

Wittenberg History Journal

Spring 2017



EXPOSING HIDDEN DEBATES AND SCANDAL:
FROM AFGHANISTAN TO CLEVELAND

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Exposing Hidden Debates and Scandal: From Afghanistan to Cleveland

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The Hartje Paper

The Martha and Robert G. Hartje Award is presented annually to a senior in the spring semester. The History Department determines the three or four finalists who then write a 600 to 800 word narrative essay on an historical event or figure. The finalists must have at least a 2.7 grade point average and have completed at least six history courses. The winner is awarded \$500 at a spring semester History Department colloquium and the winner paper is included in the *History Journal*. This year's Hartje Award was presented to Keri Heath.

On the Cover

Tower Bridge In London is a painting by Brian Thompson

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Dedication

The staff of the History Journal dedicates this issue to Dr. Scott Rosenberg, whose dedication to Wittenberg students in all areas of study has inspired us to reach outside the constraints of what is expected, and instead push through to our fullest potential. We appreciate all you do for your students and the community and strive to take note.

Edith Cavell: What Makes a Hero?

Real life heroes come in all shapes, sizes, and from all places, but like a great many things heroism is often thrust upon the beholder. People standing and acting on what they believe in, especially in political or socially turbulent times, often find themselves given the title of hero with minimal say. Edith Cavell is one of these heroes. Serving as a nurse in Belgium, Cavell stood at the forefront of the war-torn Europe in 1914, fulfilling her nursing duties; while simultaneously aiding Allied soldiers evade German forces. Her actions led to her arrest, conviction, execution, and heralded hero status in England and the other Allied nations. Her story is one of an ordinary, small town girl to a woman with marble memorials: the story of who a hero is.

Born 4 December 1865 in Swardeston, England, Cavell's dedication and passion to nursing and her country was apparent in her lifelong commitment to the field.¹ Fountains Fever Hospital in Lower Tooting hired her first in 1895, where she stayed for four years before moving the London to work at the London Hospital.² It was there that she caught the attention of Belgian Dr. Antoine Depage who invited her to serve as the Directress at school for nurses in Brussels, so Cavell packed up and moved to Brussels in 1907.³ At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, Cavell continued nursing in Belgium for the Red Cross, and maintained her position even after the Germans gained control of Belgium.⁴ By 1915, Cavell had joined an underground network that worked to smuggle captured Allied soldiers out of German controlled territory.⁵ Her efforts in smuggling reportedly saved over 200 soldiers.⁶ As an English nurse in German occupied Belgium, Cavell's actions against those Germans put her at considerable risk of retribution from her enemy. Indeed, Cavell's secret

contribution to the Allied war effort did not continue for long, as German military police arrested her on 5 August 1915.⁷ During her trial on 6 October 1915, she pleaded guilty to charges of treason, and as a result was executed by a firing at dawn, 12 October 1915.⁸ Cavell's story does not end with her death. Almost overnight, Cavell's execution sparked something in propagandists, women, nurses, soldiers, potential enlistees, and ordinary people around the globe.

Much of Cavell's life was only widely known after her death. Most of the current understanding of Cavell as a woman, a nurse, and a hero come from articles propagating the righteousness of the war against those that would kill a pious, nurses. However, the night before her execution, Cavell met with Reverend H. Stirling Gahan, a British chaplain, with whom she shared her last conversation. Gahan wrote of Cavell's last thoughts and confession, and concluded with these words: "He (a German military chaplain) told me: 'She was brave and bright to the last. She professed her Christian faith and that she was glad to die for her country. She died like a heroine.'"⁹ Although a fellow Christian, this chaplain was still the enemy, but could still recognize the heroic actions of this woman, sacrificing all concern to her own safety and security for the lives of her country's soldiers.

Accounts describe Cavell's calm demeanor towards her own fate in the days between the trial and the execution, but it is impossible to know if she understood the impact her death would have and the legacy she would leave behind. Thousands of people, people who never knew Cavell, came together in mourning to memorialize her actions. They made her the hero. Cavell's actions were not dissimilar from many others in war, but hers were remembered; remembered as heroic.

Endnotes

- ¹ Shane M Barney, "The Mythic Matters of Edith Cavell: Propaganda, Legend, Myth and Memory," *Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques* 31, no. 2 (2005): (217-33), 218.
- ² Ibid. 218-19.
- ³ Ibid. 219V
- ⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵ Ibid.
- ⁶ Ginny A Roth and Elizabeth Fee, "A Soldier's Hero: Edith Cavell (1865-1915)." *American Journal Of Public Health* 100, no. 10 (October 2010): (1865-1866), 1.
- ⁷ Barney, "The Mystic Matters of Edith Cavell," 219.
- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ H. Stirling Gahan,. "Account on the Execution of Edith Cavell." Oct. 1915. 1

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The Halpin Affair: How Cleveland went from Scandal to Success

Courtney Huck

If ever there was a question as to which political vice Americans were more tolerant of- sexual philandering or financial corruption-the presidential election of 1884 presented a clear choice.¹

Introduction

As the 1884 presidential election approached, the Democratic Party was hopeful it would win the presidency for the first time since before the Civil War. An up and coming politician from New York, Grover Cleveland, had been selected as the Democratic nomination in early July. Cleveland prided himself in ‘clean government’ and making decisions that would be best for the majority of his constituents. He refused to make choices that would benefit big business or his own pockets.² Despite Cleveland’s virtuous public face, Cleveland had to defend his private virtue after the *Buffalo Evening Telegraph* released an article claiming that Cleveland had an illegitimate nine-year-old son with Maria Halpin. In what came to be known as the Halpin Affair, Cleveland defended his virtuous reputation to continue his chance at running for the presidency, even though that meant putting down Halpin’s reputation. Cleveland’s reputation as “Grover the Good” from before the scandal broke helped him win the 1884 presidential election due to him appearing virtuous in his public dealings. While having sex outside of marriage was against the expected norms of the time, Cleveland’s status as a bachelor prevented the media from painting him as a complete hypocrite. Halpin’s lack of voice in the “credible” new sources, paired with Cleveland’s political clout, his virtuous reputation, and his management of the scandal allowed Cleveland to recover from the scandal in time to win the presidency.

Background

Cleveland became the mayor of Buffalo, NY on the January 1st, 1882, and he made it clear from the beginning he was not going to treat his career in politics as a business initiative.³ Cleveland quickly moved up the political ranks and became the Governor of New York in 1883. Cleveland continued to push for clean government, and he won many “battles against corruption, preventing John Kelly, Boss Tweed’s successor at Tammany Hall, from appointing



Figure 1: The pillars say “Honest, Faithful, Capable.” These virtues were the literal foundation of Cleveland’s campaign

his disreputable and incompetent friends to public office.”⁴ Cleveland refused support from Tammany Hall despite his aspirations to someday become president and despite the difficulties that came from winning a presidency without Tammany Hall’s support.

