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The Martha and Robert G. Hartje Award is presented annually to a senior in the spring semester. The History Department determines the three or four finalists who write a 600 to 800 word narrative essay dealing with an historical event or figure. The finalists must have at least a 2.7 grade point average and have completed at least six history courses. The winner is awarded \$400 at a spring semester History Department colloquium and the winning paper is included in the *History Journal*. This year's Hartje Paper award was presented to Anna Hahn.

On behalf of all Wittenberg history students past and present, we dedicate this year's history journal to Dr. Tanya Maus and Dr. Christian Raffensperger. Both of these professors are new additions to the Wittenberg family, and already both have made quite an impact. This dedication is not for what they have accomplished but for what they will accomplish. For all the lives that will be enriched and the minds that will be sculpted; the students of today welcome this great addition to our already excellent staff.

*The History Journal Staff*

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## Hartje Paper: John Foster Carr: Humanitarian and Advocate for the Huddled Masses

*Anna Hahn*

The passage of time has obscured the name of John Foster Carr, but his impact on the lives of millions of European immigrants in New York City at the turn of the twentieth century is unmistakable. As founder of the Immigrant Publication Society and Secretary of the National Liberal Immigration League, Carr worked tirelessly to battle the racism, poverty, and inequality faced by recently-arrived immigrants. Although he wore many hats—public speaker, author, activist—Carr was at heart a humanitarian, someone who cared deeply about his fellow human beings and made it his personal mission to soften the challenges of assimilation in the United States.

During his lengthy career, Carr worked alongside hundreds of other philanthropists and members of the Progressive Party, petitioning members of Congress, imploring wealthy donors, and appearing at public functions throughout his city. The documents he left behind are a testament to the breadth of his impact. Through the sizable written record of his professional accomplishments, now kept in the archives of the New York Public Library in New York City, historians can rediscover his legacy and share it with the world.<sup>1</sup> In this way, scholars reveal his positive impact on American society and thereby inspire progressive-minded citizens of the modern world to celebrate and embrace Carr's legacy.

Throughout his career, Carr was quite active politically, carefully watching legislation pertaining to immigrants and urging politicians to support his cause. In a letter to James P. McNichol of the Pennsylvania Legislature on March 29, 1911, for example, Carr campaigned for a law that would provide equal life insurance benefits to immigrants, reminding the senator that "equal treatment to the alien...is in conformity both with the high principles of morality and with the spirit of our American institutions."<sup>2</sup>

In charitable spheres, Carr supported groups such as the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor, which, amongst other causes, raised money to send immigrant children to summer camps outside of the city. The poster advertising the opportunity to contribute to this particular fundraiser reminded prospective donors that "such children sorely need a break in the monotony of their cheerless lives...for mind's sake and...for the future welfare of the city itself." The poster boasted pictures of frail children swimming, hiking, cooking out, and taking hayrides, activities which the caption described as "real country joy for city kids."<sup>3</sup>

Carr also battled the racism and eugenics-based thought that plagued the immigrant experience in the early twentieth century. In a speech entitled "Immigrants

Are Not Criminals: The Facts," given in November 1910, Carr fought a favorite stereotype of Nativists at the time.<sup>1</sup> "The truth," Carr maintained, "is that we ourselves are a lawless nation. It is not the fault of the foreigner."<sup>2</sup> And while Carr held that there was a need to teach newcomers the American ways, he was also able to strike an important balance between assimilation and coercion, the need to welcome newcomers as they were while simultaneously teaching them to be Americans. He urged immigrants to learn English and claim citizenship, but he also told recently-arrived Jews to "be proud of your race, your birth and your family."<sup>3</sup> In doing so, Carr helped to build the rich cultural history that America boasts today.

One of Carr's most practical accomplishments was the publication of his "Little Green Books." In these guides for immigrants, written in their native tongues, Carr offered advice about how to find a job, briefly explained U.S. government, currency, and geography, and highlighted important American laws. The statutes he chose to explain to the immigrants illustrate both the cultural differences between European societies and the United States and the legal problems that the mass immigration caused. At one point, for example, Carr explained to Jewish readers that it was illegal to marry a girl under the age of eighteen without the permission of her parents.<sup>4</sup> Writing for the Italians, he reminded his audience to "never give wine or beer to children," an admonition that did not appear in the books for Poles and Russian Jews.<sup>5</sup> Some of the contemporary legal issues, however, spanned enough ethnic groups that Carr felt the need to include them in all versions of his book: in bold, capitalized script Carr made sure that the immigrants knew that "bigamy is a crime," and that "the fact that the first wife lives in Europe and has never been to this country makes no difference."<sup>6</sup>

John Foster Carr represented a group of men and women who helped to ease the difficulties immigrants faced by offering both direct aid and by acting as an advocate in the political and legal spheres. Although the impact that Carr had on American history has been largely forgotten, historians must continue to recognize him for his personal devotion to human uplift, for his tireless labor on behalf of the "huddled masses," and for his establishment of a legacy that shows the promise of progress through liberal action. The rediscovery of Carr demonstrates that careful research in history ensures that past humanitarian work is not forgotten and thus shapes a fuller understanding of the human experience.

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> All information regarding John Foster Carr and his life's work was accessed through the archives of the New York Public Library during a research trip to New York City conducted by the author in October 2007.
- <sup>2</sup> John Foster Carr to James P. McNichol, 29 March 1911, Box 1, John Foster Carr Papers, Manuscript Division, New York Public Library, NY, NY. [Hereafter all sources from this collection will be cited as the JFC Papers].
- <sup>3</sup> Three Page Advertising Poster from the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor, Box 1, JFC Papers.
- <sup>4</sup> "Immigrants Are Not Criminals: The Facts," Public Speech given by John Foster Carr, 17 November 1910, JFC Papers.
- <sup>5</sup> "Restrictions on Immigration," Public Speech given by John Foster Carr at the People's Institute, 9 April 1911, JFC Papers.

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- <sup>6</sup> John Foster Carr, *A Guide to the United States for the Jewish Immigrant* (Immigrant Publication Society, New York), 63-64. Accessed through the JFC Papers.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 86.
- <sup>8</sup> John Foster Carr, *A Guide to the United States for the Italian Immigrant* (Immigrant Publication Society, New York), 54. Accessed through the JFC Papers.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, John Foster Carr, *A Guide to the United States for the Jewish Immigrant*, 37, and *A Guide to the United States for the Polish Immigrant*. All accessed through the JFC Papers.

# The Robie House: An Inspirational Design

*Grace Mooney-Melvin*

"His home environment may face forward, may portray his character, tastes and ideas, if he has any, and every man here has some somewhere about him."<sup>1</sup> This quote of Frank Lloyd Wright discusses the American homeowner and suggests a direct relationship between the homeowner and the nature of the house. This sentiment directly captures the house of Frederick C. Robie. An architectural genius, Wright put all his effort into every house he designed, from bottom to top, from floor to ceilings, from flowers to furniture. Wright's design of the Robie house, one of his premier Prairie houses, reflects not only Wright's notion of the appropriate house but Robie's interests as well.

Born in 1876, Frederick C. Robie was driven by his passion for bicycles and automobiles. He attended the Yale School in Chicago and the Chicago Manual Training School. Robie journeyed to Lafayette, Indiana to continue his studies at Purdue University, where he received an engineering degree. His father owned the Excelsior Supply Company, which specialized in the manufacturing of bicycles as well as, eventually, making automobile supplies. Robie began working for his father's company and became the president of the company in 1910.<sup>2</sup> Automobiles and mechanical elements fascinated Robie and this interest became the link between Frank Lloyd Wright and Robie's dream house.

As his success grew, Robie wanted to build a house for his family that reflected his position. He chose a plot of land in the Hyde Park community of Chicago, Illinois and on May 19, 1908, he bought the sixty by eighty feet piece of land for 13,500 dollars.<sup>3</sup> Robie needed an architect and found his way to Frank Lloyd Wright. According to Robie, "I contacted him, and from the first we had a definite community of thought. When I talked in mechanical terms, he talked and thought in architectural terms. I thought, well, he was in my world".<sup>4</sup> The mechanical engineer and the architect both thought in terms of lines, angles, and space.

The price of the land represented, as it turned out, the more inexpensive part of the project. Wright ultimately required a budget of 35,000 dollars to create Robie's house. This budget was seven to ten times the amount necessary for the construction of a 'modest' house.<sup>5</sup> However, a modest amount would not have resulted in a masterpiece. This generous budget allowed Wright to design the structure with freedom and create a distinctive character for the house.

Situated at the corner of 58<sup>th</sup> Street and Woodlawn Avenue, the Robie house stands very close to the University of Chicago. The Gothic Revival architecture adopted by the University of Chicago, which projected a strict and "sentimental" environment, was directly at odds with the structure envisioned by Wright and Robie.<sup>6</sup> "Radical and masculine the Robie house would be built in a part of Chicago characteristically stern and urbane."<sup>7</sup>

Large brick houses and the streets book-ended the site and accentuated its horizontality and the physical constraints represented an influence on the shape the house would ultimately take. Important as well were the ideas Wright drew from his interest in German culture. During this period, he defined many things by the ideal of "the comprehensive and unified work of art, the *Gesamtkunstwerk*."<sup>1</sup> "Discipline, unslackening vigor, power in place of prettiness: those were the German preferences that would inform the house."<sup>2</sup> The combination of the narrow nature of site and the German influence resulted in a structure that mimicked "a great steamship at anchor."<sup>10</sup> "Everything about the site suggested a long, low, streamlined, shiplike house: the prairie, the nearby lake, the new sense of speed, the still unshaken faith in the machine, and the shape of the lot, three times as long as it was wide."<sup>11</sup> The house, although considered, "the distilled essence of Wright's Prairie School style and the culmination of his search for a new architecture," Wright himself acknowledged this German influence on his work.<sup>12</sup> He claimed that the house became known as *Dampfer* in Germany, which was steamship architecture.<sup>13</sup>

By March of 1909 Wright had finished the drawings for the house and construction for this masterpiece began. Harrison Bernard Barnard was the builder for the Robie house and he worked on the project from the spring of 1909 until its conclusion in the spring of 1910. At the time of the construction of the house, Wright faced distractions from his home life. Ultimately, he turned over the final bit of construction to his assistants and turned his back on his Oak Park practice. He and his new love and mistress, Mamah Borthwick Cheney, left for Europe.<sup>14</sup>

The materials used for the house were brick, cut stone, reinforced concrete, wood, tile, and steel. The brick was for the walls and the cut stone was for the copings and sills. The wood-trimmed floors and the balconies were constructed of reinforced concrete while the beams were made of steel.<sup>15</sup>

During the construction important innovations to the house emerged. For example, Wright introduced a new type of indirect heating into this structure. The radiators lined the doorways and windows, hidden from the eye, and the pipes laid beneath the floors, allowing the homeowners to never have to step foot on a cold floor.<sup>16</sup> There were other modern innovations placed in the house during construction such as electric lighting, telephone equipment and even the installation of a burglar and fire alarm system.<sup>17</sup>

Despite the German influences which had an impact on the Robie house design, the structure was built during a time when Wright was building prairie style houses. It resembles greatly the Tomek House of 1907 built by Wright in Riverside, Illinois. Anchored by a large chimney, the house has "two parallel, rectangular two-story masses," with "a smaller, square third story."<sup>18</sup> Like all of the prairie-style houses designed by Wright, "the exterior formulation of base, wall, and cornice... is repeated in every part of the elevations."<sup>19</sup> The house is very horizontal because of the extended cantilevering roofs and the thin Roman bricks Wright used to accent the elevations. Along with this sense of horizontality, both the roofs and walls of the house seem as if they are floating. The roofs and walls gained a certain level of independence because of the hidden support and exaggerated roofs. The support piers are built nearer to the house and the cantilever beams hold the weight.<sup>20</sup> The roofs appear even closer to the ground due to the absence of an attic.<sup>21</sup> Wright's ideas of "asymmetric balance" are clearly articulated in the Robie House.<sup>22</sup>



The bold and modern lines and spatial arrangement suggested in Wright's design certainly capture Robie's mechanical and engineering interests. The Robie house appeared as a bold structural statement for a man who wanted a modern house. Wright's incorporation of the homeowner's interests exist in other ways as well. The tall wall and larger iron gates to the drive surrounded the courtyard area in which Robie's children could play, reflecting Robie's fear of kidnappers and burglars.<sup>23</sup> Robie's desire for privacy resulted in the placement of the main entrance to the house in the rear of the structure:

"[t]he intentions of the house, however, have nothing to do with the supplication of the gods of sun or rain, the steps express instead the stages of privacy, for the house exists to be lived in".<sup>24</sup> Reflecting Robie's passion for automobiles, Wright did not construct stables. Instead, Wright had garage ports built and they became "the first attached three car garage in the world."<sup>25</sup>

The strong and massive exterior of the house belies the fluidity of the interior. On the ground floor, the billiard room, playroom, kitchen, living room, and dining room all connect with and flow into one another. "Each leads to the next, and one is allowed to detract from the harmony of the whole, the *Gesamtkunstwerk*."<sup>26</sup> In keeping with the idea of bringing nature into the house, the rooms flow into balconies, into terraces, and the large playroom on the first floor opened to a "walled playground."<sup>27</sup> As well as fluidity, Wright incorporated the sense of family into the house by dividing the rooms into both living and dining areas centered around the hearth.<sup>28</sup> Inspired by Wright's travels to Japan, Wright incorporated eight oak screens in to the house's design.<sup>29</sup> The ceiling was separated into panels that held two different types of electric light. Glass globes hung on the sides of the main area and there covered bulbs hid behind the wooden grilles in the lower spaces at the edges of the panels, reflecting Wright's desire to combine decorative elements with structural necessities.<sup>30</sup>

Unfortunately, the excitement this new house generated turned sour due to the death of Robie's father and the need to pay off business debts. Domestic troubles further destroyed Robie's world when his wife, Lora, left him in April of 1911, taking the children with her, and she divorced him on March 1, 1912. Robie was forced to abandon his dream house in December 1911. He sold it to David Lee Taylor, the head of the Taylor-Critchfield Co., an advertising firm.<sup>31</sup> Following Taylor's residency, other owners occupied the house and today it has been preserved and is a museum.

The Robie House still stands today on the campus of the University of Chicago and is one of Wright's most famous structures. Built on a constricting plot of land, Wright designed an imposing house that dominated the streetscape. While drawing on German influences as well as Wright's prairie design elements, it's a house that showcased, however briefly, the essence of the modern that Frederick Robie, with his mechanical bent and passion for automobiles, desired. It suggests the dynamic combination of the desire and character of a homeowner and the vision of the architect.

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- <sup>1</sup> Donald Hoffman, *Frank Lloyd Wright's Robie House: The Illustrated Story of an Architectural Masterpiece* (New York: Dover Publications, 1984), 35.
- <sup>2</sup> Joseph Connors, *The Robie House of Frank Lloyd Wright* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 5.
- <sup>3</sup> Donald Hoffman, *Frank Lloyd Wright's Robie House: The Illustrated Story of an Architectural Masterpiece* (New York: Dover Publications, 1984), 6.
- <sup>4</sup> Joseph Connors, *The Robie House of Frank Lloyd Wright* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 6.
- <sup>5</sup> Donald Hoffman, *Frank Lloyd Wright's Robie House: The Illustrated Story of an Architectural Masterpiece* (New York: Dover Publications, 1984), 14.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.
- <sup>10</sup> Paul Kruty, "Frederick C. Robie House," in Alice Sinkevitch, ed. *AIA Guide to Chicago* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1993) 433.
- <sup>11</sup> Donald Hoffman, *Frank Lloyd Wright's Robie House: The Illustrated Story of an Architectural Masterpiece* (New York: Dover Publications, 1984), 17.
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- <sup>13</sup> Donald Hoffman, *Frank Lloyd Wright's Robie House: The Illustrated Story of an Architectural Masterpiece* (New York: Dover Publications, 1984), 14.
- <sup>14</sup> Joseph Connors, *The Robie House of Frank Lloyd Wright* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 59-60.
- <sup>15</sup> Donald Hoffman, *Frank Lloyd Wright's Robie House: The Illustrated Story of an Architectural Masterpiece* (New York: Dover Publications, 1984), 32.

- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 82.
- <sup>17</sup> Brendan Gill, *Many Masks: A Life of Frank Lloyd Wright* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1987) 194.
- <sup>18</sup> Paul Kruty, "Frederick C. Robie House," in Alice Sinkevitch, ed. *AIA Guide to Chicago* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1993) 433.
- <sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 433.
- <sup>20</sup> Donald Hoffman, *Frank Lloyd Wright's Robie House: The Illustrated Story of an Architectural Masterpiece* (New York: Dover Publications, 1984), 40.
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 57.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 38.
- <sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 57.
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.
- <sup>27</sup> Brendan Gill, *Many Masks: A Life of Frank Lloyd Wright* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1987) 194.
- <sup>28</sup> Colin Davies, *Key Houses of the Twentieth Century: Plans, Sections and Elevations* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2006) 32.
- <sup>29</sup> Donald Hoffman, *Frank Lloyd Wright's Robie House: The Illustrated Story of an Architectural Masterpiece* (New York: Dover Publications, 1984), 49.
- <sup>30</sup> Colin Davies, *Key Houses of the Twentieth Century: Plans, Sections and Elevations* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2006) 32.
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## *Jinrikisha* in Meiji Japan

Lauryn Noahr

The *jinrikisha*, which is Japanese for a man-powered vehicle, is also known as rickshaw, ricksha, and pull cart. It is a two wheeled cart with a padded cushion that is built to seat either one or two passengers. In Meiji Japan it became vastly popular after its invention in 1868. Japan had very few horses which were used mainly for military and agricultural purposes and were very expensive to keep because the land was unsuitable for grazing. This ruled out the possibility for horse drawn carriages as a popular form of transportation. Manual labor was a cheap form of labor in Meiji Japan, especially in the cities because of industrialization, which left the poorest of citizens to pull *jinrikisha*.

The original *jinrikisha* was very simple; its design was centered on the seat platform and there were four erect columns with curtains hanging off the roof and over the sides. The *jinrikisha* was built slim for these two reasons; first the pullers could run easily with them, and second, they could fit the overflowing streets of Meiji Japan. The *jinrikisha* was first popularized by Akiba Daisuke, who designed the current model of the *jinrikisha* that has the box cab, furnished steps, lacquered sides and metal rims. Prior to Daisuke and the *jinrikisha*, there was the *beka-guruma* and *daihachi-guruma*. These were personal transportation propelled by manual labor; both had wooden wheels and were cumbersome to use in taxi services. They were soon made obsolete by metal-wheeled *jinrikisha*. Once Daisuke, with his partner Tobihisa, started to mass produce and export the *jinrikisha* to other parts of Japan and spread out their factories, *jinrikisha* production soared. Others began to manufacture the *jinrikisha*; they include Yosuke Izumi, Tokujiro Suzuki and Kosuke Takayama. The *jinrikisha* practically appeared overnight; there were over 113,921 in use barely five years after they started to manufacture them.

There were speculations of who invented the *jinrikisha*. Some say that an older man, who lived in Shiba Tokyo, named Uchida Kanzaemon, invented it. Others claim Jonathan Goble, an American Baptist missionary who was stationed in Japan, invented it for his invalid wife but when he tried to send the blue prints to a Japanese builder they were lost. The French claim to have invented it first with the *brouette*, which is a two wheeled carriage pulled by men. There have been two other American missionaries who have laid claim to the invention of the rickshaw as well as one American blacksmith. Three Japanese men also claim to have invented the rickshaw based on the designs of the European horse drawn carriage, the dray, which is a low heavy horse cart that has no sides, and the *Kago*, which is much like the Roman litter that was used to carry around the Roman aristocrats. No matter who produced the *jinrikisha* first there is no question as to the impact the men who pulled them had on

Meiji Japan through transporting the foreign diplomats, showing them Japan, and also being able to adjust to the constantly changing economic environment that was Meiji.

The social elites favored the *jirikisha* and it soon became a status symbol. Many Western travelers chose to hire *jirikisha* men to run them all around Japan. Through the foreigner interactions these lower class Japanese soon learned bits of English in order to attract more customers. They were seen as being very respectful not only to the foreigners but also to other Japanese; this impressed the foreign travelers. The foreigners, who would travel inside cities or the prefectures, would often call solely on one set of *jirikisha* men; this was similar to having private *jirikisha* men. But if the foreigners were traveling too far from the prefecture they often hired new *jirikisha* men in the towns and cities they stopped in.

The wealthier Japanese families, officials, and businesses often hired private *jirikisha* men. The private *jirikisha* were often decorated differently and had constant changes or perks to them. Some of the perks included the hood, to cover the rider when it was raining, sunny, or snowing; decorated sides, rubber wheels, and fancier uniforms for the *jirikisha* men. The private *jirikisha* owners started many trends which trickled down to the lower classes and quickly became must-haves for them. The rubber wheels are one such example; they started out on private *jirikisha* and then spread to the lower classes and soon the demand forced all *jirikisha* men to have rubber wheels on their carts. These wheels were not only for the customers but for the pullers as well as they made the *jirikisha* easier to pull.

The *jirikisha* men ran all sorts of people around the city ranging from diplomats, families, geisha, and foreigners. The *jirikisha* men were a part of the welcoming committee to foreign diplomats and royalty. The Japanese welcoming committee would hire carriages for the diplomats but some would insist upon traveling in *jirikisha* for the "Japanese experience," like Czar Nicholas II. Nicholas II's entourage consisted of *jirikisha* and carriages, but upon seeing the *jirikisha* he refused to enter the carriage and chose instead to ride in the *jirikisha*. His insistence to have the Japanese experience proved to save his life because someone tried to assassinate Nicholas II. The quick action of his *jirikisha* man and surrounding *jirikisha* men thwarted the assassination attempt and they beat and chased down the assailant allowing Nicholas to escape relatively unharmed.

Many of the younger *jirikisha* boys would show the foreigners around Japan and it earned them a favorable spot in the foreigners' minds. The foreign diplomats and traders would bring their families over to Japan. Clara, one woman who grew up during Meiji Japan, kept a diary of her life there. She wrote how she found out bits of gossip from *jirikisha* men, such as when an Empress had a child. The pullers got their information from other pullers and from their clients who liked to gossip. The near constant talking and gossip of the pullers promoted the popularity of the shade that customers could pull down to ignore their *jirikisha* man.

Even though the majority of the *jirikisha* men made a positive impact on the foreign mind there were others who did not. The *jirikisha* was one of the chief attractions for the foreigners and while some of the foreigners found the *jirikisha* men charming, others found them a terrible waste of man power. One traveler found not only the *jirikisha* men disgusting but also the streets; these foreigners could complain about anything. Another complaint the foreigners had was that the *jirikisha* men tried

to charge them more than what they had originally agreed upon or that they tried to overcharge them from the beginning. Fortunately for the *jirikisha* men, this view was not popular. In general, the foreign consensus of the *jirikisha* men was that they were charming and hard working.

At first the *jirikisha* men were scoffed at by the *kago* carriers, even though usage of the *kago* was quickly declining. The *kago* was one of the main methods of transportation prior to the *jirikisha*. The *jirikisha* were not only faster and cheaper but they were also able to travel longer distances than any previous method of transportation, and by 1872, there was "not a single sedan chair" in use. The relatively easy transition from a scoffing *kago* carrier to a *jirikisha* man helped the *kago* carriers maintain a living.

Not all *jirikisha* men started out, or were ever, terribly poor. Initially the Japanese loved the *jirikisha* and some of the younger boys from upper class families pulled them occasionally because the "soiled clothes after one haul were at the height of fashion." This did not last for very long, like most fashions, and the pulling was soon left to the poor.

After the fashion trend died out, the *jirikisha* men were *kago* carriers, samurai who had their rank and stipend removed in the Restoration, and anyone else who was too poor to have a better means of making a living.

The *jirikisha* men had to be at least eighteen and wear a common uniform. The uniform consisted of blue or

white cloth passed between the legs and wound tight around the waist; a blue cotton shirt, and under it a cotton chest-protector hanging from the neck, and held in its place by a strap buttoning on the back; sometimes a blue and white handkerchief is bound in a twist around the head. Sometimes they wear blue cotton trousers... shod with sandals made of rice straw.

This was to ensure that the *jirikisha* pullers looked uniform and were not an eyesore to the public as they tried to make a living.

There came to be four main types of *jirikisha* men: the private, unionized, those owned by a *jirikisha* operator, and independents. Each type of *jirikisha* had a different price they charged that was ever changing over time. The private *jirikisha* pullers were hired with a fixed monthly salary and the employers often gave the men room and board. Some men did decide to have their own home and therefore had to travel back and forth between their employers. They usually made ten to fifteen yen a month depending on how busy the employer was. Even though the *jirikisha* men were employed, and well taken care of, they would venture out into the streets to make some extra money. They were often encouraged to do so by their employer. Sometimes the private *jirikisha* men would marry a household servant of the family where they were employed. Sometimes whole families would work together creating a bond with the wealthier families and their servants that lasted many generations.

Other *jirikisha* men were employed by *jirikisha* companies and were just given a room and salary, or commission. These were the second richest *jirikisha* men. In the busier parts of the cities there was often one company per block. The companies

took up to twenty five percent of the *jinrikisha* men's fees, leaving the *jinrikisha* men to depend upon tips; the *Yado-guruma* was one of these companies. These men pulled a *jinrikisha* owned by an entrepreneur and tended to be found in districts nearer to government buildings and geisha. *Jinrikisha* men would stand by a stall that had ropes hanging down with street names and numbers on them and the customers would pick which rope and which puller they wanted. The *jinrikisha* men would pay their employer about three yen per month and their employer would supply the uniform, lunch and hot tea for that month. The employer would also get about thirty percent of the fares, which equaled out to about thirty to thirty five yen per month. This lifestyle did not work for long periods of time because they had set rates and customers often looked for cheaper rates, forcing the *jinrikisha* pullers to find new employment within three to four months.

Another group was the *yonashi*, the night-time *jinrikisha* men. They were forced to work late at night or early in the morning. There came to be two categories, the experts and the amateurs. The experts would focus on the rich customers and relying on their tips, while the amateurs would walk around looking for customers and when they got tired would go home and make very little money.

The unionized *jinrikisha* men were in a fixed location and had to pay an entrance fee of one *sho* of sake plus 100 *sen*, plus an additional ten *sen* per month after the initial month. This money went into a pot that helped any *jinrikisha* man that could not work because of illness or had another misfortune and could not work. The unions were started because there were often outcast *jinrikisha* men who traveled from town to town looking for and trying to steal the customers of local *jinrikisha* men. The unions also had set prices within their unions. Being in a union came in handy around the 1880s when the government started to regulate the *jinrikisha*.

Special police were employed to ensure the laws that the government passed on the *jinrikisha* men were followed. The special police were there to prevent any fights between the *jinrikisha* men, mostly between the local *jinrikisha* men and the drifters, to ensure that rates were being honored, and to make sure that places were not overcrowded with the *jinrikisha* men. The unions would have to have their rates approved by the government and all *jinrikisha* men had to post their prices in order to prevent the bickering between them and the customers.

The pay the *jinrikisha* men received was often very low and it was often barely a decent wage. They were paid about one *sen* for every *ri*; a *sen* is one hundredth of a Japanese dollar and a *ri* is two and a half miles. Not very much when one is to consider that an average *jinrikisha* man could cover about twenty to thirty miles a day, which averaged out to about seventy *sen* a day. This was the standard rate for federal workers, which meant that the price could become negotiable as the customer learned how to bargain.

The worst off of all the *jinrikisha* men were the independent pullers. The independent pullers were not only the poorest but also the most numerous. The independents were forced to live in the slums because they had no support like the other *jinrikisha* classes. Many, if not all, had to rent their *jinrikisha*; the rent was known as "tooth money." Some also had to rent their uniforms, all of which were charged a daily fee. Not only did they have to keep up with the renters but they also had their families to feed, clothe, and give their children spare change. The whole family had to work in order to keep up with the bills and to survive.

The independent pullers had to work extremely hard to provide for themselves as well as their families. In 1890 it became even harder when the price of rice skyrocketed. Even foreign rice was too expensive to buy. The only food affordable was wheat husks and bran, which was used to make dumplings that the *jinrikisha* men and their families had to survive off of. Unfortunately these dumplings would cause their stomachs to cramp and make working even harder. The wives and daughters of *jinrikisha* men would often become mid-wives and the children would sell candies to people walking on the streets in order to try and get by.

All of the *jinrikisha* men were considered a very substandard social class, but this subclass was the worst, they rarely had a place to call their own and often had to sleep in overcrowded rooms functioning as inns, when they could afford it. When they could not afford it, the *jinrikisha* offered not only a way of life but also a house and storage area. Many of the *jinrikisha* men stored their possessions under the cushioned seat. These possessions often consisted of "a spare pair of straw sandals, a pipe and tobacco pouch, and a paper lantern." Another smaller group of *jinrikisha* were part-time. They were mostly farmers who needed to make extra money and pulled *jinrikisha* in the rural areas for a very short period of time.

There was competition between the different *jinrikisha* men along with the initial niceties that the foreigners noticed. Most of the competition came out in what each *jinrikisha* had to offer; in the winter charcoal heaters became a part of the *jinrikisha*, and newspapers were given to the customers so they had something to do during the ride. In 1877, with the cholera outbreak, the *jinrikisha* men started to disinfect their carts after each customer with carbolic acid, and meters were installed in the *jinrikisha* to record the distance traveled and to help stop arguments among pullers and customers about prices. Needless to say these enhancements often led to higher prices and arguments between the *jinrikisha* men and the customers on rates.

Teams of *jinrikisha* men were used in order to travel faster and farther. The teams would work so that one person was pulling while the other was running along side or behind the *jinrikisha*. When the puller became fatigued then the runner would take his place. In order to increase the speed of the *jinrikisha*, teams of two or three would pull and push at the same time. This impressed the foreigners a great deal.

Once the railways started to open up and snake across Japan, the *jinrikisha* slowly disappeared. However, they were not obsolete. The *jinrikisha* men no longer made a living traveling across Japan but instead they had to fight for positions inside and around the train stations. The special police decided that it was best to give out lottery numbers in order to prevent over crowding in the stations.

The impact of the *jinrikisha* is still prevalent today, not only in Japan but also throughout Asia. The *jinrikisha* men helped to move foreigners across Japan and allow them to see Japan as it really was, while opening up cultural connections. The *jinrikisha* men helped to forge Meiji Japan through showcasing Japan while transporting the foreign diplomats, and also being able to adjust to the constantly changing environment that was The Meiji Period.



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## Tattooing in the *Fin de Siècle*

Seth Bitter

The art of tattooing is by no means a recent invention; tattoos and tattooing equipment have been recorded from as early as 10,000 BC. It has been said that “[tattooing] may well have been one of [man’s] first conscious acts which distinguished him from the rest of the animal kingdom.”<sup>1</sup> However, in spite of its extensive history it was not until the end of the nineteenth-century that tattooing really hit English and American cultures in full force. Originally perceived to be the indulgence of sailors and criminals, the tattoo evolved to become a trendy accessory of England’s most elite socialites and America’s most daring citizens. The American and English sailors bringing tattoos home, the invention of the electric tattoo machine, the artistry of early tattooists, and the adventurous and perhaps haphazard attitude of the *fin de siècle* all attributed to the wildfire nature of tattooing at the end of the nineteenth-century.

