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Editor's Note:

The 1997 History Journal represents a wide array of subject matter and oustanding writing by Wittenberg students. Much hard work and dedication has played a significant role in the production of the journal and we wish to thank our staff for their efforts.

We would like to extend our thanks to the Wittenberg History Deparment for their support of our project, especially Margaret DeButy and our advisor Dr. Charles Chatfield. Susan Crown and the Publications Department, Clark County Historical Society, Robert Gaetjens and all the other people involved in the creation of the journal deserve a warm thanks for their help with the journal. Without the help and dedication of these people the journal would not exist. Thank you all for your work and dedication; we could not have done it without you.

Kristin M. Spalding
Kevin M. Lydy

The Hartje Papers

The Martha and Robert G. Hartje Award is awarded to a Senior in the spring semester every year. The History Department determines three finalists who write a 600-800 word narritive historical essay dealing with an historical event or figure. The finalists must have a 2.7 GPA and the completed six history courses. The winner is awarded $300 at a spring semester History Colloquium and all three entries are included in the History Journal. This year all three entries received the award and the award was divided between the three participants.

The Wittenberg History Journal
1996-1997 Staff

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Damage to the Krell-French Piano Works.

Photo courtesy of The Clark County Historical Society.

View of the entire East Street Front . . . looking south.

Photo courtesy of The Clark County Historical Society.

Agents of Change:
The Burning of the East Street Shops and the Black's Opera House

By Jillian Benjamin
Senior, Cincinnati, Ohio—Written for an Independent Study with Dr. Chatfield

The Springfield fire department of today bears little resemblance to the hiarchicial structure of the turn of the century. Gone are the days of the bucket brigades and minute men that defined a century of firefighting. In 1904, fearing the further destruction of Springfield, the city restructured the current system of part time fire fighters, replacing it with a new, more skillful department. The transition to the modern structure was filled with the destruction of many buildings that made up the history of Springfield. Out of the mistakes of two devastating fires in this midwestern city would come the complete restructuring of the department. The East Street Shops fire of 1902 and the Black's Opera House fire a year later would have a profound impact on the department because it would call into question the city's priorities. The incompetence of the fire department as well as the city itself, would be buried under a stream of beauacracy until the two conflagrations woke the citizens of Springfield to recognize that something had to be done. To understand the transition, it becomes necessary to look at these two fires in light of the Springfield of today.

The history of the Springfield Fire Department involved four different periods of fire fighting, leading up to the restructuring of the department. The first period dates back to the begining of Springfield when "Bucket Brigades" became standard practice. Each member of the community was expected to own two leather buckets capable of holding water. In the event of a fire, all citizens available would assist in extinguishing the blaze. Gradually, as technology advanced, Springfield found itself in a second stage, with various volunteer departments vying for jurisdiction over the city's blazes. The third stage, from 1865 until 1904, involved the use of both part time and full time paid firefighters. With half of the force working on a full time basis, the part time firemen or minute men, as they were known, became resentful. "Minute men" were paid fire fighters who retained their original source of employment. In the event of a fire, these men would leave their jobs and extinguish the fire. This system, due to the competitive nature of the division in pay, gave rise to the incompetent management of the East Street Shops Fire and the Black's Opera House fire. As a result, the Springfield Fire department would enter its fourth period, that of a full time, fully paid staff that would avoid the mistakes of the past through organization and training.[1]

Built in the early 1880s by William Whitely, the East Street Shops had been the home of Champion, one of the largest farm equipment manufactures in the country.[2] Known then as Whitely, Fassler & Kelly, the facility could hold up to three thousand employees within its walls. "When completed, it was said to be exceeded in size only by the Krupp Munition Works in Germany."[3] However, by 1900, after Whitely had suffered in the 1887 financial panic, the imense building was partitioned out to ten smaller businesses, employing roughly one thousand people. Chief among these was the Krell-French Piano Company.

Albert Krell, originally of Cincinnati,[4] viewed Springfield as an ideal city to begin to turn his dream into reality. In late nineteenth and early twentieth century America, the piano was a status symbol that any respectable household contained. With the parlor as the focal point of Victorian society, the entertainment and educational value of the instrument was highly revered.[5] Perhaps fearing the completion of the Baldwin Piano Works of his native city, Krell's choice of Springfield seemed a natural match. Springfield had the potential to become another Chicago, with its current rate of growth. The National Road had seen to its rapid expansion, as

important figureheads such as ex-President John Quincy Adams and well noted statesman Henry Clay, made their way west.[6] Even with Champion gone, Springfield still claimed Buckeye and the American Seeding Company as chief manufacturers of farm implements holding onto the title that Champion had brought to the city. Purchased in 1901, the site of the piano works underwent massive renovations, preparing for a merger with six other eastern piano manufacturers, with headquarters in Springfield. When completed, Krell intended to buy out the remainder of the Whitely, Fassler, and Kelly building, increasing production from the current 12,000 to 60,000 pianos a year. At the time of the fire, roughly a dozen families had transferred to the Springfield area to begin the transition as more prepared to come. An open house was held on Sunday, 2 February to display the new facilities to the public; it seemed as if Krell's dream was becoming a reality.[7]

Springfield saw Krell as an ideal company. Krell's rapid restoration of the facility and his praise of Springfield as everything a city should be, convinced city officials that his business could be the key to the future. However, while the city opened its arms for the company, it failed to listen to its owner's pleas for preventive fire measures. Built of wood and brick, the East Street Shops were constructed during some of the coldest winter months Springfield could endure. Perhaps due to the adverse conditions that surrounded its assembly, the Whitely, Fassler, and Kelly building was a known fire hazard. In addition, major fires in the Arcade, the PP Mast Home, and Wittenberg's Hanna House, had given most businesses in town a justifiable fear of fire. In December 1901, two months previous to the fire that would destroy it, the Krell-French Piano company approached the Springfield Waterworks for the purpose of obtaining a fire plug. The company's fear (which would prove justifiable) was that "city mains were not large enough to furnish protection for a structure so enormous and that the plugs were too far apart to be of service in all emergencies."[8] Yet the request for another six inch main line with several additional plugs was denied due to a technicality. The trustees of the department, strapped for funds, determined that the private business should be responsible for its own fire prevention. As a result, a fire call box was installed in the west wing at Krell's expense. At the time of the meeting the *Springfield Press- Republic* reported (in an editorial):

> It is to be hoped that the Water Works Trustees, at their next meeting, will take prompt and favorable action on the request of the Krell-French Piano Company for adequate

fire protection. There is no denying the fact that the section of the city in which the East Street Shops are situated has been shamefully slighted in this respect, and yet the manufactories in that district are the backbone of Springfield. Without them the town could not exist. Homes there must be when there is work.[9]

The question remains, if the city valued its new piano company, as well as the other businesses in the area, why was it willing to ignore what was perfectly clear to the paper? The money saved on the installation of roughly six fire plugs, would cost the city nine businesses, two to three thousand jobs, and the integrity of both the waterworks and eventually the fire departments of Springfield .

Krell's plans for building a company to rival all others, would come to a screeching halt the morning of Monday, 10 February 1902, as "the most destructive fire in [the] city's history wiped out ten splendid industries."[10] At approximately 8:45 A.M. a fire was discovered in the garret above the Progress Furnace and Stove Company, one of the smaller businesses to be housed in the complex. The fire was slow in spreading, burning through much of the attic space of the factory, and allowing time for all employees and customers to escape with relative ease. Later reports state that many boarders in the houses that lined East Street, came out to watch the spectacle, as people are prone to do.[11] Yet they soon left because the fire seemed to be dying on its own. Three Springfield fire companies responded to the first alarm at 9:15 A.M., led by chief William Follrath. After assessing the situation, Follrath ordered that the remainder of the companies in the city respond to the East Street Shops. The delay between the first arrival, and the second wave of companies would later cause much criticism. Due to the shear size of the building, the lack of manpower would prove detremental to containing the blaze. The second set of companies to be called had been sent to answer a call from Buck Creek, prior to Follrath's request. Fire call boxes were transmitted to the station houses, so these companies had no way of knowing what was happening only blocks away. The fire at Buck Creek was a false alarm and so the companies returned to their stations with tired horses.

> Find [sic]that Buck Creek was not on fire, the tired horses were sent back to the West End Engine House, whence they had started only to find that their services were needed in the extreme east end of the city where one of the greatest factories in the world was going up in smoke for the lack of a competent fire chief.[12]

It was never resolved as to who was to blame for this unnecessary run, but the fire department and Follrath would eventually shoulder the blame. Friction would remain between many of the companies as firemen refused to speak to other firemen. Morale could not have been high in the aftermath of the fire.

Meanwhile,the fire that had first seemed minor and under control was rapidly becoming unmanageable. Witnesses would report to both the *Springfield Sun* and the *Press Republic* that there was no organization by Follrath or his squad. Spectators crowded the area as firemen ran in all directions. Ground crews were unsuccessful in fighting the fire with their hoses, due to a lack of water pressure. According to Cal Roberd's book, *150 Years: From Buckets to Bolts,* "three firefighters attempted to reach the attic but the water pressure was so poor that the water hardly ran out of the nozle."[13] The fire plug that the fire department was using was over half of a block away from the East Street Shops.

The cry of low pressure would be an excuse that Chief Follrath used in his explanation of many of the fires during his tenure as Chief of the Springfield Fire Department. Among those were:

> PP Mast Home
> Wittenberg Seminary
> Arcade Hotel
> Lagonda House
> St. John Sewing Machine Co.
> Whip Factory
> E.W. Ross and Co. Shop
> Funk Building
> Congregation Church
> Grant's Slaughter House[14]

The system of using city water mains to draw water to a fire was a more effective method that that of the "bucket brigade." However, the city had not allocated enough money to make it a realistic practice at the turn of the century. Due to the bureaucracy that surrounded the department, implimentation of water mains had been slow in coming to Springfield. "The practice of answering fire alarms without a means of providing proper water pressure for fire streams, in this case, lost the battle before it was even begun."[15]

In addition to the problems of water pressure, there was also the matter of equipment. Ironically, the original steam engines that had been retired in favor of the fire plugs would provide the only true water pressure available during the fire. The engines had been mothballed, thus time and property were lost in the faith of the new system. "While fire streams from these engines might have made a difference if they had been available and ready for action on the initial alarm, it was a case of too little

and too late when they were finally put in action.[16] Further creating a problem were the aerial trucks that were originally brought to the site of the fire. After raising the ladder of the larger truck, it was decided that the location was wrong. In the process of moving the truck a bolt slipped, rendering the ladder useless. An attempt at raising a second, smaller ladder provided the same results. After the ladders failed, Follrath ordered his men inside the building. Lack of direction caused a panic on the part of the men in the building, allowing the main hose to be burnt in half. Thus as the fire raged on, the fire department was now without water, hoses, or ladders.

As it became apparent that the fire was not coming under control, many of the business owners stepped in, demanding action of some sort. Without permission from the fire department, the Indianapolis Frog and Switch Co. ordered its independent operators to dynamite the wall connecting Frog and the remainder of the companies. The dynamite steered the fire clear of this portion of the factory, saving the business from ruin. After the success of the dynamite, Krell pleaded with Follrath to do the same with his factory. Having neither the manpower or the dynamite needed, Krell could not save his factory on his own.[17] Follrath, believing that the destruction of the dynamite would outweigh the impact of the fire, refused Krell's request. The fire had not yet reached the piano factory and Follrath believed the fire would be contained before it caused any damage. The fire continued to spread as it eventually reached the Krell-French building, even as the mayor of Springfield ordered bystanders to retrieve molds from the factory floor.[18]

As the fire continued toward the northern portion of the shops, the fire department realized that a thirteen car train was siting on the railroad tracks that ran next to the building. It was reported that there was "only little hope of getting the cars away before explosion."[19] Several of the cars contained the toxic substance, benzine. The department was busy with the building itself, the train cars could not be dealt with. No evacuation attempt would have saved the hundreds of men, women and children that were in close proximany to the East Street Shops. However, two volunteers of the Detroit Southern Railroad, James Schafer and Lew Underwood, drove the cars to safety only minutes before the collapse of the building walls. If the train would have been struck by the walls, the issue of the fire would no longer have mattered: the area would have ceased to exist.

In the aftermath of the East Street Shops fire there remained many unanswered questions. Krell, who had praised Springfield only the week before his

company's demise, went on record the day after the fire:

> Our plant would have been saved if there had been proper fire protection, sufficient fire engines, and water pressure. There is no excuse for the loss of the East Street Shops. I consider it criminal negligence on the part of the city. Where there is one fire there is always another and God help the companies that can not help themselves. We applied for proper fire protection but the city refused to aid us. The town is to blame and responsible.[20]

The city set up a public forum that elicited a response from then governor A.S. Bushnell of Ohio: "anything that interferes with our industrial pursuits, is a calamity."[21] In this confusion, blame flew in all directions, but it settled on the fire department. Slow response time, inadequate organization and equipment failure had turned the city's eyes on the department. Chief Follrath offered a statement in his defense:

> When I arrived almost the entire forth floor was ablaze inside. In Eastern Ave. the pressure was so low that we could not reach the top of the one story building with a stream. When I saw that the part fronting count could not be saved, I then turned my attention to the Krell-French Piano works. . . I had pleaded with the Board for fire protection for our factories, perhaps I will get it now.[22]

The days surrounding the fire were filled with attempts to appease Krell and the other businesses. The city needed Krell. However, the fire had effectively put the Krell-French Piano Works out of business. Local Springfield residents tried to hold onto the companies by setting up a trust fund donated by area teachers, school children, police, and janitors.[23] Yet once it became clear that Krell was leaving, accusations died down.

The fire department was more of a political entity than a skilled profession at the turn of the century. Firemen came and were let go at the slightest comment. The result was a department staffed with incompetent men, who were afraid to voice their true opinions, or lose their jobs. The team work that was essential to fighting these fires was replaced by active competition and uneasiness. Thus the problems that arose from the East Street Shops fire were buried under a mountain of buacracy. "An agitation was then begun for the purchase of engines, and the city again became the possessor of several steam-engines, and now possesses what might be considered a very well managed and adequate fire department."[24] The city increased the budget to

compensate for two new engines and soon the issue faded from the public consciousness. In the end, over $750,000 (in terms of 1902 prices) in damages was reported from the various owners. The factory that had stood for so much was completely destroyed; however, the destruction was not over yet.

In the cold, early morning hours of 19 February 1903 almost a year to the day of the East Street Shops Fire, the Black's Opera House was reported to be on fire by F.A. Bennett of room 55, a boarder at the new YMCA located to the rear of the building.[25] The informant claimed to have seen flames coming from the basement of the Miller Brother's Plumbing company. Among the original five companies, Central Company (# 1) arrived first on the scene and immediately began searching for the hydrant to connect with the hoses. With no clear idea of where the plug was located, it took the company took nearly twenty minutes to discover and connect the hoses to the plug at Fountain and Main. The inadvertent mistake of the city in shoveling snow onto the plug, combined with the extreme cold of the February morning, resulted in a frozen fire hydrant. The confusion of simply connecting the hose delayed action and in so doing, gave the firefighters a larger fire to face. Yet again, a fire that seemed under control at its discovery would expand into catastrophe, as the incompetence of the Springfield fire company surfaced in the public eye.

