating a reactionary and ultranationalistic point of view and that a revolutionary reform of the education system was necessary before democracy could make much headway." (5) What was Japan's prewar system of education? A brief examination of the recent history of Japanese education will facilitate an understanding of the situation faced by the American Occupiers as they arrived in Japan.

In the Tokugawa period (1603-1867), Confucianism was the focal point of studies, but its influence was in decline by the end of the eighteenth century. (6) As western influences in Japan increased, it became evident that educational change was necessary. Modern education in Japan began as a result of the Meiji restoration. Education was seen as a key tool for the westernization and modernization of the country, and the system that was established remained essentially the same until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. The Imperial Ministry of Education was founded in 1871, and a Fundamental Code of Education was issued in 1872, for the first time in Japanese history outlining a comprehensive national school system. (7) The goal was modernization of Japan through the education of the citizenry, and an important ideal was "schools for the whole citizenry." (8) A system of six years of compulsory education was instituted for both girls and boys.

The Meiji educational reforms were initially made using western schools as models, but reforms were adapted and the system ultimately developed as a reflection of Japanese tradition. (9) One of the most important results of this was that "the aims and functions of education were defined in terms of imperatives of the new state." (10) This meant that from the very beginning, modern Japanese education emphasized "the subordination of the individual to the state." (11) This tenet undergirded the educational system from the Meiji restoration to the end of World War II. The purpose of education was not to fully develop the individual personality but rather to produce a useful servant of the state. (12)

It was during the Meiji restoration that *shushin*, or "moral cultivation," was first introduced. Teachers were "required to make moral education primary...to advance the national character of Japan by combining western knowledge and techniques with Oriental morality." (13) The Imperial Rescript on Education, proclaimed in 1890, provided an official statement on how to include morals in education. (14)

The basic educational system established by the Meiji Restoration remained until 1945. The educational themes of individual subordination to the state and moral education as decreed by the state facilitated the development of the totalitarian ultranationalism which characterized Japan as it slipped down a militaristic slope toward the destruction of World War II. The guiding principle of the wartime education system was the trinity of "Shintoism, government, and education." (15) In 1937, the Ministry of Education published *Kokutai no Hongi*, "the Cardinal Principles of the National Entity," outlining the ideology of religious nationalism. (16) Ultrnationalism was promulgated through the cult of state Shinto, which included unwavering worship of the emperor. Primary schools were renamed "national schools" and provided "basic training of the people in conformity with the moral principles of the Japanese Empire." (17) Of course, education in Japan grew less and less effective as the war progressed, with disruptions increasing exponentially as war tore the country apart. By 1945, the educational system had basically ceased to function.

In the first days after surrender, before American education personnel had even had time to arrive on Japanese soil, the Japanese Ministry of Education seized the initiative in beginning educational reform. Without orders from American personnel, it cancelled all orders and directives which had been issued to foster militarism and ultrnationalism. (18) For example, military officers untrained in education had been assigned to teach in the schools during the war, thus providing a link between education and the military. Five days before General Douglas MacArthur arrived in Japan, Ministry of Education Order #20 purged these officers. (19)

The arrival of the Occupation Forces marked the beginning of a complete overhaul of the Japanese education system. Educational reforms occurred in two stages. Phase one was punitive, with "Reform by Directive," and encompassed the period from September 1945 to March 1946. (20) During this first stage of reform, efforts were primarily directed at purging the system of undesirable elements and formulating make-shift plans for the school year slated to begin in April of 1946. (21) Education policies during this stage were under the auspices of the American military. Specifically, policies were implemented by the Education Division, which was part of the Civil Information and Education Section, one of several sections within the General Headquarters of the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers. (22) The Education Division was

composed of educators who were either serving in or hired by the military and who were without extensive Japanese experience. (23)

Four important Directives were issued during this first stage of reform. SCAP issued a Basic Directive of Education on Oct. 22, 1945, ordering the Japanese government to remake the schools and providing the ideological basis for the entire educational reform program. Elements in education that contributed to militarism and ultrnationalism were to be abolished, while elements conducive to education in a democratic society were to be introduced. Only personnel and curricula which supported those aims were to be utilized. The system was to be decentralized, breaking up the concentration of power held by the Ministry of Education. (24) The other Directives initiated a program for screening personnel, abolished state Shinto in education, and suspended all courses in geography, Japanese history, and *shushin*. (25) The suspension of these courses was due to the necessity of using wartime textbooks, with objectionable material deleted, until new texts could be manufactured. The Americans felt that there was so much prohibited material in the geography, history, and *shushin* textbooks that the minuscule amounts of text that remained were unusable. (26)

The second stage of Occupation reform, from March of 1946 to April of 1952, was characterized by constructive measures, with an overall tone of guidance and assistance. (27) Reforms in this phase were promulgated by a civilian body: the United States Education Mission. The Education Mission was a group of nationally known civilian American education leaders who spent the month of March 1946 in Japan. It operated independently of the Education Division and other Occupation agencies. (28) Basically, the Education Mission sought an ideal system that emphasized decentralization of educational control and the development of individual growth. (29) It made proposals comprising six categories: the aims and content of Japanese education, language reform, the administration of education, teaching and the education of teachers, adult education, and higher education. (30)

An important component of reforms of this period was the idea of popularization of education. As Article 3 of the Fundamental Law of Education (1947) stated, "the people shall all be given equal opportunities of receiving education..." (31) This was in direct contrast with the dual structure of the prewar system of education, which used rigid tracking to separate elite and mass education. (32) With the introduction of democratic ideals after World War II came the adoption of a "single track," as opposed to the previous multi-track system. (33) Besides the reorganization into a single track, the popularization of education was also achieved through the raising of the age at which students were permitted to leave school, the emphasis on equal co-education, and adult education programs. (34)

Education changed dramatically in the last half of the 1940's due to five education laws enacted as a result of the

U.S. Education Mission's recommendations. The Fundamental Law of Education has already been mentioned. Also of extreme importance was the 1948 School Board Law, which imposed an unfamiliar pattern of decentralization on the Japanese system with the establishment of popularly elected local school boards. (35)

To summarize, a plethora of reforms resulted from the Education Mission's recommendations. The whole system of education was reorganized, with a move to a single track, 6-3-3-4 system and with the extension of compulsory education to nine years. (36) The number of universities was also vastly increased, with a greater emphasis on broader humanistic education. (37) Schools were made co-educational and women were given access to institutions of higher learning. (38) Development of the concept of the individual was encouraged through introduction of a flexible system encouraging student initiative instead of learning by rote. Decentralization was achieved with the creation of local school boards. (39) One reform which was not adopted was the proposed reform of the Japanese written language. Very few of the American Occupiers knew Japanese, and the extreme divergence of the language from western norms led to recommendations for its simplification. Specifically, the Americans wanted to romanize the written system of *kanji*. However, the Japanese resisted such a radical despoiling of their cultural heritage. (40)