However, Cleveland managed to build an honorable reputation through his independence from the Hall. Democratic Party leaders took quick notice of Cleveland's growing popularity in New York amongst 'the common people,' and when "General Edward S. Bragg of Wisconsin nominated Cleveland for president as the 1884 convention, he said, 'We love him most for the enemies he has made.'" ⁵

Cleveland continued to play off of his honorable and upstanding reputation as he campaigned for the presidency as can be seen in Figure 1. ⁶ When the scandal with Maria Halpin broke,

Cleveland's honorable reputation was damaged, but he proved he had a strong enough image with his public virtue to overcome the scandal that resulted from his private life.

Maria Halpin moved to Buffalo in 1871 after her husband died from tuberculosis. With two children from her marriage, Halpin moved to Buffalo to take a sales position from a family friend at Flint & Kent, a dry-goods store. ⁷ She left both of her children behind in Jersey City to stay with her parents. Halpin worked in the men's collared shirt section of the store, and met Cleveland in 1873. He began to court her for several months. In 1874, Halpin gave birth to a son, but Halpin was unsure if the child was Cleveland's or not: "Neither she nor Cleveland were certain, but since the other men with whom she was involved were married, Cleveland willingly accepted responsibility. Although Maria demanded marriage, Cleveland consented only to child support." ⁸ Halpin may or may not have been seeing multiple men, but it is also likely Cleveland was seeing various women. As Pastor Henry W. Crabbe would claim in a later article by the *Buffalo Evening Telegraph*, he saw Cleveland as a "corrupt" man who'd had many relations with different women. ⁹ However, while the Halpin Affair would cite national debate over the moral ethics of electing a 'fornicator' to the oval office, Cleveland managed to keep many of the other details of his private life away from the media. This allowed Halpin to be painted as the one with loose morals, whereas Cleveland could claim that he had made a one-time mistake.

Publicized

The scandal became public on July 21st, 1884 when the *Buffalo Evening Telegraph* published a front-page article called "A Terrible Tale: A Dark Chapter in

a Public Man's History." ¹⁰ The *Telegraph* received news of the story from Rev. George H. Ball. The *Telegraph* was viewed as a modern day tabloid, and Ball's story was extremely sensational. ¹¹ A staunch Republican, Ball claimed that he saw it as his duty to reveal the 'truth' about a man who he saw as a moral threat if he were to make it to the White House. Ball claimed Cleveland would get drunk at public events, become involved in fistfights, and have orgies. ¹² The *Telegraph* also claimed Cleveland had seduced Halpin, but "withdrew his promise to marry her, then 'employed two detectives and a doctor of bad repute to spirit the woman away and dispose of the child.'" ¹³ Due to the *Telegraph's* tabloid status, a wider audience did not believe the scandal until an additional account was printed in the *Boston Journal*. ¹⁴ This account narrowed in on the one part of the *Telegraph's* article that was true: Halpin had a nine-year-old son, and she was claiming his father was Cleveland. After the scandal broke, many people saw Cleveland as the one at fault, and the "sensational charges, quickly transmitted throughout the nation, generated a tempest of debate, eliciting heated commentary from ministers, partisans, and independents alike." ¹⁵ Throughout the course of his campaign though, Cleveland would prove that he could recover from the scandal, and he would prove that Americans did see sexual philandering as a less onerous crime than financial corruption.

The Comeback

So how was Cleveland able to overcome this sex scandal that threatened to ruin his run for the presidency as well as the rest of his political career? Part of the reason that Cleveland was able to recover from the scandal was due to the pure timing of when it was released. The *Telegraph's* article was released two weeks after Cleveland was chosen as the Democratic nominee at the National Democratic convention. If the scandal had broken before the convention then Cleveland would not have been chosen. An article released in *The New York Evangelist* called "The Various Defenses of Governor Grover Cleveland" was released August 21st, 1884. The paper claimed it was a long time supporter of Cleveland, but was "forced to conclude that if things now developed had been known to the country three months ago, there would not have been in the United States of America a man less likely to be nominated for President than Grover Cleveland of Buffalo." ¹⁶

However, Cleveland had fourteen weeks before the election to turn public opinion back into his favor, and he was more than able to use this time period to his advantage.¹⁷

As the scandal broke, and Cleveland's advisers began to panic about what their next move should be, Cleveland kept his next step simple. On July 23rd, Cleveland sent a telegraph to his advisers, and said: "whatever you do...tell the truth."¹⁸ Cleveland admitted to his advisers that he'd had an affair with Halpin, but he was unsure if Oscar was his child or not.¹⁹ Cleveland never admitted to being Oscar's father, nor did he deny it. However, he did allow it to be known that he was paying for Oscar to be taken care of. This tied into his persona as "Grover the Good." "The more details that came out, the nobler he looked. Cleveland, it was revealed, had dutifully watched over the child and had always acted in his best interest."²⁰ Cleveland claimed that although he may have made a mistake when he was younger, he would make up for it in the best way that he could. He financially supported Oscar and Halpin. While some later claimed that he did this to simply keep Halpin quiet, he still appeared in the public light as a hero.

It was also revealed that Cleveland had done more than just attempt to protect Oscar through finances, but Cleveland also protected him when Halpin began to drink excessively on a regular basis. Early in March of 1876, Cleveland found out Halpin was an alcoholic and had the child removed from her custody. Oscar was taken to the Protestant Orphan Asylum, and Cleveland paid for his stay there.²¹ Cleveland also had Halpin admitted to the Providence Asylum in an attempt to have her sober up and get her life back on track. However Halpin only stayed at the asylum for five days because she was deemed to not be insane.²² Cleveland even provided financial support for Halpin after she left the asylum to begin her own business outside of Buffalo. However, Halpin stuck around Buffalo, and as Halpin appeared to be on the road to recovery, she was allowed to visit her son at the orphanage. At least she was allowed to visit until she kidnapped him from the orphanage one day. It took three months for authorities to recover the child. Halpin consulted with a Buffalo lawyer about fighting for custody, yet he advised her against suing Cleveland, and she ultimately dropped the charges and resolved that her son would be adopted.²³ Not long after Oscar

was returned to the orphanage, Cleveland ensured an influential family of his acquaintance adopted him. While not in Oscar's life, Cleveland guaranteed Oscar had everything he could ever want in life. As the details of Cleveland's heroics continued to be leaked to Democrats, more people came to support Cleveland and refused to be turned away by a sexual exploit that he had committed ten years earlier.

Cleveland was also able to win the presidency because the age old question of public vs. private virtue came forward as it was discovered that James G. Blaine had not been completely honest in his public dealings. Blaine had "used official powers to grant railroad rights that would profit him personally. Even juicy tales about Cleveland's sexual past did not eclipse Blaine's misdeeds."²⁴ In addition to these true accusations, Blaine was already seen as a "friend of the rich."²⁵ In contrast, Cleveland was seen as the honest common man. In addition to his public misdealings, Blaine had his own private scandal as his wife gave birth only three months after she had gotten married.²⁶ Despite this information reaching Cleveland's desk, he decided to not publicize it. This partially tied into Cleveland's persona to not feel the need to fight dirty to win the election from using gossip to defeat Blaine, but it also "kept any head-to-head comparison of the sexual lives of the two men out of the headlines, and the focus straight on their financial reputations: an arena in which Cleveland could clearly triumph."²⁷ Despite Cleveland's attempts, Blaine's untimely marriage still reached the press, but unlike Cleveland, Blaine refused to admit the truth and denied the allegations. His refusal to admit to his private life allegations, in addition to it being discovered that Blaine had lied to an 1876 House investigating committee about his involvement with the railroads and his ties to the rich, cast Blaine in a position that made it hard for many voters to identify with him. As a Chicago reformer commented on the 1884 election,

We are told that Mr. Blaine has been delinquent in office but blameless in private life, while Mr. Cleveland has been a model of official integrity, but culpable in his personal relations. We should therefore elect Mr. Cleveland to the public office, which he is so well qualified to fill and remand Mr. Blaine to the private station that he is admirably fitted to adorn.²⁸

Many Americans came to reflect this view, and saw Cleveland's public virtue as more important than his private virtue.