Built by Andrew C. Black in 1868, the Opera house was situated on the northwest corner of Main and Market Streets (now Fountain Avenue). After the initial presentation of "The Drummer Boy of Shilo," the Opera house, for many years, remained the focal point for entertainment and conventions in Springfield as the only building of its kind.[26] Located where the First National Bank now stands, Black's was a regal addition to the Springfield landscape. Standing four stories in height, the building contained an concert hall on its second floor, that could seat up to fifteen hundred people, a post office on the ground level, five residential flats housing approximately twelve men, women, and children on the fourth floor, as well as many local businesses on the street level. In addition to the YMCA and Michell Brothers Plumbing, the building housed Kaufman's clothing store, Black's Dry goods (which was founded by Black), and Mullholland's Jewelry store. All would be among those businesses destroyed. By the time of the arrival of Companies #3, 7, and 5 (in that order), the original team had entered the building. Extremely heavy smoke made finding the fire nearly impossible. If the smoke prevented the firemen from entering on the ground level, it was the chief of the fire department who impeded any effort to approach the fire from another angle. Follrath did

not believe that ladders would be needed at the Black's Opera House, sending his men to search the building even as the floor began to collapse: "no ladders were used and the firemen were wasting energy as well as water in the lack of a competent leader."[27] Follrath responded to this criticism by stating that " ladders at this time were not needed as the firemen could go any place about the Opera House." However, Follrath's excuse does not match accounts of the fire. The smoke and weakening floorboards that comprised the stage of the Opera House were not safe by any means.

The fire continued to grow, spreading into Kaufman's Clothing Store. As firefighters concentrated their efforts on extinguishing the blaze:

> The Chief stated that for some time he thought that the fire could be confined to the opera building, but when he saw that the flames were spreading in spite of the work of the department, he sent for the #2 steamer, which was stored at #3 Engine House. It was over an hour from the time the first alarm was sent until the second steamer arrived.[29]

While firefighters directed their efforts to Kaufman's, the fire quietly moved toward the new YMCA. The Young Men's Christian Association was not a new member of the Springfield community; however, it had recently established itself in a new location on Fisher Street. With strong connections to Springfield politics, the burning of the YMCA in all probability influenced the actions against the fire department in the wake of the fire: "Incompetence and mismanagement alone are due to the destruction of the city's favorite institution, the YMCA."[30] Failing to stop the spread of the blaze to the building in time, the YMCA was beyond salvation.

Unfortunately, the Opera House fire also claimed the lives of three men, as the walls of the building that had been extinguished, began to fall. After news of the fire spread throughout Springfield, many of the merchants surrounding Black's Opera House rushed to the scene in an effort to save their belongings. Among those were the owner and employees of Mulholland Jewelry Store, as owner J.H. Mulholland, fourteen-year-old Dorsey Crane, and African-American porter, Albert Voorhees perished in the effort to remove the store's merchandise from harm's way.

Unlike the East Street Fires that had miraculously taken no lives, the Black's Opera House fire would be viewed in weeks to come with a heavy heart. In fairness to the fire department, the influx of store owners combined with the "Kodak fiends"[31] prevented firefighters from rescuing the men trapped under the wall. Rescue teams comprised of firefighters, police, and citizens, were unsure of how many victims lay under the ruble. However, Follrath's lack of control over the scene could easily be blamed for their deaths simply because ordinary citizens had no business entering buildings that were in potential danger.

In the aftermath of the Black's Opera House fire, criticism of the fire department in general and Follrath in particular, spread throughout the community. Three main issues came into question after the fire:

1) The delay involved with locating and connecting the hose;
2) The considerable delay in sounding the second alarm calling the remainder of the companies.
3) The delay in activating the second steamer, allowing the fire to spread.[32]

"I want to make the statement that if I deserved to be criticized, all right," responded Follrath to allegations for the mistakes of the fire. However, in the weeks that followed the destruction, questions of Follrath's position as chief of the department were raised by the papers and in turn, city officials. According to an anonymous source in the fire department,

> The charge was freely made yesterday that there had been more and greater fires since his installation as chief of the department than there had been in five times that period previous to his advent. As one man put it, 'The people are prone to forget under the excitement of one fire, the great destruction which had been wrought by previous conflagrations.'[33]

This source for the paper went on to state that, against the pleadings of members of the police force, Follrath refused to provide protection in the alleyway that separated the Opera House from the YMCA.

Follrath did not makes things easier on himself as he attempted to shift the blame to his men. Due to the political nature of the department there was some validity to his claim that his men had their own agendas to attend to in the course of the fire. However, Follrath was still in command, and therefore would shoulder the condemnation. Other former fire chiefs, such as R.Q. King did step up to Follrath's defense, perhaps aware of the position he was in:

> The Chief was rattled I believe but under the circumstances I also believe that any chief would be as much confused. . . I thought the most serious mistake made in the management of the fire was the line leading into the alley from Fisher street. The firemen who had hold

of this nozzle were not competent as it appeared to me. . . there was bad judgement on the part of the firemen stationed at this point.[34]

Opinions such as King's were, however, in the minority. The downfall of Follrath and the Springfield fire department was sealed by the outcome of the fire. The city began searching for a new structure to replace its ineffective department. Within a year, barely a trace of the old department existed.

On 26 March 1904 Samuel F. Hunter of Columbus, Ohio was hired to replace Follrath. Along with Hunter came a new set of codes of conduct. Firefighters were required to live at the stations, fostering a sense of teamwork that had been lacking under the old system. Training and equipment inspection took precedence as the fire department came under the command of Chief Hunter. While there would always be fires in Springfield, the new department was better equipped to handle them. Both the East Street Shops fire and the Black's Opera House fire exposed the city to the problems of the Springfield fire department. Lack of training, ineffective management, and inter-departmental fighting provided unnecessary loss to the community. The Krell-French piano company could have brought thousands of jobs to the area. If Krell had succeeded, it is probable that other businesses might have been attracted to the Springfield area. The fires, in addition to their effects on the department itself, changed the face of Springfield by denying it the businesses that were its lifeline. The two separate fires burned more than property, they burned the integrity of a fire department, the position of a man, and the economy of a city.

Businesses Lost or Damaged
in the East Street Fire of **1902**

Krell-French Piano Co.
Grant Axle and Wheel Co.
Miller Gas Engine Co.
Owen Machine Tool Co
Champion Chemical Co.
Progress Furnace and Stove Co.
Green Manufacturing Co.
Springfield Foundry Co.
Kyle Art Glass Co.
Indianapolis Frog and Switch Co.

Businesses Lost or Damaged in
The Black's Opera House Fire of **1903**

Fountain Square Theatre
YMCA building
M. M. Kaufman Clothing
S. J. Lafferty and Sons
Mitchell Brothers Plumbing Co
J. H. Mulholland JewelryStore
T. J. Thomas
Tibbets Building
James Lane barbershop
Margibeth and McTerland Piano Co.
Dr. TA Lewis (Dentist)
Charles Hill Taylors
Herman Gres Taylors
Junior Order United American Mechanics

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"Springfield Inns of the National Road" Inns, Hotels, and Taverns, box A-M.

Wygant, Virginia, Informal interviews over the span of fifteen weeks.

Endnotes

[1]Calvin Roberds, *150 Years: From Buckets to Diesels*. (Springfield, OH: Miller Printing, 1978)

[2]Earning Springfield the nickname "Champion City."

[3]George H Berkhofer, *Clark County Historical Society Newsletter* (Springfield, CCHS, 1976)

[4]Some accounts give Krell's origins as being from Indiana. However, the newspaper articles after the fire all claim that Krell was a Cincinnati businessman.

[5]Coutesy of Virginia Wygant, curator of the CCHS.

[6]CCHS collection of Inns, Taverns, and Hotels of Springfield.

[7]*Springfield Press Republic* Feb 11-19 1902.

[8]*Press Republic*, Feb 11, 1902.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid.

[11]*Springfield Sun* Feb 14,1902; *Press Republic*, Feb 19,1902.

[12]"Follrath Censured in Specific Terms" *Press Republic*, Feb 21, 1903.

[13]Cal Roberds *150 Years: From Buckets to Diesels* (Springfield Oh, Miller Printing, 1978.)

[14]*Press Republic*, Feb 11, 1902.

[15]Roberds, *150 Years*, 84.

[16]Roberds, *150 Years*, 84.

[17]Roberds, *150 Years*, 83.

[18]*Press Republic*. Feb 11, 1902.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid.

[21]*Press Republic*, Feb 12,1902.

[22]Ibid.

[23]As an interesting side note, the funds raised for the victims of the East Street Shops fire never reached its intended source. Despite the good will of the men and women that contributed, reports in March of 1903 in the *Press Republic*, report the unaccountability of approximately $200.00.

[24]Benjamin F. Prince, *Standard History of Springfield and Clark County* vol 1, (Chicago, American Historical Society 1922), 382.

[25]Roberds, *150 Years*, 89.

[26]Prince, *History*, 393.

[27]*Press Republic*, Feb. 20,1903.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Roberds, *150 Years*, 93.

[30]*Press Republic*, Feb 20,1903.

[31]*Press Republic*, Feb 21,1903.

[32]Roberds, *150 Years*, 94.

[33]*Press Republic*, "Follrath Censured" Feb 21,1903.

[34]Ibid.

C.O.I. to the C.I.A.:
The Development and Nature of United States Intelligence Gathering

by Matthew David Collins Pizzorno
Junior, East Hampton, New York—Written for United States History Since 1945

Marcus Aurelius Antonius who lived from A.D. 121 to 180 once said, "The controlling intelligence understands its own nature, and what it does, and where it works." This statement hints at how and why intelligence gathering has become such a significant part of the information which determines national policy around the world. Every world power has an intelligence agency. Great Britain has "Her Majesty's Secret Service," Communist China depends on her "Social Affairs Department" for vital intelligence, and the former Soviet Union used the "Komitet Gosudarstuennoi Bezopasnosti," or "KGB" as its source of for information gathering. Why is it that almost every country in the world has placed such a high premium upon an efficient, uniform intelligence service? The answer is that there is nothing more important in the composition of normal decisions than the interplay between policy and intelligence.[1] Leaders must be able to use the information that is gathered and given to them by their various operations in order to create policy that is consistent with the times and the situation. The best leaders are able to correctly interpret this information and make sound and effective decisions. However, without current, accurate information even the best and the brightest are reduced to guess work and mere opinion.

Before one can have a real grasp on the inner workings of any nation's intelligence system, there is the need to first understand the meaning of the word "intelligence" in this specific context. *The Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Usage* has the following definition for the word, "intelligence":

> The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, reintegration, and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas of operations and which is immediately or potentially significant to planning.[2]

In this definition, one sees not only the contextual definition of the "intelligence," but also a clear and concise explanation of the duties of an intelligence agency. This definition allows us to see beyond the diverse ways in which nations choose to organize their intelligence operations and focus on the characteristics which are essential to all.

This focus helps one realize that there are three main elements germane to most, if not all, efficient intelligence systems. The first is called "strategic" or "national intelligence." This area is concerned with the capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions of foreign nations. The second is termed "operational" or "tactical intelligence." This information is required on the field of battle. It concentrates on the man power, reserves, weapons, etc. which an enemy might possess in a theater of war. The third element is termed "counter-intelligence." This refers to the intelligence which is devoted to curtailing or "countering" hostile activities and intent as represented through the actions of their foreign intelligence operations.[3] All three of these elements are crucial. Whether the agency is China's Social Affairs Department or the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States, these three areas must work efficiently together in order to run an effective operation.

These three elements have always been necessary ingredients in governmental intelligence activities concerning other nations. There are numerous examples throughout history that can help illustrate this point. As written in the Bible's *Book of Numbers*, Moses sent twelve men to the land of Canaan in what was an intelligence gathering operation. He told them to:

> See what the land is like, and whether the people who live there are strong, few or many. See whether it is an easy or difficult country in which to live, whether the cities are weakly defended or well fortified; is the land fertile or barren, and does it grow trees or not.[4]

Here Moses seems to be launching what could be viewed as a pre-emptive counter-intelligence operation. He has no idea of the operations or capabilities of the people of Canaan while the information he seeks definitely hints at his own hostile intentions. The information required falls into both the strategic (Canaan's vulnerabilities and capabilities) and the tactical (Canaan's military fortifications) categories. All three elements of an effective intelligence system are present. A further reading of the Bible shows that the men sent by Moses were able to gather the necessary information. Based on their reports and what Moses perceived as divine guidance, a decision was made to attack, successfully as it turned out, Canaan.

With the above background one would think that the United States had established some type of unified intelligence gathering system at least by World War One. Many countries do establish a central intelligence operation very early in their development to aid them in their policy decisions. Interestingly enough, it was not until World War Two that there existed, in the United States, a coordinated intelligence gathering system.[5] This is not to say that before this time the government did not seek intelligence. Most Americans have grown knowing the story of Nathan Hale who paid with his life for the information he gathered for Washington's army. During the American Civil War, Aline Pinkerton, a famous detective, was hired as head of intelligence by General George McClellan for his Union Army. Unfortunately for McClellan, Pinkerton greatly exaggerated the Confederate Army's troop strength during the Peninsula Campaign. McClellan based his whole campaign strategy on these estimates. Due to them, the General acted with extreme caution leading not only to the ultimate failure of his offensive but to his dismissal as commander of the army.

During this century, there was an effort by the United States to establish what amounted to a semi-coordinated intelligence system. This occurred during World War One when the country expanded its "Military Intelligence Division" from two officers and two clerks to 1,200 officers and civilians at the time of the armistice in 1918. The duties of the Intelligence Division were:

> To maintain estimates, revised daily, of the military situations the economic situation, and of such other matters as the chief of staff may direct, and to collect, collate, and disseminate military Intelligence.[7]

One can see from the duty description given above that this intelligence service was limited in both function and scope. Even so, up to that point in time it was the most advanced and largest American intelligence system that had existed.

The existence of this system, however, was short lived. In subsequent years, the government decreased the Military Intelligence Division both in size and funding. During the 1920's and 1930's, the United States reverted to its isolationist position. Nowhere was this more reflected than in the basic stagnation of its military power and development; as a result, military intelligence was seen as an unnecessary luxury. As far as the nation was concerned, there was no need for any of the services provided by an intelligence organization. There was neither the desire, the money, or the manpower to build an effective intelligence system. Then came the attack on Pearl Harbor.