The end of the American Occupation marked the beginning of a new phase in Japanese education, as the Japanese reacted to American reforms by "re-reforming." (41) Many educational reforms barely outlasted the Occupation, and "the shift from the U.S. pattern of education practice toward a more Japanese pattern was completed within fifteen years." (42)

The process of reversal began even before the Occupation ended in April 1952. In April of 1951, President Truman removed General Douglas MacArthur from his position as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. (43) The new SCAP, General Matthew Ridgeway, had a very different focus. One source described him as "primarily concerned with Korea...[he] knew and cared little about the American reforms in Japan." (44) In this new atmosphere, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru reported no difficulty in persuading him to allow the Japanese government to consider revision of laws. In August 1951, the subsequently-created Ordinance Review Committee recommended administrative streamlining, entailing the abolition of boards of education in cities with populations under 150,000. (45)

In 1956, the New School Board Law effectively abolished the Education Mission's much-vaunted program of decentralization. (46) In 1957, the Ministry of Education decided to once again incorporate moral education into the elementary and middle school curricula. (47) In the latter half of the 1950's, the Ministry continued to revise school curricula, with "a definite departure from the early postwar,

experience-centered education and a shift to a more traditional, subject-centered education with focus on the continuity of Japanese culture and structured instruction..." (48) By the end of the 1950's, there was a new orientation toward a greater degree of uniformity, state control, traditional subject-centered teaching, and behavioral conditioning. (49)

With so many reforms jettisoned so quickly, the question may well be asked: were the educational reforms of the American Occupation a failure? Certainly many American observers had a very negative view of the fate of Japanese education. In the early 1950's, one American wrote that "little remained of the highly lauded innovations and reforms. Launched amid fanfares of publicity and promises, most of them had been repealed or ...distorted and ignored." (50) However, such pessimism was largely mistaken, for several reasons.

First of all, the changes in education instituted by the Japanese after the Occupation must be seen as part of a natural process of making the "transplanted" democratic education take root in Japanese soil. They did not signal the failure of democracy and a return to totalitarian, ultra-nationalistic tendencies. Instead, Japanese reversal of many of the Occupation reforms was necessary and natural because of their basic incompatibility with Japanese culture. The Americans knew very little about the Japanese society that they were trying to reform, and therefore, many of their actions were characterized by a dearth of cultural sensitivity. For example, one American, defending the proposed reform of the Japanese language, wrote that "there is no possibility of democracy flourishing in a land with such an outlandish method of speaking and writing." (51)

Kazuo Kawai, the editor of the *Japan Times* for several years after World War II (52), wrote that "SCAP correctly diagnosed the defects of the old system of Japanese education and strenuously sought to remedy them by introducing the chief features of American education." (53) An example is provided by the American emphasis on decentralization. The Americans, from one of the most educationally decentralized countries in the world, sought to impose their system on a country which had no such tradition. A centralized system is not automatically anathema to democracy. France, a modern, democratic nation, has a completely centralized system of education. (54) The system of local school boards simply did not work in Japan. This reform often had the undesirable result of taking control from competent, experienced bureaucratic professionals in the Ministry of Education and giving it to petty, venal, corrupt local bosses. (55) It did not work in Japan, and it was eliminated after the Occupation ended.

Another example of a reform insensitive to the realities of Japanese society was the attempt to replace *shushin*, moral education, with social studies. Social studies represented completely unfamiliar territory for Japanese educators. They had never taught history and geography in such an integrated form, and there was a resulting shortage

of qualified teachers. Also, in the 1950's, the Japanese felt that their youth were not receiving adequate moral education. A widespread feeling was that the war had destroyed the religious foundations of Japan, and that young people were being swallowed up in a resulting moral vacuum. Symptomatic of this was a rise in juvenile crime rates after World War II. (56) The reinstatement of moral education, made mandatory in 1962, did not mean a return to martial, ultranationalistic values, but rather supported ideas of respect and harmony. The name of the lessons was changed from *shushin*, with its strong militaristic overtones, to *dotoku*. (57)

Benjamin C. Duke wrote of two trends that were discernible in Japanese education in 1964. First, the previously discussed Japanese reforms of American reforms illustrate an inexorable movement in an ideologically conservative direction. Second, and very important in evaluating the effectiveness of American educational reform, are liberal democratic influences implanted by the Americans that did last, with tremendous effect on Japanese education and society. (58) Ultimately, the American effort to popularize Japanese education had a very important effect. Results are most noticeable at the higher levels of education. In 1935, only 39.7% of the Japanese population completed secondary school. In 1947, that figure had risen to 61.7%, and by 1955, 78%. Only 3% of the population attained the level of higher education in 1935, compared to 5.8% in 1947, and 8.8% in 1955. (59) During and after the American Occupation, more people were reaching higher levels of education. Occupation reforms also opened the

doors of education to women, "symbolizing a new era of educational opportunity." (60) The system that was established is today characterized, especially at the university level, by academic, political, and social freedom. (61)

In a final evaluation of the results of American Occupational reforms, one must look at the original goals of the Occupation. In an initial policy statement, the United States stated that it sought to "insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world." (62) Arguably, the intent of the democratic system as expressed in the 1947 Basic Law of Education lives on beyond the reforms. (63) Japan is now a peaceful, democratic nation. Even when the prohibition on rearming was lifted, Japan "chose not to modify its pacifist way of life." (64) In the words of Herbert Passin,

...in a large sense, the Occupation did accomplish its broad objectives...to transform Japan from a militaristic, ultranationalistic, fascist, imperial state into a peacefully inclined, democratic, and economically healthy nation that would never again be a threat to the peace and security of the world. (65)

The American Occupation instituted numerous reforms in its attempt to reshape Japanese education after World War II. Due to incompatibility with Japanese culture, many of the specific reforms did not last, but the spirit of democracy endured.

Endnotes

¹ Joseph C. Trainor, *Educational Reform in Occupied Japan* (Tokyo: Meisei University Press, 1983), viii.

² Nobuo K. Shimahara, *Adaptation and Education in Japan* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), 67.

³ *Outline of Education in Japan* (Tokyo: International Cultural Relations Division, Government of Japan, July 1972), 1.

⁴ Trainor, viii.

⁵ Kazuo Kawai, *Japan's American Interlude* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 183.

⁶ Shimahara, 46.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁸ Kaigo Tokicomi, *Japanese Education: Its Past and Present* (Tokyo: Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai, 1968), 50.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 52.

¹⁰ Shimahara, 44.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Kawai, 185.

¹³ Tokicomi, 54.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 56.

¹⁵ Makoto Aso and Ikwo Amano, *Education and Japan's Modernization* (Tokyo: Japan Times, Ltd., 1983), 56.

¹⁶ Trainor, 86.

¹⁷ Aso, 57.

¹⁸ Trainor, 19.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 20.

²⁰ Ronald S. Anderson, *Education in Japan: A Century of Modern Development* (Washington: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1975), 63.

²¹ Trainor, 74.

Endnotes - cont.