Throughout history some of the most distinctive cultures have practiced the art of tattooing. The earliest known example of tattooing comes in the form of a five thousand year old corpse known as “The Iceman.” The Iceman’s body is adorned with various small crosses and lines which are believed to indicate where body aches and ailments were located. The position of the tattoo marks indicate that they were applied for medicinal purposes.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, Amunet is an Egyptian tattooed mummy who sports parallel lines on her arms and thighs and an elliptical pattern below her navel. There are also many other Egyptian wall paintings and statues that seem to represent the art of tattooing.<sup>3</sup> In parts of Europe tattooing equipment has been found that dates back to the Upper Paleolithic period (10,000 BC to 38,000 BC) which includes “a disk made of clay and red ochre together with sharp bone needles that are inserted into holes in the top of the disk.” It is believed the disk served as a pigment reservoir and the needles were used to prick the ink into designs on the skin.<sup>4</sup>

Several Greek and Roman writers such as Plato, Plutarch, and Galen wrote about tattooing as well, though “respectable Greeks and Romans did not indulge in decorative tattooing, which they associated with barbarians.”<sup>5</sup> Tattooing was viewed by the Romans as a form of punishment and was used to mark slaves, criminals, and soldiers so they could not escape or desert. The Romans also provide the oldest recorded description of the tattoo process, written by a physician named Aetius; the process involves mixing an ink using elements such as bark, corroded bronze, and gall, then pricking the design into the skin with pointed needles until blood is drawn, and then rubbing ink into the wound. Aetius also recorded the first ever tattoo-removal process which essentially called for a “corrosive preparation that causes infection” that would remove superficial layers of skin and obscure the tattoo marks to some extent.<sup>6</sup> Interestingly enough the Greek and Roman historians even observed Britons in the third century AD with tattoos as Herod of Antioch wrote: “The Britons incise on their bodies colored pictures of animals, of which they are very proud.”<sup>7</sup>

With the vast history of tattooing in cultures all over the world including third-century Britain, it seems odd that tattooing would not reach its peak in Europe and America, until the nineteenth century. Religious taboo could have played a large role in tattooing's slow beginnings; in 787 AD Pope Hadrian I "forbade tattooing of any kind" and the popes who came after Hadrian followed suit.<sup>8</sup> In 1888, A.W. Buckland wrote an article in an anthropological journal in which he reasoned:

Falling under the head of ornament, it seems probable that this very painful mode of personal adornment was adopted at a very early period of human history, and was at one time almost universal, falling into destitute with the advance of civilization when clothing became general, and ornaments were chosen which would not entail pain, and could be varied according to the caprice of the wearer.<sup>9</sup>

This is an interesting theory because it argues that humans have been interested in some manner of self-decoration since a very early age. Advancements in clothing meant that painless, alterable self-adornment was possible. This ruling by the Catholic Church and the advancement of textiles are the reason tattooing in the Christian world was unheard of before the nineteenth century.

It was through Captain James Cook of the British Navy and Joseph Banks, the ship's historian, that modern society "...came into contact with tattooing on a scale never before seen by Western eyes."<sup>10</sup> Cook's ship, the *Endeavour*, and its crew embarked in 1769 on a journey to explore the South Pacific. It was on this voyage that Cook and Banks encountered the facial and full-body tattoos indicative of the native people of Tahiti and New Zealand. Banks recorded the process the Tahitian people used to tattoo as well as the design and placement of the tattoos.<sup>11</sup> Banks' journals as well as his tendency to entertain partygoers with tales of "...stormy seas, exotic islands, and tattooed cannibals" would plant the seeds for the tattoo craze to come.<sup>12</sup>

It was not long before the strange art of the South Pacific became standard procedure for servicemen in Britain's Navy:

During the nineteenth century tattooing flourished in England as nowhere else in Europe. This was due in a large part to the tradition of tattooing in the British Navy, which began with the first voyage of Captain Cook in 1769. During the decades that followed, many British seamen returned home bearing souvenirs of their travels in the form of exotic tattoos. Sailors learned the art, and by the middle of the 18<sup>th</sup> century most British ports had at least one professional tattoo artist in residence.<sup>13</sup>

Tattooing began in England as being "mainly prevalent among soldiers, sailors, and a certain class of civilians associated with both classes."<sup>14</sup> Sailors were ideal candidates for getting tattooed as "the very mobility of the sailor provided the impetus required for habit and tradition to form..."<sup>15</sup> One sailor, when asked why he got tattooed, was quoted as saying, "See...we are like sheep, and when one of us does anything we all imitate him at once, even if we risk doing ourselves harm."<sup>16</sup> One serviceman would get tattooed, show his fellow crewmates, and then they, in turn,

would get tattooed and so on and so forth. It seemed that tattooing among British Royal Forces was even encouraged as Field Marshall Earl Roberts (bearing a tattoo himself) proclaimed that "every officer in the British Army should be tattooed with his regimental crest. Not only does this encourage *esprit de corps* but also assists in the identification of casualties."<sup>17</sup>

The growing popularity of tattooing in Britain came with the first known English professional tattoo artist, David Purdy, who opened the first professional tattoo shop in North London in 1870.<sup>18</sup> Purdy commented, "I believe [tattooing] to be a common thing among soldiers and sailors."<sup>19</sup> The opening of Purdy's shop meant that sailors no longer had to rely on the amateur tattoo skills of their shipmates and could instead visit a true tattoo artist. Purdy published a booklet entitled *Tattooing: How to Tattoo* in which he instructed amateurs how to sketch a design on the body ("...a good deal of rubbing out to do before you get the figure drawn correctly"<sup>20</sup>), avoid tattooing on top of large veins, shave the area to be tattooed, and draw in fine lines so as the fine tattoo needles will have a good design to work from.<sup>21</sup> Little about Purdy's career is known past his booklet.

The transition of the tattoo in England from a sailor's whim to an aristocratic trend came in 1862 when the Prince of Wales (later King Edward VII) had a Jerusalem cross tattooed upon him while visiting the Holy Land. Edward VII had his sons, the Duke of Clarence and Duke of York, tattooed in Japan by master tattooist Hori Chiyo as well as in Jerusalem by the same artists who had done his tattoo twenty years prior.<sup>22</sup> This marking of royalty sent the British aristocracy into a frenzy and soon fashionable society was overrun by a "tattoo craze."<sup>23</sup> Historian James Bradley sums up the aristocratic interest in the permanent art, "For the beautiful people, of whatever gender, obtaining a tattoo was tantamount to buying a new frock. And unlike its rude counterpart, the operation took place in the comfortable environs of the 'studio,' the place of artists and photographers."<sup>24</sup>

However, not everyone was sold on rushing out to get tattooed. Ward McAllister, a British socialite at the time, expressed his sentiments to the press:

It is certainly the most vulgar and barbarous habit the eccentric mind of fashion ever invented. It may do for illiterate seamen, but hardly for an aristocrat. Society men in England were the victims of circumstance when the Prince of Wales had his body tattooed. Like a flock of sheep driven by their master they had to follow suit.<sup>25</sup>

Other opponents of tattooing are evidenced in periodicals of the time that range from the tame to the grossly libelous. An 1899 article from the *London News* screams "Tattooed to Death" and tells the story of a man passing away of blood poisoning a week after a ten-hour tattoo session. The article says the man died of blood poisoning but it does admit that "there was no evidence to show that it was caused by tattooing" and that the tattoo artist was not put on trial.<sup>26</sup> It is interesting then that the title of the article becomes nothing more than an attention-grabber as the actual content is about a man's death who *happened* to be tattooed and not a man who was tattooed to death.

An even more sensational article ran in an 1884 issue of the *New York Times* that claimed a baby had been born with marks identical to the tattoos of its mother.



The article claims "the baby is remarkable because his skin bears the same marks or tattooed figures as the mother. Not only are these figures reproduced identically on the child's epidermis, but they are in the same colors as the marks on the mother's body."<sup>27</sup> Obviously is it impossible for an unborn child to be tattooed simultaneously with its mother but the fact that such a tabloid article ran in a legitimate news source such as the *New York Times* represents a certain aura of distrust and mystery that surrounded tattooing at the time.

The skepticism surrounding tattooing along with its increasing popularity in England brought the desire to legitimize tattooing as an art. For example, Sutherland Macdonald was a flourishing and talented tattoo artist in late nineteenth-century London who understood the benefits in transforming tattooing from a vice of sailors to an indulgence of the aristocracy. Macdonald's studio was opened in 1890 in London's trendy West End so that his elite clientele "...need not remove themselves from their social milieu."<sup>28</sup> In addition to fine tattoos, Macdonald made sure his decadent customers were surrounded in their element and insured that a luxurious cushion, cigarette, or cool drink was never out of hand.<sup>29</sup> Macdonald was also the man responsible for the popularization of the term "tattooist" in lieu of "tattooer" claiming "that 'ist' sounded like 'artist' whereas 'er' sounded like 'plumber.'"<sup>30</sup> Macdonald's ability to skillfully tattoo as well as his acute business sense earned him celebrity and publications of the time hailed him as "the Michelangelo of tattooing" saying that his work was "the very finest tattooing the world has ever seen."<sup>31</sup>

Tattooing in the United States followed very similar patterns to those in England. Martin Hildebrandt was a German immigrant who started tattooing in America in 1846, and in 1870, he opened the first American tattoo studio in New York City. As in England, the first Americans to get tattooed were sailors, and many of the first accounts of tattooing are found in their diaries.<sup>32</sup> Early American tattoos consisted mostly of patriotic and nautical themes that were meant to serve as good luck charms for the sailors and soldiers who sported them.<sup>33</sup> In a 1901 *New York Times* article one tattooist displayed an album of "ordinary work, sailors' art [that consisted of] United States shields, full-rigged ships, ladies that might represent any one of a hundred, cannons, and anchors. This is the common sort of stuff which the ordinary seafaring man wants—the more ink and the blacker, the more he thinks he is getting for his money."<sup>34</sup>

Hildebrandt soon had a worthy competitor by the name of Samuel O'Reilly. O'Reilly opened his New York City tattoo studio in 1875.<sup>35</sup> Up until this point all tattoos were done by the method of hand-poking which could be as painful as it was slow. A tattoo artist would use a series of sticks with needles attached to the ends. Sticks with single-needles were used for details and fine lines whereas sticks with rows of needles attached to them would be used for washing in large areas of color. These needles were dipped in ink and then rhythmically tapped into the patron's skin until the desired tattoo was created. A skilled artist could tap the needles into the skin at a rate of two to three times per second.<sup>36</sup>

O'Reilly, who in addition to being a tattoo artist was also a mechanic, reasoned that if he could invent a machine to automatically move the needles up and down then an artist could tattoo on skin as simply as he could draw on paper.<sup>37</sup> Using Thomas Edison's autographic printer as a template, O'Reilly modified the design to create the

first electric tattoo machine. After some refinement, O'Reilly patented his creation in 1891 and changed the face of tattooing forever. "The electric tattoo machine... not only quickened the process and decreased the pain involved, but facilitated greater detail and subtlety in colouration and shading. With the increased technical proficiency in tattooing itself, the quality of the drawings and paintings on which they were based also improved."<sup>38</sup>

O'Reilly's career skyrocketed overnight, and he would spend the next two decades of his life traveling to major U.S. cities where he tattooed prominent, upper-class citizens.<sup>39</sup> Around the turn of the century however O'Reilly would become wrapped up in multiple, frivolous lawsuits as he sought to defend his patent rights against other tattooists releasing similar machines. In 1900 the *New York Times* ran an article entitled "Tattoo Artists at War: Dispute in the Courts as to the Rights of an Instrument," where O'Reilly brought another tattooist, Elmer E. Getchell, to court over who owned the patent to the tattoo machine. Getchell argued that "...the main part of the device was patented by Edison, and that neither man could get out a patent."<sup>40</sup> These successive lawsuits consumed O'Reilly's time and money.

In England the invention of the tattoo machine brought about an interesting result. Since the tattoo machine made the process less painful and seemingly less intrusive than the previous hand-poked method, tattooing became "not entirely unsuited for daring 'ladies.'<sup>41</sup>" The *Tatler*, a British society magazine, wrote that "tattooing was a 'gentle art,' the height of fashionability."<sup>42</sup> Alfred South, a tattooist, was quoted in the *Tatler* as claiming that out of 15,000 clients, 900 of them had been women. This client-base of nearly seventeen percent female is impressive and quite indicative of the "New Woman" sentiments being advocated at the time.

As tattooing in the United States became more popular it also became more acceptable for the upper classes of society. Affluent members of society began to accumulate tattoos based on fashion and artistic merit. A visiting Japanese tattooist at the time commented:

Next to the people of my own country, Americans take more interest in the subject of artistic tattooing than any other civilized people...I have traveled much all over the world, each time returning to my own country, but nowhere do the people understand as they do here the beauties of art..., for no matter where you go you will find the ordinary sailor tattooed. But the difference between tattooing and artistic tattooing is the same as that between a chromo which you hang on the wall of your stable and the fine oil painting which you hang in the parlors of your homes. It is this understanding which the Americans have.<sup>43</sup>

Clearly the tattoo in the United States had shifted from ink scratches on sailors to a legitimate art form.

The writings of Joseph Banks on the tattoos of island people and the daring nature of sailors provided the long-awaited flame that would spark the tattoo revolution in the Christian world. Modern tattooing owes itself to the commitment to artistry of early tattoo artists, O'Reilly's invention of the first electric tattoo machine, and the daring nature that characterized the end of the nineteenth century. The start

of the twentieth century marked a new beginning in tattooing. Up and coming artists improved upon O'Reilly's machine and created tattoo designs that would eventually become the "traditional American" style.<sup>44</sup> Artists like Sutherland Macdonald who innovated the tattoo as art in a Christian world would pass on their skills to trained apprentices who would continue their businesses for generations to come.

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## The Decadent Olympics of 1896

*Stu Hartenstein*

Throughout history, recurring instances of progress and modernity led to the formation of a more advanced, more complex collaboration of societies worldwide. For example, European imperialist efforts to modernize “uncivilized” worlds in Africa and Asia to gain an advantage in the global economy through the Atlantic Slave Trade exemplifies a particular instance where nations were looking to become better and more dominant than their counterparts. The same is true for a period at the turn of the nineteenth century from 1890 to 1900. Labeled as a “decade of decadence,” this period is another exemplar of nations looking to progress, mainly in the realm of science in this particular instance. As nations were looking to become superior in this decade, fearing the possible effect of degeneration and Social Darwinism, or survival of the fittest, society also looked to progress into a more modern society. The emergence of “New Woman,” increased crime rates, and a sexual and moral revolution challenged what was assumed to be “acceptable” in society and left many governments and religious institutions scurrying to remedy such ills.

But a French nobleman, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, envisioned a different method to address these issues while still fighting the effects of degeneration and Social Darwinism. What Coubertin proposed was a unique way to use athletics to exemplify qualities that established positive role models through individual athletic performance and education around the world. His research and his passion for athletics led him to the idea of reviving the Olympic Games in 1896. By looking to restore national pride and prominence, specifically in France, Coubertin created a system that demanded physical fitness of humans to fight off degeneration by being supremely strong while creating an institution that taught greater lessons in peace, tolerance, morality, and connectivity. Through the revival of the 1896 Olympic Games, society was provided with an example and an institution that looked to reform, teach lessons, and give opportunity for greatness to nations and individuals on an international stage.

The Modern Olympic Movement began in Athens, Greece, in late March 1896. Revived by Pierre de Coubertin and the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the 1896 games marked the first time the Olympics were held since they were banned in Ancient Greece fifteen centuries prior. At the conclusion of the 1896 Games, the IOC declared that the Olympiads would be hosted by different cities worldwide—an unpopular idea in Greece as it claimed the Olympics as its own. The next two Olympiads, 1900 (Paris) and 1904 (St. Louis) were held in conjunction with world fairs, even though the 1904 world fair was held in Chicago. Because these two Olympiads were considered to be unsuccessful, the IOC decided to hold an intermediate Olympiad in 1906, and the Games continued in 1908 and are still held every four years. Although interrupted twice by world wars, the Olympic Movement prospered,

establishing the Winter Olympics at each two year interval between the Summer Games after the success of the IOC sponsored "International Winter Sports Week" held in France in 1924.<sup>1</sup>

While the entire Modern Olympic Movement is generally perceived to be one of the most successful widespread sports organizations in modern history, it is the 1896 Olympiad that laid the foundation for Olympic success. For if the 1896 Games had been a failure, many IOC members predicted that continuation of the games would be rather difficult. In fact, the 1896 Games may not have occurred because Greece, gaining its independence in 1830 from the Ottomans, was a relatively new nation, looking to establish a profitable economy and did not have the funds to finance such an effort. Fortunately for the IOC and the movement, a wealthy Greek merchant in combination with many Greek citizens donated the necessary funds to host the event and reconstruct the Olympic facility in Athens.<sup>2</sup> In the end, Greece reaped a profitable income as a result of hosting the games, generating 400,000 drachmas for the Organizing Committee in combination with tickets sales and souvenirs, which brought in an additional 200,000 drachmas.<sup>3</sup>

Although the 1896 Olympiad's success thrived on the abundance of Greek participants, it is estimated that thirteen nations took part in the games. Interestingly, eleven of these thirteen nations were European countries with the exception of the United States and Egypt.<sup>4</sup> Imperialism played a role in the lack of diversity of nations from multiple continents in that many European nations, such as Great Britain and France, had colonized a majority of African and a few Asian nations. What is important to note here is the fact that the Olympic Charter "...states that no country may be represented by anyone but its own nationals..." thus eliminating participation from colonized African and Asian nations as the likely athletes that would compete from these nations were European Imperialists in these conquered nations.<sup>5</sup> After the games were completed, the United States finished with the most first place finishes in the events with eleven winners, and Greece finished with forty five of its athletes winning a medal, the most of any nation in the 1896 Games. Behind these two countries were Germany and France, finishing with over ten athletes placing in the various events.<sup>6</sup>

With these thirteen nations participating, nine main events comprised the various athletic competitions during the first Olympiad. Of these nine events, Athletics, or track and field, Shooting, and Gymnastics were the most popular games.<sup>7</sup> Other main events included Cycling, Fencing, Weightlifting, and Wrestling. According to Coubertin's research, Track and Field, Shooting, and Gymnastics were specifically included in the physical training program of many military institutions of the participating nations, such as Germany, who focused on gymnastics to build up strength and endurance needed for battle. Thus, these events were, in Coubertin's opinion, necessary to attain his goals of a prominent and strong French military. In addition, the shooting event self-evidently correlates to the impact of military training on the events included in the 1896 Olympics. Moreover, the greater picture which illustrates a decadent theme from this era is the fact that through winning events, nations looked to establish greatness on an international scale in their quest to become the "fittest." This is specifically addressed by Baron Pierre de Coubertin, the revivalist of the Olympics, who looked to use athletics to "...create superior humans, to become

supremely human..." to ultimately bring specific nations to prominence on the international stage.<sup>8</sup>

As Coubertin stated, becoming superior and supreme individuals to represent respective nations was exactly what many athletes accomplished in 1896. Germany dominated the gymnastic events, having three athletes win a combined nine different events in the gymnastic games.<sup>9</sup> In addition, American athletes also dominated in 1896 as they won eleven different events, most of which were in the Track and Field events. One of the most famous American athletes was long-jumper James Connolly, a Harvard student, whose victory placed him in the record books as he became the first winner in the modern era.<sup>10</sup> Lastly, Greek marathon runner Spyridon Louis "[revived] national pride in past glory" by winning the marathon event, where all but four of the participants were Greek citizens.<sup>11</sup> In the larger sense, these individuals, through their accomplishments in 1896, were successful at invigorating national pride and setting a positive example for their respective nations, specifically exemplified through the victory of Spyridon Louis—a main goal of reviving the 1896 Olympics.