On 7 December 1941, the Japanese launched a successful surprise attack on the Pacific fleet of the United States based at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. In the months after the attack, various investigations concluded that there was enough information in the possession of certain civilian and military departments of the United States, that if brought together and analyzed, would have given the military base at Pearl Harbor time to defend itself. The price paid for this lack of coordination of information concerning the Japanese and their intentions in the Pacific made the government painfully aware of the need for a change. This attack showed the need for a coordinated intelligence agency which would operate full-time in the interests of the United States. At that time, the ground work had been laid for such an organization although it was not fully functional. On 11 July 1941, approximately five months before Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had added another ingredient to his "New Deal Alphabet Soup." Seeing the precipitous onrush of Europe to war, Roosevelt realized that there soon would be a need for the services provided by an effectively coordinated intelligence system. Thus came into being the office of the Coordinator of Information or the COI.[9] The head of this office, the Coordinator of Information, as well as those under his authority, were to:

> Collect and analyze all information and data which may bear upon national security; to correlate such information and data, and to make such information available to the President and to such departments and officials of the government as the president may determine; and to carry out, when requested by the President such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of the nation.[10]

Now that Roosevelt had the structure for an intelligence system in place, he needed the right person in charge to make it work. For this he turned to William "Wild Bill" Donovan. Donovan was a "Hoover Republican," a Wall Street lawyer and a self-made millionaire. By many accounts, he did not appear to be the type of person who would head a department which dealt with ". . . excursion into espionage, sabotage, 'black' propaganda, guerilla warfare, and other 'un-American' subversive practices." [11] However, Roosevelt knew better than to base judgment on appearance. Donovan had been a confidant of the President and a hero in World War One. He had also been in close contact with the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) since 1941. With this background as well as his own personal abilities and drive, Donovan seemed the obvious choice as head of the COI.

Donovan devoted himself completely to his new responsibility. He helped sell the idea of a coordinated and central intelligence system to Roosevelt and was fully committed to making it a reality. His basic goal for the COI was to ". . . beat the Germans at their own game." This meant that it was necessary to demoralize the enemy and then to destroy their industrial and military capabilities. In order to demoralize the enemy, Donovan felt that there had to be a constant flow of up-to-date information concerning one's foe. This came from field operatives placed behind enemy lines and from nationals, co-opted or otherwise. These groups gathered information from simple observation, reading the newspapers, spying and bribery. This information was then sent back to the United States for analysis. After the government had enough information about the enemy, it was time to turn the dirty work over to a small task force of the COI operatives who would do the little things necessary to prepare for a full scale military invasion.

With this game plan in mind, Donovan directed his efforts toward obtaining the manpower and resources needed to make it work. The organization that Donovan had in mind needed massive amounts of money to function, a huge area in which to work and a staff of brilliant and insightful people committed to the COI's success. Donovan was also realistic enough to know that he would have to tackle each need one at a time.

The COI was originally housed in a three-room office located in the old State-War-Navy Building in Washington. However, within twenty days Donovan had secured thirty-two rooms at the Apex Building, located at the base of Capital Hill. Within the same period the COI had placed offices in New York and on the west coast of the United States. Additionally, it had sites in London as well as at other overseas' locations.[17]

Now that Donovan and his COI had sufficient work space, he needed sufficient funds to run his organization. Roosevelt had initially given Donovan $450,000 to get the operation off the ground.[18] This money came directly from the President's security fund.[19] However, such a sum fell far below the needs of the COI. Donovan went to work and in the months leading up to Pearl Harbor was able to achieve an allocation of $1.7 million with $12 million coming three months after.[20]

Nevertheless money and space are useless without a talented staff to take advantage of them. This was the final element necessary to make the COI the organization that Donovan had envisioned. Although he had spent his first few months at the helm of the COI traveling, Donovan was able to assemble an ". . . astonishing group with wide ranging foreign expertise. . ."[21]

At the forefront of this staff were three men. These were James R. Murphy, who became Donovan's right hand man; William Whitney, who ran the COI office in London; and Col. G. Edward Buxton, who was an old war friend of Donovan.[22] All three worked closely with Donovan and promoted his vision of the COI. Donovan also searched for and found scholars whom he sent straight to work at the Library of Congress doing research and analysis.[23] Finally, Donovan recruited and trained his field operatives, those whose responsibility was to gather the information for which the COI existed. The reason that Donovan was able to organize and attract such a highly intellectual and skilled group of individuals can be directly attributed to his previous service in World War One and to his connections on Wall Street.[24] These men knew what Donovan stood for and what he could do. With their help, Donovan was able to organize the COI under his own terms and vision.

Now that Donovan had the COI set up to his liking, it was time for the agency to get to work and accomplish its mission. At the time, the COI decided to concentrate on two main areas of the world, Asia and North Africa.[25] Unfortunately, while the idea of a coordinated intelligence system seemed an excellent one, operating it effectively was far from easy, as the COI found, in these two areas.

The COI was able to gain access to the Pacific area through an organization known as the Foreign Information Service. However, Donovan and his staff had to struggle in order to install an intelligence system in Asia. The problem that the COI first encountered was General Douglas MacArthur, who was in charge of operations in the area. MacArthur's obstinacy, desire to have his own way, and be completely in charge have been well documented. At

first, he wanted to use the COI to help with propaganda, but by the time Donovan was able to give assistance in this area McArthur had already "... developed his own intelligence and subversive and warfare operations, first in the Philippines and then in Australia." [26]

Frustrated by MacArthur's actions in the South Pacific, which in essence ran counter to the idea of a coordinated intelligence system, Donovan and his COI operatives turned their attention to Korea, Burma and China. Of these three, the staff of the COI felt that only Korea offered any real opportunities. [27]

Once again these "real opportunities" never materialized. The COI developed a plan which would organize a resistance movement in Korea. However, before any such resistance could be established, General John Magruder went to Washington to circumvent the COI's efforts and block their plan. He argued that the COI's actions in Korea could be seen by General Chiang Kai-Shek as gross and offensive interference. The last thing the government of the United States wanted to do at that time was to offend the General whose cooperation and support was seen as crucial to victory in the Pacific. Furthermore, the COI was frustrated because it pulled out of the area for the time being. [28]

Halfway around the world, in northern Africa, Washington was extremely concerned with intelligence gathering operations. During the first years of World War Two, the United States was extremely worried about the German activity in the area. After the establishment of the COI, Donovan immediately sent men to Africa under the command of World War Marine hero, Lt. Col. Eddy. From the beginning, events went badly for Eddy and his band of COI operatives. There were many problems with the joint Anglo-American command that was in control in the area. Each wanted to handle the German buildup in different ways. The British were more concerned with an invasion of North Africa. The United States favored a scaled down military force which would bother and harass the Germans while plans were formulated for an allied assault on the European continent by early 1943. The COI tried to stay under the constraints of the American plan. Eddy's on site evaluation of the situation lead him to believe that the Germans were about to attack Morocco and Algeria and that time was of the essence. He requested that Washington send "... 500 motorcycles, 150 artillery and antitank guns, 45 tanks, 150 additional vehicles, and ammunition for all weapons." [29] Washington declined Eddy's request since they believed that a German attack would not come anytime soon. Washington was proven correct

in this evaluation and once again the COI was perceived in an unfavorable light. American generals, especially George Marshall, were not willing to support the COI when they personally believed that a German invasion was not forth coming. [30] The COI was undergoing a crisis of credibility. In all three areas, the COI operatives had made serious miscalculations. This was especially true in North Africa where Eddy's evaluation of the information available was erroneous, a grievous mistake for an organization whose main purpose was to analyze gathered information correctly.

While Donovan had established what he felt was the best intelligence organization possible, like all organizations it had to go through growing pains and learn from its mistakes. Unfortunately for the COI, these occurred at a time of extreme national distress and urgency. The operations in Asia and northern Africa showed that problems did indeed exist in the infrastructure of the COI. It was definitely not accomplishing anything which seemed to be worthwhile and, while Donovan felt that eventually the COI could and would work efficiently, many people in Washington felt that the COI's performance showed that the organization was a waste of time and money. Many traced the problems of the organization to the feeling that Donovan could not coordinate research and analysis, propaganda, secret intelligence, special operations and the war room under one department. In fact William Whitney, the head of the COI office in London, advised Donovan by the end of 1941 to "... pick one horse and ride it as well as your very great talents will enable you to ride it." [31] The young organization experienced personal conflicts especially in the leadership positions. While Donovan had done his best to choose men whom he felt were best suited to the job, this did not guarantee that these men could fulfill their responsibilities in a way Donovan thought best. For example, Robert Sherwood, a successful and honored playwright by profession, was head of the COI's propaganda wing. Sherwood did not get along with Donovan and had major problems working under the constraints placed upon his department. Sherwood worked slowly, at his own pace and Donovan disliked the way Sherwood ran things. This conflict was never resolved and as a result the propaganda wing never functioned properly. [32]

These problems and others caused the COI to run inefficiently and prevented it from reaching its potential. Donovan eventually realized that he could not administer an organization that was so big. Thus in August of 1943, Donovan struck a deal with the then Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Wells. [33] These

two men agreed that the COI was to be disbanded and its propaganda division moved to the new Office of War Information. Donovan would head this new department and name it the Office of Strategic Services or the OSS.[34]

Donovan learned well from his experiences at the COI and OSS ran more smoothly than its predecessor. This is not to say that COI did not accomplish anything. The COI set the standard for the American intelligence organizations that would follow. Rather than debunk the need for a coordinated intelligence system, its failures showed the crucial necessity of such a system for the security of the United States. The problems it faced in its formation and short existence made the organizations that followed it stronger and wiser for the experience. Unknowingly in July of 1941, Roosevelt's support of Donovan's brain child started a process which laid the groundwork for what would eventually become the CIA, one of the most powerful central intelligence organizations in the world.

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Evolution and the Dynamo: Henry Adams' Failure at Applying Scientific Theory to History

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A man born in the United States during the mid-1800s grew up in a time of turbulent change. He saw the United States divide and then reunite; he saw the emancipation of the slaves, and he was exposed to the Darwinian theory of evolution and the discovery of uranium. The world was changing fast for men of the 1800s. Most men could not understand or did not care about the changes taking place in their worlds. Henry Adams was not such a man.

Adams was born in Quincy, Massachusetts on 16 February 1838. He was the great-grandson of President John Adams, and the grandson of President John Quincy Adams. Adams' father, Charles Francis Adams, Sr., was a congressman. Adams grew up in a worldly household where men were expected to understand and talk about current events. Henry Adams absorbed his surroundings and tried to create for himself an order out of the apparent chaos of his time. He looked to the past for continuity and explanations about America during the latter half of the 1800s. Adams was so desperate to find some kind of order in the external world that he turned to natural science. Adams applied scientific theories to history to derive laws from the past in order to explain the present.

Adams' two major historical works were *The History of the United States During the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison* and *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres*. In each historical study, Adams tried to find the laws governing society. Adams used an evolutionary theory of history in *The History of the United States* and a dynamic theory of history in *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres*. His evolutionary theory was based on a cause and effect relationship in which the superior entity would survive. Adams' dynamic theory of history was founded on the idea that society was ruled by forces that were normally in equilibrium; if a new force entered into a society it would destroy the equilibrium. After the equilibrium was destroyed, society would be in a time of great change until the forces balanced each other out and formed a new equilibrium. When the evolutionary

scientific philosophy failed Adams, he was forced to look for a new philosophy, the dynamic theory of history. This paper will discuss the influences which drove Henry Adams to form an evolutionary theory of history and then a dynamic theory of history, how he applied each of these theories to his historical writings, and why he ultimately believed that both scientific theories of history failed.

Henry Adams' education in grade school and at Harvard had little influence on his philosophy of history. Although Adams studied the political and economic philosophies of Karl Marx and the positivist theories of Auguste Comte, he conceded that he was ignorant about what he had learned. In *The Education of Henry Adams*, Adams admitted about Harvard, that, "The entire work of the four years could have been put easily into the work of any four months in after life."[1]

Adams' "after life" consisted of two years of schooling in Germany where he studied Civil Law. Just as he rejected the education he received at Harvard, he rejected the education he received at the University of Berlin. Disillusioned by formal education, Adams withdrew from the University of Berlin to learn the German language at a German high school, the Friedrichs-Wilhelm-Werdersesches Gymnasium. He learned the language although he did not master it. He knew of the theories of Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and the writings of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller, but he did not understand or sympathize with these men. Adams' formal education failed to give him a deeper knowledge of European and American society in the 1800s. This inability to gain an understanding of the society around him made him question whether he really understood himself.[2]

Feeling lost, Adams returned home to Quincy in October of 1860. His time in Quincy was short. He soon went to Washington to assist Charles Francis Adams, Sr., Quincy's representative to Congress. As his father's private secretary, Adams was exposed to

all of the treason and bribery that accompanied a nation in civil war. Daunted by the corrupted Washington society, Adams was quick to accept his father's offer to go to England.[3]

President Lincoln appointed Charles Francis as the American minister to Great Britain. Henry traveled with his father to London in 1861 and stayed on as his father's private secretary until 1863. It was in London that Henry was introduced to theories about biological evolution and the social theories that evolved from it. During his second stay in Europe, Adams discovered the writings of Charles Darwin, Sir Charles Lyell, and Herbert Spencer. Adams was also reintroduced to the works of Auguste Comte.

Charles Darwin had published his book, *The Origin of the Species*, in 1859. Discussion about Darwin's theory reached its height in England during the 1860s.[4] Debates over the validity of biological evolution intrigued Adams. He looked upon Darwin's theory of evolution so favorably that he regarded himself as a Darwinist.

Adams combined his interest in Darwinism[5] with his understanding of Auguste Comte's positivism. Comte was a sociologist who believed that, "by applying the natural methods of science to history," it would be possible to "discover the laws of historical development and thus foretell the future."[6] Adams embraced the "positivist belief that science could explain the universe through all-embracing laws."[7] After Adams read about how Herbert Spencer applied Darwin's evolutionary theories to human society, he believed that he could use Darwin's theories of evolution as a "stepping-stone towards a universal system that would make history scientific."[8]

Enamored with an evolutionary approach to history, Adams wrote to his brother, Charles Francis, Jr., from London to explain that what the United States needed was a "rational set of young men, like ourselves or better, to start new influences not only in politics but in literature, in law, in society, and throughout the whole social organism of the country— a national school of our own generation."[9] Adams wanted rational young scholars to go abroad and learn about Darwin, Spencer, and Comte, and then form a "scientific school" in the United States.[10]

In 1870, Adams returned to Boston with all the knowledge that he had gathered from abroad and applied it to teaching at Harvard. Harvard hired Adams as an assistant professor of history. It was his duty to fill the space between Ephraim Whitman Gurney's courses in classical history and Henry Warren Torrey's modern courses.[11] This meant that Adams was assigned to teach medieval history, an area about which he claimed total ignorance. His lack

of knowledge, however, did not discourage Harvard's President, Charles Eliot, from offering Adams the assistant-professorship, because Harvard wanted Adams not for his teaching skill but his editing skills.