While many newspapers continued to comment on Blaine and Cleveland's scandals, Cleveland's seemed to become of lesser importance when juxtaposed with Blaine's: "Set against Blaine's identification with the rich and famous, Cleveland's sexual misdeeds played more as a joke than as a disqualification for public office."²⁹ As seen in Figure 2, on September 27th, *The Judge* printed a political cartoon showing "Grover the Good" looking frustrated as a mother holds a crying baby.

Despite the tension that is present in the picture, both Halpin and the baby have been taken care of financially, and "the prosperous appearance of the figure of Maria Halpin in the cartoon reveals that, throughout the scandal, Cleveland managed to cast himself not as victimizer, but as something closer to a victim."³¹ Cleveland's lack of appearance as a predator represents a shift from "the first stories about Halpin [portraying] him as a wolfish womanizer who had satisfied his own desires at the cost of a helpless widow's health and reputation." This cartoon shows a definite shift in the public's perception of Cleveland's scandal just a month and a half before the general election.



Figure 2

Halpin Silenced

While the talk of the scandal overwhelming resolved around Cleveland and his political climb to the presidency, Halpin's side of the story failed to be told. Cleveland had enough political clout to keep Halpin's own voice out of the media, but,

He did allow Halpin's personal life to be made public to the extent that this assisted him. Halpin was an alcoholic, which made Cleveland's decision to take the child away from her an act of rescue. Even Cleveland's refusal to admit the child's paternity worked in his favor, leaving open the possibility that the child wasn't his— which made his sexual relationship with Halpin appear, paradoxically, less damaging. It turned Halpin into a loose woman, possibly a seducer, definitely not marriage material, and certainly neither innocent nor vulnerable.³²

Here Halpin's silence works in Cleveland's favor. Cleveland had more control over what could enter the media strictly based on his support from the Democratic Party. If Cleveland had affairs with other women in the past, those dealings certainly did not reach the media. However, if Halpin was even too close of "friends" with a gentleman it put their relationship, and her virtue, into question.

The name of Halpin's son, Oscar Folsam, especially pulled the issue of the boy's parentage into question because many people believed that Halpin and the adult Oscar Folsam, Cleveland's old law partner and close friend, had an affair together. Halpin knew Folsam's wife from working at the department store, but Halpin claimed "I never spoke a word to that man in my life."³³ Halpin's son came to be named Oscar Folsam not because of an affair she was having with Folsam, but when "the child was Christened, one of his sponsors in baptism was Oscar Folsam; and the infant was called Oscar Folsam Halpin."³⁴ In the fall of 1884, an article written by Charles McCune and released in the *Buffalo Courier* claimed that Cleveland accepted responsibility simply to protect his deceased friend.³⁵ Even Cleveland himself refuted claims that he was paying support just to protect Folsam. In a letter to a friend, Cleveland commented on McCune's article, "now is this man crazy or does he wish to ruin somebody? Is he fool enough to suppose for a moment that if such was the truth (which it is not, so far as the motive for silence is concerned) that I would permit

my dead friend's memory to suffer for my sake?"³⁶ Despite the facts and Cleveland's own reaction, the majority of the public opinion still shifted to see Halpin as a loose woman who had intimate relations with multiple men.

Halpin was also silenced through being committed to a mental institution even though she was not insane. However, this was not uncommon for 'deviant' women of the time. Such was the case with Alice Mitchell, a woman who murdered her closest friend and lover in 1892. However Mitchell was tried for being insane, not for being a murderer, because her lover was a woman.³⁷ Mitchell killed her ex-lover Freda Ward with a razor when Mitchell ran into her one day on the docks. At the time, American society could not comprehend same-sex love, so the jury did not see how it was logical for Mitchell to kill Ward and attributed her actions to insanity. Lisa J. Lindquist, author of "Images of Alice: Gender, Deviancy, and a Love Murder in Memphis" claims, "by murdering Freda Ward, Alice Mitchell transgressed a multitude of boundaries around acceptable middle-class female behavior."³⁸ Although an entirely different kind of case, Halpin's alcoholic behavior differed from what was considered 'acceptable middle-class female behavior,' and resulted in her being sent to an asylum. In September 1884, the *Chicago Daily Tribune* printed an article with a quote from one of the doctors at Providence Asylum where he stated that Halpin clearly was not crazy, and he did not understand why she had truly been brought to the asylum in the first place.³⁹ Even though Halpin was an alcoholic at the time that her son was taken from her, her trip to the asylum is an example of what American society would do with women who presented deviant behavior in the late 1800's.

Cleveland also benefitted from the reality that it was not uncommon for politicians to have sex scandals. Although Cleveland's scandal took place in 1874, it can still be tied to modern day political scandals. One sex scandal Cleveland's can be paralleled to is Dick Morris' sex scandal with the prostitute Sherry Rowlands. In 1996, Morris was Clinton's top adviser, and he was accused of cheating on his wife as well as giving Rowlands some insider information. However, Cleveland's scandal ties into this more modern sex scandal because "as the media coverage progressed, Morris' 'fall' was normalized, taking its place as a demonstration not of a bad apple spoiling

the bunch, but of an American political environment in which good apples, not bad ones, ought to be the surprise.”⁴⁰ The same was true of the 1884 election for Cleveland. Even though he was presented as the sexual predator from first accounts, the public view of his transgression eventually shifted and accepted what had happened before the election. In addition, it helped Cleveland that his competitor had his own private scandal. Like Cleveland, Morris managed to orchestrate his own comeback into the political realm, and “although it began with the tabloid-driven sexual story, in the hands of mainstream political reporting it became a story of politics as usual.”⁴¹ The parallels between Cleveland and Morris show how the comeback of a politician is obtainable if the scandal is handled in the “right” way within the political machine.

Another parallel between the two scandals is that a tabloid broke both scandals. *Star* reported on Morris’ indiscretions, but the tabloids were the only media to cover Rowland’s side. Gamson claims, “the women whose sexuality was for rent were dismissed or further objectified in the storytelling (largely erased from the mainstream media stories... Rowlands [was] regulated to tabloid and pornographic press).”⁴² While Halpin was not a prostitute, she was not a famous woman, and it was therefore deemed unnecessary for her voice to enter the mainstream media. In the same way the prostitutes were ‘erased’ from mainstream media, Halpin did not enter mainstream media unless it was for other people to talk about her. She did not get to truly tell her own side of the story to reputable news sources. Halpin was also objectified in newspaper articles when she was described as a ‘loose woman.’ As Democrats spun the Halpin affair into a story that benefitted Cleveland, Halpin was “possibly the seducer rather than the seduced.”⁴³ However, one exception occurred when the *Chicago Tribune* printed pieces of an affidavit Halpin had written. In it, she defends her honor and claims Cleveland took advantage of her. Halpin also wrote, “the circumstances under which my ruin was accomplished are too revolting on the part of Grover Cleveland to be made public.”⁴⁴ Unfortunately, the majority of the mainstream media must have agreed with Halpin’s point because having her words printed in a paper as reputable as the *Chicago Tribune* was a rarity.