While the 1896 games were quite successful, it is important to call attention to the individual whose efforts made such an event possible. This man, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, was the man who proposed and enthusiastically pursued the task of reviving Olympic sport. Coubertin was born to a noble, aristocratic family in Paris on January 1, 1863, whose family lineage could be traced back to Louis VI.<sup>12</sup> Growing up, Coubertin attended a Jesuit institution in Paris where he studied law and political science, finishing among the top three of his class. It was at this institution where Coubertin, although deprived of athletic and physical activity academically, began to ride horses, box, fence, and row.<sup>13</sup> After completing his studies, Coubertin began to devote his time to "...work as an amateur—someone motivated by a love of the work, not by a desire to earn money" in the initial phases of his obsession for physical activity and athletics.<sup>14</sup> In addition, he began to research efforts that would help revive France after its demoralizing defeat to Prussia in the war of 1870-1871.

In order for Coubertin to satisfy his profound love of athletics and his desire to reform his country, he began to travel around the world to many prosperous nations to study societies—specifically educational systems—to give him ideas about how exactly to revive the French society. For example, he was particularly impressed with English institutions and became an "Anglophile," or a lover of English things, because he noticed that "England seemed to be enjoying great success, whereas the French were struggling to recover for past misfortunes."<sup>15</sup> Moreover, Coubertin was fascinated by the role of physical education in the English educational curriculum, leading him to begin to think that England's domestic and military success revolved around the principles found in physical education.<sup>16</sup> Ultimately, Coubertin's studies not only in England but also in the United States formulated his initiative to use athletics as a way to reform and rejuvenate France and, in the final event, the world at large.

After completing a substantial amount of research on athletics on the international scale, Coubertin began to suggest the idea of reviving the Olympics. Although his first proposal in 1892 was denied, he worked harder and ultimately formed the Union of Sports Societies and Athletic Sport (USFSA) in France to promote athletics nation wide. The success of the USFSA led to the formation of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), where plans were accepted to revive the

Olympic Games internationally in 1896, and Coubertin was ultimately the second president of the IOC.

In the remaining years of his life, Coubertin continued his work with the IOC and peace keeping efforts in Geneva. On September of 1937, Baron Pierre de Coubertin died of a stroke in Geneva; he was known to the world as a pioneer in modern education and athletics on the global scale.<sup>17</sup> In his will, Coubertin wished his body to be buried in Lausanne, the home of the IOC, "but first, his heart was to be removed from his breast, encased in a marble column and buried separately at Olympia in Greece."<sup>18</sup> Perhaps this was the most appropriate burial choice as the modern Olympic revival owes its existence to Coubertin's compassion for and profound dedication to athletics all over the world. Coubertin lived to see ten Olympiads since his project of revival, and he worked to reform society through implementation of athletic participation until his death in 1937.

Through Coubertin's extensive research and work, Olympic revival "became possible...even necessary."<sup>19</sup> However, the larger question to be addressed concerns what exactly made 1896 the "necessary" time to revive the games. One argument to be made is the fact that this period between 1890 and 1900 is often times associated with progress—socially, politically, academically, and nationally. For example, Coubertin's "profound conviction that [athletics were] one of the cornerstones of progress and health for the youth of [his] day" led to the belief that physical activity and athletics would first yield progress in health in order to achieve progress in other realms, such as in the military.<sup>20</sup> In achieving progress in society and in the military through athletics, Coubertin looked to put France on the map in the context of the imperial scramble, specifically in Africa, where England had established control throughout the continent. Ultimately, Coubertin looked to use athletics and physical education as a way to improve health in the youth of the period that would enable a stronger, more prominent generation to succeed in the future and ward off signs of degeneration to create the fittest race to compete with the progress and dominance of other European nations, such as England.

However, the fact that some nations were substantially ahead of others posed a problem for Coubertin's vision. Coubertin noticed that the more progressive nations, such as the United States, were participating in athletic games that were years ahead of the games in most of Europe. For example, Americans were literally ahead of the game athletically as early as 1856 when the nation declared baseball its national pastime.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, other sports such as American football became another popular sport as more than 40,000 spectators gathered to watch Princeton and Yale play football on Thanksgiving Day, 1893. In fact Americans "recognized the Thanksgiving Day football game as 'the greatest sporting event and spectacle combined that this country has to show.'<sup>22</sup> Through baseball and football, Americans were given a unique identity through sports, while many European countries were still focusing on traditional games, such as fencing, cycling, and gymnastics (although some such as England, were playing soccer and tennis).

Another way Coubertin looked to use athletics to spur progress was in the context of the military. For example, Coubertin, a lover of English society, "came to believe that bodies strengthened by sport...had made Englishmen into the kind of soldiers who could beat Napoleon's army" which opened his eyes to sport as a



way for a nation to progress militarily.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, "Coubertin was convinced that the introduction of a system of school sports...might strengthen the democratic society of France and reinvigorate the moral discipline of those enlisting in the French Army."<sup>24</sup> Again, Coubertin's main vision of a French movement to reestablish national greatness was an outcome specifically attributed to physical education that would inevitably make stronger, more physically fit citizens to supply the French Army after its embarrassing defeat to the Germans in 1871. Therefore, sports, physical activity, and physical education would ultimately serve the purpose of spurring nations to have better, healthier citizens that would eventually yield progress in different realms of the global society.

While Coubertin specifically wanted to use revival to jump start French progression, the IOC determined that the 1896 Olympics would be held in Athens, Greece. Holding the Olympics in Greece was essential to Greek prominence as it was a fairly new independent nation at the onset of the games. Because Greece was considered to be subordinate to many European nations, hosting the Olympics would be an event that would link Greece with progress and modernity and essentially provide Greece with an "Enlightenment" to display such progress to the world.<sup>25</sup> More importantly, the 1896 Games asserted the fact that, "[m]odern Greek identity is based on the concept of continuity with ancient Greece, and the 1896 Olympics connected modern with ancient" to ultimately give the Greek people identity as Greece, through many of the hardships newly independent nations face, hosted the world.<sup>26</sup>

Another decadent issue the 1896 Olympics looked to address was how to reform and remedy the declining morality of society during this period. Coubertin believed that sport should be regarded concerning the individual so that individual performance and success might inspire and motivate others to imitate a particular athlete.<sup>27</sup> This is why Coubertin and the IOC decided to exclude any type of group or team sport, such as baseball and football, for they feared such sport would yield corruption rather than building character to inspire.<sup>28</sup> Coubertin's beliefs became reality when Spyridon Louis won the marathon and thus provided a national identity to Greek citizens in addition to his individual performance to inspire citizens to remain healthy, moral individuals to ultimately achieve such a prestigious accomplishment as winning the marathon. Thus, athletic competition looked to provide citizens with role models that displayed moral qualities to remedy society's immoral practices and yield inspiration and motivation through athletic individual performance.

One final purpose for revival in 1896 was the Olympic role in teaching lessons in peace and its design to create a common place for athletes to compete. For example, Coubertin stated that, "sport can do something more for us...to safeguard the essential good without which no durable reconstruction will be possible—social peace."<sup>29</sup> From its inception, Coubertin and the IOC recognized the fact that the Olympics would do more than simply provide a common playing field for the world's athletes—it could be used as a tool to teach lessons in morality, peace, and increase connectivity by bringing nations together on common ground. In the final analysis, Olympic sport teaches something about peace by obliging the world to set aside their conflicts, treat others as equals, and tolerate differences.<sup>30</sup> Ultimately, sport does more than provide strength, greatness, and progress; Olympic intentions align with the notions and agendas of other peace keeping organizations, such as the Hague Conventions and Alfred Nobel's

1895 request for the world to establish a fund to award individuals for their peace keeping efforts.<sup>31</sup>

While the Olympics were successful in teaching lessons of peace, it is important to note that the 1896 Games did fail in one particular area. There are no records of female participation in the 1896 games. Perhaps this is to be rationalized by the time period of 1896, where the emergence of the "New Woman" created a stir in the decadent period leading to the popular belief that a woman's place was not in society but at home. However, in many European societies, women were allowed to participate in specific athletic activities, such as cycling and tennis. Although these two sports were included in the 1896 Games, Coubertin and the IOC denied female participation in the first Olympiad—perhaps to remain consistent to the widespread decadent male belief that a woman's place was in the home, not in the athletic or societal realms. Women, however, were permitted to participate in the 1900 Games in Paris, France, after the IOC recognized its double standard in denying participation to women.

In the larger picture, the Olympics provided a variety of positive and motivational ways to inspire and institute progress, peace, and unity through athletic competition. Its success and approach to addressing and teaching a variety of lessons about sportsmanship and peace led to a unanimous decision by the IOC to revive the games every four years in different cities world wide. Although some critics of the movement claim that moving the Olympics every four years is insane because the host staffs do not remain the same from nation to nation, Coubertin recognized the essential international element to hosting the Olympics, looking to bring such a great impact as the Olympics on Greek society to other nations worldwide.<sup>32</sup> Regardless of opposition to moving the Olympics, Coubertin and the IOC moved the Second Olympiad to Paris, France, in 1900. From this point forward, the summer games were held every four years in different cities across the globe to ultimately avoid a loss of connectivity in the world, a theme that emerged during the period of revival.

In the final analysis, the Olympics did more than just set aside a time and place for international athletic competition; it looked to reform society, teach lessons, and give opportunity to nations and individuals. Through many issues rising in the decadent period from 1890 to 1900, Baron Pierre de Coubertin envisioned an event that would display the need for athletics in modern society while recognizing the potential for such an idea to teach a variety of complex lessons greater than sport itself. Perhaps this is why many of Coubertin's advisors and friends could not fully comprehend such a movement; however, his persistence and dedication eventually led to widespread approval and support for the revival of the games in 1896 to do more than just provide for international athletics. In the greater picture, the Modern Olympic Movement is a tool from which life lessons and peace efforts result to reform society and remind the world that there is more to life than its differences with other nations, and the legacy of such a movement lives on today.

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## The Amarna Period in Egypt

*Molly Bogner*

The Amarna period in Egypt was a turbulent time in which many changes occurred. The period saw the rise and fall of the sun god Aten, as well as the rise and fall of his most ardent follower, Akhenaten, who was in power from 1353 BCE to 1336 BCE. Over 3,000 years have passed since the end of the Eighteenth Dynasty and the death of the Akhenaten. Scholars continue to research and debate the legacy the Amarna period left on Egypt. Although some scholars have dismissed Akhenaten, calling him the heretic king, the importance of his primary wife Queen Nefertiti has never been questioned. It cannot be refuted that Nefertiti was one of the most important women in ancient Egypt. There is so much focus placed on this dynamic woman that the other women in Akhenaten's life, such as Queen Kiya, are most often overlooked.

There has been a minimal amount of research done on Kiya. However, the research that has been done has proven that her power and importance at Amarna has been underestimated for thousands of years. Even through this realization, Kiya is still not given the credit she deserves. The evidence presented in this paper will demonstrate that Kiya deserves to take her rightful place in the history books because like Akhenaten's primary wife, Nefertiti, she is an influential woman in ancient Egyptian history.

Queen Kiya was a secondary wife of Akhenaten and she was a much more important figure than most people think. Queen Kiya held the title of "great beloved wife," a title itself that tells of the importance of Kiya in Akhenaten's life. Archaeological sources depict Kiya performing key priestly duties, and evidence shows that she was most likely Tutankhamun's mother. Although the research on Kiya is minimal, the archaeological and written sources come together like pieces of a puzzle to shine light on Kiya's life and her role at Amarna.

Records recovered from Amarna begin to discuss Kiya around year nine of Akhenaten's reign. There are several theories about her origins.<sup>1</sup> She is identified by some scholars, such as Subhash Kak, as Mitannian princess Tadukhepa, daughter of King Tushratta. Mitanni was an Indic kingdom which had bonds with Egypt through marriage across several generations, including the Eighteenth Dynasty.<sup>2</sup> By sending his daughter to Egypt at the beginning of Akhenaten's reign, Tushratta cemented relations between the two countries.<sup>3</sup> Tadukhepa would have then taken on a pet name, as did many of the ladies of the harem. The name Kiya could be considered a contraction of the foreign name Tadukhepa.<sup>4</sup>

Records of Tadukhepa also surface during the reign of Akhenaten's father, Amenhotep III. Barry Kemp writes in *Ancient Egypt: Anatomy of a Civilization* that Tadukhepa was sent from Mitanni to be a bride of Amenhotep III.<sup>5</sup> Egyptologist Erik Hornung's ideas parallel Kemp's. In *Akhenaten and the Religion of the Light*, he

writes about Kiya, "Even if she was a Mitannian, she cannot have been identical to Tadukhepa, whom Akhenaten inherited from the harem of his father."<sup>6</sup> Horning also states that it is possible Kiya was one of 317 ladies-in-waiting who arrived in Egypt with princess Gilukhepa, daughter of the Mitannian king Sutarna II, where she was to marry Amenhotep III.<sup>7</sup> Although the two theories propose very different things about who Kiya was, they both suggest that she came to Egypt from Mittani. Both theories are convincing, yet no information has been found to favor one over the other. Whether or not Kiya was princess Tadukhepa will probably never be known for sure. The theories argued by both sides are convincing and supported by evidence, and therefore should be considered when researching Kiya.

When considering Kiya's importance, it is critical to examine the plethora of archaeological sources, such as reliefs and inscriptions, which help reveal her place at Amarna. Kiya played a vital role at her Sunshade temple at Maru-Aten located in the southern precincts at Amarna. The temple consisted of two walled areas which enclosed a series of shrines and altars, or 'Sunshades' assigned to royal women. The images and inscriptions found at the temple prove that the temple was not built for Nefertiti as originally thought, but for Kiya.<sup>8</sup> This was confirmed when examining the expunged inscriptions on the temple. Dorothea Arnold writes in her article, "Aspects of the Royal Female Image During the Amarna Period," that Kiya's role at Maru-Aten suggests that "this royal woman must have had singular beauty and a truly important position in Akhenaten's life and religion."<sup>9</sup> Having a temple built for oneself at Amarna signified a position of power and importance, something Kiya unquestionably possessed.