Along with his position in the history department, Adams was named editor-in-chief of the *North American Review*.[12] As editor, he was able to better familiarize himself with the works of evolutionists. He was particularly influenced by the evolutionary anthropologist, Lewis Henry Morgan. He believed that Morgan's greatest contribution to society and the field of anthropology was establishing a belief in Social Darwinism.13 Through the *North American Review*, Adams was able to share the writings of Sir Charles Lyell with the United States. Lyell was a geologist who promoted a uniformitarian theory of evolution. Lyell believed that organic and inorganic development occurred gradually and uniformly over a long period of time. The vision of history that Lyell defended in his book, *Principles of Geology*, was one "in which land masses gradually rose and fell, affecting climate and geology but always maintaining the delicate equilibrium that nature dictated."[14] Adams believed that Lyell's observations provided the link between uniformitarianism and the evolutionary theory.[15]

Adams combined his understanding of the theories of Darwin, Spencer, Lyell, Morgan and Comte to form an evolutionary theory of history. Following Comte's teachings, Adams studied society in order to discover the law which governed the course of history. Adams studied society as Darwin studied the biology of animals, as Lyell studied geology, and as Morgan used anthropology to study social institutions. This work resulted in an evolutionary survey of American society between 1800 and 1815.

The nine volumes that formed *The History of the United States During the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison* constituted Adams' first attempt at applying his evolutionary theory of history to historical writing. Spencer's evolution of human society gave Adams the scientific basis for centralizing and rationalizing a movement in American history. Adams used Spencer's theme of external organization to shape his work.[16] He believed that all the facts must be collected in order to "help us understand how a nation has grown and organized itself."[17] Adams attempted to gather all of the facts surrounding the events between 1800 and 1815. He compiled information such as the number of births, deaths, suicides, divorces, and cases of insanity, provided by the United States Bureau of Statistics.[18] He combined this evidence with newspaper accounts, economic reports, books of

travel, memoirs, and letters to fashion order out of the apparent chaos of the early 1800s.[19] When Adams believed that he had collected all of the facts, he assumed that he could "find then the corresponding delineations of succeeding ages . . . how each belief, institution, custom and arrangement was modified; and how the *consensus* of preceding structures and functions were developed into the consensus of proceeding ones."[20] Before writing *The History of the United States*, Adams also studied the facts of history in order to see the general mechanical principles of rigid causality that would lead him to determine a law which would explain the past and predict the future.

Over the nine volumes of *The History of the United States*, Adams covered the political aspects of the administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison along with the physical and economic conditions of American society in 1800, the problems that hampered Anglo-American relations, the ramifications of diplomacy which resulted in the War of 1812, the military, political, and diplomatic actions during the War of 1812, and how all of these forces combined to shape the society of 1815. Adams successfully showed how American beliefs, institutions and customs evolved over the period between 1800 to 1815, but he used his evolutionary theory most convincingly in his discussions about military affairs during the War of 1812.[21]

For almost every military engagement, Adams provided authoritative reports from both sides, along with the number of men engaged, the reserves, the number of men killed and wounded, and the number and character of the artillery.[22] Adams used statistical calculations to prove why one side should victor over another, thereby supporting Spencer's theory of the survival of the fittest.[23] In the account of the engagement between the American "Wasp" and the British "Frolic," in *The History of the United States*, Adams compared the ships' length and weight, the number of crew, and the strength of the armaments, in order to determine which ship was the superior ship and should therefore survive the battle. In this case, Adams concluded that the ships were fairly matched and the reason the "Wasp" triumphed over the inferior "Frolic" was because the crew of the "Wasp" were superior marksmen.[24] Adams believed that his retrospective analysis of the engagement provided proof for the evolutionary law of survival of the fittest because the superior "Wasp" triumphed over the inferior "Frolic."

After completing *The History of the United States*, Adams saw the faults in creating a scientific theory of history based on evolution. Indeed, a pattern of cause and effect relationships could be seen throughout history and usually the superior entity triumphed over the inferior entity but there was no single definitive law to determine these historical relationships. In a letter written to Francis Parkman on 21 December 1884, Adams explained that "for all the science of his analysis, he could not escape the contradictions and dilemmas of the effort to harmonize mechanical evolution."[25] Evolutionary history had failed to provide Henry Adams with the general principles or laws by which he could predict the social phenomena of human behavior; thus Henry Adams went in search of a new theory.

In 1894, Adams was elected president of the American Historical Association. His presidential address, given to the association in absentia, was entitled "The Tendency of History." In this address, Adams argued that four out of five serious history students desired to discover a great generalization that would reduce history to a law much like the laws that govern nature.[26] Citing, for example his failure with evolutionary history, Adams warned his colleagues that, "Any science of history must be absolute, like other sciences, it must fix with mathematical certainty the path which society has got to follow."[27]

After abandoning his attempt to subordinate history to an evolutionary theory, Adams looked for an absolute theory from which he could predict the behavior of society with mathematical certainty. Adams was not the first man to try to mathematically predict the functions of society. "The French mathematician Pierre LaPlace had postulated that the past could be re-created and the future predicted by one armed with the knowledge of Newton's law of motion and accurate calculations of the present position of the material bodies in the universe."[28]

Willard Gibbs was the closest thing to Sir Isaac Newton that the United States in the 1890s could provide for Adams.[29] Willard Gibbs was a Yale physicist made famous by his phase rule. Gibbs first introduced his phase rule in his book, *The Equilibrium of Heterogeneous Substances*, published in the 1870s. By the time Adams learned of the phase rule in the 1890s, it had already become the foundation of the law of thermodynamics. The phase rule explained that the number of variables, for example, temperature, pressure and volume, must be specified in order to maintain a state of equilibrium. If all of the variables are at their equilibrium, then the three phases of water— water, ice, and steam— can exist simultaneously in the same system. If the equilibrium of the variables changes for any reason then only one or two of the phases can exist at once. Adams ignored the other parts of Gibbs' phase rule and focused on his explanation of the conditions and nature of the phase transitions.[30]

Before Adams' historical application of the phase rule can be discussed an explanation of Adams' visit to the Paris Exposition of 1900 is necessary. Samuel Pierpont Langley, a physicist from the Smithsonian, showed Adams for the first time the Hall of Dynamos. It was in the Hall of Dynamos that Langley introduced Adams to the idea of forces. Adams was shown, first hand, the force of the steam-engine, the sun, heat, and coal.[31]

> For Adams, the master symbol of the powerful new forces was the dynamo, which he first encountered at the Paris Exposition. The dynamo generated extraordinary amounts of electric power while scarcely humming an audible warning; its murmuring bulk expressed with ultimate energy— a new kingdom of force that was more powerful than the men entrusted to govern it.[32]

If the dynamo, a mechanical steam-engine created by man, could have so much force over man, then Adams believed that history had other forces, forces that man did not create, and that these had equal or greater energy over man.

Adams wanted to reduce all of the forces to a common numerical value in order to discover what truly drove human society. The only problem with finding the "common value" was that, "This common value could only be measured by the degree of attraction in one's own mind." Adams did not feel discouraged because he could not find a mechanical formula by which to measure the effect of forces on man because he discovered experiments by Marie Curie, Wilhem Conrad Rontgen, and Michael Farraday, at the Paris Exposition, which suggested the existence of forces which could not be mechanically measured.[34] To compensate for the lack mathematical measurement in his dynamic theory, Adams encouraged historians to follow carefully the track of the force or energy and discover, where it came from and where it went.

The only difficulty Adams had with his emerging dynamic theory of history was that his new theory progressed by leaps rather than by a gradual evolving movement. Adams explained how he accounted for the dynamic leaping movement of history by applying Gibbs' phase rule, to his essay, "The Rule of Phase Applied to History." According to Adams:

> We know that, in history, thought may be conveniently studied as a current form, of historical sequence. We know only too well that thought has inertia, since its always obstinately resisting deflection by new motives, and that it has mass, because of the force it exerts. We know that it acts as though it felt the resistance

of friction, and that it is constantly stopped outright by obstacles that it may or may not overcome. We can by applying it, letter for letter, [to] one of the capital laws of physical chemistry that [states] where an equilibrium is subjected to conditions which tend to change it, it reacts internally in ways that tend to resist the external constraint, and to preserve its balance alone.[35]

In this statement, Adams combined the force of mind, a force much like that driving the dynamo, and Gibbs' phase rule to form a new dynamic theory of history.

Adams experimented with his dynamic theory of history in *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres*. In this book, Adams focused on the architecture of three medieval French churches, Mont-Saint-Michel, Chartres, and Amiens, to enable him to depict to his readers the forces which governed medieval society.

The book begins with an account of the eleventh century church of Mont-Saint-Michel, or the church of Saint Michael the Archangel. According to Adams, eleventh century France was dominated by a masculine view of society. Adams explains how "the whole design is as beautiful a bit of early Gothic architecture as exists, but what would take the most time to study, if time were to spare, would be the instinct of the Archangel's presence which has animated his architecture."[36] With elaborate description, Adams shows how, "The masculine, military energy of Saint Michael lives still in every stone. The genius that realized this warlike emotion has stamped his power everywhere, on every centimetre of his work; in every ray of light, or the mass of every shadow . . . the architect intended it all."[37] Just as the eleventh century architecture of Mont-Saint-Michel was dominated by the masculine body of Saint Michael the Archangel, the twelfth century was dominated by an equally influential feminine being.

From Mont-Saint-Michel, Adams took his readers through Normandy and the Ile de France to Chartres. In the following chapters, Adams toured Chartres "towers and portals, its roses and its apse, its marvels of glass and its meanings of legendary windows, its nave, and the church's grand significance as the Virgin's palace court."[38] Adams explains all of these fixtures with grandiose descriptions in order to convince his readers the popular dominance of the Virgin Mary in twelfth century medieval Catholicism. Not only could Mary's presence be seen in the architecture of the Church but also in local history and-laws.[39]

The Virgin's reign over the Catholic Church and twelfth-century French society ended with the onset of reason and the teachings of Saint Thomas

Acquinas. The last three chapters of *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres* focused on Acquinas' influence over the thirteenth-century Church. Adams showed how the beauty of Amiens could never compare to the majestic scenes in *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres*, because Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres were built out of love and faith while Amiens was built with the reason and logic of Saint Thomas Acquinas.[40] Acquinas believed that God was order, unity, and law.[41] Acquinas' architecture reflected these three fundamental principles, but it lacked the grandeur of the great cathedrals of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

At the end of *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres*, Adams explains why Saint Thomas Acquinas' force of reason failed to have the same force as the Archangel or the Virgin. Adams warned that if we lose the faith behind a force, we lose the force. According to Adams' dynamic theory of history, faith was the driving force behind each age. It was faith that allowed for the reign of Saint Michael the Archangel in the eleventh century and faith that allowed the Virgin Mary to pervade twelfth century France. It was also a type of faith in reason that allowed for Saint Thomas Acquinas to take the reign from the Virgin.

In *Mont-Saint-Michel*, Adams used a logical scientific format to explain history. Adams' dynamic theory of history explained why each era of French society acted as it did and how thought abruptly changed from one dominating force to another. Unfortunately, Adams' dynamic theory of history lacked as much of a scientific basis as his evolutionary theory of history.

In the *History of the United States* and *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres*, Henry Adams tried to apply scientific theories to history. He based both his evolutionary theory of history and his dynamic theory of history on the current scientific dogma of the time. In Adams' first theory, his evolutionary theory of history, he collected "in an apparently objective fashion a multitude of facts and then made a scientific induction or generalization within the limits of those facts."[42] In his second theory, the dynamic view of history, Adams was "concerned primarily with ideas and generalizations, rather than the facts."[43] Each time Adams was attempting to formulate a law of history from the laws of science in order, ultimately, to predict the future; however, he failed both times.

One should not disregard Adams' work because his scientific theories of history failed. Formulating a scientific account of history is impossible, because a historian cannot conduct experiments to validate his work, social data is more complex than the material data used by scientists, physical phenomena tends to be constant while social phenomena changes between societies and eras. Also, scientists' data can be found within their time while most of the historians' pertinent data is lost beyond the point of recalling.[43] Scientific historians write sound history but the generalizations that they draw from their facts do not have the validity of law.

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RED OCTOBERS:

What Won the Battles of Hastings and Agincourt

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The period in European history labeled "Medieval" is known by a few other terms which evoke some negative images in the mind. Time has come to know this period, which can run anywhere from A.D. 400 to about 1400 (depending upon the sources) as the "Middle Ages" or the "Dark Ages," neither of which sound terribly progressive. Indeed, this period has been studied, or rather skimmed over, with the belief that progress had been put on pause while time moved forward. To make this claim is not only cynical, but invalid. Many technological developments did, in fact, rise from this time frame. Revolutionary agricultural processes erupted making harvest time much more plentiful. The development of larger castles fabricated from stone have provided future generations with everlasting symbols of a highly productive age. Sometimes overlooked, as technological contributions, are the weapons and armory of Medieval Europe. Being an essential ingredient to the success of a kingdom, weapons and armor needed to be not only effective, but continuously effective. Indeed, Medieval Europe had its own version of an arms race.

This technological development of Medieval Europe's weapons is illustrated when two major battles of equal significance are compared. One battle, The Battle of Hastings, occurred in October 1066, the other, The Battle of Agincourt in the same month 1415. Both were fought between the inhabitants of modern day France and England and, surprisingly, both victors possessed a smaller army. This paper will illustrate that the technological developments of armor and of certain weapons resulted in victory for the army which took advantage of Medieval Europe's productivity. However, knowledge concerning the tactics, strategies, and actual events of both battles must be presented in order to achieve this goal. Before that assignment is approached, it is necessary to outline the causes of these two battles and explain their significance.

The Battle of Hastings centered on two highly popular characters, Harold Godwineson, Earl of the West Saxons and William II, seventh Duke of Normandy. The year was 1066 and Edward the Confessor, King of England, lay at his deathbed without a child and therefore no direct heir to the throne. Harold, who was the Queen's brother, felt he should rightfully succeed the ailing King; he was, after all, the King's brother-in-law. William too could lay claim. His grandfather was Edward's mother's brother. In other words, William was Edward's first cousin once removed. Ultimately, Harold beat William to the throne, which infuriated the Duke. William thus set out on an invasion of England to rightfully take the crown from Harold.

The Battle of Agincourt took place beneath the larger heading of The Hundred Years War between England and France. Ever since Hastings, the two nations had been constantly involved in disputes. England had settlements in France as did France in England, which resulted in discrepancies over who controlled what. These territorial disagreements led to armed conflicts. Richard II, King of England until 1399, nearly resolved the conflicts but, as often happens in monarchies, he was deposed. His cousin, Henry IV, took up the crown in the midst of controversy and once again armed territorial conflicts began. Henry IV died, however, shortly after formally taking the crown and was succeeded by his son, Henry V. Engaged in a civil war between the Orleanist and Burgundian Factions, France sat vulnerable to any invasion. Henry V took advantage of this French division as well as the weak leadership of France's King Charles VI, and decided to invade the mainland. His timing was just a bit off, for when he landed in Normandy, the warring factions of France were making peace. The Battle of Hastings occurred during the dawn of a new century. Men fought with ancient weapons and the battle would test the efficiency and effectiveness of ancient technology. In addition, had the outcome of the clash been different, there might not have been any conflicts between England and France such as those

that sparked the Hundred Years War and the Battle of Agincourt. The Battle of Agincourt broke any possibilities of reconciling the conflicts, such as Richard II's efforts, between England and France. In both battles, it is possible to see that the winners achieved victory by utilizing the most technologically advanced weapons and armor.