Conclusion

The Halpin Affair reveals how strongly a sex scandal can shape a presidential election. Cleveland was the favored winner for the presidency until the scandal broke. However, Cleveland also proved that one could make a comeback from a sex scandal – even one that included an illegitimate child. Cleveland showed that using honesty was the best policy to get the public back on his side. Despite his instructions to “tell the truth,” though, many details of the Halpin Affair are still unknown. It is unclear if Halpin was actually raped by Cleveland as some early reports stated or if their relationship was consensual. Overwhelmingly, it seems the affair was consensual, but the question of the true patronage of the child is also left open. Cleveland claimed there was a possibility the child was his, but Halpin was also accused of being with multiple men and was said to have only chosen Cleveland as the father because he was the only bachelor she was having intimate relations with. It is entirely possible both Cleveland and Halpin were having relations with various partners, but Cleveland’s acceptance to pay does seem to indicate him as the father. The money trail connected him to Halpin more than any rumors or gossip ever could. It would have been a poor and risky move for Cleveland’s political career to pay Halpin money for the child if he was not the father because of the connection the money created. Although Cleveland was known for his generosity, it seems unlikely he would pay Halpin unless he felt guilty and responsible to help take care of them. Regardless, Cleveland’s financial care for Halpin and Oscar cast him as an honorable man attempting to atone for a mistake in the eyes of the public, and “Democrats explained his sexual indiscretion as a transient weakness– a one-time personal mistake that had been handled honorably.”⁴⁵ Even with Cleveland’s comeback, and Blaine’s own public and private indiscretions, Cleveland only managed to win the presidency with thirty-seven more electoral votes than Blaine. Yet, the public still made it clear they would prefer a president with a private scandal instead of a president with public corruption.

Halpin’s lack of voice also attributed to Cleveland’s presidential victory. Halpin was restricted to the tabloids, and she lacked the power to prove that Cleveland had seduced her or ever promised to marry her. While Cleveland was originally seen as the womanizer when the scandal first broke and was being

spread by most newspapers, Halpin was quickly phased out of reputable papers. Her lack of presence in major newspapers was partially due to her being a woman of no famous standing in the late 19th century. Her lack of presence was also tied to the projection of politicians overall. As could be seen with Morris' case, the public is usually shocked at first by a political sex scandal, but then normalizes it and almost comes to see it as an expected behavior for politicians. Unfortunately, Halpin came to be a victim of that viewpoint. Overall though, the Halpin affair does not have a tragic ending for any involved. Cleveland went on to become the president, Halpin remarried, and Oscar became a doctor.⁴⁶ If nothing else, the Halpin affair set the precedent for how future politicians could handle career threatening sex scandals, and manage to become positive in the public's opinion again.

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John Betjeman's "Baker Street Station Buffet:" The Influence of an Architectural Literati in the fight Against Modern City Planning

Kristen Brady

In the decades after World War II, London experienced one of its most significant periods of social, economic, and structural regrowth since the reconstruction of the city after the fire of 1666.¹ An "economic rejuvenation" brought increasingly more people into the city, and, along with them, the need for more efficient means of transportation and housing.² London felt keenly the burgeoning thrusts of change within its bounds, but its growth could hardly be controlled, and much less contained. As it became progressively obvious that London's design needed a reevaluation to bring it to the standards of its inhabitants (and in competitive comparison with other metropolises), the questions about how to do so arose.

Plans of revitalization sprung up in every direction: *The County of London Plan*, *The Report of the Preliminary Draft Proposals for Post War Reconstruction in the City of London*, *The Greater London Plan*. Collections of essays were published, such as *London of the Future*, which explored London's utopian dreams from garden cities to high rises. London societies and government organizations found themselves at no shortage of ideas, but initially failed to provide the public with details, information, and opportunities to voice their opinions.³ This led to a retaliation through media, film, and literary outlets, allowing audiences a chance to hear what was happening in their city—and even take on an opinion. Rather quickly, the best method of revitalization became a question in political debates. On one side of the debate were engineers and government; on the other were intellectuals and the literati. A 1946 documentary called *The Way We Live* acknowledged in the introductory sequence that James Paton Watson and Professor Patrick Abercrombie might either be

"the heroes or villains [of the restructuring in Plymouth], according to your point of view."⁴ This exemplifies that, no matter the efforts to create a unified plan for London, contention was inevitable. While there were numerous personages pitting their soapboxes against the "destructive plans," the most well executed and informative are the works of Sir John Betjeman. His piece entitled "Baker Street Station Buffet" both symbolizes and epitomizes the clash between architectural literati and the modern visions of city planners.

Hailing from Highgate, London, Betjeman proved himself to be a self-made phenomenon after making contributions to film, architecture, and poetry without ever receiving his degree, although he studied at both Marlborough College and Oxford.⁵ His writings were highly regarded and successful, earning himself the title of Poet Laureate as well as a knighthood. His publications are extensive, ranging from prose in *Ghastly Good Taste* to poignant verse in *A Few Late Chrysanthemums*, the anthology in which "Baker Street Station Buffet" was published. Moving from his literary success, he also found radio broadcasts, film, and television to be beneficial platforms for his opinions. It was his innovative filmmaking techniques in pieces such as *Metroland* that allowed him wider access to London and ultimately helped popularize his criticisms on modern city planning. Mark Tewder-Jones claimed that Betjeman's bold opinions acted as an alternative to those of professional city planners, arguing that his criticisms became truly political:

Betjeman turned many of his television broadcasts into propaganda statements against those issues he perceived as threatening Britain and against those in charge of

restructuring the state. He used film to juxtapose the official expertise from the planners and government, a particular film style of the period, with his own perspectives that he genuinely believed to be the ‘voice of the people’.⁶

Whether or not he wished to get involved in the politics of city planning (and it seems as though he did), Betjeman and his works themselves became patrons and symbols of many organizations fighting for the restoration, rehabilitation, and prevention of destruction of Georgian, Regency, Victorian, and Edwardian history and architecture. In a tribute upon his death, the Thirties Society published a piece in their journal about the loss of an ally who fought alongside them against the “destruction or vulgarization” of historic buildings.⁷ They described him as a “friend of the unfashionable and wrongfully rejected.”⁸ Although perhaps exaggerated, their description was not necessarily incorrect. With the rise of modern architecture, electricity, railways, and motorcars, the fight against progression was not in concordance with what many of his contemporaries believed.