Archaeological sources also help uncover Kiya's role in Akhenaten's religion. She was a devout worshipper of the sun god, Aten. Although it is often thought that Nefertiti was the only female who participated in religious ceremonies, it can be noted that Kiya officiated religious ceremonies along with her husband on several occasions.<sup>10</sup> Arnold suggests that perhaps it was not Nefertiti alone who was a powerful figure in the religion of the Aten, but that there were other females, like Kiya, who also played important roles in Akhenaten's religion.<sup>11</sup> An image from the Metropolitan Museum of Art depicts Kiya performing important priestly functions by herself (fig. 1). The relief shows water being poured over Kiya and the ray hands of the Aten. Although it is a very small piece, the image is best understood as a part of an offering scene that portrays Kiya's involvement in religion at Amarna.

There are a number of artifactual sources that depict Kiya. Many of these pieces attest to Kiya's importance at Amarna. Some sources show Kiya parallel to Akhenaten which indicates her power and her concrete relationship with Akhenaten. Cyril Aldred writes in *Akhenaten King of Egypt*, "The twin iconography was not conformed to Nefertiti but was also used to depict the unity of Akhenaten and his other consort 'the wife and great beloved of the King of Upper and Lower Egypt...Kiya.'<sup>12</sup> Another archaeological piece found at Hermopolis in 1939 depicts Kiya represented at virtually the same scale as Akhenaten. The relief shows two conjoined heads in profile; the head on the left is Akhenaten and the head on the right is Kiya. Kiya is identified by the particular wig she is wearing. Reeves writes in *Akhenaten: Egypt's False Prophet* that this piece is significant because "it testifies to Kiya's importance at court..." (fig. 2).<sup>13</sup>

Although it is normally the powerful queen Nefertiti who is seen represented on the same scale as Akhenaten, she was not the only one who received this honor.

Other archaeological sources shed light on Kiya's physical characteristics. Three similar plaster studies found at the workshop of Thutmose at el-Amarna portray Kiya. The plaster studies a young member of the royal court. Scholars agree that the masks represent Kiya because of the large earrings attached to the woman's earlobes. These large earrings were often depicted in reliefs of Kiya (fig. 3).<sup>14</sup>

Arnold presents interesting information about a beautiful fragment of a queen made from yellow jasper in her article "An Artistic Revolution: The Early Years of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten." The fragment is thought to depict either Kiya or Nefertiti. Arnold believes it is more likely to be Kiya because the reconstructions of the head with the various off-the-neck crowns worn by Nefertiti are extremely unlikely.<sup>15</sup> It is more likely that the jasper figurine depicts Kiya because the Nubian wig worn frequently by her fits when reconstructed with the fragment (fig. 4).<sup>16</sup> If, in fact, the fragment does represent Kiya, she must have had a place of importance to have such a beautiful sculpture created for her. Many reliefs which depicted Kiya were changed after her disappearance from the royal court, when Akhenaten's daughter Princess Meretaten took over as the king's Chief Wife.<sup>17</sup> At this point in time many archaeological pieces which had originally shown Kiya were changed to depict Meretaten.<sup>18</sup> However, Kiya was not totally eradicated from the images, as traces of her can still be seen on many pieces.

Although Nefertiti and Kiya were both married to Akhenaten during his reign, they were very different in many ways. It is very obvious that they led completely different lives. Their titles alone suggest this. Nefertiti's title was 'Chief Wife' while Kiya's full, formal title was 'Greatly beloved wife of the king of Upper and Lower Egypt, living on truth, lord of the Two Lands, Neferkheprurewaenre, [who is] the goodly child of the living Aten and who lives forever and eternity, Kiya.'<sup>19</sup> While Nefertiti did have her own title, she never possessed a title like 'Great Beloved Wife.' While Nefertiti's title suggests that she held substantial political power at Amarna and was an important part of the government, it is Kiya's title which is more personal. Her relationship with Akhenaten must have been one of love and compassion if he chose to give her such a unique title.

Unlike Nefertiti, Kiya was never shown wearing a royal crown, such as the Blue Crown or the royal uraeus. Instead, Kiya is frequently shown wearing the Nubian wig.<sup>20</sup> The wig was the most frequently worn hairstyle at Amarna and was worn by men, women, royals, and commoners alike.<sup>21</sup> Royal women such as Queen Tiye and Nefertiti wore the Nubian wig on occasion, but it is Kiya who was shown wearing the wig most often.<sup>22</sup> Kiya's lack of a crown could be interpreted by some to mean that she never possessed the power that Nefertiti did. However, as said before, Nefertiti's power was different than Kiya's. Nefertiti held political power which would have needed to be validated by a crown; Kiya possessed a different type of power that, perhaps, did not require her to wear a crown.

There are also many physical differences between Nefertiti and Kiya. The Thutmose studio portraits give substantial evidence of Kiya's appearance which Reeves calls, "pretty and accessible, a complete contrast with the cool, haughty beauty of Nefertiti."<sup>23</sup> Most reliefs show Kiya's neck not straightened, but "thrust forward



obliquely, as was common in portrayals of many royal women.<sup>24</sup> These images also show that Kiya had a prominent chin, a full mouth, and an elegant neck.<sup>25</sup> In comparison to Nefertiti's long, thin face, Kiya's was rounder, wider, her nose fleshier, her mouth softer, and her smile more relaxed.<sup>26</sup> By looking at the two woman's physical characteristics it is not difficult to see that they were both beautiful in their own way. However, it is Nefertiti's beauty which stands out in history, not Kiya's. The differences between the relationships each woman had with Akhenaten, the tasks they performed at Amarna, and their physical characteristics show that Kiya and Nefertiti were radically diverse, yet each brought something to Akhenaten's reign that the other could not have.

Although it is known that Akhenaten had many children from his various wives, there is a great deal of speculation about the children Kiya bore him. It is known that Nefertiti gave Akhenaten six daughters. Kiya did not give Akhenaten as many children; she had one daughter and possibly one son, Tutankhamun.<sup>27</sup> Although the name of Kiya and Akhenaten's daughter has been lost, she is often shown with Kiya in various reliefs. These reliefs attest to the fact that Kiya did in fact give birth to a daughter even though there is no record of her name. In a relief preserved only in fragments, Kiya appears, along with her daughter, behind Akhenaten.<sup>28</sup> Two of Akhenaten and Nefertiti's daughters are lying on the ground in proskynesis, which literally means "kissing towards," behind Kiya and her daughter, showing that they have been relegated to second in rank.<sup>29</sup>

Kiya giving birth to Akhenaten's seventh daughter was most likely of little concern to a king who was still hoping for a male heir. James Allen argues in "The Amarna Succession" that one of the prime goals of his marriage to Kiya was so that she could hopefully give him a son.<sup>30</sup> This is why the mystery that surrounds Tutankhamun's parentage is so interesting. Scholars are still unsure of whether Kiya was Tutankhamun's mother. This is a topic which deserves much more research because if the mystery of his parentage was solved, many other mysteries would be solved along with it.

Although many scholars agree that Kiya was Tutankhamun's mother, firm evidence is lacking to establish this. There is much speculation about Tutankhamun's parentage; something that Reeves writes in *The Complete Tutankhamun* is fueled by the fact that Nefertiti bore Akhenaten no sons.<sup>31</sup> Reeves also states that the chronology of Kiya's appearance at Amarna around year nine and her supposed disappearance around year eleven does line up with the time of Tutankhamun's birth, but that alone is not enough to determine if she was his mother.<sup>32</sup>

Reliefs which have been used as evidence by advocates of the Tutankhamun-Kiya connection were found in a chamber in Akhenaten's tomb at Amarna.<sup>33</sup> These wall reliefs depict the death of a woman in childbirth and a baby being handed off to a nurse. Some scholars believe the woman to be Kiya and the baby to be Tutankhamun, but the evidence is not completely clear.<sup>34</sup> Aldred states that being Tutankhamun's mother "would have added immeasurably to her appeal in oriental eyes," giving Kiya access to privileges only few were allowed.<sup>35</sup> If Kiya was Tutankhamun's mother it would explain why she enjoyed such exceptional privileges at the court of Amarna.

Since the evidence on Tutankhamun's parentage is uncertain, several scholars believe that Kiya was not the mother of Tutankhamun. Marc Gabolde argues in his

article, "The End of the Amarna Period: Tutankhamun's Parentage," that Nefertiti was the only one of Akhenaten's wives to have more than one child.<sup>36</sup> Gabolde states that a block recovered from a site nearby Amarna at Hermopolis confirms Tutankhamun had at least one sister and probably two.<sup>37</sup> If Kiya did not give Akhenaten more than one child, it would then be impossible that she could be his mother. Allen concurs, writing that like Nefertiti, Kiya gave Akhenaten only daughters.<sup>38</sup>

The theories which surround Kiya's death are almost as controversial as the ones that deal with her relationship to Tutankhamun. There are two likely scenarios regarding Kiya's death. Scholars are undecided on which is true, so all evidence must be considered. One is that she died in 1352 BCE, year eleven of Akhenaten's reign, after giving birth to Tutankhamun.<sup>39</sup> The other is that she died in year fourteen, most likely of natural causes.<sup>40</sup> Reeves is a supporter of the first theory. In *The Complete Tutankhamun*, he concludes that Kiya disappeared in year eleven, around the time of Tutankhamun's birth.<sup>41</sup> He repeats the statement in his book *Akhenaten: Egypt's False Prophet*.<sup>42</sup>

Other scholars believe Kiya disappeared later in Akhenaten's reign. Arnold relies on a convincing piece of art which shows all six of Akhenaten and Nefertiti's daughters together in order to prove this. The piece of artwork was dated in the second month of year twelve. Less than two years later, Princess Meketaten died, for the last mention of her is in year thirteen.<sup>43</sup> Arnold states that the deaths of Queen Tiye and Kiya followed closely behind the death of the princess. This would put Kiya's time of death around year fourteen. Arnold hints that the deaths of Queen Tiye and Kiya shook up the city of Amarna because the city "began to show signs of growing instability: erasure of the names of traditional gods became frantic; the positions of the female members of the royal family changed..."<sup>44</sup> Aldred's ideas about the year of Kiya's death parallel Arnold's. He writes in his book, *Akhenaten King of Egypt*, "Early in Year 14, on the death of the Chief Queen Nefertiti... The death of Kiya, also about the same time, obliged him to bury her in the Royal Tomb, or in a tomb nearby" which indicates that he believes that Kiya died sometime in year fourteen.<sup>45</sup>

Although many believe Kiya could have died during childbirth, or from natural causes, Reeves implicates Nefertiti. When discussing Kiya's death in *The Complete Tutankhamun*, he writes, "But it is equally possible that she fell from grace, victim of a court intrigue engineered by the jealous Nefertiti; indeed, it may be no coincidence the meteoric rise in the status of Nefertiti seems to have begun in earnest only after Kiya's demise."<sup>46</sup> He reiterates his theory in *Akhenaten: Egypt's False Prophet* explaining that Kiya's popularity with Akhenaten must have posed a clear threat to Nefertiti, one which she could not have ignored.<sup>47</sup> Reeves' theory could be a bit far-fetched, but it is certainly something worth drawing attention to. If the theory about Nefertiti changing her name to Nefernefruaten and becoming Akhenaten's co-regent is true, Reeves states this co-regency would have begun around year twelve of Akhenaten's reign.<sup>48</sup> With Akhenaten's 'Great Beloved Wife' out of the picture, it would have been much easier for Nefertiti, now Nefernefruaten, to reenter his life.

After Kiya's death, Akhenaten first elevated his eldest daughter Meritaten to royal wife.<sup>49</sup> Later, in year 15 Akhenaten married another one of his daughters by Nefertiti, Akhesenpaaten.<sup>50</sup> These two princesses gave Akhenaten at least two more daughters.<sup>51</sup> Although these princesses provided Akhenaten with companionship

after Kiya died, neither was given the title of 'Great Beloved Wife.' This shows that although Akhenaten married again after Kiya disappeared, no one could take the special place she had at Amarna.

Although researchers have made considerable discoveries regarding various royals of the Amarna period, they have yet to discover Kiya's mummy or her definite place of burial. There are many theories about the mystifying secondary queen's final resting place. The secretary general of Egypt's Supreme Council for Antiquities, Zahi Hawass, believes the more recent discovery of KV63, the first tomb found in the Valley of the Kings since the discovery of Tutankhamun's tomb (KV62) in 1922, could be the tomb of Queen Kiya.<sup>52</sup> He said,

I announce today my belief that KV63 is indeed the tomb of King Tutankhamun's mother, Queen Kiya. The identification of KV63 as the final resting place of Queen Kiya helps to solve the riddle of the location of King Tutankhamun's tomb in the Valley of the Kings. KV63 faces KV62, making it clear that the tomb was for someone near and dear to king Tutankhamun.<sup>53</sup>

There was not a mummy found in the tomb but artifacts like embalming supplies, pillows, and oil were found.<sup>54</sup> A coffin was also uncovered during the final phase of the digging. This coffin contained gilded collars, sticks, linen pieces, and clay fragments.<sup>55</sup> Hawass notes that there could be a few other women to whom the tomb belonged to, such as Tutankhamun's wife Ankhesenamun, or his step-mother Nefertiti, but both are unlikely.<sup>56</sup> Ankhesenamun outlived Tutankhamun and is usually ruled out on that account.<sup>57</sup> The tomb is also probably not Nefertiti's because KV63 is unfinished and Hawass states that Nefertiti had plenty of time to carve out a tomb.<sup>58</sup>

Scholars also link Kiya to tomb KV55. Although the male corpse found in the tomb could not belong to Kiya, the coffin and canopic jars may. On an alabaster canopic jar with glass and stone inlay show faint hieroglyphs which prove the jar was originally inscribed for 'Greatly beloved wife of the king of Upper and Lower Egypt, living on truth, lord of the Two Lands, Neferkheprurewaenre, [who is] the goodly child of the living Aten and who lives for ever and eternity, Kiya.' (fig. 5).<sup>59</sup> It is thought that KV55 was not the original burial place for the body or any of the burial equipment found in the tomb. In fact, Tomb fifty-five was, according to Reeves, "a hasty reburial of mother and son, accompanied by a random selection of funerary items originally prepared for other and very different owners – most notably the coffin and canopic jars, which had once belonged to a secondary wife of Akhenaten named Kiya."<sup>60</sup> Although it is not known for certain where Kiya is buried, her funerary equipment being found in another's tomb suggests her own tomb may have been ransacked after her death.

When discussing Kiya, it seems there are not many certain answers to the aspects of her life. All of the research that has been compiled about her provides historians with few answers to important questions regarding her time at Amarna. The evidence does, however, prove that Kiya played an influential part at Amarna, in Akhenaten's life, and in the religion of the Aten. It is necessary to continue to research this mysterious woman in order to further demonstrate her importance. If

Egyptologists solved some pieces of the puzzle involving the life story of secondary queen Kiya, other unsolved mysteries of the Amarna period, such as the parentage of Tutankhamun, would slowly unravel.


Figures



Figure 1. Relief showing the purification of the minor queen Kiya, later changed into Princess Meretaten. Limestone.

Reprinted from Dorothea Arnold, "Aspects of the Royal Female Image During the Amarna Period," in *The Royal Women of Amarna: Images of Beauty from Ancient Egypt*, Dorothea Arnold (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1996), 106.

ROYAL WOMEN




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
Figure 2. Among the mass of dismantled temple reliefs brought to light at el-Ashmuezin (Hermopolis) in 1939 was this fragment with two conjoined heads in Egyptian profile – that on the left evidently Akhenaten himself, the head on the right, by its particular wig, a variant representation of Kiya. The fact that the two are represented at virtually the same scales testifies to Kiya's importance at court – we may guess following the birth of a male heir, Tutankhamun.

Reprinted from Nicholas Reeves, *Akhenaten: Egypt's False Prophet* (London: Thames and Hudson, 2001), 159.



*Figure 3. One of three closely similar plaster studies from the workshop of the sculptor Thutmose at el-Amarna: a young, pretty member of royal court – to judge from the earrings which seem to be a characteristic feature of her representations in relief, the 'greatly beloved wife' Kiya, Akhenaten's mysterious 'other woman'.*

Reprinted from Nicholas Reeves, *Akhenaten: Egypt's False Prophet* (London: Thames and Hudson, 2001), 158.



*Figure 4. Fragment of a head of a queen. Yellow Jasper.*

Reprinted from Dorothea Arnold, "An Artistic Revolution: The Early Years of King Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten," in *The Royal Women of Amarna: Images of Beauty from Ancient Egypt*, Dorothea Arnold (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1996), 37.