Bright and early on 14 October 1066, two great armies prepared to engage. William and his Norman army, after successfully landing on the English Isle and sacking the coastal town of Hastings, began marching toward London. In his way stood Harold, strategically placed atop the hill which the Normans must overcome if they were to follow the trail out of Hastings and on to London. The Norman army, which included French and Bretons as well as Normans, consisted of approximately seven or eight thousand men—"three thousand horsemen, one thousand archers and the rest as infantry."[1] William's forces were divided up into three divisions: Normans (representing the middle division), French (representing the eastern wing), and Bretons (representing the western wing). William, himself a Norman, commanded the center flank possibly due to the amount of loyalty he would get from this division. Each division was subsequently divided into three separate arms: archers in front, foot soldiers (infantry) directly behind the archers and mounted soldiers (calvary) bringing up the rear. With this highly calculated, highly organized force staring Harold in the face, William decided to hold his ground and let Harold initiate the inevitable battle.

Harold, too, wished for a defensive battle. His goal was to simply halt the Norman progress. His army, which had "slightly more [men than William],"[2] proved themselves against the fierce Vikings only weeks earlier at the Battle of Stamford Bridge.[3] Though experience and victory were on their side, so too were fatigue and loss of men. In addition, Harold's defensive strategy did not come equipped with an efficient organization such as William's. Essentially a homogeneous group of Englishmen, the divisions of this army consisted almost entirely of infantry. What few horses Harold possessed he distributed to his housecarls and his brothers. The infantry contained a vast number of individual fighters, many of whom preferred to fight alone rather than as a unit. Thus, among the infantry, there seemed to be no real sign of organization within the English army.

William's forces armed themselves with quite an array of battle provisions. His archers held short bows and, leather garments aside, went unarmored. Some archers equipped themselves with crossbows that used heavier bolts, but there were too few of them to produce any remarkable difference in the outcome of Hastings. The Norman infantry wore chain mail (a complex iron "shirt" made of interconnected rings that could stop the cutting or slashing effect of most weapons) and carried either a sword or a pike (similar to a spear). Calvary weapons consisted of swords, spears or lances, and iron maces (a club topped off with a spiked metal ball). These men wore metal helmets, chain mail that extended to their knees and rode on unprotected horses.

The weapon of choice for the English happened to be the two-handed battle axe, an extremely vile instrument whose pre-war function was the slaughtering of animals. In addition to the battle-axe, the English infantry carried swords, spears, javelins (lightweight throwing spears), and small axes which could be hurled at one's enemy. The primary weapon of the poorer soldiers consisted of a stone tied onto a stick which could be thrown quite a long distance. Those fortunate enough to possess a horse utilized essentially the same weapons as the infantry. English armor included, along with the universal chain mail "shirt," giant shields. These shields had a triangular shape to them and protected a soldiers thighs and stomach as well as the chest region.

As mentioned above, both William and Harold wished to pursue a defensive battle. However, "a battle cannot be won without attack—and the English needed to win, not merely hold that ridge."[4] This concept never entered into Harold's mind and consequently William's army made the first advance. Due to the ferocity of their fighting, the English managed to thwart the initial attack and actually forced the Normans to retreat. What they lacked, however, was an orchestrated attack plan since Harold still insisted on a defensive battle. Thus, while Harold's forces (at least those who did not chase after the fleeing Normans) remained on the hill, the Normans were able to regroup and lead a second charge. On their first charge, the Normans tried to run through the English lines, which led to disaster at the hands of the devastating battle-axe. So, learning a vital lesson, their second charge began around one hundred yards away from the English. The English javelin could not travel the distance between them and their enemy. The Normans, with a fairly large archer corps, sat back and rained arrows upon the English. This "arrow-storm" tactic weakened the English emotionally as well as physically. It was only a matter of time before William (henceforth nicknamed "the Conqueror") and his Normans could successfully overtake their opponents. The English crown now rested on a foreign head.

The roles of the French and the English were reversed for the Battle of Agincourt: in this episode, the English were invading, and the French were

defending. Henry V planned to take France by establishing a base and then attacking in successive bursts from that base. That base became the coastal town of Harfleur. On 8 October 1415, Henry set out for the town of Calais, 180 miles from Harfleur. The French received word of the English move and hence pursued the English, finally passing them on 24 October. The massive French force then set up for battle just outside of the town of Agincourt.[5] After losing men to various unfortunate circumstances over the long journey to Calais, "[Henry's army] now numbered about ten thousand in all, eight thousand archers and two thousand men-at-arms."[6] Henry spread his troops along a clearing between two dense forests, alternating the differing soldiers. On either wing were a group of archers, farther in stood two bunches of men-at-arms, or infantry, inside these two groups were two more "wedges" of archers and, finally, a third group of men-at-arms in the center. Henry, much like Harold and William in the Battle of Hastings, wished to be on the defensive. He tried to provoke the French into initiating an attack by launching a series of arrows into the French lines.

The French army (the French king, Charles VI did not participate in this battle) severely outnumbered Henry's forces nearly two to one, with an estimate of about 25,000 men. The bulk of the French army consisted of men-at-arms, which totaled nearly 24,000, leaving only 1,000 or so mounted soldiers. The tremendous number of men-at-arms were broken into two separate lines, one in front of the other. Calvary formed the wings on either side of these two lines as well as a third line behind the rest of the infantry. With their advantage in numbers, the French could easily attack. However, they too wanted the English to instigate the unavoidable contest.

The English army, with their infamous archers, chose the bow and arrow as their primary weapon. These bows were drastically different from those used in 1066. The bow itself increased in length (hence the name "longbow") which in turn increased the distance the arrows could travel. Each archer carried with him one or two bundles of approximately twenty-four arrows. In addition to their precious bows and arrows, the archers carried with them swords, axes, or mallets in the event they must fight hand to hand. One other "weapon" the archer's utilized were giant stakes which they pounded into the ground at about a forty-five degree angle (their grisly purpose will be revealed later). The men-at-arms carried essentially the same weapons as soldiers of the past: swords, lances, battle-axes, spears, perhaps a dagger. The crucial difference between the past and 1415 lay in the armor. Chain mail served exclusively as mobile armor covering the

joints (e.g., shoulders and elbows) while plated steel armor covered the rest of the body. This new body armor eliminated the use of a cumbersome shield, a bare necessity for any soldier four hundred years earlier.

The French calvary dressed themselves in much the same way as the English men-at-arms. Their horses too were shielded on their faces and chests and a padded cloth was draped over the sides of the horse. Thus, the horses of Agincourt were much more battle-ready than those of Hastings. These mounted soldiers had cut their lances down since they knew they would not be fighting other mounted soldiers, but foot soldiers. The French men-at-arms equipped themselves with swords, maces, battle-axes, or bills (spears with a hook extending from the point of the spear). The helmets of both calvary and infantry ranged from bassinets, which were open-faced, to helmets with nasal slits extending from the forehead.

The Battle of Agincourt took place the morning of 25 October 1415 but, much as the Battle of Hastings, it began more or less as a stand-off between two armies wanting to fight on the defensive. However, the consistent barrage of English arrows upon the French effectively provoked them into engaging. The first to charge were the calvary from the wings. Riding at full gallop through a curtain of arrows, some of which bounced off the steel armor and some piercing the chain mail joints with their bodkinlike tips, the French charged into the English lines. As mentioned earlier, the archers had pounded giant stakes into the ground at forty-five degree angles. Though the horses were armored, the combination of the speed of their approach and the sharpness of the stakes resulted in a ghastly scene. At the sight of so many horses and men falling, a call for retreat rose amongst the French. As they sped away from the English lines, however, they ran smack into the first line of French infantry. This collision halted the second French charge for some time until they could gather themselves and proceed; all of this while the storm of arrows continued.

Torrential rains had soaked the battlefield the night before the actual battle. The calvary charge had created a virtual mud pit for their comrades to cross. In addition, the English archers on the wings funneled the French so that the English would be attacking a smaller front of French infantry. The clash between the English and French men-at-arms went on for quite some time, at which point many of the archers put down their bows and picked up their swords, axes, or daggers to aid their infantry. The archers attacked with great ferocity, which the French did not return. That is, they were somewhat

reluctant to attack any of the archers. To fight an archer would not produce the same amount of respect for a soldier as fighting another soldier. This resulted in several archers ganging up on one or two French infantrymen. Thus began what John Keegan calls the "tumbling effect." The French foot soldiers were falling on top of one another, some as a result of injury or death, some from slipping in the muddy field. Previously, the French believed they could simply roll over the English with their superior numbers. The "tumbling effect," however, prevented much of their infantry from even coming into contact with the English army. Eventually, both armies retreated and another waiting period began.

The English numbers were falling as well. Thus when Henry received word that the French planned on another attack with the second line of infantry and a third calvary charge, he ordered the execution of all French prisoners. This drastic measure, though cruel, placed enough fear into the French army to cause them to retreat from the battlefield; the English soon did the same. The Battle of Agincourt demoralized and humiliated the French. After all, they outnumbered the English by more than two to one and they were fighting on their own ground. For the English, the victory increased their interest in a conquest of France which only hardened the relations between the two nations. The Hundred Years War was only in mid-stride in 1415; the fighting went on for another forty to fifty years.

Many theories have been proposed concerning the outcomes of both the Battle of Hastings and the Battle of Agincourt. Hastings' result has been linked to such things as Harold's "indecision, stubbornness in a prepared plan, caution or sheer inability to inspire"[7] and the Norman usage of calvary since "Englishmen had never met horsemen in battle."[8] The French loss at the Battle of Agincourt has been attributed to the rain-soaked battlefield as well as the lack of a dominating leader to successfully coordinate the massive French force.[9] However, the use and alterations of the bow and arrow as well as the development in armor stick out as the most pervading explanation for the results of the two battles.

There is nothing beautiful about war. It is bloody; it is vicious; it is ghastly. Despite the glory or valor one might receive for any brave actions performed in the heat of battle, there is one simple, one basic fact that cannot be ignored: no one wishes to die. Becoming a martyr is a special honor, but the prospects of remaining alive to receive the rewards of valor seem more appealing. Comparing the Battle of Hastings with the Battle of Agincourt, one can see, beneath the developments in weapon technology, the fear of death amongst the soldiers. Most notably

this is exemplified in the changes in armor from vulnerable chain mail to durable steel-plated armor. These steel plates covered the vital regions of the body, while chain mail was used only near the joints for mobility. It is true that chain mail could lessen the cutting effect of swords and, although not as effectively, could reduce the effect of arrows. However, the force behind the blow of a sword was not thwarted. Thus, one could escape decapitation yet still get knocked unconscious. Similarly, as the strength behind an archer's arrows increased, the interconnected chain mail could not repel an onslaught of arrows.

In addition, the increasing distance between the armies illustrates how they feared death. In 1066, initial contact was hand to hand, but as the battle progressed, the distance between the two opponents increased. The same holds true for 1415; the difference occurring only in the distance between the English and the French. To be sure, many deaths resulted from hand to hand combat in both Hastings and Agincourt, but the fact remains that from 1066 to 1415 the desire to keep the distance between one's enemy as great as possible pervaded military strategy. The logic in this is quite simple, especially if one's army is outnumbered. To even out the odds, one needs to cut the opposing army down before engaging. This tactic persevered and survived between Hastings and Agincourt and even beyond. To prove this, one only needs to look at present-day military weaponry.

Comparing the weapons used during the Battle of Hastings and the Battle of Agincourt allows one to see the technological advancement that took place within this four hundred year time span. It is essential to observe primarily the weapons utilized by the victors of each battle, for their weapons proved to be the most effective. The Battle of Hastings would have progressed differently had it not been for the bow and arrow of the Normans. They could sit back far enough out of the range of the English javelins yet within the range of their own projectiles.

It is true that the battle-axe performed brilliantly when caught in hand to hand combat, however the lack of such combat reduced its potency; a battle-axe obviously would be useless in the hands of someone who was over one hundred yards away from his enemy. This concept grew in popularity over the years, as the development of the longbow illustrates. This magnificent weapon possessed the ability to launch an arrow up to four hundred yards. By altering the trajectory of their weapons toward the sky, archers could increase the force with which their arrows landed. The combination of the force behind the bow and the earth's gravity generated a weapon

that could pierce even the revolutionary steel-plated armor. The horrific stakes employed by the English archers during the Battle of Agincourt, as indispensable as they have been made out to be, seem trivial in comparison to the effect the continual showers of arrows had on the French men-at-arms. Indeed, as the French infantry marched ahead toward the mass of English archers, the piercing effect of the arrows increased. Though they did not kill as many Frenchmen as they wished, they archers did achieve two goals. First, they demoralized the French. It is hard to keep high spirits when arrows are coming "in sheets of five thousand at ten-second intervals."[10] Second, as mentioned earlier, the archers were able to funnel the French soldiers providing a narrower front of attack.

The information presented above illustrates how the bow and arrow achieved victory for the Normans during the Battle of Hastings and for the English at the Battle of Agincourt. This might cause one to wonder why the English did not utilize the bow and arrow at Hastings or why the French did not possess longbows at Agincourt. In order to achieve victory in battle, an army must possess some kind of advantage (e.g. number of troops, strategic placement of troops, etc.). The key to victory lies in holding that advantage and keeping the enemy from gaining it as

well. "Englishmen had never met horsemen in battle"[11] before Hastings, yet they were able to combat that Norman advantage with the battle-axe. The bow and arrow, for the English, was a hunting tool, much as the axe was to the French. It just so happens that the bow and arrow proved to be more effective than the axe.

This concept can be further illustrated in the Battle of Agincourt. The French possessed bows and arrows, but they were certainly not as deadly as the English longbow nor were they as influential. Furthermore, the English possessed the same steel-plated armor as the French. The French arrows merely bounced off the English while the arrows from the powerful English longbows could penetrate the French soldiers. The French just did not know how effective a longbow could be. They were deprived of Medieval technology. This can even happen in modern-day war, as illustrated in the United States' possession of nuclear weaponry during World War II. The U.S. had something no other nation possessed. This devastating weapon was kept secret in a time when one nation could contact another nation in a matter of seconds via a telephone call. Imagine how easy it was to keep a revolutionary weapon secret in Medieval Europe!

Endnotes

[1] David Howarth, *1066: The Year of the Conquest* (New York: The Viking Press, 1979), 169. DA1 95.H69

[2] Ibid., 169-70.

[3] Ibid., 142.

[4] Ibid., 176.

[5] Anne Curry, *The Hundred Years War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 97-8. DC96.C87

[6] John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (New York: The Viking Press, 1976), 81. D25.K43

[7] Frank Barlow, *William I and the Norman Conquest* (London: The English Universities Press Ltd, 1965), 78. DA197.B33

[8] Howarth, 175.

[9] Keegan, 113-14.

[10] Keegan, 98.

[11] Howarth, 175.