Published in 1954, *A Few Late Chrysanthemums* contains several pieces of verse, which express his sentiments of love for the countryside, and disdain for the city planning which encroaches upon its tranquility. Poems such as “Baker Street Station Buffet” and “The Dear Old Village,” though very clearly show Betjeman’s criticism, are far less harsh than some of his other pieces. In his film *Bird’s Eye View, An Englishman’s Home* several years later in 1969, he took on a heavily sarcastic tone. A piece of verse featured in the film begins with him openly mocking the city planning: “Oh, the planners did their best. Oh yes, they gave it all a lot of thought.”⁹

Although “Baker Street Station Buffet” resonates strongly with his critical themes, not all of the verses in *A Few Late Chrysanthemums* are architecturally or historically focused and thus still digestible for the average literary reader. As pointed out by Thomas Peter, Betjeman had an eye for detail that allowed him to create scenes based off the smallest of characteristics, like Baker Street’s old electrolier, whether his intention was to express it negatively or positively.¹⁰ The chopped trees and murmuring firs of Baker Street can be taken at face value for their simple nostalgia, but, when put into context of Betjeman’s involvement and other works; you can glean the politics of city planning through its “worn memorial.”

“Baker Street Station Buffet” certainly memorializes the careful beauty and excitement of new electricity and progress and its sour slide into hostility. Betjeman sets the scene of likely an Edwardian Era individual whose parents lived in one of the small neighboring London country towns. The tone starts off lighthearted and wistful, describing the electrolier and its installation with “radiant hope.” Old fashioned streets lined with trees, stained-glass windmills, and pots of tea fill the first stanza, and the early electric feels distant as we follow a couple on a train into London, watching the villas and green slip away. What is portrayed to be a happy trip to food stalls at Farringdon and shopping on Oxford Street with its hydraulic lifts, which he even describes specifically as “safe,” swiftly changes tone in the last stanza. Although they met up “beneath the hearts of this electrolier” and return home via the first non-stop train to Willesden Green, the very first line of the next stanza is “Cancer has killed him. Heart is killing her.” Their loves and hopes have flurried away with their long-gone country villa, where now stands a theater with flashing lights. Betjeman deftly makes his readers feel the initial excitement and love for progress and modernity before revealing to them that its happy glow and rising opportunities are a ruse, and ultimately will lead to the destruction of their homes—leaving what once was exquisite and familiar as only worn memorials.

A writer from the *Thirties Society Journal* emphasized that Betjeman’s reliability lay primarily within his “sympathetic understanding of inter-war suburbs and of the people who lived in them...he did more to engender a serious interest in the diversity and peculiarity of suburbia than any writer or historian.”¹¹ His opinions may have been harsh on the occasion, but his ability to create prose and verse with the most seemingly negligible of details (“Of copper, beaten by Bromsgrove Guild.”) is identifiable and relatable to the public, allowing him to rally the community against the destruction of their communal history.

As a symbol of the fight against modern city planning that bore its teeth into the rich history and countryside of London’s satellite cities, “Baker Street Station Buffet” is a poem that stood its ground in the larger political controversy. The desire to retain London’s history, in the eyes of much of the public, clashed with “the ascendancy of experts and professionals who, the people were constantly reminded, ‘knew best’.”¹² Betjeman became the spokesperson for the anxieties that London would be “leveled down”¹³ by the loss of its vast cultural styles and differences. Yet Betjeman was not the only man with concerns over what modernity meant for

London. Gilbert mentions that perhaps parts of the past are not worth preserving, but quotes Lord Crewe's concern that this leveling of London would lead it to be "neither modern nor picturesque."¹⁴

Attempts to keep up with other modern cities, such as Paris, Zemgulys has argued, spurred on the government to the demolition of some of London's historical buildings.¹⁵ Not only was Postwar London affecting the rest of Britain—it has more than once been described as an octopus reaching out to strangle every settlement and city within its reach¹⁶—but it had to keep up with the rest of the world and act as a center for international communications and economics, all the while accommodating to its growing size and culture. In a city that sprung forward both unregulated and unplanned, the process of retracing their steps to reorganize and plan the entire city was proving to be a challenge, especially with activists discovering the power of news and media outlets. It is impossible to say whether the destruction of history inside the city or the encroachment of London into the nearby suburbs was worse, but Betjeman addresses both with solemn respect and distress. Peter sets the scene quite accurately for Betjeman's "The Dear Old Village" by pointing out that the quiet country towns were growing less and less quiet and increasingly more congested¹⁷ with citizens who had little desire for the country, but were being driven out from the city due to population, pricing, and slum removal. Many of his poems are set in these little intruded-upon settlements and exhibit his displeasure with what the blocks of concrete have done to the countryside. Even at the front of the war, in his poem "Slough," he is severe in his condemnation:

Come friendly bombs and fall on Slough!
It isn't fit for humans now,
There isn't grass to graze a cow.
Swarm over, Death!¹⁸

Betjeman's works, both in literature and in filmography, have proved themselves to be vital to the study of 20th century London's history. He manifests, for one of the first times in history, the important role televised and broadcasted journalism (in conjunction with poetry) played in the attempts of saving Britain's history. Media gave the public a voice when the UK did very little to actually confer with Londoners,¹⁹ and Betjeman was one of the first personages to discover the power of "transposing prose and poetry into a filmic format."²⁰ His significance to London's history has been recognized both in modern and contemporary times. When *A Few Late Chrysanthemums* was first published, his peers and contemporaries—even the ones that did not entirely agree with him—recognized his

work in the underrepresented and under-appreciated. In a review when the anthology was first published, John Arlott acknowledged that:

He saved much from that output which our age had lumped together and dismissed as ugly or in a fashionable minority collected as comically odd. Indeed, for many a jettisoned Victorian artist and craftsman, he became a new voice of posterity, rediscovering and displaying neglected merits.²¹

"Baker Street Station Buffet" then offers a modern historian the unique perspective of an intellectual and architectural minority. In a time of copious publications for utopian London, high rises, and garden suburbs, Betjeman represented not only a minority, but the overall fears which accompany any amount of great change or reworking of a city. London was (and still is) progressing and changing structurally and culturally, and, in the words of Conway, "none of us can stop it."²²

While Betjeman may not have offered any real solutions to the problem of growth in London, he played the important role of reminding the organizations at the time that preserving history was necessary and healthy, all the while acting as an intermediary between the public and the government. In an era of "celebrated new architecture, improved housing conditions, faster transport and economic growth," this architectural literati worked to ease the agitation felt on the traditional, old fashioned, and familiar ways of life.²³ Without works like "Baker Street Station Buffet" to commemorate the past, some of it may have been lost.

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¹⁹ Tewder-Jones, "'Oh, the planners did their best,'" 390.

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²² Gilbert, "London of the Future," 103.

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¹¹ "Sir John Betjeman," 1.

¹² Tewder-Jones, "'Oh, the planners did their best,'" 394.

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¹⁴ David Gilbert, "London of the Future: The Metropolis Reimagined after the Great War," in *Journal of British Studies* Vol. 43, No. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, January 2004), 112.