*Figure 5. New Kingdom, Dynasty 18, late reign of Akhenaten, ca. 1340–1336 B.C. Egyptian; From KV55, Valley of the Kings, western Thebes. Egyptian alabaster with glass and stone inlays; H. 20 1/2 in. (52.1 cm). Theodore M. Davis Collection, Bequest of Theodore M. Davis, 1915 (30.8.54).*

Reprinted from Canopic Jar Lid [Egyptian; From KV55, Valley of the Kings, western Thebes] (30.8.54). Metropolitan Museum of Art. On-Line. Available from the Internet; [http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/ho/03/afe/hod\\_30.8.54.htm](http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/ho/03/afe/hod_30.8.54.htm). Accessed April 19 2007.

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- <sup>3</sup> Reeves, *The Complete Tutankhamun*, 24.
- <sup>4</sup> Cyril Aldred, *Akhenaten King of Egypt*, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1988), 285.
- <sup>5</sup> Barry J. Kemp, *Ancient Egypt: Anatomy of a Civilization*, 2d ed. (New York: Routledge, 2006), 293.
- <sup>6</sup> Erik Horning, *Akhenaten and the Religion of Light*, trans. David Lorton (Zurich, Germany: Artemis and Winkler Verlag, 1995), 107.

- <sup>7</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>8</sup> Reeves, *Akhenaten: Egypt's False Prophet*, 159.
- <sup>9</sup> Dorothea Arnold, "Aspects of the Royal Female Image During the Amarna Period," in *The Royal Women of Amarna: Images of Beauty from Ancient Egypt*, ed. Dorothea Arnold (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1996), 107.
- <sup>10</sup> Ibid., 86.
- <sup>11</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>12</sup> Aldred, *Akhenaten King of Egypt*, 67.
- <sup>13</sup> Reeves, *Akhenaten Egypt's False Prophet*, 159.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid., 150.
- <sup>15</sup> Arnold, "An Artistic Revolution: The Early Years of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten," in *The Royal Women of Amarna: Images of Beauty from Ancient Egypt*, ed. Dorothea Arnold (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1996), 86.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid., 88.
- <sup>17</sup> Arnold, "Aspects of the Royal Female Image During the Amarna Period," 89.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>19</sup> Reeves, *Akhenaten: Egypt's False Prophet*, 159.
- <sup>20</sup> Arnold, "An Artistic Revolution: The Early Years of King Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten," 88.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>23</sup> Reeves, *Akhenaten: Egypt's False Prophet*, 159.
- <sup>24</sup> Arnold, "An Artistic Revolution: The Early Years of King Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten," 88.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid., 106.
- <sup>27</sup> Hornung, *Akhenaten and the Religion of Light*, 106.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>30</sup> James E. Allen, "The Amarna Succession" [on-line]; available from <http://history.memphis.edu/muznane/Allen%20-%20Amarna%20Succession.pdf>; Internet; Accessed March 22 2007, 9.
- <sup>31</sup> Reeves, *The Complete Tutankhamun*, 24.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>34</sup> Mark Rose, "The Final Coffin" [on-line]; available from <http://www.archaeology.org/online/reviews/kv63/kv63.html>; Internet; Accessed 19 March 2007.



- <sup>25</sup> Aldred, *Akhenaten King of Egypt*, 287.
- <sup>26</sup> Marc Gabolde, "The End of The Amarna Period: Tutankhamun's Parentage" [on-line]; available from [http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ancient/egyptians/amarna\\_04.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ancient/egyptians/amarna_04.shtml); Internet; Accessed 27 March 2007.
- <sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>28</sup> Allen, "The Amarna Succession, 9.
- <sup>29</sup> Reeves, *The Complete Tutankhamun*, 24.
- <sup>30</sup> Arnold, "Aspects of the Royal Female Image During the Amarna Period, 115.
- <sup>31</sup> Reeves, *The Complete Tutankhamun*, 24.
- <sup>32</sup> Reeves, *Akhenaten: Egypt's False Prophet*, 161.
- <sup>33</sup> Arnold, "Aspects of the Royal Female Image During the Amarna Period," 115.
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>35</sup> Aldred, *Akhenaten King of Egypt*, 288.
- <sup>36</sup> Reeves, *The Complete Tutankhamun*, 24.
- <sup>37</sup> Reeves, *Akhenaten: Egypt's False Prophet*, 160.
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 172.
- <sup>39</sup> Aldred, *Akhenaten Egypt's False Prophet*, 287.
- <sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>42</sup> Rose, "The Final Coffin".
- <sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>49</sup> "Canopic Jar Lid [Egyptian; From KV55, Valley of the Kings, western Thebes] (30.8.54)" [on-line]; available from [http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hc/08/afc/hod\\_30.8.54.htm](http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hc/08/afc/hod_30.8.54.htm); Internet; Accessed March 2007.
- <sup>50</sup> Reeves, *Akhenaten Egypt's False Prophet*, 63.

## French Desire and Arab Demise: The French Mandate of Syria and Lebanon

Dylan Baun

*The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world.'*

*-Excerpt from Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points-January 8<sup>th</sup>, 1918*

At the conclusion of World War I, Woodrow Wilson believed that imperialism could and would not work in the former Ottoman Empire, and that the international powers would have to work together for the sake of the independence of these dismantled Ottoman territories. Little did Wilson know that three years before his speech, the French and British had made the secret Sykes-Picot agreement that would set them in place to gain the spoils of war and benefit their own national interests in the Ottoman region. For almost thirty years after World War I, the French and British mandates set up by the League of Nations (and approved by Woodrow Wilson) lasted without any major power struggle, and in that time period, these imperialist nations showed only meager signs of preparing their directive territories for independence.

Since the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, historians have been interested in looking at this time period, which has shaped the borders and conflicts of the modern Middle East today. For my own synthesis of these historians, I am going to focus solely on French imperialism in Syria and Lebanon. Throughout this paper I am attempting to answer two interdependent questions: First, how did the French gain so much influence in the area of Syria and Lebanon in order to control, wield the power, and guide the national destinies of these two countries? Second, how did the Arab Nationalism of Syria and Lebanon fail to mobilize a united movement, and why did their nationalist impulses fall into French control with so little physical resistance? The time period I will view is broadly from 1914-1946. The end point of my research, 1946, was the year when these countries received their actual independence.

This paper will target the years of 1914-1923 specifically, as this span of "preparatory mandate history" that best explains French influence and Arab demise.<sup>2</sup> The historiography of this study that will help answer these two questions can be broken up into three major parts: 1) "reactive metropole" history shaped by the views of early scholars like Polson Newman, Worrel, and Longrigg, that try to get at French notions of imperialism through undeveloped nationalist and individualist theories, not looking further into the past than 1914; 2) historians who view the periphery only as a part of the metropole like Tanenbaum, Fitzgerald and Shorrock, who use many different theories from different academic backgrounds to explain the influence of the

French in acquiring the mandate; and 3) historians following Said's *Orientalism*, like Fieldhouse, Gelvin, and Provence, who either use the periphery as their focal point, or equally link the metropole to the periphery to obtain the best understanding of how the French wielded power and how the Syrians and Lebanese fell into their arms for almost thirty years. It is necessary to understand that this historiography, like any other, is not completely linear. All and all, viewing the historiography on the French mandate as a whole gives the fullest understanding of French Imperialism in Syria and Lebanon, and cohesively creates answers for the co-dependent questions I have put forth, as the texts create a clear colonial relationship between the metropole and periphery.

### **I. How did the French acquire the Mandates? Historical Developments: 1914-1923**

Before these complicated theories for French-Syria/Lebanon relations that scholars have created over the last century are explained, it is necessary to give a history of the events that led up to the French mandate system. The renowned historian D.K. Fieldhouse writes that, "In November 1914 no one could have forecasted the shape of the Ottoman Empire," as at that point many international powers were vying for power in this region. In 1914, the Ottoman Empire was going through political reform to appease those living in the empire. These democratic reforms completely opened the Ottoman Empire to Western political dealings. Following the nineteenth-century expansionist movement in Africa and Asia, the French and the British came out as the two supreme powers. When World War I broke out, their national desires and understanding of how important this region was to the West brought the individuals Francois Georges-Picot of France and Mark Sykes of Britain together. They met secretly (unknown to any other nations until 1917) to divide the spoils of a possibly unraveling Ottoman Empire. On November 23, 1915, the Sykes-Picot agreement was initially formed, with the French taking Lebanon, coastal Syria and south east Anatolia under direct rule and administering a sphere of influence over Inland Syria (Damascus, Aleppo).<sup>4</sup> Per the agreement of a possible Ottoman breakdown, the British would receive the whole of Mesopotamia (mostly modern day Iraq and Palestine), and Jerusalem would be under international protection. This agreement was by no means a treaty, but an accord that was based on whether the Ottoman Empire would fall apart or not.

1917 was a very important year for British and French determinism, as the Bolshevik Revolution broke out and toppled the Tsarist regime in Russia. Geography gave Russia a natural justification for territory in the area, but now, Britain and France had nothing in between their national interests and actual seizures of the Syrian and Lebanese territory with the fall of the Russian Empire. As the war was concluding, the Sykes-Picot agreement became public, and it became obvious to the world that the French and British would control the national destinies of the torn Ottoman territories. At this time, nationalist groups in the region were campaigning for independence from the Ottoman Empire. These Syrian and Lebanese nationalist ideals were a pretext for Western European intervention in the area, as the French politicians and officials dealing with these groups did not believe that these states were quite ready for full autonomy after being ruled by foreign powers for over four centuries (especially with

the quasi-radical nationalist factions they contained). In early 1920, British troops took over Damascus (the French could not mobilize quickly enough after the devastation of World War I, because it was primarily fought on their own soil), and positioned King Faysal of Iraq as King of Greater Syria under international supervision in March 1920. At this point, the global political voice believed that the French were so torn by World War I that their interest in these areas was now secondary.

By April 1920, the French were reconstructed following the woes of World War I, and French representatives met with the British and other international powers at the San Remo Conference. This conference basically solidified the earlier Sykes-Picot Agreement with few revisions (example: at this point, French gained direct influence over all of Syria). French troops invaded Damascus in July 1920, and Faysal's right as King of Syria was taken away. In August, all decisions were made at the Treaty of Sevres, finally giving the areas of Syria and Lebanon to the French and Mesopotamia to Britain. In 1922, Greater Syria was made a federation of five different states: Damascus, Aleppo, Aloawite, Druze, and Lebanon, dividing both ethnic and religious cultures. Finally in 1923, the League of Nations approved the French mandate for Syria and Lebanon, and for twenty years to come the French would be the sole imperial administrator for Syria and Lebanon.<sup>5</sup>

## II. The French Mandate: Primary Source Justification

The primary document of the French mandate is the perfect place to start, because it demonstrates that the French had unadulterated influence over the area and that the indigenous leaders who agreed upon this mandate basically handed them over to French direct-rule. This document as a whole sets the foreground for the historiographical debate. The League of Nations approved the very vague "Class A Mandate" that gave the fewest restrictions to French rule. The mandate charged the French Republic "with the duty of rendering administrative advice and assistance to the population,"<sup>6</sup> which almost all historians view as a broad statement giving the French the right to rule however they felt necessary.

The mandate tried to show that French rule was meant to gear Syria and Lebanon for independence with the idea of "Organic law," which was an extremely vague term in the mandate, supposedly paving the way for the establishment of a constitution. The mandate states that there would be a three year period, in which the French would establish an "Organic law" for Syria and Lebanon that "shall further enact measures to facilitate the progressive development of Syria and the Lebanon as independent states."<sup>6</sup> The mandate does speak of establishing rights to religion, military restrictions, judicial reform, and territorial solidifications, but lacks any real specific plan as to how the French will establish this "Organic law" within three years that will gear Syria and Lebanon for independence. This point of the document makes this "Organic law" idea extremely unrealistic. The only statement that speaks of any kind of restrictions to French political rule is that "The mandate shall, as far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy."<sup>6</sup> "As far as circumstances permit," is a very broad way of saying that the French could encourage local autonomy and progressive national independence campaigns, but if anything stood in the way of French control in the area, they could crush any insurgence that would undermine their authority in the area.

From this primary source analysis, it is clear that the mandate was an annexation in sheep's clothing, meaning that the political world basically agreed that the French could pursue their own national interests to protect their territories. The League of Nations approved this document which had no real plan as to when the French would give these countries the independence for which they so rightfully asked. From this document several questions arise that will define the historiographical argument I put forward: What French influence led to the agreement of the mandate that basically handed over Syria and Lebanon? Why did the indigenous leaders agree to such an unspecific document that by no means helped their nationalist aims? These two questions are more or less the ones that the historiography of the French mandate has produced, and the first group of historians, who wrote only several years after these mandates were set up, display how difficult it is to write immediately after an event of this magnitude occurs.

### III. Early Historians and the Development of the Historiographical Debate

This group of historians writing from the 1920s to the 1950s are what I like to call "reactive historians," as their writing shows that they are only reacting to the primary documents that led to the French mandate, and do not look further back in time to see how these influences were formed. Yes, every historian is reacting to an event they intend to write about, but these "reactive historians" are different, as they are writing immediately after the event occurred. Knowing the entire historical spectrum of this debate, it is clear that these authors looked through a narrowed scope, only viewing the French imperial power. These scholars are usually ignorant about the periphery, claiming that "the Orient" played almost no role in the French mandate, and they only use documents and knowledge of the early twentieth century to explain how the French acquired these territories.

E.W. Polson Newman's *The Middle East* (1926) is a perfect example of "reactive history," and it adheres to all the characteristics described. His narrow view is extremely prevalent, in which he writes that the Middle East was "where the Oriental and his neighbor from the West meet on common ground," and "The Arab just sits drinking his coffee and watches Western activity."<sup>7</sup> Polson Newman even goes as far to say that "Arabs are struggling for independence although they scarcely know what the word means,"<sup>8</sup> showing that his views on this topic are completely Eurocentric, and his own peripheral ignorance shapes how his arguments on French influence in the mandate are presented. Polson Newman does not use any documents before 1914, so his arguments are completely shaped by what was going on in the present time; therefore, his theories lack any real development. He presents the nationalist and individual theories (that almost all historians following him will exhibit) through French domestic and political examples, and these theories regardless of how broad, founded the historiography of French mandate history.

Polson Newman's argument is very primitive compared to scholars who followed him, because he speaks of no actual events or instances, but explicitly claims that the French had influence in the area due to their prior dealings with Lebanon. He points to the fact that the French had past influence in Lebanon through religious ties between French Catholics and Lebanese Maronites, but that is as far as he goes. His main idea is that the French believed they did not only have a nationalist cause for

seizing Lebanon, but had to take Syria because it was tied to Lebanon culturally and by geographic proximity. He also presents the "individualist" thesis that the French had complete control in this region, in which the mandate area was a "shop window, behind which French officials exerted complete control."<sup>9</sup> Polson Newman's main point is that the French could do whatever they wanted and could communicate to the public that they were gearing Syria and Lebanon for independence by putting indigenous leaders in charge. He claims that these indigenous leaders were either Maronite (a very prominent Catholic religious sect with direct connection to French missionary work) or French supporters, neglecting the fact that French elected positions were divided equally between Christians and Muslims. Regardless of how ignorant Polson Newman's piece is, it shows the nationalist and individualist theories for French influence and power that have been used ever since to describe the mandate system.

Polson Newman's piece is the cornerstone of the historical debate of the French mandate; his theories symbolize the approaches of historians of this time, and Cora Fern Worrel's dissertation, "The Administration of the Syrian Mandate" (1930), builds on Polson Newman's nationalist ideas and also introduces the international pressures theory. Worrel writes frankly that "Oil and a desire to keep up with Great Britain have led France on its desire for colonial growth."<sup>10</sup> This is Worrel's main argument, and even though Arabs are not invisible in her writing as with Polson Newman, she is still a "reactive historian," because she only views immediate economic and international influences of the French mandate. Oil as an economic reason for influence is understandable, as it is a prevalent resource in the area, but she does not even explain from where French interest in oil stemmed, and she completely neglects any influence dealing with anything that is not political or economic. In stating that France wanted to keep up with Great Britain, she introduces the "international pressure" theory for the mandate, as many historians like Worrel believe that if the French would have conceded the area, the British or some other superpower would have taken it.<sup>11</sup>

She also brings in the individualist theory like Polson Newman, as she blames the French influence on the benevolence of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. Worrel believes the Fourteen Points gave the French the ability to administer power as they wanted. This is a plausible explanation for how the French received so much power in this area, but ignores the historical developments of the relationship between France and Greater Syria that were set into motion far before Wilson's speech in 1918. She states that the French wielded power through Christian Maronites in office, but is not as narrow-minded as Polson Newman, as she states that seats were equally represented in government between Christians and Muslims. Worrel's theories are backed by more plausible evidence than Polson Newman's, and illustrate the development of new theories (international pressures) for the existence of the French mandate. Still, her scope is extremely limited as she barely looks at any political, cultural, or social dealings from before 1915.