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An Analysis of the Mithraism/Christianity Relationship in Rome And Its Traditional Interpretation

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Before the advent of civilization, early people sought to explain the meaning of their existence in terms of the divine or supernatural. Natural occurrences and other unexplained phenomena were said to be manifestations of gods even before humanity had established itself in permanent settlements or developed the written word. When the movement towards civilization was born, and as it grew stronger, small villages and ancient cities organized themselves around the temple community. From the dawning age of civilization through the present, a myriad of cult religions and belief systems have entered into the human consciousness. While the vast majority of these faiths flourished and faded before the modern age, several have survived the millennia and continue to have profound affects on the topography and relations of societies around the world. Perhaps more than any other deceased religion, Mithraism, throughout the ages, has had the most profound affect on present day faiths such as Christianity and Judaism. The Persian Mysteries, rooted in the nature worship of ancient Iran, managed, by the grace of their marvelous adaptability, to disseminate throughout the ancient world and be assimilated into numerous unrelated societies. After a circuitous and lengthy journey, a fully developed Mithraism entered the Roman Empire and soon rose to the status of state religion. In the heart of ancient Rome, a classic, yet controversial battle was played out between the elder Mithraic tradition and the emerging Christian faith. Despite an established, rich tradition, the exclusivity of the Mithraic brotherhood, the impersonal nature of its savior, and its own tragic adaptability proved to be key elements in the downfall of Mithraism when confronted with the rising popularity and absolute rigidity in faith of the infantile Christian Church. This has been the traditional analysis of Christianity's victory over Persian paganism, yet it fails to acknowledge the significance of the numerous similarities in doctrine, values, and legends that existed between the two faiths. Due to the analogous nature of the two doctrines, Christianity should no longer be viewed as simply a victor, but rather as a more refined and lasting form of a single, universal tradition that has addressed the basic spiritual needs and hopes so desperately yearned for by humanity since its inception.

Before one can fully appreciate the theological battle that developed between Mithraism and Christianity in Rome, one must first understand the social, political, and religious climate of the Empire. D. Brendan Nagle accurately depicts this environment when he states:

> The great cultural diversity of the Empire was reflected in the chaotic variety of religions, cults, philosophies, and theosophies that offered themselves to the inhabitants of the Roman world. There were officially sanctioned and supported state cults that functioned openly and splendidly and small, private groups that met and worshiped in secret. Every taste and every class were accommodated.[1]

Truly, in an environment such as this it is difficult to agree with authors who describe the spiritual and moral bankruptcy of Rome at the time. Authors like Arturo Graf, who wrote, "in Rome there was no sacred Book of Morals, no theocratic code," seem to regard the proliferation of foreign cults as a sign of some spiritual failing or emptiness on the part of the Romans.[2] While it is true that Romans were often given to joining cults of non-Roman origins, the very fact that the ancient Empire could nurture and support such a wide variety of belief systems is a testament to the importance of religion in Roman life. From this plethora of minor cults and deities

large and small, arose Mithraism and Christianity; two minor groups that were to survive political and social unrest for numerous decades, and eventually become dominant religious forces. How these two ideologies sprouted, grew, and eventually confronted each other is as fascinating and controversial an event as any that history provides.

The development of Mithraism from the rustic, Iranian nature worship tradition, to the rich, established cult that rose to prominence in Rome is an intriguing history. All the cultures which Mithraism encountered altered the faith in some way that reflected their own fundamental beliefs concerning humanity, the universe, and the divine. From the well-developed, quasi-scientific system of the Babylonians to the reason of the Greeks, Mithraism adapted itself with perfect chameleon-like ability. As it traveled from country to country, the Mithraic doctrine became increasingly defined and solidified in its teachings. Although each culture imparted its own beliefs on Mithraism, it would be false to say the heart of Mithraism was altered. Throughout its travels, the original Iranian tradition of nature worship remained central to the religion. Franz Cumont succinctly states the relationship of the various cultures that helped create the Mithraism that entered Rome, when he writes:

> The basal layer of this religion, its lower and primordial stratum, is the faith of ancient Iran from which it took its origin. Above the Mazdean substratum was deposited in Babylon a thick sediment of Semitic doctrines and afterwards the local beliefs of Asia Minor added to it their alluvial deposits. Finally, a luxuriant vegetation of Hellenic ideas burst from this fertile soil and partly concealed from view its true original nature.[3]

Thus Mithraism entered Rome as yet another foreign cult to cross into the west as a result of the its vast conquests. However, Mithraism presented a doctrine that differed greatly from the festive or familial cults that populated the Empire. Instead of offering yet another god to honor with dancing, drinking, and festivals, Mithraism proclaimed personal salvation and eternal protection for the faithful who were required to lead an almost ascetic-like existence. The faithful believed in the need for repeated bodily cleansings, resisting sensuality, that good arose from action, and that strength and courage were greater than gentleness and tenderness. This demanding new doctrine that offered hope for a better life beyond the grave was readily assimilated into the Roman army. Indeed, Roman soldiers flocked to the protective fold of the sympathetic warrior, Mithra. Roman soldiers, like all soldiers before and since them, faced the constant threat of

death. The kindly, protective doctrine offered by the disciples of Mithra was the perfect assurance of assistance and guidance sought by people who faced such an existence. Often it was the veteran commander of a group of common soldiers who brought his men into the Persian Mysteries. The Brotherhood of Mithra was so influential throughout the army that the soldiers, on the whole, could be described as a pious even superstitious group.[4]

The structure and policies of the army also contributed greatly to the spread of Mithraism. In accordance with Roman policy, soldiers of conquered lands were displaced to other distant regions occupied by the imperial army. This policy provided a natural vehicle for the dissemination of Mithraism as an increasing number of Mithraic lands were conquered during Rome's eastward expansion. Despite being removed from their homelands for twenty years or more, the foreign members of the Roman army usually maintained the religious traditions of their native country, and even offered their faith to those interested. Roman soldiers were also subject to the grand troop movement policies of the Roman government. Upon serving a specified length of time in their homeland, these soldiers were promoted to the rank of centurian and transported to foreign lands. Obviously, once established in these foreign, possibly Mithraic lands, the soldiers would have been forced to encounter once distant theologies. Thus, soldiers who might have never known of the eastern religion, were it not for the policy of continual, massive troop movement, were much more likely to encounter a follower of Mithra among their own ranks, or in the native populace.[5]

Nonmilitary people were also influential agents of Mithra's dissemination. As Rome incorporated an increasingly larger portion of the Middle East, the numerous competent tradesmen of this region found grand opportunities opening up to their business. Again, like the movement of soldiers from their homelands to the outskirts of the empire, merchants from the conquered eastern lands traversed all regions of the empire and worked to spread their native religion. Mithraism also counted among its members a large number of slaves. There existed in ancient Rome a booming slave trade throughout its territories, as new lands were conquered and more people taken under Roman control. Slaves of both Romans and successful foreigners alike faced a difficult life of hardship without end. They too, like the soldiers, took solace in the warm embrace of Mithra, who promised to free them from their earthly toils and reward his faithful with eternal paradise. Although Mithraism began as a religion that populated the outskirts of the empire, it soon permeated the entire territory, especially concentrating in maritime cities with their high

numbers of foreign merchants and slaves.[6]

Although Mithraism presented an empathy and hope for eternal peace for the common soldier, slave, and wealthy aristocrat, such a doctrine was a rarity among Roman cults. However, the doctrine of Mithraism was not entirely unique since the teachings and doctrine of the early Christian church were strikingly similar, if not in some instances identical. The early church offered hope and salvation to the faithful of all social and economic status as well. Just as Mithraism flourished among the ranks of the Roman army, so too did Christianity spread rapidly among the lower, oppressed classes. However, again like Mithraism, Christianity itself did not attempt to limit its teachings to the lowly, but offered them freely to rich and poor alike. For both traditions, faith, not status, was the most important factor in a person's acceptance by the religion. To discover the causes of these, and many other similarities between the two religions, one must first journey back to ancient Babylon where both theologies found the basis for a great deal of their doctrine.

The Babylonian civilization was advanced scientifically, well beyond the simpler cultures of the Jews and Iranians. Their pseudo-scientific system had a profound effect on the rudimentary nature worship of the Iranian magi. Their primitive tradition was assimilated with the advanced astrological ideas of the Babylonians, resulting in the alignment of Iranian gods with the focal planets and suns of the Chaldeans. It was in this fashion that the Supreme Deity of the Iranians, Ahura Mazda, and the Judeo-Christian God became associated with the heavens, and Mithra with the sun. The Babylonians also introduced the doctrine of Fatality, or destiny, by which the Supreme Deity organized and governed the universe.[7] However, the influence of the Babylonian period had profound effects on the two developing religions that went beyond these simplistic examples. Previous to the Babylonian - Captivity, the ideas of resurrection, everlasting life, and a day of final judgment were unknown to Jewish culture.[8] The theological views of the Babylonians, in the form of Zoroastrianism, had a similar effect on the unformed, early version of Mithraism. This common root played a significant role in the development of two traditions that hold Sunday as a sacred day of worship, possess a categorical system of ethics, view asceticism and denial as meritous, and count abstinence, continence, renunciation, and self control among the virtues. The faithful of both theologies are baptized and receive through confirmation the powers necessary to combat evil, and through the Lord's Supper gain the salvation of body and soul.[9] In practice, the two faiths broke with tradition by moving the place of worship from the

temple to a smaller, private, communal worship area (i.e. the Mithraeum and church).[10] Moreover, Author Esme Wynne-Tyson sees a connection between Joseph and his twelve brothers and the grain producing, life sustaining Sun God and the twelve Signs of the Zodiac.[11] Both religions drew many of their basic views of humanity and the divine from Zoroastrianism: the first to preach a dualistic, antagonistic relationship between good and evil.

Like the Zoroastrianism of the Babylonians, both Christianity and Mithraism are based on a dualistic world view in which a single god of good constantly battles the forces of evil. The highest divinity in Mithraism was Boundless Time, or Ahura Mazda. Although it had no true physical form, the Supreme Deity of Mithraism was depicted in human form with the head of a lion and encompassed by a large serpent. In its hands it held the scepter and lightning bolts symbolic of divine sovereignty. It was a winged creature with the signs of the Zodiac inscribed on its body.[12] The Supreme Deity, like Yahweh of the early Christians, was opposed by the god of the Underworld, Ahriman or Satan. Whatever the name, the King of Hell reigned over the perverted monsters and demons beneath the earth. Interestingly, in both traditions the God of the Damned was less powerful than the God of Good. Even more, the followers of both early Christianity and Mithraism believed the evil god to have once been the favorite of the Supreme Deity. Both Ahriman and Satan held favored seats in the House of the Lord, yet were cast out from Paradise due to their own vanity and selfishness. Clearly, the very foundations of each religion are strikingly analogous. However, the similarities extend even further than this basic world view. The creation stories of the universe, humanity, and the births of Mithra and Jesus Christ further reveal the extent of these similarities.

The creation of the universe known to humans occurred after the birth of Mithra, when Ahura Mazda sent the first sacred Bull down from Heaven which he commanded Mithra to slay. The imagery of the Bull is significant in that the Persian word for Bull means life. The Bull could also date back as far as 3000 years before the Christian Era to the conjunction of the Sun and the Sign of the Bull at the vernal equinox.[13] According to John M. Robertson, the Bull has in the past symbolized the earth, the moon, the Bull of the Zodiac, and the "cosmogenic Bull of the Magian System."[14] With a heavy heart, the dutiful Mithra diligently searched for the Bull, which he eventually found in a cave. Upon attacking the Bull, a great battle ensued, with Mithra being the ultimate victor. The sacrifice of the Bull released fertility throughout the earth, bringing forth an abundance of animal and plant life. The evil Ahriman attempted to defile Ahura Mazda's creation by

sending the snake, scorpion, lizard, frog, and dog to drink the blood and consume the flesh of the Bull.[15] Although the myths do not align perfectly, the impetus for the creation of the universe clearly stemmed from both the Christian and Mithraic Gods of Good. It was the Christian god that created the land, the sea, and the sky, and all the creatures that dwell within, just as all the creatures of Earth flowed from the carcass of the slain Bull sent by Ahura Mazda. Whether from a sacred animal or six days of divine labor, all that humanity knows of its universe was the direct result of the actions of a benevolent, supreme god.

The stories of the two theologies concerning the advent of humanity also share many basic concepts and images. According to the Mithraic legend, humanity was created when the Supreme Deity sent another sacred Bull to the earth. However, Ahriman sought to defile this creation of Ahura Mazda and slew the Bull. Yet from the blood of the Bull arose a single couple from whom all humanity was born. Ahriman's machinations were not thwarted however, as he further tempted the woman with gifts of milk and fruit thus corrupting the purity of the Supreme Deity's creation.[16] Obviously, the archetype of the primordial couple is common to both religions. Again, from the direct action of the God of Good, the ancestral parents of all people were born alone in a world of paradise. Similarly, the female in each couple is approached by the God of Evil, whose temptations of fruit were too much for the early couple to resist. With this action, paradise is lost for the couple and all of humanity. Although the Mithraic legend does not mention Ahriman coming disguised as a snake, the imagery of his snakes and frogs attempting to spoil the first sacred Bull is evidence of the commonality of the snake as an agent of evil.

Although the Fall from Eden of Adam and Eve in the Christian tradition is cited as the introduction of sin and suffering into the world, pain and sin had already entered the world long before the arrival of the primordial couple according to the Mithraic doctrine. According to myth, the agents of evil rose out of the bowels of earth in an attempt to usurp heaven and its inhabitants. Although they were defeated, the demons remained on earth and were the cause of misery and pain. This minor discrepancy, however, highlights another source of similarity between the two faiths; that of the existence of the soul and the final judgment. Mithraists believed the souls of heaven descended in order to battle the evil on earth. When a person dies, his or her soul is fought over by the forces of good and those of evil. In both traditions, the ultimate fate of the soul is decided by judgment of its earthly existence and is then delivered unto the proper realm. Souls that entered the Mithraic Heaven passed through seven levels each guarded by angels. As they passed through a level they were stripped of their outer garments and earthly desires until they were finally stripped naked and merged with Heaven.[17] This is clearly synonymous with the ascendancy of the Christian soul to heaven and the achievement of complete peace, free from earthly suffering, and the eventual unity with God. The legends of both traditions continue by proclaiming the struggle between good and evil will eventually end. Ahriman and the demons of Hell will succeed in destroying the world, but Ahura Mazda will send a Bull and Mithra will redescend to earth to awaken all men to new life. All humanity will be judged and the good will be separated from evil. Mithra will immolate the Bull and feed the good with its fat and wine while destroying the wicked with fire.[18] Again, despite technical differences, the final judgment awaiting Mithraists is identical in nature and purpose with the Christian final judgment. Analogous to Mithra, Christ will redescend to earth bringing with him the salvation and wrath of his father. The souls of the dead will be resurrected and punished, or rewarded accordingly.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, are the similarities between Mithra and Christ themselves. The births of the two saviors, aside from both being celebrated on 25 December, share many other similarities. According to the Mazdaean doctrine, before any plant, animal, or human had been created, a great light shone down from Heaven and birthed Mithra from the solid rock that was the universe. He entered the universe naked, holding a knife and torch symbolic of his role as warrior and illuminator. Christ is also depicted as being both a warrior and illuminator, yet one who came to earth, much like Mithra, as a naked, helpless babe. Neither was born into luxury, but rather the harsh reality of life: Christ in an animal stall, and Mithra in the wild, under a tree. When they saw the great light that shown forth upon the birth of both Mithra and Christ, a group of lowly shepherds came to see the event and worshipped the newborn lord. Soon after his birth, Mithra traveled the land and eventually encountered the Sun, whom he defeated in battle. Instead of vanquishing his opponent, Mithra allied himself with the Sun and the two became almost synonymous with one another.[19] Although Christ did not immediately travel the land as Mithra had, he too lived compassionately, taking pity on his enemies. When their work on earth was done, each divinity gathered their twelve faithful followers together and, after sharing a Last Supper with them, ascended back to heaven with his father.