- 22 Ibid., vi.
- 23 Kawai, 188.
- 24 Trainor, 31.
- 25 Ibid., 35.
- 26 Ibid., 37.
- 27 Anderson, 64.
- 28 Trainor, 68.
- 29 Shimahara, 62.
- 30 Ibid., 64.
- 31 *Education in Japan 1971: A Graphic Presentation* (Tokyo: Ministry of Education: Government of Japan, 1971), 9.
- 32 Shimahara, 58.
- 33 Outline, 1.
- 34 Tetsuya Kobayashi, *Society, Schools, and Progress in Japan* (Great Britain: Pergamon Press, 1976), 48.
- 35 Shimahara, 63.
- 36 Edwin M. Martin, *The Allied Occupation of Japan* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1948), 60.
- 37 Anderson, 75.
- 38 Ibid., 64.
- 39 Martin, 61.
- 40 Trainor, 299.
- 41 Aso, 69.
- 42 Shimahara, 62.
- 43 Herbert Passin, "The Occupation—Some Reflections," *Daedalus* (Summer 1990): 108.
- 44 Ibid., 110.
- 45 Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, eds., *Democratizing Japan: the Allied Occupation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987.), 277.
- 46 Shimahara, 71.
- 47 Ibid., 68.
- 48 Ibid., 67.
- 49 Ibid., 74.
- 50 Harry Emerson Wildes, *Typhoon in Tokyo: the Occupation and its Aftermath* (New York: Octagon Books, 1978), 337.
- 51 Trainor, 298.
- 52 Passin, 120.
- 53 Kawai, 195.
- 54 Passin, 23.
- 55 Anderson, 69.
- 56 Ben C. Duke, "The Irony of Japanese Postwar Education," *Comparative Education Review* (February 1963), 214.
- 57 Ben C. Duke, "American Educational Reform in Japan Twelve Years Later," *Harvard Educational Review* 34(4) (Fall 1964), 526.
- 58 Ibid., 525.
- 59 *Education in Japan 1971: A Graphic Presentation*, 16.
- 60 Trainor, 62.
- 61 Duke, 532.
- 62 Passin, 110.
- 63 Duke, 532.
- 64 Makoto Iokibe, "Japan Meets the United States for the Second Time," *Daedalus* (Summer 1990), 105.
- 65 Passin, 124.

Bibliography

- Anderson, Ronald S. *Education in Japan: A Century of Modern Development*. Washington: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1975.
- Aso, Makoto & Amano, Ikuo. *Education and Japan's Modernization*. Tokyo: Japan Times, Ltd., 1983.
- Duke, Ben C. "American Education Reforms in Japan Twelve Years Later." *Harvard Educational Review* 34(4)(Fall 1964): 525-36.
- . "The Irony of Japanese Postwar Education." *Comparative Education Review* (February 1963): 212-7.
- Education in Japan 1971: A Graphic Presentation*. Tokyo: Ministry of Education, Government of Japan, 1971.
- Hall, Robert King. *Education for a New Japan*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1988.

Bibliography - cont.

- Horio, Teruhisa. *Educational Thought and Ideology in Modern Japan: State Authority and Intellectual Freedom*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1988.
- Iokibe, Makoto. "Japan Meets the United States for the Second Time." *Daedalus*, Summer 1990, 91-106.
- Kawai, Kazuo. *Japan's American Interlude*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960.
- Kobayashi, Tetsuya. *Society, Schools, and Progress in Japan*. Great Britain: Pergamon Press, 1976.
- Martin, Edwin M. *The Allied Occupation of Japan*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1948.
- Michio, Nagai. *Higher Education in Japan: Its Take-off and Crash*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1971.
- Outline of Education in Japan*. Tokyo: International Cultural Relations Division, Government of Japan, July 1972.
- Passin, Herbert. "The Occupation—Some Reflections." *Daedalus*, Summer 1990, 106-125.
- Shimahara, Nobuo K. *Adaptation and Education in Japan*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979.
- Tokio, Kaigo. *Japanese Education: Its Past and Present*. Tokyo: Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai, 1968.
- Trincer, Joseph C. *Educational Reform in Occupied Japan*. Tokyo: Meisei University Press, 1983.
- Ward, Robert E. & Yoshikawa, Sakamoto, ed. *Democratizing Japan: the Allied Occupation*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987.
- Wildes, Harry Emerson. *Typhoon in Tokyo: the Occupation and Its Aftermath*. New York: Octagon Books, 1978.

John C. Calhoun's - *A Disquisition on Government*

by John Bennett

In his book *A Disquisition on Government*, John C. Calhoun spells out his beliefs about what government is and how it should be organized. Calhoun believes that government is created by men in order to "protect and preserve society," although he sees a great risk in the domination of that society by the majority. (1) Therefore, he proposes the idea of the "concurrent majority" in government, in which "each division or interest" in society is given a veto in the government in order to protect its rights from encroachment. (2) In many ways Calhoun's writing harks back to earlier republican thinkers who distrusted the domination of the majority, ranging from Aristotle to Thomas Jefferson and George Mason.

John Caldwell Calhoun was born on March 18, 1782, in the farm country of southwestern South Carolina to a family of Scottish-Irish farmers. During his youth, there was great upheaval in his home state due to the westward spread of slave labor from the coastal regions of South Carolina because of the spread of cotton planting. (3) South Carolina at this time was dominated by white planters who lived in the coastal regions and who were successful at the state's Constitutional Convention of 1790 in:

...insisting that taxable property including slaves be used as a base along with population for representation in the state legislature. (4)

The farmers of the interior region were thus clearly disadvantaged, because slavery was nowhere near as extensive in their region as it was in the coastal areas. John C. Calhoun thus spent much of his childhood listening to his father argue about how unfair the political situation in South Carolina was, as it was a state in which just one-fifth of the white population dominated the political landscape. These discussions undoubtedly had an effect on the younger Calhoun, as he could see the effects of injustice in the government, for the dominant coastal planters were blamed for much of the lack of development in the interior.

Calhoun wrote his *Disquisition* in part to defend slavery, which he felt was threatened by the influence of abolitionist forces in the government. He further viewed this as a great threat to the entire social structure of the South, as

he shared the commonly-held Southern belief that "the Southern economy without the slave would collapse." (5) During his time in the Senate, he opposed abolitionist efforts to pressure Congress into enacting legislation on slavery in the territories and in the District of Columbia. (6) Calhoun viewed this as an incredible threat to the Union, not only because it represented the domination of the majority in government, but also because he viewed slavery as the "corner-stone of our republican edifice." (7)

Calhoun's defense of slavery rests mainly on racial grounds. He felt that not everyone possessed the "virtue required for citizenship in a republican government," which echoed earlier republican thinking that virtuous men were needed for government to function properly. (8) Clearly, he felt that blacks were incapable of earning the "reward" of liberty; therefore they were to work in order that others (namely whites) could fully "enjoy liberty." (9)

Despite his motives for defending slavery, Calhoun still clearly wrote the *Disquisition* in order to protect the rights of political minority groups. The vehicle by which Calhoun hoped to accomplish this was the so-called "concurrent majority." The concurrent majority proposal was designed by Calhoun to:

...give to each division or interest, through its appropriate organ, either a concurrent voice in making and executing the laws, or a veto on their execution. (10)

This desire for the protection of political minorities comes in part from the long-held fear of the Founding Fathers that republican government would ultimately be "subverted" by the effects of one faction or group gaining power and using that power to dominate the political minorities. (11) Unlike other political thinkers such as James Madison, who felt that the sheer size of the United States would be sufficient in preventing the majority from invading "the rights of other citizens," Calhoun felt it was vital to construct a system which would ensure this, rather than to leave events to chance. (12)

Calhoun sought support for his plan for concurrent majority in government through use of historical precedents,

especially the governmental system of the Roman Republic. Calhoun viewed the Roman Republic as having been dominated by the patricians after the fall of the monarchy. After a long period of oppression by the patricians, the plebeians finally rose up and demanded "concessions from the ruling elite." (13) Ultimately, the plebeians were able to gain a veto "over all actions of government." (14) Clearly, this example serves Calhoun's case well, as it helps to prove that the idea of concurrent majority in government not only is a good idea but also is feasible; it has worked in the past and could possibly work in the future.

Another historical precedent which Calhoun found useful was one from his own home state of South Carolina. In 1808, while Calhoun was serving in the state legislature, a compromise was worked out giving the two sections of the state (the coastal and interior regions) effective vetoes over the actions of each other. This was done through a "system of apportionment and representation" which gave each region control of one house of the legislature. (15) This not only protected each region of the state from domination by the other but also gave the state an "unusual degree of harmony." (16) South Carolina thus gave Calhoun a glowing example of how one state adopted the system of concurrent majority in government with a happy conclusion, despite the fact that it governed only 275,000 white men.

Calhoun's desire to protect minority rights can also be seen in his views on nullification, the doctrine in which a state may veto a federal law on its territory. He saw it as a "way out short of secession" on occasion when the federal government was overstepping its bounds. (17) Calhoun spoke out in support of nullification during the Crisis of 1832, when the leaders of South Carolina felt that they were "being extorted by an unjust tariff," and moved to "nullify" the tariff in South Carolina. (18) Calhoun truly believed in the preservation of the Union and looked upon nullification and the concurrent majority as ways to preserve it from the threat of majority domination.

A major component of this system was the necessity of virtuous men in the government. This is consistent with the political beliefs of earlier republican thinkers, who also focused on the necessity of virtue in the government to protect the rights of the people. Indeed, Calhoun has often

been described as an "eighteenth-century republican" for his belief that a constitutional system had to be created in order to "make virtue a necessity." (19) Clearly, virtuous men would be required in a system in which every faction had a veto in the government, for if the leaders were unable to set aside their own self-interest, then the government would be unable to perform its duties; this would ultimately result in anarchy, which Calhoun feared as being "the worst of all evils." (20)

In conclusion, John C. Calhoun's *A Disquisition on Government* represents an attempt not only to protect the institution of slavery in the American South but also to create a political theory which could be applied to everyone in American society. Concurrent majority was an attempt to "transcend sectional preoccupations," which were becoming increasingly important in a society which was rapidly dividing over the issue of slavery. (21) Although he has been accused of "endeavoring intentionally to incense the North and the South against each other," Calhoun felt throughout his life that he was acting in accordance with his "imperious duty towards the South and towards the Union." (22) Perhaps in the end it is best to describe Calhoun as continuing the work of the Founding Fathers in building a system of government which would protect the rights of all citizens, even though Calhoun's work was in part a defense of a system we find reprehensible today, instead of an attempt to expand the "realm of liberty to include those to whom freedom was denied." (23)

John C. Calhoun in his *A Disquisition on Government* above all else was trying to develop the "constitutional mechanisms that would insure the perpetuation of those republican values" he so cherished, although in the end the system he created was incapable of bridging the gulf which had already developed in the United States over slavery. (24) One can also question whether such a system could ever truly function in a society as vast and diverse as that of the United States, as one of the main examples Calhoun held up for concurrent majority, South Carolina and the Compromise of 1808, entailed less than 300,000 white men, hardly representative of the true nature of society, either then or now. Perhaps the best way to protect the rights of political minorities is to ensure that all members of society continue to use the vote as the only true way to protect their rights.

Endnotes

¹ John C. Calhoun, *A Disquisition on Government*, edited, with an Introduction, by C. Gordon Post (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953), 7.

² *Ibid.*, 7.

³ John Niven, *John C. Calhoun and the Price of Union: A Biography* (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 11-12.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁵ Charles M. Wiltse, *John C. Calhoun: Sectionalist, 1840-1850* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1951), 50.

⁶ Niven, 307.

⁷ J. William Harris, "Last of the Classical Republicans: An Interpretation of John C. Calhoun," *Civil War History* 30 (September 1984): 263.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 262.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 262-263.

¹⁰ Calhoun, 20.

¹¹ Lacy K. Ford, "Recovering the Republic: Calhoun, South Carolina, and the Concurrent Majority," *South Carolina Historical Magazine* (1988): 150.

¹² James Madison, *Federalist Paper Number 10*, quoted in *The American Intellectual Tradition*, edited by David A. Hollinger and Charles Capper (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 184.

¹³ Ford, "Recovering the Republic...," 154.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 154.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 154.

¹⁶ Ford, "Recovering the Republic...," 155.

¹⁷ Margaret L. Coit, ed., *John C. Calhoun* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 32.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 33.

¹⁹ Lacy K. Ford, "Republican Ideology in a Slave Society: The Political Economy of John C. Calhoun," *Journal of Southern History* (August 1988): 410-411.

²⁰ Harris, 265.

²¹ Robert A. Garrison, "Proslavery as Political Theory: The Examples of John C. Calhoun and George Fitzhugh," *South Atlantic Quarterly* (Spring 1985): 199.

²² H. Von Holst, *John C. Calhoun* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1882 and 1889), 124.

²³ Ford, "Recovering the Republic...," 159.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 155.

Bibliography

Calhoun, John C. *A Disquisition on Government and Selections from the Discourse*. Edited, with an Introduction by C. Gordon Post. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953.

Coit, Margaret L., ed. *John C. Calhoun*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970.

Ford, Lacy K. "Recovering the Republic: Calhoun, South Carolina, and the Concurrent Majority." *South Carolina Historical Magazine*. Vol. 89, no.3 (1988): 146-159.

_____. "Republican Ideology in a Slave Society: The Political Economy of John C. Calhoun." *Journal of Southern History*. Vol. LJV, no. 3 (August 1988): 405-424.

Garrison, Robert A. "Proslavery as Political Theory: The Examples of John C. Calhoun and George Fitzhugh." *South Atlantic Quarterly*. Vol. 84 (Spring 1985): 197-212.

Harris, J. William. "Last of the Classical Republicans: An Interpretation of John C. Calhoun." *Civil War History*. Vol. 30 (September 1984): 255-267.

Niven, John. *John C. Calhoun and the Price of Union: A Biography*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988.

Von Holst, H. *John C. Calhoun*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1882 and 1889.