D. Campbell Lee's *Mandates: How They Are Working* (1926), is yet another piece from this first group of writing on French mandates, and he continues the theme that the writers of this time were in no means interested with the periphery, and were just reacting to the current events around them. Lee believes mandates were formed with "an exalted form of trust."<sup>12</sup> This law of trusteeship is what Lee terms as a Roman Law

Tradition, and he explains that in France, there is no sign of "anything resembling the law of trusteeship," and that this idea of trust "is entirely foreign to their legal conception."<sup>13</sup> This explanation is exerting the nationalist theory, in which Lee claims France's national desires that have been in motion since expansionist campaigns began are in complete conflict with the idea of mandate. This idea explains how the French wielded power, as the mandate that the French were meant to follow was far too broad and their own nationalistic character could not allow them to adhere to this type of system.

Lee's piece is very developed and shows more substance than Polson Newman's or Worrel's, as it explains a complex nationalistic theory that France gained influence by faking this bond of trust, and they exerted power for so long because they did not believe in this type of trust. This piece shows how Lee, Worrell and Polson Newman use similar causal theories for imperial rule in this area, but use distinctly different examples and reasons for why and how the French began to administer power. Still, all these authors can be grouped together as reactive because they completely leave out the periphery, as Lee, like the other writers, only uses recent metropole history and reacts to it to form his own views.

Stephen Hemsely Longrigg's *Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate* (1958), is another completely Eurocentric piece, in which he gives ample theories for why the French gained so much influence in the area, but still completely neglects Syria and Lebanon's role in this situation. He expounds upon the nationalist thesis than Polson Newman and Lee wrote about, explaining, like Lee, that France was only pursuing their national interest that had been unchanged since the Partition of Africa sixty years earlier. His overt explanation for influence is that France believed that there was no central threat to their power as a colonial administrator of Syria and Lebanon, so they acted upon their own national interest, not caring at all for the supposed independence campaign that they agreed to in the mandate. Longrigg claims that "Arab independence appears...as little more than a necessary evil to be tolerated by powers,"<sup>14</sup> and the French dealt with it by adhering to a mandate that they never really meant to fulfill. Longrigg agrees with Worrel, and uses the "Wilson individualist theory" to explain the origination of French influence. This similarity is interesting as both authors use evidence that only dates back to 1918, neglecting to look back further than the twentieth century to see earlier pretexts for French conquest.

The next writer, Phillip Marshall Brown, sets himself apart from Polson Newman, Worrell and Lee because of his understanding that some knowledge and explanation of the periphery is necessary to understand how the French acquired and wielded so much power in this region. Brown is the first author who starts to get at the second question I put forward about the indigenous people's role in the French mandate. Brown's piece *From Sevres to Lausanne* (1924) speaks of the Treaty of Sevres and how it was a treaty of defense for the French against the nationalists. Brown acknowledges this irony, as on paper this treaty was meant to protect the future mandated areas. The French used this treaty to solidify the mandates, which would quell nationalist movements, that if un-checked, could alter French political influence in the area. Brown writes, "The French had been compelled by serious troubles with the Nationalists in... the revolt of the Arabs in Syria..."<sup>15</sup> and regardless of what the

mandate said dealing with independence, the French could use it to crush future nationalist revolts.

Brown's understanding of the treaty shows how Arabs played themselves into the mandate, whether they knew it or wanted to do so. When the nationalists, who were not unified and defined by the West as "radicals," met at Lausanne for the treaty, "they were at a humiliating disadvantage."<sup>18</sup> This was because Faysal's brief experiment in Arab Nationalism proved to the Western powers that the French could exert control by any means necessary until they could form independence on their own terms. The nationalist leaders who spoke with French officials after the Arab Revolt of 1920 had no choice but to concede to international politics. This understanding of peripheral causes and the relationship between power and dependence shows where the historical debate is leading to, and the next group of historians start to speak more of the periphery as a counterpart to understanding the metropole. Still, it is necessary to understand that Brown neglects to speak of more distant causes that lead up to the Arab Revolt, or external influences of why the French felt they could take advantage of the nationalists. In summary, these "reactive" writers were ignorant to the periphery, as they believed it had no effect in the French expansionist endeavors of their time. Regardless, this group sets up the debates and questions on the French mandate that historians of the last twenty years have been studying.

#### IV. Understanding the Periphery as a Part of the Metropole

The main problem with the "reactive historians" of the 1920s and 1930s was that their subject base had not yet been completely developed. They had to take the general current events of their time as their sources, and therefore were at a disadvantage due to the fact that they could not see how the mandate system played out. This is why the historians of the Post-World War II era seem to have a better understanding of influence, cause, and effect, all because they were writing after the time period of French imperialism in Syria and Lebanon. This next group of historians is what I term as the "Periphery-influenced metropole historians:" these writers do include the periphery in their study, but only as a part of their metropolitan understanding and analysis. These writers build off of the nationalist and individualist theories that writers like Worrel, Lee and Polson Newman set up for French mandate history, but also create new theories (like the institutional theory) that tie in the periphery with metropole. These writers also begin to blend other academic fields like sociology and anthropology into the study of imperialism. The writers of this group fully answer the first question I put forth, as they explain with actual factual knowledge dating back centuries for how the French obtained influence, and how they were able to control the national destinies of Syria and Lebanon for so long. These writers still have faults though, as generally speaking, they are generally Eurocentric and do not place the periphery as an equal part of the metropole. Therefore, they do not fully answer the second question of the Arabs' role in the French mandate, as their focus is the metropole, not the periphery. With the foundation that early historians set, these writers present a fuller understanding of French influence, power maintenance, and start to get at the idea of Arab demise into French hands.

Paul C. Helmreich's *From Paris to Sevres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920* (1974) is a great starting point for this second group



of historians, because his piece presents a good bridge between the earlier historians and the more recent Post-World War II scholars. He adds substance to the nationalist thesis that Polson Newman and Worrel argued, presents the new institutional theory and also writes from a Syrian point of view on some topics. Helmreich advocates that French influence budded from their own nationalist views when he writes, "The aura of history and long-standing French moral, political, educational and economic influence formed a foundation for French interests in the Near East."<sup>17</sup> He also presents the institutional thesis, as he believes French administrations, at certain points in colonial administration, were more stringent or benevolent based on what individuals were in office. For example, in 1915 when the Sykes-Picot agreement was finalized, a right-wing parliament was in charge of wielding agreements like this, and that, in Helmreich's mind, is why the Sykes-Picot was as deterministic as it was. On the other hand, in 1926 the left-wing High Commissioner Henri Ponsot strove for more representative government in Syria and Lebanon to gear them for actual independence. Helmreich is using the individualist thesis that Worrel exhibited along with the idea of specific political institutions to explain why certain things happened in the colonial administration and how they were handled.

He also makes mention of the Syrian and Lebanese indigenous people and what they were thinking about the French when he writes, "Unlike the Arabs, the Syrians were politically mature enough to recognize that they were not ready to govern themselves completely..."<sup>18</sup> In this statement, Helmreich tries to explain why the Syrians gave in to the French, but uses stereotypes and a "Eurocentric" view to voice Syrian belief. Therefore, in Helmreich's writing it is clear that he wants to link peripheral effects to metropole influence and power, but falls short, as his views are as narrow in scope as the writers before his time.

Jan Karl Tanenbaum's "France and the Arab Middle East: 1914-1920" (1978) is a great example of how these Post-World War II era scholars do not just react to the events of their time, but looked further back into French influence in the area to explain the mandate. His first sentence acknowledges this development, as he writes, "...Since the crusades of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, France had established extremely close cultural, economic, financial, and religious ties with Syria, Lebanon and Palestine."<sup>19</sup> Tanenbaum asserts that the influence was created by a deep French foundation in Syrian and Lebanese culture, not by political agreements, conferences, and treaties from 1915-1920 as the "reactive" historians argue.

Tanenbaum also presents the many theories of French influence in the area, writing, "...French colonial society, economic and political pressure groups, and colonial and military authorities urged that French troops be sent into the Levant in order to assure that France would control Syria when the postwar territorial settlements were determined."<sup>20</sup> In one sentence he presents the nationalistic, individualistic, institutional, international pressures, and military theories as a foundation for his writing on French influence in the area. What separates him from the earlier writers is that Tanenbaum actually looks to French influence before 1915, unlike Polson Newman, Worrel, and Longrigg, and he shows an understanding of theories that explain the evolution of the study dealing with the mandate system. Still, he only mentions the periphery in relation with France as his focal point, so he barely tackles the Syrian debate.

William I. Shorrock, like Tanenbaum, explains how cultural influence solidified political justification for the mandate, but taps even more in-depth into peripheral-based accounts. He starts his book, *French Imperialism in the Middle East: Failure of Policy in Syria and Lebanon 1900-1914* (1976) with voicing the Syrian point of view (more correctly than Helmreich's stereotypes on Syrian thoughts), when he writes that it is "quite interesting and instructive to contrast the French views of their own popularity in Syria and Lebanon with the estimates of others."<sup>21</sup> Unlike Helmreich, he does not use a completely Eurocentric voice for the indigenous people, and is one of the first authors to point out that the Syrian and Lebanese majority did not want the French there. With this idea, he opens up the debate of the second peripheral question I put up for debate, because his writing takes a closer look at what the periphery thought of the dominant French.

He also clarifies that looking at actual documents of the mandate does not tell much about earlier French influence. His piece symbolizes how the "periphery-influenced metropole historians" attempted to get away from a limited analysis of documents from 1900-1923. He writes on the influence of the eleventh-century Catholic crusaders and how later missionary work created an economic, social, educational and cultural relationship between France and its mandated territory. Even though these missionaries created influence for the French superpower, he believes that, "...Such emphasis was useless...since the populations became hostile and frustrated by losing deep contact with their own culture."<sup>22</sup> Shorrock is trying to explain the failures in policy, and why the Syrians revolted against the French, focusing on how earlier French cultural infusion was detrimental to the periphery. Still, he only uses the periphery in relation to the metropole, but alludes to how these writers are starting to examine the periphery more closely.

Peter Shambrook's *A French Imperialism in Syria, 1927-1936* (1998) is actually more similar with the "reactive" historians' approach to documentary evidence, as he writes, "The mandate was a liberal sounding concept which covered and legitimized outright imperial control."<sup>23</sup> His piece shows that in recent years, some historians still completely disregard further reaching evidence and the role of the periphery in relationship to the metropole, as he believes it played an insignificant role in how French would administer its policy. The only reason he is in this second group of historians is that his individualist theory is extremely developed, and portrays a different picture of the High Commissioner Henri Ponsot than Helmreich. Unlike Helmreich, he does not believe that Ponsot was extremely benevolent, but that "The High Commissioner endeavored to maintain French control and prestige in the region, whilst he continued in public to declare his faithfulness to the official Mandatory Policy of progressive emancipation."<sup>24</sup> His understanding of Ponsot's actions progressive representative government and elections, while maintaining French power with a whip, explains how commissioners like Ponsot suppressed indigenous nationalism for so long. His views on French domination are completely militaristic and Eurocentric because he believes that the French basically took what they wanted without any resistance. This argument is similar to Longrigg's, and like his predecessor, Shambrook fails to voice any concern or influence from Syrians or Lebanese. This source completely exhibits the trap into which historians still fall. While Shambrook does exhibit highly-developed theories on how the French wielded

power and national destiny, he neglects to incorporate the indigenous as a pertinent to his arguments.

The next two scholars, Roger Owen and William Watson, exhibit the historical revolution incorporating other academic fields into history to get a better examination of the topics at hand. Owen, an economist, and Watson, a sociologist, explain French influence in the area with examples from their own background of analysis. Roger Owen's *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century* (1998), uses the French economic thought process to explain why the mandate lasted so long. With the Great Depression and World War I being large economic factors to the metropole and periphery, Owen believes the French wielded power by giving concessions to the locals little by little and portraying to the public world that everything was fine in the mandate areas. Owen shows his knowledge of metropole-periphery relations when he wrote that it was hard to find the "middle path between French exaggeration and Syrian and Lebanese nationalist rhetoric."<sup>25</sup> He is explaining that getting the full picture of economic history in Syria and Lebanon is extremely difficult. This middle ground he is attempting to find is the metropole-to-periphery relationship, which exhibits how the French and Syrians interacted and dealt with economic policy as a group. Using economics as his background, Owen relates the two sides of the debate in a clear way that gives a better understanding of how the mandate lasted so long while economic conditions were less than stellar.

Watson's book, *Tricolor and Crescent: France and the Islamic World* (2003), illustrates the best understanding of cultural influence that writers like Tanenbaum and Sharrock exhibited before him. He does this by providing concrete examples of physical influence in the area: in the nineteenth century the French invested in Ottoman infrastructure, roads, railroads, shipping, etc.. He also demonstrates a point that most historians would not agree with: that the French were not ignorant of Islamic culture, just highly self-interested. Watson also points out that the French were the first Orientalists, as they became extremely obsessive with Near Eastern lifestyles, especially Arabic literature. He reminds his readers that the French were the first Western power to translate the Quran in 1697, and how Antoine Galland's translation of the eighth-century *A Thousand and One Nights* in 1704 opened up French public interest in the area, as there was a cross-cultural diffusion between France and the "Orient" that led to political interest. He sums up this idea when he wrote, "Orientalists greatly enhance the ability of the colonial government to gauge the varieties of problems that arose."<sup>26</sup> Both Owen and Watson exhibit how imperialistic history began to open up to other academic fields in the last ten years and how these different backgrounds can give a better understanding on French and Arab influence.

Edward Peter Fitzgerald's work is very important to note, as his "France's Middle Eastern Ambitions: the Sykes-Picot Negotiations and the Oil Fields of Mosul" (1994) builds off Worrel's ideas, but actually explains why oil was so important in the area. To recount, Worrel only explains that oil played a large role in French influence in the area, but gives no explanation to where this influence was created or why it was important. Fitzgerald explains where Worrel fails to when he writes, "Petroleum seepages and tar sands in northern Mesopotamia had been observed...long before the Christian era...[and] Western experts had been reporting on the potential of the region for oil exploitation since the 1870's."<sup>27</sup> Like the other "Periphery-influenced metropole

historians," Fitzgerald starts where Worrel left off, explaining why the French were so interested in the area. The Mosul oil field agreement is very interesting to this study, because French relinquishment of these fields explains why the British conceded to French imperialism in all of Syria. Fitzgerald notes that the Syrians would have been more favorable with British or American protection, but with the French conceding these supremely economically profitable fields, the British had to give up all of Syria to France. This piece shows exactly how this group of historians is approaching the subject differently.

M.B. Hayne's *The French Foreign Office and the origins of the First World War, 1898-1914* (1993) is the last piece from this group of scholars, because it shows the birth of "metropole-to-periphery" scholars with pertinent examination of the periphery. Hayne uses a specific colonial institution, the Quai d'Orsay, to explain his institution theory of how the French wielded power. Hayne's institutional thesis is like Helmreich's, but has more clout behind it, as Hayne believes that the Quai d'Orsay was the "most powerful and independent foreign office in Europe."<sup>28</sup> Hayne writes that the un-checked power of the Quai d'Orsay, led the French to wield power, in which this organization acted as a separate colonial government from the French domestic political government. This is not the main reason Hayne is discussed last, but he is viewed as the bridge to our third group of historians because he understands the ignorance of French colonial government.

Hayne writes this about the Quai d'Orsay: "They had a decidedly Eurocentric outlook which frequently led them to view in rather patronizing fashion less technically advanced parts of the world."<sup>29</sup> Yes, this quote can be used a pretext example for why the French believed they had the right rule (similar to Longrigg's overt thesis), but Hayne also understands that his sources are Eurocentric and he has to step away from that to get a better understanding of how the Quai d'Orsay wielded colonial power for thirty years. He is also the only historian in this group to view history as a post-modernist would, as he is obviously influenced by Said's *Orientalism*, which shaped the third group of historians that have left the historiographical debate where it is today.