The followers of Mithraism and Christianity worshiped their divine leader as the God of Light,

protector of truth, "antagonist of falsehood and terror," the bringer of abundance and health, destroyer of evil, and ally of the faithful who sees, hears, and knows all from his reign with Ahura Mazda or Yahweh in Heaven. In this manner, they are sometimes viewed as emanations of the Supreme Deity, in essence, a part of Yahweh or Ahura Mazda. Mithra was the greatest genii through which Ahura Mazda protected his creation and worked to defeat the evils of Ahriman, just as it was through Christ that God worked to restore paradise on earth for the faithful Christians. It is with this understanding, that both Christ and Mithra came to be worshiped as mediators between Heaven and earth, between Heaven and Hell. Mithra was said to have inhabited a Middle Zone between Heaven and Hell from which he acted as the mediator between an unknowable god and the suffering, painful existence of humanity.[20] In describing the dualistic system of Mithraism and the role of Mithra in that system, Plutarch writes "The former (Ahura Mazda) he asserts is of all natural phenomena most closely akin to the light, the latter (Ahriman) to darkness, and that Mithra holds an intermediate position."[21] Truly, whatever has been written about Mithra can apply directly to the role of Christ, whose specific purpose was to bring God's lost children back into his paradise.

Despite the close theological relationship of Mithraism and early Christianity, disciples of neither tradition acknowledged the legitimacy of the other, and the Christian church even went so far as to openly persecute and defame Mithraic worshipers and structures. Surprisingly, the two had coexisted within the confines of the Roman Empire for many years without open conflict. Since Christianity existed predominantly in Asia Minor and Syria and Mithraism populated Europe, natural contact between the two was quite limited until increased travel and growth in the Empire forced them to confront each other. Once unavoidable contact was established, several key characteristics of Christianity and Roman imperial policy greatly affected the conflict. Christianity had spread as a result of the Jewish Diaspora, and was at first a religion based predominantly along coastal cities. More importantly, the movement from the cities and into the interior of the empire was the result of concerted, conscious missionary efforts. Unlike Mithraism, Christianity spread not as a result of social and political trends, but solely on the efforts of its disciples, regardless of the cultural climate of the time.[22] This adamant refusal to be swayed in action by the persecution or support of governments or foreign traditions was the single most important factor in Christianity's conflict with Rome and Mithraism alike. Where as Mithraism's willingness to adapt to new environments won it great favor throughout the Empire, Christianity's unrelenting refusal to change brought upon it the wrath of Roman government. Cumont believes that as the Christian annoyance worsened, Rome allied itself with the Church's greatest enemy, Mithraism.[23] This is a rather limited view of the religious history that disregards a key element in the alliance of Mithraism and the Roman government. This element is the simple fact that, long before the rise of Christianity, emperors, rulers, and aristocrats alike were attracted to the powerful, militaristic Persian deity in which they found justification for oligarchic, or autocratic rule. Unlike Cumont's argument, the attraction that Mithraism held for the power elite existed well before the rise of Christianity. However, regardless of the reasons behind it, as the Christian church struggled to become an increasingly powerful presence, a full-scale conflict with the entrenched Mithraism was unavoidable.

Although the Church was heavily persecuted by the Romans, it did not show any mercy or compassion towards its religious rival. In his book *De Corona Militis*, the Christian apologist Tertullian writes: "We may recognize the craft of the devil, who counterfeits divine things to turn us from our faith and bring us into condemnation."[24] Indeed the fathers of the Christian Church were always searching for some new heresy to pin on the Mithraists. Early on, the Church stated that the Mithraic doctrine had imitated that of Christianity. When that could not be supported, they switched to claim that the "Mithraic Devils" had anticipated the Church rites in order to discredit them.[25] Later Christian apologists called the similarities "Satanic Travesties."[26] Magic, soothsaying, astrology, oracles, and divination, all intricately involved in the development of Mithraism, were thought by the early Church to be, in fact, the inventions or creations of demons.[27] As the author Esme Wynne-Tyson states:

> Therefore none of these religious similarities should disturb the educated man, although it is quite easy to see how men in a less informed age would be shaken and horrified at discovering in a rival Faith the stories of Adam and Eve, the Flood, the Ark, and of Moses causing water to burst from a rock. Small wonder that it seemed as though devils had been at work.[28]

The early Christians went beyond simply discrediting, in writing, Mithraism as a heresy. Scores of Mithraeum were systematically destroyed and desecrated. Most often this was done by the ritual murder of Mithraic priests within the Mithraeum

itself and then sealing the body in the temple. Mithraic temples were not the only object of the destructive sights of the Church. Truly, any Mithraic artifact was summarily destroyed when discovered, so as to rid the world of this pagan heresy.[29] This could not have been a small, quite private battle between two religious groups by any means. The conflict took place in homes, temples, public streets, and government buildings. The significance of the outcome of this conflict was to have drastic consequences for many people, and this fact was not lost on the Roman public. In AD 177, before the Christian/Mithraism conflict had come to a head, the early Roman writer, Celsus, had already pitted the doctrines of the two religions against each other in his work, *True Discourse*. Although Mithraism went on to reach its height during the end of the third century and beginning of the fourth century AD, the battle at the Milvian Bridge on the Tiber river (AD 312), brought Christ into Rome behind Constantine's ultimate triumph.[30] Yet even as Christians were eradicating Mithraism, the Roman wealthy remained true to the Mithra of their ancestors.[31]

Ultimately in the course of history, Mithraism fell among the ranks of the dead religions of the world, while Christianity went on to shape the events of humankind up to the present. The single largest political blow to Mithraism was, of course, the conversion of Constantine. After this event, Mithraism was only tolerated, and later emperors would openly persecute the eastern religion. Once assured success, the Christian church called for the abolition of idolatry of all forms.[32] With the reign of Julian the Apostate, however, Mithraism enjoyed a revival of sorts. An intelligent, mythical believer, Julian felt Mithraism would have to shed many of its primitive aspects and incorporate more philosophical elements if it were ever to become a world religion. Ironically, Julian's dream was cut short by a Persian assassin. After Julian's death, there was a brief period of tolerance, but with the emperor Gratian (AD 382), all state support for the once magnificent cult was ended. Then, in AD 391, the emperor Theodosius proclaimed an edict that forbade all pagan worship and attendance of pagan temples. Finally, in AD 392 there came a second edict that made all forms of pagan worship, public and private, open to persecution. Truly, the religion of the Romans had always developed within the framework of politics.[33] When the Roman government finally turned from Mithraism, it was only a matter of time before it would meet its final end.

Yet, as damaging as the change in Roman political mood was to the Mithraic doctrine, it was not the most profound reason for its failure. Even the conversion of Constantine was not quite the awesome event that it is held to be, as H. Doerries wrote in his biography of the emperor, "politics were for him determined by religion, and religion determined by politics."[34] Mithraism failed due to three significant faults in its doctrine. Although chastity was held as meritous by both traditions, for Mithraism it was not an end in and of itself, but rather a simple conservation of energy. For the Mithraist, women were a temptation to be avoided.[35] Thus women were virtually banned from the cult. Even though it hoped for a universal religion, Mithraism still preached the "esoteric and exoteric exclusion of women".[36] Surely a religion that summarily excluded half the human race could not have hoped to survive. As an alternative to this, the Christian church was not exclusively male. It allowed the presence of women at its functions and welcomed them completely into its arms.[37] Biblical authors such as Luke, often worked diligently to convey God's love for man and woman equally. Luke taught that Jesus' ministry was to free the oppressed, and that women were one of the most oppressed groups in need of divine aid. Luke often stressed Jesus' compassion for women of all backgrounds: widows, the poor, prostitutes, and mothers. In his book, *Women in the Earliest Churches*, Witherington states: "Perhaps Luke has a concern to show that the Word goes out to men and women of all social classes."[38] Flender continues, as he writes, "Luke expresses by this arrangement (his use of male-female parallelism) that man and woman stand together and side by side before God. They are equal in honor and grace; they are endowed with the same gifts and have the same responsibilities. . ."[39] Truly, the early Church far surpassed Mithraism in its radical, progressive stance on gender issues.

Throughout its life history, Mithraism's great adaptability to new social and political environments had proved to be a marvelous asset. Yet, when confronted with the stalwart, unfaltering faith of the Christian church in its own doctrine, Mithraism seemed weak and unformed. Where as Mithraism simply melded with Roman culture, the nonlinear and often contradictory nature of Christianity demanded confrontation. It required its followers to give something more than Mithraism. For in giving this, the faithful were rewarded with something more meaningful than that offered by Mithraism. To the ancient people, the Christian texts were alive, passionate and uncompromised, while the Mithraic texts fell flat and were continually altered and modified. As the Christian body grew strong and persecution heightened, faithfulness and devotion to the church only strengthened. Salvation was a community issue for the Christian church, not an

individual commitment as in Mithraism. From the chaotic, disorganized nature of the early Christian church a unified struggle for concrete community was revealed.[40]

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the fundamental difference between Jesus Christ and Mithra. Both were compassionate and benevolent saviors who would punish the wicked as soon as they would deliver the faithful unto Heaven. Yet, Jesus Christ was a living, suffering human who had actually existed in some of the very places where his followers now tread. Mithra was a mythical god. As kind and protecting as he could have been, his sufferings and sacrifices and were mythological. Where as Christ had truly lived, faith in Mithra was ultimately based upon a long tradition of legend and myth. As Robin Lane Fox mentions in his book, *Pagans and Christians*, mystery cults offered myths of god, while the Judeo-Christian tradition offered history. Where as pagan mysteries conveyed a secret experience, the early church offered a "revelation" based on texts.[41] Jesus was also a mediator between God and humanity, yet Mithra, according to the legends, was simply a mediator between good and evil. In the Mithraic doctrine, there exists no human element, no passionate love that can exist only between two people who share common experiences. In short, the goodness of Mithra was no match for the goodness of Christ the living, passionate human, who suffered and died on the cross.[42]

Perhaps the analysis of the events of Roman religious history would not be so controversial if the reasons for Christianity's ultimate triumph were as simple and definite as above. However, like many events in world history, the act of gleaning any meaning or deciphering the true nature of a relationship is difficult at best. The problem presented by a historical analysis of the Mithraism/ Christian struggle begins at the very core of the commonly held view that Christianity did indeed eventually triumph over Mithraism. To make such a statement is not only dangerous, but it is also ignorant, revealing a general lack of understanding of the situation existing in the Empire at the time. Despite the power Christianity eventually acquired, to deny the influence and strength of Mithraism and its faithful is woefully incorrect. In the time before Christianity, Mithraism had risen to the rank of official state cult, a position achieved by few traditions before or since. It was popular amongst the rich and poor alike, and within the Roman army was virtually all-powerful. Any religion given the opportunity to usurp this powerful theology would have been required to make a multitude of compromises and alterations in order to even hope to attract the faithful of another cult. Although the early church was rigidly faithful to its core belief that Jesus of Nazareth was the son of God, it had to make numerous concessions to the Mithraic doctrine and adopt Mithraic practices and concepts as its own. Thus Christians celebrate the birth of Christ on the same day as that of Mithra's birth 25 December. The 25th is clearly a date of Mithraic significance in that it corresponds to the winter solstice which was worshiped as the Nativity of the Sun. The early church also lacked a collection of hymns, which were popular in the Mithraic tradition. Thus the earliest hymns of the church are actually based on Mithraic tunes combined with altered Christian lyrics.[42]

Finally, Christian founders were "keen to include in their faiths all the sublime values and beautiful ideals appealing to human conscience mind," values and ideals previously embodied in the Mithraic tradition.[43] This statement suggests that regardless of its specific beliefs and concepts, Christianity is not merely indebted to, but simply an emanation of a grander, basic set of values, needs, and beliefs within the collective human consciousness. The technical similarities in beliefs and legends might reveal the possibility of the relationship, but such an interrelatedness extends deeper, beyond all differences and similarities in form and belief. The shared basic idea of a compassionate, all-powerful, cosmic god in whose protective fold the faithful can find inner peace and eternal salvation speaks more loudly than any differences in its earthly character. The seemingly universal need for divinity in a persons daily life points to a much closer relationship between Mithraism and Christianity than ever before postulated in a historical, social, or even religious context. Thus the ultimate religious history in Rome is not so much the triumph of Christianity over Mithraism, but rather a refinement of a common, spiritual human need into a more permanent form that has continued for almost two millennia. Only when this vital element in the Christianity/ Mithraism conflict is understood can scholars move past the desire to proclaim a victor, and focus on the history and development of these universal needs regardless of their earthly form.

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[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Esme Wynne-Tyson, *Mithras the Fellow in the Cap.* (New York: Barnes and Noble Publishers, 1972)

[7] Abbas Aryanpur, *Iranian Influence in Judaism and Christianity.* (Tehran: Kayhan Press, 1973)

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[10] Wynne-Tyson, *Mithras Fellow in the Cap.*

[11] Ibid.

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[13] John Robertson, "Religious Systems of the World", In *Mithras the Secret God.* Ed. M.J. Vermaseren. (New York: Barnes and Noble Inc., 1963)

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[15] Cumont, *Mysteries of Mithra.*

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[19] Cumont, *Mysteries of Mithra.*

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[22] Nagle, *The Ancient World.*

[23] Tertullian, *De Corona Militis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.)

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[29] Vermaseren, *Mithras the Secret God.*

[30] Cumont, *Mysteries of Mithras.*

[31] Ibid.

[32] Vermaseren, *Mithras the Secret God.*

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[36] Laeuchli, *Mithraism in Ostia.*

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[43] Ibid.