Wiltse, Charles M. *John C. Calhoun: Sectionalist, 1840-1850*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1951.

How the Shah Won: The CIA's Role in the Iranian Coup of 1953

by Pamela Elvresman

The official version was quite simple: on August 19, 1953, the Iranian Shah Pahlavi replaced Mohammed Mossadegh with General Fazlollah Zahedi as Prime Minister of Iran. However, the actual events of that restless summer in Iran were much more devious, much more conspiratorial. The Shah's move to oust Mossadegh was not his alone, and it was not accomplished by a simple royal decision, but instead by plotting and covert action. In addition to the Iranians who supported the Shah, Western influence played a critical role in organizing and implementing the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh. British intelligence, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and especially the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency represented the Western powers who participated in planning the coup.

The conflict that culminated in the coup of 1953 began with unrest over the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). An agreement signed in 1933 gave the British-dominated AIOC an oil concession in Iran for sixty years — until 1993. The royalties that the Iranian government received from this concession comprised up to thirty percent of Iran's national income and sixty percent of its foreign exchange, yet — and this was the sensitive point for most Iranians — the AIOC earned ten times what it paid to Iran. (1) Clearly, Iran felt exploited by the British, who controlled Iran's major resource.

The Shah, recognizing that the AIOC operated in British, not Iranian, interests, proposed to remedy the situation as a component of his Seven Year Economic Plan. (2) Advocating the nationalization of the oil industry became "politically correct" in Iran during the early 1950s. In 1950, a petroleum analyst for the U.S. State Department summed up the mood in Iran: "AIOC and the British are genuinely hated in Iran; approval of AIOC is treated as political suicide." (3) Apparently, his analysis was correct, for in 1951 Prime Minister Razmara spoke in opposition to nationalizing the oil industry and four days later was assassinated. Negotiations with the AIOC for a fairer share of its profits were failing, and one prime minister after another, all struggling with the issue of nationalizing oil, proved too unpopular with the Iranian people to remain in office. Out of this chaos, Mohammed Mossadegh arose. Mossadegh, age 78 in 1951, had served thirty years in

the Majlis, Iran's lower house of Parliament. Because Mossadegh was popular and passionate about nationalization, the Shah promised to support him if he would nationalize the oil industry and raise the standard of living. (4) Mossadegh, therefore, became prime minister on April 19, 1951, and Iran's policy toward the West shifted to reflect the general attitude of Iranians as he proclaimed, "It is better to be independent and produce only one ton of oil a year than to produce 32 million tons and be a slave to Britain." (5) In September 1951, he expelled all British AIOC employees from Iran, which threw the refinery plants into disarray and left 70,000 Iranian AIOC employees without pay. After a continuing impasse in negotiations with the AIOC, Mossadegh boldly broke relations with Britain and ordered the remaining British citizens out of his country. After these two acts, the oil stopped flowing, causing Iran to lose the oil revenues on which it so desperately depended. The AIOC oil income, although less than Iran desired, was crucial to the country's economic health. *Time* magazine interpreted Mossadegh's seemingly self-defeating maneuvers as choosing "the ruin of Iran" over surrender to the British. (6)

America's reaction to the AIOC-nationalization issue was more sympathetic to Iran than to Britain. For example, when the British wanted to respond to Iranian nationalization with military force, the United States dissuaded them from action. Assistant Secretary of State George McGee believed that the British "were forcing nationalization on themselves" by acting so stubbornly when negotiating with Iran; in essence, he felt the AIOC should have accepted Iran's initial offer to share oil profits evenly. (7) True, Mossadegh proved just as unyielding as the British, but the United States tended to sympathize with his struggle against imperialism.

The Shah, meanwhile, had changed from being supportive of Prime Minister Mossadegh to being embarrassed by him. The Shah later wrote, "He spent his entire tenure of office fighting the [AIOC] in an amateur fashion and regardless of the effects upon his country." The Shah further criticized the Prime Minister for his limited grasp of economics and for negotiating as though Iranian oil were the only oil to which the British had access. (8) Of

course, Britain found other sources of oil (Kuwait and Venezuela) and responded to Mossadegh's impudence by imposing a boycott on Iranian oil. By the end of 1951, the Shah began to realize that Mossadegh may have done more to harm than to help his country. The Shah also became suspicious of the growing support Mossadegh was garnering as the leader of a loose coalition of political groups called the National Front, which (most significantly from America's standpoint) included the communist Tudeh party.

In November 1952, frustrated representatives of the AIOC approached Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA's chief representative in the Middle East, about overthrowing the Prime Minister of Iran because he was causing their company so much trouble. Expelled from Iran, the AIOC and British intelligence found they had to rely on American intelligence for a successful coup. The British also proposed that Roosevelt be the field commander for a joint operation to overthrow Mossadegh, and Roosevelt accepted. He did not believe, however, that the time was right to sell the plan to the American government because President Truman was still in power. In his book *Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran*, Roosevelt wrote, "As I told my British colleagues, we had, I felt sure, no chance to win approval from the outgoing administration of Truman and Acheson. The new Republicans, however, might be quite different." James Bill, an expert in American-Iranian relations, agrees that the conservative governments that came to power in Britain (under Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden) and in America (under Eisenhower and Dulles) "were more susceptible to the argument of the oil industry and were considerably more paranoid about the communist threat." (9) Despite its decision to participate in England's boycott of Iranian oil, the outgoing Truman administration had officially supported Mossadegh.

After Eisenhower took office, Mossadegh found that he faced a new, tougher American policy toward Iran. In May 1953, he appealed to America for more economic aid to substitute for Iran's loss of oil income. In his letter to the President, Mossadegh implied that he would turn to the Soviets for aid if Eisenhower refused him. Despite the threat, Eisenhower did refuse him, advising that Iran should settle with the AIOC and sell its oil to obtain the desperately needed funds. But Eisenhower's covert response to Mossadegh's request was Operation AJAX, the plan to overthrow him, approved four days before Eisenhower penned his official reply to Mossadegh. (10)

Meeting to approve Operation AJAX were Kermit Roosevelt; John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State; his brother Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA; Loy Henderson, Ambassador to Iran; and other members of the State Department. As the field commander for AJAX, Roosevelt had devised a plan for the coup, which he presented at the meeting. Those in attendance stressed the communist threat to Iran, stemming from the communist Tudeh party's support for Mossadegh. Roosevelt told his small audience,

"Naturally, the British have been primarily concerned with their oil problem, while our concern has been principally the Soviet threat to Iranian sovereignty," or what he later called "the obvious threat of Russian takeover." (11) John Foster Dulles had become convinced that the Soviet Union sought control of Iran to fulfill its long held desire for a warm-water port. In the Cold War atmosphere of the early 1950s, most top officials in the U.S. government believed that the communists had aspirations for dominance in Iran and would achieve them through Mossadegh.