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How the Afghan Opium Business Grew into a multi-billion dollar enterprise from 1992-2008

Michael Resko

When Americans imagine what the country of Afghanistan looks like, they create an image of a desolate arid land scattered with some dried shrubs. Although this may be accurate for some areas in Afghanistan, a significant part of Afghanistan is a beautiful field of crimson, pink, and white poppy flowers that stretch as far as the eye can see. To an average person, this is a picture of absolute beauty, to an Afghani, this looks like a bountiful harvest, to the United States, United Kingdom, and United Nations officials, and it is a monument to all their failures in Afghanistan. Every May, Afghan farmers head into the field and harvest a light brown to black damp paste, called opium from the poppy pod. This opium is then given to a local warlord or insurgent group, in exchange for enough money to feed the farmer's family, and a year's worth of protection against rape, kidnapping, or death. This is the opium business in Afghanistan, and there is nothing the combined force of the US, UK, NATO and UN can do to stop it. This is exacerbated by the fact that the US allowed the opium business to thrive in the first place.

Throughout history, opium has been one of the most popular narcotic drugs in the world. Dating all the way back to 3400 BCE, opium was used as a painkiller, antidepressant, sleeping aid, and stress reliever amongst its many uses. A favorite of pre-modern doctors, opium has been called the "king of narcotics" and "God's medicine" due to the soothing feelings of peaceful and painless

sleep that the drug provides. Today, Opium is used in morphine, heroin and various cannabis concoctions.¹ Despite the wide effective uses, opium is highly dangerous. The drug can be used professionally in hospitals through controlled and highly monitored doses as morphine, however prolonged uses makes the body resistant to the sedative and soothing effects. This leaves the user with an insatiable craving for higher doses and more powerful opiates like heroin to receive the desired effect. Heroin overdoses result in hypoxia forcing the user into a coma while the body shuts down from lack of oxygen in the lungs and brain. With such dangerous and addictive applications, heroin and other opiates are illegal in many countries around the world with the only exception being morphine in controlled doses.² Though many countries ban the illegal production and sale of heroin and opium, countries like Afghanistan, Mexico, Myanmar, Columbia and Laos all have large opium business and supply the world with illegal heroin.

Afghanistan became an opium growing country during the 1980s when the Mujahedeen first began cultivating opium to fund their campaign against the Soviet Union. However, only an average of 200 metric tons were being produced during the 1980s.³ The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) World Drug Reports shows that it was only after the Soviet retreat that Afghanistan became the world leading producer of opium,

contributing to an annual average of 75% of the world's opium supply by the early 1990s.⁴ In 1994 the UNODC began annual ground surveys on the cultivation and production of Afghan opium. Therefore, despite being the leading anti-drug agency recording Afghanistan's drug activity, it is important to note that before 1994 all figures are estimates and account for only a portion of total opium production.⁵ The reason the UNODC started its surveys in 1994 and not in the 1980s was because various American intelligence agencies like the ISI and CIA kept international anti-narcotic agencies out of Afghanistan until after the Mujahedeen defeated the Soviets. In the 1980s, the US Drugs Enforcement Administration (DEA) had identified 40 major heroin collectives in Pakistan, including some headed by top government officials, none of which were sanctioned at the time. The CIA and ISI, did not want the world to see the drug links between the "heroic" Mujahedeen, Pakistani officials, and the drug traffickers. Several of the seventeen DEA officials in Pakistan had received suspicions orders to relocate and at least one was forced to resign for unspecified reasons. Despite these suspicious incidents some documents show the CIA's and ISI's guilt. In 1986, Major Zahooruddin Afridi was caught shipping 220 kg of high-grade heroin within Pakistan, the largest drug interception in Pakistan's history. Two months later, Air force Officer Flight Lieutenant Khalilur Rehman was caught on the same route with another 220 kg of heroin. He confessed this was his fifth mission. The US street price of the 440 kg confiscated from these two high-ranked military personnel was about \$600 million, which corresponds to the amount the US gave Pakistan that year.⁶

In 1992 after General Asif Nawaz appointment as Army Chief a vigorous campaign to root out the narcotics mafia within the Pakistani Armed Forces began.⁷ In 1992, the UNODC estimated that Afghanistan had cultivated 49,000 hectares (ha) of opium and would increase by 10,000 ha annually until 1994 when it reached 71,000 ha.⁸ Coincidentally, the UNODC's ground surveys had begun the same year the Taliban had taken Kandahar, the first province to fall to the Taliban

and a year after the drug lords were rooted out of Pakistan's National Assembly.⁹

The civil war that began after the Soviet retreat decimated Afghanistan's infrastructure causing its economy to rely almost solely upon agriculture. With Afghanistan's infrastructure and economy already weak because of the Soviets, the Mujahedeen sold anything of value to support their internal conflict with rival warlords; factory equipment, road rollers, telephone poles and wires, bricks, and they even sold young children into slavery.¹⁰ This decimated Afghanistan's economy and prevented any hope of creating non-agricultural jobs. With only agriculture to keep the economy afloat, many farmers and warlords resorted to cultivating opium as their primary crop lacking the equipment or seed to produce other crops. In addition, much of the farmable land became giant minefields during the civil war. This civil war had also made any chance of trade impossible, as nearly as every convoy of shipment from neighboring countries would be raided.

For Pakistan, this was an economic catastrophe and the government needed to find a solution to open trade routes in Afghanistan in order to trade goods with the Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.¹¹ They saw an opportunity to achieve this by hiring the Taliban, which at this time were living around the Afghan-Pakistan boarder in refugee camps and represented a highly radical form of Pakistan's conservative right-winged political party, the Jamiat-e Ulema-I Islam. In 1995 the Pakistani government hired the Taliban in protecting transport convoys going through Afghanistan. At this time, the Taliban had not yet gained a reputation for violence but were still capable of protecting the Pakistani convoy against an onslaught of Mujahedeen soldiers. Having proven their potential in protecting the trade routes, the Pakistani government increased its support to the Taliban by providing millions of dollars in financing and supplies to ensure the continued relationship with the Taliban and security to the trade routes.¹²

This was the beginning of the Taliban's campaign to end the civil war and become the de facto

leader of Afghanistan. The Taliban decided to remove the Warlords from power and restore security and peace in the war torn country of Afghanistan. Right after the Taliban first took Kandahar, they declared that they would eliminate all drugs, a declaration that made some US diplomats ally with the Taliban and to immediately offer support. However, a few months later, the Taliban realized they desperately needed the income from the poppies and lifted the ban for farmers. The Taliban had no other means to fund their regime. "We cannot be more grateful to the Taliban," said Wali Jan, a toothless elderly farmer as he weeded his fields, "The Taliban have brought us security so we can grow our poppy in peace." Wali's farm could produce 45 kilograms of opium per year and earned \$1,300 from it. Although Wali knew the drug dealers would be able to sell his opium for fifty times more than what he received, he needed the money to feed his 14 children.

The Taliban allowed Pakistan to establish trade routes through Afghanistan. However, the US was still wary of Pakistan's support of the Taliban due to "Taliban's brand of Islam... might infect Pakistan."¹³ While the Pakistani government continued to foster relations with the Taliban, the transport mafia in Quetta and Chaman assured the Taliban that if they secured the trade routes for smuggling convoys the mafia would pay handsomely. Many members of the Quetta transport mafia were from the same Pashtun tribes as that of the Taliban. The Taliban were paid a large sum for the protection smuggling routes and as more and more provinces fell to the Taliban, more and more revenue began flooding in from drug smugglers. In 1995, the Taliban had been paid \$150,000 from the smuggling trucks going through Afghanistan. The transport mafia's revenue increased dramatically as their annual turnover was \$2.5 billion in 1995.¹⁴ Although the Taliban was not the mastermind behind the opium trade, it began a mutually beneficial partnership between the Taliban and the transport mafia, which would serve as the key component in the growth of the Afghan opium business.