The Worker's Woe: A History of the Haymarket Affair

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The hour approaches noon in Chicago on Friday, 11 November 1887 as four men "with their arms pinioned, their wrists handcuffed, and their bodies cloaked in white, muslin shrouds"[1] are led to the scaffold. The nooses are placed securely around their necks when one shouts through the hood that covers his head, "the time will come when our silence will be more powerful than the voices you strangle today."[2] These are the final words of August Spies, as he and his fellow anarchists Adolph Fisher, Albert Parsons, and George Engel are hanged. These words mark, for the men, the close of a battle that began over a year before on 1 May 1886.[3]

The first day of May in 1886 was designated by the American Federation of Labour as the day which would mark the beginning of the eight hour workday. Chicago's leaders, who were plagued by striking workers in the railroad, gas, iron mill, meat packing, and plumbing industries,[4] held their breath as 1 May approached. Although more than 30,000 people demonstrate for an eight hour day, the first passes peacefully. Reassured by the lack of trouble, Chicagoans begin to think that the movement will die without violence. This is not to be.

On Monday, 3 May, the trouble begins. Striking workers at the McCormick Harvester factory attack the strike-breakers with sticks and rocks. Police at the scene begin firing into the throng of strikers. As reenforce-ments numbering almost 200 policemen arrive the strikers dissipate. Meanwhile, August Spies lectures to a group of striking lumber workers not far from the McCormick factory. He arrived at the scene to learn that six of the strikers have been killed. Angered by the tyranny of the bosses, he penned a circular calling the workingmen to unite in arms;[5] a meeting is called for the next evening at the Haymarket.

On the night of the meeting, a crowd of approximately 2,500 people gathers. This number is much smaller than anticipated, and the group moves from the Haymarket to Crane's alley. A rostrum is assembled, and Spies begins to address the crowd.

"The object of this meeting is to explain the general situation of the eight hour movement and to throw light upon various incidents in connection with it."[6] Carter Harrison, Chicago's mayor, was in the crowd; upon hearing Spies' remarks and the remarks of the second speaker Albert Parsons, he decides that the meeting is "tame" and tells Chicago Police Inspector John Bonfield to dismiss his reserves.[7] Bonfield instead goes to the alley where a group of approximately 300 remain listening to the closing remarks of the third and final speaker, Samuel Fielden. Bonfield, backed by 180 men, tells the crowd to "disperse immediately and peaceably." To this Fielden responds, "but Captain, we are peaceable."[8] Any further communication between the two is cut off as the explosion of a bomb rips through the crowd. One policeman is killed instantly, and several others are wounded, six of whom later die.[9] The police open fire on the audience.

The investigation into the events of the evening quickly turns into a witchhunt as offices, stores, and homes are raided, often without warrants.[10] Eventually eight men are on trial for murder; they were Spies, Parsons, Fisher, Engel, Fielden, Michael Schwab, Oscar Neebe, and Louis Lingg. These men cannot be connected to the bomb, and in fact, Engel, Schwab, Neebe, and Lingg were not even present at the rally.[11]

The trial is a farce. The Bailiff, Judge, and jury are all extremely biased against the defendants. The Bailiff even says "I am calling such men as the defendants will have to challenge peremptorily and waste their time and challenges. They will have to take such men as the prosecution wants."[12] The judge supports this action, saying that an admitted bias is an insufficient reason to remove a man from the jury.[13]

It is late August when the jury delivers its verdict; all eight are found guilty: Neebe was given a fifteen year sentence and the rest are ordered to hang. Appeals to both the Illinois and United States Supreme Courts fail. Spies, Fielden, and Schwab

petition the governor for executive clemency, but it is not until two days before the hanging, when Spies inexplicably withdraws his petition, that the governor converts the sentences of Fielding and Schwab to life imprisonment. Louis Lingg commits suicide by placing

a dynamite cap in his mouth the day before the trial. On 11 November 1887, the remaining four: Spies, Parsons, Fisher, and Engel are hanged. All eight later are proven to have no connection to the bombing.[14]

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[1] Henry David, *The History of the Haymarket Affair*, (New York: Russell and Russell, 1958), 463.

[2] Paul Avrich, *The Haymarket Tragedy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 393.

[3] It is acknowledged that labor unrest did not spontaneously begin on 1 May 1886; however, this is the day that the American Federation of Labour resolved would constitute the beginning of the eight hourday. Thus, especially due to the brevity of this paper, it will be used as a starting point to explore the events of the Haymarket Affair.

[4] David, 187.

[5] Lesley Wischmann, "Remembering the Haymarket Anarchists: A Hundred Years Later," in *Monthly Review*, October 1987, volume 39, 19.

[6] Avrich, 200.

[7] Ibid., 204.

[8] Wischmann, 19.

[9] Of the police officers wounded and dead, medical evidence later showed that many of their injuries were the result of the policemen's own bullets, which in their panic had been fired into the backs of their fellow officers.

[10] "Why Mayday," on the Internet.

[11] Of the eight brought to trial, only Samuel Fielden remained at the meeting at the time of the bombing. Wischmann, 19.

[12] Wischmann, 23.

[13] Avrich, 263.

[14] Introduction: "Haymarket Remembered," on the Internet.

John Lobach's Death and Implications for Wittenberg Security Force

by Dave Norton
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(1997 Hartje Award Winner)

In 1969, John Lobach lost his life less than a month before he was to graduate from Wittenberg University. This is the story of his death and its repercussions for Wittenberg Security. Born 28 July 1947 in Pennsylvania, John graduated from high school in the top fifth of his class. While in high school he participated in athletics, theatre, and choir. At Wittenberg, John was a history major and a member of the Phi Kappa Psi fraternity.[1]

On 9 May John and two of his fraternity brothers, Theodore Winzeler and Allen Mitchell, drove to an off-campus party. Following the party, the three friends drove back to campus, parking near the women's dorm, North Hall. Lobach decided to climb the side of the three story dormitory (which has a number of terraces and ledges) so that he might knock on the window of a fraternity brother's girl friend.[2] Both Winzeler and Mitchell advised, unsuccessfully, against scaling the wall. In climbing the side of the dorm, Lobach may have rattled a window pane as he neared the second floor of the building. Sophomore Amy Cunningham reported that she heard "a window rattle" and saw "a shadow."[3] Disturbed by what she saw and heard, Cunningham quickly reported her observations to a resident assistant, Diane Smith. In turn, Smith immediately alerted the dormitory housemother, Mrs. Wirna Benson, of the situation.[4] After receiving Benson's call at 2:22 A.M., security responded by dispatching the two officers on duty to the scene. Arriving on the scene in a security cruiser, officers Frank Lytle and Chester Phillips instructed John to remove himself from the ledge. At the approach of the officers, Lobach's friends slunk away unnoticed. As was the standard operating procedure, one of the officers, Lytle, proceeded inside the building to call the head of security, William Lockman. Meanwhile, Lobach, showing "no physical resistance," was placed in the patrol car.[5] In the cruiser, Lobach told Phillips that he was an eighteen-year-old high school student named James Carson, and that he lived at 801 North Fountain Street.[6] While Lytle was inside, Lobach fled from the car, running north along the side of North Hall towards what is now Bill Edwards Drive.[7] Jumping out of the car, Phillips ordered Lobach to halt four or five times. Finding Lobach unresponsive to his shouts, Phillips drew his newly-purchased .357 magnum revolver and fired a warning shot into the air.[8] With Lobach still not responding, Phillips fired "aiming at his legs."[9] The bullet penetrated Lobach's back. Unaware of what was going on outside, Lytle hurried out of the building after he heard the shots to find Phillips calling for "the police and an emergency car."[10] When the emergency squad arrived on the scene at 2:56 A.M., Lobach was already dead. At age twenty-one, with thirty-six days left until he would graduate, John Lobach was killed by a Wittenberg security officer.

Lobach's death compelled the University to rethink its approach to protecting students. A review of the policies and procedures of the security office by the Torch staff revealed Phillips' actions to be in violation of the "Manual of Operating Procedures."[11] Of the twenty-two "responsibilities and job requirements" listed, Phillips disregarded the regulation detailing the proper use of lethal force. It states that "Fire arms, shall only be used for self defense or for the protection of human life."[12]

Despite such a clear mandate, Wittenberg University chose to retain Phillips, transferring him to a new position.[13] However, Wittenberg did revamp its security department. In the fall of 1969, new policies were adopted that addressed some of the issues raised by Lobach's death. For example, officers were only permitted to carry .38 caliber weapons (not the more powerful .357). Additionally, officers would only carry weapons from 8 P.M. to 5 A.M. or when transferring money. Before any officer could carry a gun, s/he was required to complete a 120-hour basic training program by the Springfield Police Academy.[14] Thus, the tragedy of a student's death compelled Wittenberg to change its security policies.

Endnotes

1 "Wittenberg Student Killed by Guard" *The Springfield Daily News*, 10 May 1969, 1.

2 Ibid., 1.

3 Idem.

4 Idem.
One can judge the speed of this interaction by the police reports cited in the *Daily News*. Lobach's friends reported that they arrived back on campus at 2:20 a.m.

5 Martin Curdes, "Wittenberg loses civil suit" *The Torch*, 10 October 1974, 1.

6 Wittenberg Student Killed.. .. ," 1.

7 "Death Opens Security Study," *The Torch*, 16 May 1969, 1.

8 Dialog with Robert Cherry, then director of the Upward Bound Program at Wittenberg, February 27, 1997. Cherry spoke with Phillips two days prior to the shooting. Phillips told Cheery of his new, more powerful .357 weapon.

9 "Death opens security study," 1.

10 Curdes, 1.
Both the Curdes article and a later 29 April 1976 article assert that Lobach died three to five seconds after being shot

11 "Wittenberg security department subject to rules and regulations," *The Torch*, 16 May 1969, 1.

12 Idem.

13 "Death opens security study," 1.

14 "Security staff is reorganized; icreased staff has eight men," *The Torch*, 3 October 1969, 1.

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A Hero in the Night

By Dawn Lucas
Bay Village, Ohio
(1997 Hartje Award Winner)

I shan't forgit the night
When I dropped be'ind the fight
With a bullet where my belt-plate should 'a'
been.
I was chokin' mad with thirst,
An' a man spied me first
Was our good old grinnin', gruntin' Gunga Din.
'E lifted up my 'ead,
An' he plugged me where I bled,
An' 'e guv me 'arf-a-pint o' water green.
It was crawlin' and it stunk,
But of all the drinks I've drunk,
I'm gratefullest to the one from Gunga Din.[1]

Rudyard Kipling

When writing histories about war, most historians focus on the battles fought between the opposing sides; few give account of what happened after the gunfire ended. The Battle of Fredericksburg exhibits one of the cruelest days of warfare that Americans have ever seen. If one studied only the actual engagement of Fredericksburg, he would miss a great act of heroism by a Confederate soldier.

Commander of the Army of the Potomac, General Ambrose Burnside and his officers, General Edwin Sumner and General Joseph Hooker, stood on the balcony of the Phillips House and surveyed the town of Fredericksburg, Virginia.[2] In the two mile region in front of the Phillips House, ran the Rappahannock River.[3] On the other side of the river was the urban center of Fredericksburg whose population of five thousand had been replaced by one hundred and fifty thousand Union soldiers.[4] Circling the southern half of the town was a field. This barren ground rose gradually rose about fifty feet.[5] At the top of the rise was an old road worn from its many years of wagons traversing upon it. In order to prevent further erosion, citizens of Fredericksburg reinforced the sides of the sunken road with stone. Within this sunken stone road, Confederate soldiers held their position.[6]

After surveying the theater of operation Burnside discussed with Sumner and Hooker the best plan of attack. By eight o'clock, the morning of 13 December 1862, the Generals had sent the battle plan to Union officers; the officers were to lead their troops in a frontal attack against Rebel lines.[7] General William A. French's division was to lead the attack on the sunken road supported by Generals Winfield Hancock and Oliver Howard.[8]

As French's division emerged from the town onto the barren plain they knew that they were doomed.[9] The eight hundred yard stretch between the edge of the town and the Rebel front at the sunken road was impenetrable. The Confederate infantrymen barricaded behind the sunken road had an unobstructed view of the approaching Union soldiers. As the Union soldiers emerged from the town, their brothers from the South rested their guns on the wall, aimed the barrels at the enemy and began to fire.[10]

Undaunted by their hopeless position, Union soldiers gallantly proceeded with the attack. French's division formed into three lines and began their march to the sunken road. As the Union soldiers charged up the hill toward the sunken rode, the Confederates continually pummeled them with gunfire. Large gaps formed in the lines and within a few minutes French's division was reduced from six thousand to fifteen hundred.[11]

The Irish Brigade under the direction of General Hancock was sent to support French's dwindling position. These men who had survived the Siege of Yorktown, the Battle of Seven Pines, the Second Battle of Bull Run, and "Bloody Lane" at Antietam, would find their demise on the field at Fredericksburg.[12] The hail storm of Confederate bullets from behind the stone wall was too strong for these Union veterans.[13] For six long hours the Confederate soldiers successfully defended their land from the invading enemy.

As nightfall set upon the battlefield, the fighting stopped. Union dead and wounded were left where they fell. Moaning and crying of the wounded

replaced the sounds of gunfire on the hill. The Confederate soldiers tried to ignore the anguished cries of the Union soldiers they had shot down a few hours earlier.

Whether he felt guilt from slaying his fellow man or had sympathy for the dying souls a few feet away, a young Confederate infantryman scaled the stone wall in order to relieve the suffering of those attacking his country. Nineteen-year-old, Richard Kirkland received permission from his commanding officer to relieve the fallen Union soldiers of their agony. Kirkland knew that once he emerged from behind the stone wall he would be exposing himself to Union and Rebel fire, but the cries for help were too great. Kirkland climbed the wall and gave water to the Union soldiers who laid dying on the battlefield. When the Rebel and Union sharpshooters guarding the battlefield saw that Kirkland was comforting the fallen soldiers they ceased their fire, allowing the young man to provide relief to the wounded.[14] Most historians do not account for the actions of Richard Kirkland in their writings; they rather focus on the movements of the troops and the horrors of the day. From this awful December day, one should not overlook the bravest man in the Battle of Fredericksburg. Richard Kirkland risked his own life in order to provide comfort to his wounded enemies.

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[2] "The Battle of Fredericksburg," *New York Times*, 17 December 1862, p.1.

[3] Edward J. Stackpole, *Drama on the Rappahannock: the Fredericksburg Campaign* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Company, 1962), 108.

[4] *New York Times* 1; Stackpole, Fredericksburg Campaign, 266.

[5] *New York Times*, 1.

[6] Ian Lowe, Sunken Road (information-on-line) (Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park, accessed 2/21/97); available from http://222.nps.gov/frsp/sunken.htm;internet.

[7] *New York Times*, 1.

[8] Edwin V. Sumner, "Report of Major General Edwin V Sumner, U.s. Army, commanding Right Grand Division," in *War of the Rebellion Official Records of Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1888), 219.

[9] Darius N. Couch, "Report of Major General Darius N. Couch., U.S. Army, commanding Second Army Corps," in *War of the Rebellion Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1888), 222.

[10] *New York Times*, 1.

[11] Ibid., 1.

[12] Thomas E. Rice, "Desperate Courage," *Civil War Times*, November/December 1990, 58, 62.

[13] Ibid., 66.

[14] Lowe, *Sunken Road*, http://www.nps.gov/frsp/sunken.htm.