## V. Using the Metropole as a Part of Peripheral Histories

The second group of historians used the theories and ideas that "reactive" historians before them set up, but still only used the periphery as part of metropole history, which was their main flaw. This last group of scholars, the "metropole-to-periphery historians," usually uses the periphery as the focal point for their study, which helps explain my second interdependent question: How did the Arab Nationalism of Syria and Lebanon fail to mobilize a united movement, and why did their national desires fall into French control with so little physical resistance? This group of historians was obviously influenced by Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978), which is defined as "a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient's special place in European Western experience."<sup>30</sup> This definition basically means that most historians viewing imperialism are ignorant of the Orient, and only view the Orient as historians before have created. For example, Edward Said would judge Polson Newman's statement that "the Moslem despises the Christian and hates

the Jew,<sup>731</sup> as a completely ignorant way of using Eurocentric views to shape ideas on the topic.

Said believes the Occident (the West) puts this view on the Orient, and that is where the supposed colonial justification is made. It is hard to see what Said's solution to this problem is, but it seems that he believes that peripheral examination of certain topics, for example the Syrian influence on French colonial endeavors, needs to be viewed more critically to get away from Eurocentric accounts. This idea is said to be post-modernist, to differentiate between the Post-World War II writers who only used the periphery in connection with the metropole. The "metropole-to-periphery historians" use the periphery as its forefront, and Bernard Lewis's *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (1987) portrays this idea when he writes, that in colonial endeavors "... the European is not the explorer discovering barbaric peoples in strange in remote places, but is himself an exotic barbarian discovered and observed by enquires from the lands of Islam."<sup>732</sup> John McTague brings this peripheral-based notion to our specific debate when he writes, "Perhaps the most striking aspect of these negotiations [Anglo-French over borders of Palestine] was the complete absence of any input from the Palestinians....[and that] the Palestine Arab community were never consulted about the borders of their own country..."<sup>733</sup> This last group of historians creates the metropole-to-periphery connection, which in the end will answer the two inter-related questions I have set to answer.

Heather Wagner's *The Division of the Middle East: The Treaty of Sevres* (2004) is a good starting point for this group of historians; she views the event of the Treaty of Sevres that all authors of this topic have analyzed in a new light that is obviously a product of Said's *Orientalism*. Wagner is also a good bridge between the two groups, in which her point is not to analyze the periphery, but she still does an excellent job of steering clear of Eurocentric tones that authors of the previous group fall into. Wagner establishes an idea that historians like Hayne asserted when she writes that the Treaty of Sevres and colonial decisions were "settled by leaders thousands of miles away."<sup>734</sup> This is her "ignorance" thesis, as she repeatedly notes her main theme that the French and other Western powers viewed this area as "a geographical generality viewed from a Western perspective,"<sup>735</sup> meaning that the leaders of the mandate neglected the cultural, religious and economic borders when they divided the collapsed Ottoman Empire. Now, a conflict between authors is displayed here, as Watson believed that the French were not that ignorant of Arabic culture. Still, it is probable that these two writers would agree that the way the French administered colonial power was ignorant.

This ignorance idea is similar to Said's, as Wagner believes that imperialist leaders' Eurocentric desires directly transferred to supposed influence in the area. This ignorance thesis is summed up when Wagner writes, "The boundaries carved out by the Treaty of Sevres often ignored the realities of history and population statistics; leaning more on the aims and desires of the superpower."<sup>736</sup> Wagner uses Said's views on imperialistic nature to explain why the French believed they had influence in the area. She also brings up the idea of separate cultural identities in the area of the mandate, which most authors before have ignored (besides J.W. Crawford's "Syria and the Lebanon: The Prospect," and John Spangolo's *France & Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1914*). She considers the fact that Syrians and Lebanese are not of the same

exact cultural or religious background, setting up the arguments for why these separate identities could not unite in order to take back their territory.

James Gelvin and Michael Provence are two of the most important writers of the historiographical development at hand, in that they are the only writers of this topic using the periphery as their focal point, trying to get at what role Syrians played in the colonial dominance of their own territory. These two writers (and Fieldhouse) all have similar theories on how French influence was not the only factor of long mandate rule, but the fact that the Syrians and Lebanese could not unite as a cohesive entity to gain their own national independences played the most significant role in mandate rule. Even Gelvin's title, *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire* (1998), gives away the fact that the Syrian's could not all unite under one cause, as some indigenous were loyal to the French (Syrian and Lebanese elites), some were loyal to Faysal, and all the others were loyal to separate nationalist causes.<sup>37</sup>

Gelvin's largest contribution to the study is noting the prior historiography of Syrian nationalist studies. He marks the start with George Antonius's *The Arab Awakening* (1948), in which Antonius claims that the foundation of Arab Nationalism started in 1847, when nationalist scholar societies were formed by the patronage of the Americans. Gelvin and other scholars of the topic believe that Antonius's account is the starting point for the historiography of Syrian nationalism, but Gelvin believes that his theories take a small group of elites and relate their beliefs to an entire national identity. Ziene A. Ziene and other scholars left off where Antonius starts, as they claim Arab Nationalism was brought on by "proto-proto nationalist" events like the Wahhabi movement and the rule of Mohammad Ali. Gelvin contributes to the ideas set up by past scholars, as he points out a point that was previously overlooked: regardless of how the Arab nationalism began to respond, with the French intent to annex a country that was trying to unite under an "Arab identity," mass political involvement was inevitable. This background is important, because it sets the foreground for where Syrian nationalist studies are today, and Gelvin ties this past to try and explain why the Syrians and Lebanese fell into the hands of the French.<sup>38</sup>

Finally with Gelvin, a writer is seen giving complete respect to the specifics of the peripheral cause, as Gelvin writes that four days before French invasion, "Throughout the city, petit-bourgeois members, neighborhood toughs, unemployed youths, refugees from the Biqa valley and recent demobilized soldiers...took to the streets,"<sup>39</sup> rioting in order to show the French that they were not wanted there. Gelvin also looks at the complicated installation of Faysal as ruler of Syria. Gelvin notes that Faysal's twenty-two month rule was a brief experiment in Arab nationalism that was quelled by the San Remo Conference. Gelvin actually reports on Faysal's view of the French: "I refused all help offered to me by the French because I saw their desire to occupy our country."<sup>40</sup> It is not specifically important what Faysal said about the French, but the fact that his views did not represent his populations'. Gelvin believes that even though most indigenous were not enthusiastic about the French mandate, they could not stop it because of the historical developments of the area that were already set in place. Gelvin takes the tone of Wagner, as he explains that throughout Syria and Lebanon there are more than twenty different religious sects, separate ethnic

distinctions such as the Druze, Aloawite, Maronites (who do not believe they are Arabs) and a social structure that was doomed for disaster. Therefore, regardless of mass nationalist politics, the Syrians or Lebanese could not unite in order to stop the French cause.

Michael Provence's theme in *The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism* (2005) is almost identical to Gelvin's, in that he believes the most pertinent question in understanding Syrian influence on the mandate is "How did ordinary people feel about their peripheral role in politics?"<sup>41</sup> The "ordinary people" are the central point in this debate, because they explain the differences between the indigenous and how these "uncoordinated resistance movements"<sup>42</sup> throughout the mandate era failed to do much. Provence furthers Gelvin's study though, as he uses peripheral accounts to explain immediate causes for a call of Syrian Nationalism. Provence believes, "The military government of the French mandate, sworn to foster the developmental rights and interests of the population under the mandate, used means of repression and mechanized warfare never unleashed on civilians."<sup>43</sup> Provence notes the not-so-benevolent side of the French mandate, as they burned villages, shelled Damascus upon arrival, and suppressed any nationalist hopes. It is very important that Provence notes these actual peripheral events, as on top of being ruled by the Ottoman Turks for four centuries, these events gave the "ordinary people" a pretext for the nationalism at hand.

Now, Provence speaks of 1922, as what he considers the most important year for the demise of Syrian nationalism. In this year the area of Greater Syria was broken down into five states, separating these areas that were trying to unite under one common goal. Yes, the French did install this state division, but Provence just uses this year of 1922 as a cornerstone for his theories, for which the cultural boundaries had been set up for centuries. Provence believes this most difficult task of overcoming the cultural differences and boundaries set up in their territory were impossible. This unworkable task is noted by Provence, in which he writes that the Syrian nationalists never really won their country. The French just left, not able to rule after the damage that World War II wreaked upon French politics. Gelvin and Provence as a whole answer the second interdependent question, as the Syrians fell into the hands of the French because of the cultural and religious barriers that caused the failure of the nationalists to unite under one singular body.

As we have come to the end of the historical developments of the mandate era, it is pivotal to view the work of D.K. Fieldhouse last because he does the best job of creating the metropole-to-periphery relationship. In *Western Imperialism in the Middle East: 1914-1958* (2006), Fieldhouse examines the metropole and periphery as equal parts of the historical debate, and his work displays in the clearest way why the two questions of French authority and Arab demise are interdependent. He also shows characteristics of all three groups of historians viewed in this text, because he uses many of the theories that the "reactive" historians set up and the "Periphery-Influenced metropole historians" developed, and finally, he is the quintessential symbol for metropole-to-periphery history.

He starts with examining the Ottoman Empire before the mandate. He writes, "Had the Ottoman territories lain as far from a resurgent Europe as China the empire might have remained largely intact."<sup>44</sup> This is a periphery-based examination, in which

he believes the Ottoman Empire and the future territories within were destined to be torn apart by Western Powers because of their relationship from centuries before. He then jumps to the mythical justifications for the "Glory of the Republic" founded by authors like Polson Newman, when he writes, "Coming at the end of a period of Western European expansion overseas, there was a continuing momentum of expansionist instincts, and that once the issues were opened, each power was likely to struggle to get whatever territories or advantages seemed to hand."<sup>45</sup> He looks past "reactive history" and understands that events at the time like the Sykes-Picot agreement or the San Remo Conference were only materializations of prior influence based on nationalist desires.

He writes on the institution thesis voiced by Hayne and Helmreich, as he speaks of the ability of colonial institutions like the CAF, Parti Colonial and Quai d'Orsay to wield power in the colonial arena. Finally, he uses the individualist theory set up by Worrel and Shambrook to explain the role of Georges Picot. Fieldhouse believes Picot pushed for control, not just a "sphere of influence" in 1915, because of his own colonial agenda and nationalist love for French domination. He sums up his arguments of French influence in connection with Arab nationalism, when he writes "It was based on a profound distrust of Arab Nationalism and more broadly on the long traditions of French colonial rule..."<sup>46</sup> Here we see Fieldhouse exhibit a clear understanding of the theories on both immediate and resurgent French influence to get the fullest picture of the topic.

He then moves on to discuss the Arab nationalist demise and follows the ideas of Provence and Gelvin, but with a more discrete look into social classes, and how they played a role in this disaster for Arab identity. Fieldhouse, like Province and Gelvin, believes French influence was so prime and lasted so long because Syrians could not mobilize as a whole, until the French were forced out by World War II. The most important distinction between Fieldhouse's predecessors and his work is his "social status explanation" of why the indigenous fell into French rule. He believes that the main nationalist politicians who conceded to French rule cared more about the preservation of their status than complete independence. Most of Syrian and Lebanese leaders brought to the forefront of the San Remo Conference and Treaty of Sevres were social elites, and these elites knew that the French mandate would preserve their status more than complete nationalist anarchy, which would topple the status quo out of favor. This theory best explains the Arab demise as social preservation in a territory that had just lost its empire of economic prosperity makes the most sense.

All and all, Fieldhouse's work sums up the historiographical debate of the mandate era. He pulls together all the theories for French influence in Syria and Lebanon, and explains why it is so important to understand how the Syrians and Lebanese lost their own identity. He defines the metro-to-periphery history, because he equally examines both French and Syrian influence, and how they were interconnected in French domination and Syrian disaster.

## VI. Conclusions

In the course of almost sixty years of historiography, a more complete picture of the events dealing with the French mandate era has emerged. When I set out to answer these two interdependent questions, the research and historiography



displays that this study would end with a clear relationship between the metropole and periphery based on French and indigenous influence on each other. First, how did the French gain so much influence in the area of Syria and Lebanon in order to control, wield the power, and guide the national destinies of these two countries? This question is answered by the nationalist, individualist, international pressures, military, overt, and institution theories collected by the historiography of almost sixty years. The French wielded power for so long because the individuals and institutions in French society believed in their national desire to take these former Ottoman territories as colonies.

Second, how did the Arab Nationalism of Syria and Lebanon fail to mobilize a united movement, and why did their national desires fall into French control with so little physical resistance? This question is partially answered by the fact that the dominant French influence subjected these people. From taking a closer look at the periphery, it is found that the Syrians and Lebanese lacked the ability or will to unite as an Arab community, which pushed them into the national desires of the French. All and all, from Polson Newman to Fieldhouse, the authors of this historiography worked off each other to get at the colonial relationship between France and Syria and Lebanon to explain why and how the mandate was administered and accepted. Therefore, the two questions are answered by the entire historiography, and the historians of these separate groups give their readers a complete understanding of the French mandate in Syria and Lebanon.

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## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> The World War I Document Archive, "8 January, 1918: President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points," *Brigham Young University Library Online* [Library Section on-line]; available from <http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/1918/14points.html>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2007.
- <sup>2</sup> I will also examine authors of the Post-World War II era that looked to the eleventh century and on to see how these French influences originated before the actual agreements of the Partitioning of the Ottoman Empire.
- <sup>3</sup> D.K. Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East: 1914-1958* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 44.
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.
- <sup>5</sup> Information on the history from 1914-1923 compiled from all the books and articles found in my bibliography.
- <sup>6</sup> "French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon," *The American Journal of International Law* Vol. 17 (1923), [e-journal] <<http://www.jstor.org>> (accessed 2 March 2007).
- <sup>7</sup> E. W. Polson Newman, *The Middle East* (London: G. Bles, 1926), 1-2.
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 144.
- <sup>10</sup> Cora Fern Worrel, *The Administration of the Syrian Mandate Thesis* (M.A.)—Ohio State University, 1930, 4.
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 5-6.
- <sup>12</sup> D. Campbell Lee, "Mandates: How They Are Working," *Transactions of the Grotius Society* Vol. 12 (1926), [e-journal] <<http://www.jstor.org>> (accessed 2 March 2007).
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.
- <sup>14</sup> Stephen Hemsely Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 59.
- <sup>15</sup> Philip Marshal Brown, "From Sevres to Lausanne," *The American Journal of International Law* Vol. 18 No. 1 (1924), [e-journal] <<http://www.jstor.org>> (accessed 22 February 2007).
- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 116.
- <sup>17</sup> Paul C. Helmreich, *From Paris to Sevres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974), 16.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 54.
- <sup>19</sup> Jan Karl Tanenbaum, "France and the Arab Middle East: 1914-1920," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* vol.68 No.7 (1978), [e-journal] <<http://www.jstor.org>> (accessed 22 February 2007).
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.
- <sup>21</sup> William I. Shortrock, *French Imperialism in the Middle East: The Failure of Policy in Syria and Lebanon, 1900-1914* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 6.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 53.
- <sup>23</sup> Peter Shambrook, *A French Imperialism in Syria, 1927-1936* (Reading, UK : Ithaca Press, 1998), 2.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 248-249.
- <sup>25</sup> Roger Owen, *A History of Middle East Economics in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998), 66.
- <sup>26</sup> William E. Watson, *Tricolor and Crescent: France and the Islamic World* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003), 41.
- <sup>27</sup> Fitzgerald, Edward Peter, "France's Middle Eastern Ambitions: the Sykes-Picot Negotiations and the Oil Fields

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<sup>28</sup> M. B Hayne, *The French Foreign Office and the Origins of the First World War, 1898-1914* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1993), 307.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 306.

<sup>30</sup> Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 1.

<sup>31</sup> Polson Newman, 2.

<sup>32</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982), 11.

<sup>33</sup> John J. McTague Jr, "Anglo-French Negotiations over the Boundaries of Palestine, 1919-1920," *Journal of Palestine Studies* vol.11 no.2 (1982) [e-journal] <<http://www.jstor.org>> (accessed 22 February 2007).

<sup>34</sup> Heather Lehr Wagner, *The Division of the Middle East: The Treaty of Sevres* (Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 2004), 6.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 81.

<sup>37</sup> James L. Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire* (Berkeley: University of California, 1998), 10-15, 40.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 3-5.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 162.

<sup>41</sup> Michael Provence, *The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism* (Austin : University of Texas Press, 2005), 8.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 153.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, Fieldhouse, 5.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 255.