Smuggling fees were not the only profit the Taliban made while they took over Afghanistan. With the Taliban seizing control of each province throughout the mid to late-1990s they had gained control of the poppy fields and their respective profits. On the surface, the Taliban preached eradication of opium however the condemnation stayed within the borders of Afghanistan. Abdul Rashid, head of the Taliban's

counter-narcotics force explained, "Opium is permissible, because it is consumed by *Kafirs* [infidels] in the west and not by Afghans."¹⁵ The Taliban also understood that opium was a major part of the country's economy and if they banned opium production the people would retaliate.¹⁶ For the next four years, the Taliban's relationship with the mafia and the local drug traffickers in Afghanistan kept the Taliban's policy against opium from gaining momentum as a steady flow of around 2,500 metric tons of opium per year were produced.¹⁷ After the Taliban took Kabul in 1996, the annual production yield rose another 500 metric tons. Drug dealers became a powerful force in Afghanistan during this time while Afghanistan became the top producer of opium throughout South-West Asia. In addition to the 2,500 metric tons of opium, the US and Pakistani government were taking out Afghanistan's opium competitors. From 1989-1999, the US would give Pakistan \$100 million to curtail their opium production. In 1997, opium production in Pakistan fell to only 24 metric tons and stayed under 10 metric tons until 2002.¹⁸

The rise of Taliban and the opium trade stirred up increased activity in the US government. US Federal Narcotics Agents based in Pakistan privately expressed strong hopes that the Taliban would bring an end to the booming opium trade.¹⁹ However, the opium business continued to grow each year because despite the reduction in Pakistan's opium yield, Afghanistan was still producing around 2,500 metric tons of opium each year. In February 1998, the Clinton administration accused Pakistan of failing to control the export of heroin from Afghanistan through their borders. However, the Clinton administration was unaware of the Taliban's smuggling routes that stretched throughout Southwest Asia.²⁰ During this time, the Taliban recorded revenues of \$20 million from the opium tax alone. Total profits of the opium business were distributed between Afghanistan's and Pakistan's dealers, the Transport Mafia, and the heroin labs along the Golden Crescent. In addition about 1 million Afghan farmers received over \$100 million each year from the opium trade, less than 1% of the total profits that the European dealers made from the heroin.²¹

Afghanistan and its opium business would go through a massive shift beginning in 1999 and 2000. The Taliban had taken over nearly all of Afghanistan while relegating the Northern Alliance to the province

of Badakhshan. The UNODC Drug Reports showed Afghanistan's opium yield reached up to 4,565 metric tons from the harvest season of 1999.²² The Taliban, Afghan drug lords, and farmers were receiving billions of dollars in revenue. The United Nations began to panic as illicit heroin from Afghanistan's opium business began appearing in various European countries, notably the United Kingdom. In March 1999, the UNODC successfully convened a meeting in Pakistan with high-ranking Taliban officials and Islamabad drug liaison officers. The Taliban assured the UN that they would take significant steps toward the total elimination of poppy opium. In exchange, the UN would send \$25 million each year for ten years, and help the Taliban integrate acceptable alternative cash crops to subsidize Afghanistan's economy. The meeting resulted in a positive relationship between the Taliban and the UNODC.²³

In July 2000, the Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar issued a *Fatwa* stating that poppy cultivation and opium production violated fundamental Islamic traditions. Any overt objection against the degree would reflect poorly upon the religious leadership of Mullah Omar and the strength of Taliban rule. Therefore, with personal reputation and international political favor at stake, there was a strong incentive for the Taliban to restrict poppy cultivation and opium production.²⁴ To the pleasure of world leaders, Afghanistan's annual opium yield dropped to 185 metric tons of opium in 2001 from 3,276 metric tons in 2000.²⁵ The Taliban had used three principal techniques to reduce to production of opium: the threat of Taliban-style punishment, the close local monitoring and eradication of continued poppy farming, and the public punishment of transgressors. These methods allowed the Taliban reduce the world's opium supply by 65% within one year. Also in 2000, the Taliban was aided by a drought that helped to eradicate remaining poppy fields. To many devout Afghans the drought was perceived as a gift from Allah to help the Taliban eradicate poppy fields and opium production. Afghans considered the drought redemption for their sins of producing or imbibing intoxicants. Yet, there was a different theory for the eradication of poppy fields that had nothing to do with a drought. The BBC had reported that the *Pleospora* fungus, an effective killer of the opium poppy, had finally been developed. Development of the *Pleospora* fungus began in Uzbekistan under the support of the

UN with funding from the British. At the time matters of the legality and environmental impact of this biological warfare were unsure. The credibility of this theory is quite strong due to Afghan farmers complaining that their poppies were mysteriously dying, rather than slowly from prolonged drought.²⁶

By spring of 2001, the Taliban had destroyed their largest source of income, and caused widespread anger amongst Afghanistan's population along with members of the opium industry across Southwest Asia. Thousands of farmers and drug traffickers sought refuge in the Northern Alliance, the only remaining source of poppy fields in Afghanistan. However, the Taliban decimated much of the Northern Alliance's territory. The Taliban had put their hopes in the UN and their allies to support them in their time of need. Still, the UN, UK, and US were hesitant due to some UNODC's findings. These findings stated that despite Afghanistan's decline in poppy fields and further opium production, the Taliban had refused to destroy the major stockpile of opium they had in their possession. For the Taliban, this was most likely in order to have some source of income outside the shaky revenues from the UN. Whatever the reason, after the attack on the World Trade Center in New York any ties between the UN and the Taliban were swiftly severed as blame was placed on the Taliban. Whether the Taliban knew about the attacks or not, they certainly were not prepared when the US as well as dozens of other countries initiated Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7th 2001.²⁷

Ironically, Operation Enduring Freedom was the best thing to happen for the Opium industry since the CIA and ISI shrouded the Mujahedeen's poppy fields from the DEA's radar. With little support from local Afghans the Taliban struggled to fight invading forces. President Bush's speech on Operation Enduring Freedom detailed the Afghani people as being "Oppressed people, and that they will know the generosity of America".²⁸ Two months later, the Taliban fell to American and other allied forces known as the Coalition. The Taliban retreated to Kandahar and northern Pakistan where they would sell their opium stockpile to begin their insurgency against the Coalition and Afghan forces. As a result of the Taliban's reduction in opium supply, raw opium prices were inflated to the point where 1kg of raw opium sold for \$700.²⁹ The Taliban was able to sell their 3,000 metric tons of opium supply for \$2.1 billion.