Kermit Roosevelt focused on three crucial points in his presentation of Operation AJAX. First, the operation would include full cooperation of the Iranians, led by the Shah himself. (At the time of the meeting, however, the Shah was not aware of Anglo-American intentions in his country.) Second, Roosevelt emphasized that "in a showdown that is clearly recognized as a showdown, the Iranian army and the Iranian people will back the Shah. They will back him against Mossadegh, and most especially, against the Russians." (12) Creating a "clear showdown" would be the role of Operation AJAX. Third, he felt that the worst that could happen if AJAX failed would be that communists would take over Iran, the same as would occur if America did nothing. Presented with this frightening picture of imminent Soviet dominance in Iran, all in attendance approved Operation AJAX.

What was not discussed in the meeting, or at least was not reported as being discussed, was the issue of oil. Vernon Walters, a chronicler of the CIA, notes that the Dulles brothers had previously been partners in a Wall Street law firm that represented the AIOC, and that Allen Dulles enthusiastically favored the joint operation in Iran but maintained "a casual and noncommittal posture." James Bill asserts, "There is little doubt that petroleum considerations were involved in the American decision to assist in the [operation] . . ." (13) Indeed, after Mossadegh was replaced, American-oil companies secured a forty percent interest in Iranian oil.

On the surface, though, and probably deep down for many U.S. foreign policy makers, saving Iran from communism was the only official reason for American involvement in the coup. Anthony Eden, Britain's foreign minister, claimed that Eisenhower "seemed obsessed by the fear of a Communist Iran," and was determined not to let Iran become a second China. Likewise, *Time* reported that the consensus among Americans in Iran was that the country would soon welcome communism if it were left alone. Gladys and Richard Harkness, the only journalists to whom the CIA leaked AJAX information, expressed the typical Cold War mindset when they wrote, "A Russian score there would mean the crumbling of the democracies' position in the Middle East from Cairo to Baluchistan." (14) Mass media during the early fifties took advantage of this Cold War rhetoric and incorrectly identified Mossadegh's nationalist ideology as communistic.

Despite America's assumption that the Soviet Union

controlled Mossadegh through the Tudeh party, the USSR did not want to become involved in Iran. As the Korean War came to a close, Russia hoped to improve relations with the United States, which meant avoiding confrontation in Iran. Although the Soviets had no plans to take over Iran, they did not refrain from holding trade talks with Mossadegh's government. On August 8, 1953, Eisenhower heard rumors of Soviet aid to Iran, which convinced him to give the final go-ahead to Operation AJAX. (15)

Another major development in the summer of 1953 that contributed to the coup was Mossadegh's unmistakable encroachment upon the Shah's power. In July, Mossadegh attempted to pass legislation that would make himself the Commander in Chief of the Iranian army. The Majlis refused to pass the law, and the Shah, recognizing Mossadegh's threat to his monarchical control, replaced him with a new prime minister. Immediately, violent protests against the Shah's decision broke out on the streets of Teheran, forcing the Shah to reappoint Mossadegh. The uprising proved that Mossadegh was a popular leader who tapped into a growing nationalist sentiment among the masses in Iran. This popular support for his brazen rival distressed the Shah, who did not yet know about Operation AJAX. After regaining power, Mossadegh enacted more authoritarian measures by suspending the Majlis (in retaliation for denying him the Commander in Chief position), extending martial law, and restricting the press. In his account of the situation, Eisenhower wrote, "The Shah, however, decided not to conduct a military coup; instead he resolved to do what the Constitution permitted him to do — appoint Mossadegh's successor." (16) True, the Shah did appoint a new Prime Minister, but the method clearly was not authorized by the Iranian Constitution.

According to Kermit Roosevelt, Operation AJAX planned four "lines of attack." First, the operation had to win the support of the religious right, and second, that of the military. Third, support had to be won for whomever the Shah named as Mossadegh's replacement. The Shah's choice was General Fazlollah Zahedi, a man the British had taken prisoner during World War Two because they suspected he was pro-Nazi. Roosevelt assured the British that he had every indication that Zahedi was now pro-British; they took his word for it, and both America and Britain backed Zahedi as Mossadegh's replacement. (17)

Operation AJAX's fourth objective was to have Iranian agents "distribute pamphlets, organize mobs, keep track of the opposition — you name it, they'll do it." The key to driving Iranians to the pro-Shah side was convincing them that Mossadegh was depending on the USSR and alienating Iran from the West. Also, they had to persuade Iranians that if Mossadegh extended his "personal regime . . . there could be no continuing meaningful role for a monarch in Iran." (18)

Some members of the Mossadegh-led National Front became convinced of these two points without any help from the West. The loosely banded National Front included

both the religious, traditional middle-class and the liberal, modern middle-class, bound together because they both opposed British imperialism and monarchical authoritarianism. As the communist Tudeh party became more vocal in the National Front, the religious right, which considered communism atheistic, abandoned the coalition. According to Bill, this caused a "serious blow" to Mossadegh because it "effectively cut his connections with the lower middle classes and the Iranian masses." Compounding the issue, as more religious groups left the National Front proclaiming "Better Shah than the Tudeh," (19) Mossadegh was forced to rely even more on the Tudeh for support. Sepehr Zabih, author of *The Communist Movement in Iran*, asserts that "the Communist movement became, for all practical purposes, the backbone of support for the government." (20) Mossadegh also found himself losing the loyalty of the liberal, non-Communist groups as they became disenchanted with his proposed oil-less economy and as he himself exhibited the same authoritarianism that the National Front had opposed in the Shah.

The Tudeh's growing role in the National Front became the primary matter of concern for Americans. Kermit Roosevelt interpreted the party's rise to power as the Soviet's tactic of manipulating Mossadegh and intimidating America. For his part, Mossadegh thought the West exaggerated communist influence in order to alarm the Iranian religious right (which was, in fact, one of the objectives of Operation AJAX) and to justify U.S. intervention as part of the Cold War. However, an important point is that Mossadegh distrusted the Tudeh just as the Tudeh distrusted him; in short, they were not willing allies. A State Department intelligence report listed thirteen ways that Tudeh goals differed from those of Mossadegh's National Front. (21) Furthermore, Mossadegh, a landlord and a millionaire, was not a figure that communists could easily trust. The Tudeh embarrassed Mossadegh with their overt anti-Americanism, demanding expulsion of American advisors from Iran and vandalizing American property.

Why, then, did Mossadegh not suppress the Tudeh party? First, he needed their support when many political groups withdrew from the National Front. Second, as Mossadegh's foreign minister Dr. Hossein Fatemi explained, Mossadegh believed in "democratic liberal ideals" and would not suppress any group, regardless of its ideology. Dr. Fatemi realized that although America viewed this as a pro-Soviet policy, Iran was actually pursuing a policy of non-alignment. (22) The Shah offered a third explanation for the Tudeh-Mossadegh alliance: Mossadegh believed he could outwit the Tudeh party. The Shah, however, predicted a reverse outcome — that the communists would overpower Mossadegh. Zabih agrees that Mossadegh underestimated the Tudeh's appeal to the masses; at its peak the Tudeh claimed 300,000 sympathizers. In any case, Mossadegh accepted Tudeh support, granting the party access to both government propaganda and the army, alarming many Iranians, and

leading to the downfall of Mossadegh. (23)

When Roosevelt surveyed the Iranian situation in August, 1953, he doubted he could win support from the academics in Teheran — they were firmly anti-Shah. Operation AJAX had tried to win the support of the religious groups which were abandoning the National Front, but the religious right retreated, uncommitted to either side. In contrast, most of the army (junior officers and enlisted men) were still loyal to the monarchy, even though Mossadegh had planted his own officers in key positions, especially General Riahi as the Chief of Staff. Therefore, since Roosevelt could not count on either the academy or the right, AJAX's main thrust was mobilizing the majority of the army against the prime minister. (24)

During secret meetings held in Iran, Roosevelt and the Shah planned the coup. They decided that the Shah would sign firmans (royal decrees) dismissing Mossadegh and appointing Zahedi in his place. Then, the Shah would fly to his residence on the Caspian Sea as the transition took place and would return once Zahedi had successfully taken power. In practice, however, a delay occurred in delivering the firmans because of communication problems between Iranian and American agents. The delay provided Mossadegh with enough time to uncover the plot. When Colonel Nassiry, the officer charged with delivering the firmans, reached Mossadegh's residence, General Riahi was already there to arrest him. After Nassiry was imprisoned, Mossadegh announced over the radio that some royalist officers (never mentioning the Shah) had attempted a coup and had failed. When news of the failed coup reached the Shah, he fled to Rome.

The immediate response to Mossadegh's announcement was an anti-Shah demonstration by the Tudeh party. The communists screamed anti-royalist slogans and destroyed statues of the Shah and his father. Controversy surrounds this demonstration: Roosevelt insisted that the Soviets were behind it, yet Bill claims that the Soviets "at no time indicated any external support for the Tudeh." And Mark Gasiorowski, author of "The 1953 Coup d'Etat in Iran," writes that it was not even the Tudeh that staged the demonstration on that day. He claims that the CIA paid a mob \$50,000 to pretend they were the Tudeh to "provoke fears of a Tudeh takeover and thus rally support for Zahedi." (25) Whether or not the mob was under Soviet control or was even under Tudeh control, the demonstrations did serve to frighten many Iranians, convincing them that the Tudeh, and therefore Mossadegh, was the enemy.

After the first attempt at the coup had failed, Roosevelt busied himself with improvising a new strategy, relying on his Iranian agents for help. Since Iranians did not know of the Shah's order to replace Mossadegh, Roosevelt asked his agents to copy the firmans and distribute them to key military figures who they believed were anti-Mossadegh. One general pledged his support and began to march his forces toward the city on Wednesday, August 19, 1953.

Also on that day, a pro-Shah mob congregated in Iran's capital city. Although Roosevelt claimed he would not rely on mercenaries, both James Bill and Mark Gasiorowski report that he paid for the pro-Shah mob, which was quickly joined by unpaid Iranians who had been outraged by the Tudeh uprising. (26) The mob began moving toward Mossadegh's house. Meanwhile, Roosevelt collected General Zahedi from his hiding place and presented him to the crowd, who at once carried him on their shoulders. When the mob reached Mossadegh's, army forces still loyal to the aged prime minister battled the crowd for nine hours, leaving 300 dead. As the pro-Shah mob broke through his defenses and ransacked his house, Mossadegh fled in his pajamas. The coup was complete. On Friday, August 21, Mossadegh turned himself in; the next day, the Shah returned home to cheering crowds. The immediate result, then, of the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh was the restoration of the Shah's power as the monarch of Iran.

When analyzing the West's role in ousting Mossadegh, three positions can be argued: the coup occurred only because of the West's intervention; the coup would have occurred regardless of the West's intervention; or the coup occurred because the West simply mobilized Iranians already willing to stage a coup, but not without foreign support. Gasiorowski advocates the first position, arguing that the "coup [was] unlikely without U.S. help," and "the coup could not have occurred at the time and in the manner it did without considerable U.S. assistance." (27) He offers as evidence his belief that the Iranian economy was recovering in 1953 and that Mossadegh still could count on considerable support from the National Front, the masses, and the military. Also, he asserts that the CIA played an undeniably essential role in the coup by planning, directing, and financing Operation AJAX. (28)

Professor Amos Perlmutter, author of the foreword to Zabih's book *The Mossadegh Era*, advocates the second stance: "the CIA role in these climactic events was not very significant, despite some of the heavily unsubstantiated claims of the old boys such as Kermit Roosevelt." (29) He believes that Mossadegh would have been overthrown by Iranians for Iranian reasons, without any interference by Operation AJAX. The Shah, although he clearly knew of the CIA's role in restoring him to power, echoed Perlmutter's assertion: "I defy anybody to prove that the overturn of Mossadegh was not basically the work of the common people of my country." (30)

James Bill maintains the third position in his analysis of the U.S. role in Iran from 1950-1953. He contends that Operation AJAX simply mobilized anti-Mossadegh forces already existing in Iran, but that the mobilization was critical because the Iranians needed the West's direction and support in this endeavor. (31) And although the man who wrote the foreword to his book underestimates America's role, Zabih agrees with Bill on this point. Zabih believes that to blame just the West's intervention or just Iran's domestic problems "exclusively for the collapse of the

nationalist regime is to understate the complex interaction of external and internal political forces in this era." (32) Because this interpretation takes into account both Iranian strengths and weaknesses, it is the most credible explanation for the nature of the relationship between the United States and Iran in executing the coup.

Whatever its true role in the Iranian coup, the CIA operation did produce significant repercussions for American foreign policy for the next thirty years. The coup marked the first time the United States used covert action to overthrow a government in a time of peace. The overwhelming success and low cost of the operation encouraged the CIA to use this type of action in the future. According to Bill, "The Iran escapade acted as a catalyst that bred other CIA interventions — beginning with Guatemala in 1954." (33) When Kermit Roosevelt returned to America to give a presentation on Operation AJAX, he noticed that John Foster Dulles' eyes were gleaming. Worried about Dulles's reaction, Roosevelt ended his presentation with a warning:

We were successful in this venture because our assessment of the situation in Iran was correct . . . If we, the CIA, are ever going to try something like this again, we must be absolutely sure that the people and the army want what we want. If not, you had better give the job to the Marines. (34)

But they did not give the next job (Guatemala) to the Marines — they offered it to Roosevelt, who turned it down because he felt it did not meet his qualifications for a successful operation. Kermit's warning went unheeded, and the CIA staged a coup in Guatemala and attempted coups in Cuba and Chile without success. Never again was there a domestic situation favoring a coup like there had been in Iran in 1953.

Iran's domestic situation, however, had changed radically by 1978. Eisenhower, who once had refused to give Iran more aid when Mossadegh requested it, gave the Shah an additional 45 million dollars after the 1953 coup. Unfortunately, America found itself supporting a dictatorship, not a democracy. The Shah purged the Tudeh party, rigged the Majlis elections, arrested thousands of people who had supported the National Front, and enacted press censorship. Mossadegh's government, according to Gasiorowski, was "the last popular, democratically oriented government to hold office in Iran," as compared to the

Shah's authoritarian regime. (35) Up through Jimmy Carter's presidency, the United States strongly supported the Shah, despite his dictatorship, thinking of him as America's closest friend in the Middle East. Supporting the Shah blinded the United States to the Iranian people's growing antagonism toward both the Shah and America.

This antagonism manifested itself in a revolutionary religious movement which thrived in Iran under the leadership of the Ayatollah Khomeini. It mainly attacked the Shah, whom they felt was propped up by the Americans; in 1978, demonstrators shouted "Death to the American Shah!" Iranians knew of the CIA's involvement in the 1953 coup and believed that the CIA would not hesitate to become involved once more if the Shah were again threatened. The 1953 coup, "a short-term triumph [that] led to a long term defeat for the United States," (36) contributed significantly to Iran's deep hatred of America and to the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979. Bill explains the link between the coup and the revolutions: "The 1953 intervention aborted the birth of revolutionary nationalism in Iran that would burst forth twenty-five years later in a deeply xenophobic and extremist form." Gasiorowski finds an even stronger connection between the 1953 coup and the 1978-1979 revolution: "If Mosaddeq [sic] had not been overthrown, the revolution might not have occurred." (37)

The United States, not able to foresee the consequences of its actions, participated in the 1953 coup for two reasons: communism and oil. Although Kermit Roosevelt told the Shah that he would not be under any obligation in return for American aid in restoring him to the throne, the United States obtained Iranian oil very cheaply after the coup. Also, British and American oil companies each came to own forty percent of the newly formed National Iranian Oil Company. But more important than oil, the United States felt that it had won a decisive victory in the Cold War by rescuing Iran from "the closing clutch of Moscow." (38) To the American government, assisting in the overthrow of the Iranian Prime Minister restored stability and thwarted Soviet intentions in the Middle East. To Iran, U.S. involvement in the coup helped to mobilize a segment of its society in support of its monarchy. However, in doing so, the United States erroneously imposed Iran's domestic situation onto the larger picture of the Cold War, resulting in American support for an autocratic, unpopular, yet anti-communist Shah.

Endnotes

¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate For Change 1953-1956* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1963), 160; John Prados, *President's Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1986), 92.

² Kermit Roosevelt, *Countercoast: The Struggle For Control of Iran* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 70.

³ Richard Funkhouser quoted in James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1988), 62.

⁴ Roosevelt, 85.

⁵ Quoted in Eisenhower, 159.

⁶ "Man of the Year," *Time*, 7 January 1952, 20.

⁷ Bill, 73.

⁸ Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, *Mission For My Country* (London: Hutchinson, 1961), 91.

⁹ Roosevelt, 107; Bill, 73.

¹⁰ Prados, 95.

¹¹ Roosevelt, 11 and 3.

¹² *Ibid.*, 12.

¹³ Prados, 94; Bill 81.

¹⁴ Robert A. Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 74; "Man of the Year," 21; Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," *Saturday Evening Post*, 6 November 1954, 66.

¹⁵ Aryeh Y. Yodfat, *The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 20; Prados, 96.

¹⁶ Eisenhower, 163.

¹⁷ Roosevelt, 163 and 122. Mark Gasiorowski, author of "The 1953 Coup d'Etat in Iran" (see note 25) tells a different story of how General Zahedi was chosen to become Mossadegh's replacement. He claims that it was the British who supported Zahedi, not the Shah, because Zahedi promised to implement an oil settlement favorable to the British if they would support him. The British, then, had to convince the Shah to support Zahedi, not the other way around. Gasiorowski claims the Shah told Ambassador Henderson he would support Zahedi if the United States and Britain would give Iran "massive economic aid."

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 163 and 126.

¹⁹ Bill, 72; Sepehr Zabih, *The Mossadegh Era* (Chicago: Lake View Press, 1982), 128.

²⁰ Sepehr Zabih, *The Communist Movement in Iran* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 200.

²¹ Roosevelt, 119; Bill 93.

²² Zabih, *Mossadegh*, 133. Dr. Fatemi had a point: J.F. Dulles tended to think only in terms of "us and them." To him, if a country were not expressly for the United States, then it must be for the Soviet Union. Mossadegh truly was a nationalist, trying to avoid dependence on either superpower.

²³ See Eisenhower, 163 for the Shah's explanation; Zabih, *Mossadegh*, 132; see Bill, 68 for statistics on Tudeh's sympathizers; see Zabih, *Mossadegh*, 136 for Tudeh's use of army and propaganda.

²⁴ See Roosevelt, 109 for his opinion of academia; *ibid.*, 93 for state of the army; and *ibid.*, 71 for his assessment of the religious right. The following summary of the events of the coup are from Roosevelt's account. His book has been criticized for inaccuracy, but I have not included any of his statements that have been challenged.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 179; Bill, 9; Mark Gasiorowski, "The 1953 Coup d'Etat in Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19 (August 1987): 274.

²⁶ Bill, 91; Gasiorowski, 274, who claims Kermit paid the mob \$10,000.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 278 and 277.

²⁸ Widely varying accounts exist as to the cost of Operation AJAX. Gasiorowski writes that it cost around \$60,000 and John Ranzlugh, author of *The Agency* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), estimates the cost as \$200,000. John Prados, however, states that AJAX cost between 10 million and 20 million dollars, "far more than the \$100,000 or \$200,000 originally estimated." (97)

²⁹ Amos Perlmutter, foreword to *The Mossadegh Era*, by Sepehr Zabih (Chicago: Lake View Press, 1982), vii.

³⁰ Shah, 58.

³¹ Bill, 93.

³² Zabih, *Mossadegh*, 126.

³³ Bill, 94.

³⁴ Roosevelt, 210.

³⁵ Gasiorowski, 261.

³⁶ Quoted in Bill, 86; Divine, 79.

³⁷ Bill, 84; Gasiorowski, 261.

³⁸ Harkness, 68.

Bibliography

- Ambrose, Stephen. *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*. 6th ed., New York: Penguin Books, 1991.
- Bill, James A. *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1988.
- Divine, Robert A. *Eisenhower and the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. *Mandate For Change 1953-1956*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1963.
- Gasiorowski, Mark. "The 1953 Coup d'Etat in Iran." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. 19 (August 1987): 261-86.
- Harkness, Richard and Gladys. "The Mysterious Doings of CIA." *Saturday Evening Post*, 6 November 1954, 66-68.
- "Man of the Year." *Time*, 7 January 1952, 18-21.
- Prados, John. *President's Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II*. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1986.
- Ranelagh, John. *The Agency*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986.
- Roosevelt, Kermit. *Countercoup: The Struggle For Control of Iran*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.
- Shah Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza. *Mission For My Country*. London: Hutchinson, 1961.
- Walters, Vernon A. *Silent Missions*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1978.
- Yodfat, Aryeh Y. *The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.
- Zabih, Sepehr. *The Communist Movement in Iran*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.
- _____. *The Mossadegh Era*. Chicago: Lake View Press, 1982.