Although Afghanistan's illicit economy and the US' invasion of Al Qaeda bases were not directly connected; they did play an indirect role in the ability for the US and NATO forces to work efficiently throughout the invasion.³⁰ In 2002, the UNODC and UK began to worry as Afghanistan's annual opium yield rose to 3,400 metric tons. This matched pre-Taliban yields in 2000 with 3,276 metric tons.³¹ Donald Rumsfeld's Lead Nation Strategy assigned the anti-narcotics taskforce to British agencies. MI5, MI6 and the UNODC immediately began taking action against the growing opium industry in Afghanistan. However, this growth was inevitable for three reasons. The first was that the interim Afghan government, supported by the US, and could not enforce the ban in the rural provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, and Nangarhar where most of Afghanistan's opium was produced.³² Secondly, the US, who assisted the interim Afghan government, decided to support various ethnic leaders and former Mujahedeen warlords, all of who profited from the opium industry.³³ The third and the most frustrating reason was that the US shifted resources to Iraq. Donald Rumsfeld and other conservative American officials argued that the economic resources needed to stop the drug trade in Afghanistan would detract too much from efforts against Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups.³⁴

While the US focused on Iraq, the remaining NATO forces in Afghanistan struggled to quell the ever-growing opium trade, destroying any Coalition progress along the way. The CIA reported approximately three million refugees returned to Afghanistan after being exiled by the Taliban. Approximately one million of those refugees had heroin or opium addictions. The Taliban had outlawed the use of opium and heroin even before the crackdown in 2000-2001 but with the Taliban gone there was an obvious increase in heroin labs around the Afghan border.³⁵ In 2003, the annual opium yield rose to 3,600 metric tons, which is 200 metric tons more than the previous year.³⁶

Another issue was the amount of corruption within Afghanistan's own anti-narcotics agency. Afghan units, trained by DynCorp and the British Government would initially go out to various villages and cut down poppy fields with sticks. But, the Afghan anti-narcotics units would be bribed by large and politically powerful drug lords to only cut the poppy fields of their competitors. This rose suspicions of close ties between

the Afghan government and opium drug lords.³⁷ In 2004 and 2005 the opium yield exceeded 4,000 metric tons, levels not previously reached since 1999.³⁸ It was during this time that the Taliban gained back significant territory lost to the Coalition. They intimidated and coerced isolated villages into supporting the Taliban due to the lack of military support from the Coalition aided government.

From 2006 to 2008: Afghanistan's annual opium yield increased 2000 metric tons each year. This was due to the radicalization of the Taliban and their need to fund growing operations. In 2010, Afghanistan celebrated 30 years of poppy based agriculture.³⁹ To conclude, the Afghan opium business grew into a multibillion-dollar from 1992-2008 primarily due to the US using the opium business as a bridge with the Mujahedeen warlords to take out the Soviets in the 1980s and the Taliban in the 2000s.

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Appendix

Chart 1:

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Chart 2:

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Chart 3:

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Embedded and Unilateral Journalists: How their Access to Sources Affected their Framing During the 2003 Iraq War

Gil Rutledge

Background for Media Involvement in War

The government took a completely different type of approach for how media would be permitted to show the 2003 Iraq War when it introduced its program to “embed” journalists in military units. The Department of Defense allowed over 600 journalists to embed with military units to “live, work and travel as part of the units with which they are embedded to facilitate maximum, in- depth coverage of U.S forces in combat and related operations.”¹ The Department of Defense defined embedded reporters as “a media representative remaining with a unit on an extended basis.”² On the other hand, unilateral reporters were any war correspondent that was not associated with a military unit. They remained behind the lines of fighting or stayed in one main city. In the case of the Iraq War, many unilateral journalists remained in Baghdad. The Iraq War provides an opportunity to examine writings from two groups of U.S journalist that were in completely different situations for their positioning during the war. Although their reporting covered the same time period, and sometimes the same events, differences in writing emerged from the two groups. Due to the Iraq War being the first time the United States used the embed program, it is important and necessary to examine how embedded journalists’ writings were framed. Many critics argued that embedded journalists would become biased due to their involvement with their units and that would affect the way they framed their articles. Throughout the course of this essay, it will become apparent that embedded journalists were definitely biased towards

their military units. The research of this study will show that how embedded and unilateral journalists framed their articles based more on the access they had to sources during a certain period of the war and less on their personal bias.

Right away, the embed program had arguments from supporters and critics. Supporters argued that the program “offered a first-hand, up close view of combat missions that was unavailable to unilateral (unembedded) or pool reporters.”³ In this sense, reporters would have the opportunity to report war in a way journalists had never been able to previously. Reasons for the Department of Defense to initiate the program still remain unclear, but Bryan Whitman, deputy assistant secretary of defense for media operations, claimed that the embedded program would allow the truth of what was happening in the fighting overseas to stand at the forefront and was completely necessary “‘because Saddam Hussein was a practiced liar, a master of deception’ and the only way to defend against that is through ‘objective third-party accounts from professional observers.’”⁴ Critics argued that the Pentagon’s “decision to facilitate journalists’ access to combat operations may have been motivated by a conscious attempt to slant news coverage” towards support for the war.⁵ Additionally, although the program would provide journalists with an unprecedented opportunity to see military operations up close, critics also claimed journalists would be unable to remain objective in their writings. Overwhelmingly, critics became concerned that journalists would become too biased to keep any kind

of objectivity due to the close relationship journalists formed with soldiers during life and death situations as the units traveled through Iraq. However, journalists' access to sources affected how they framed their articles more than bias did.

What Is Framing?

Framing of an event is a powerful tool journalists possess because "facts remain neutral until framed; thus how the press frames an issue or event will affect public understanding of that issue or event."⁶ As a whole, framing includes the selection and interpretation of "some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in a communication text" so that text then promotes "a particular problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described"⁷ Personal bias from embedded journalists would influence how they constructed their stories, but if journalists only had access to certain sources in the first place, then it is reasonable to see how journalists' articles became slanted based upon their location during the course of the war.

Journalistic Norms in an Ever Changing World

In order to understand the importance and the extent for which sources come to shape how journalists frame their stories, it is necessary to provide some background on journalistic norms and expectations. Althaus et al. found that the news production process, objectivity norm, timeliness norm, and source power all play a part in how a story comes to be framed.⁸ The news production process refers to what areas a newspaper sends journalists to gather information. The objectivity norm "requires that journalists present 'both' sides of a story."⁹ The timeliness norm refers to journalists' constant need to present the most recent information. Lastly, source power entails how much attention journalists pay to a certain type of source and how prominent they make that source in their story.¹⁰ For the purposes of this essay, I will mainly focus on source power and sourcing

Journalists have a tendency to rely on sources that are "legitimate" or "official."¹¹ This tendency ties into Lance Bennett's theory about journalists "indexing" their sources. Bennett's indexing theory claims journalists will include voices in their stories that tend to stick to the ideas in a debate that reflect

the mainstream viewpoints of the government.¹² However, presenting "official" voices during a time of war becomes more difficult because journalists may not have access to those official voices. Instead, the embedded journalists had access to the higher-ranking generals of their units, whereas unilateral journalists had access to Iraqi government officials. Yet, each group of journalists would be forced to deviate away from "official" voices and rely on normal citizens or soldiers to provide enough substance for their stories.

In general, it is also a journalist norm for reporters to attempt to remain objective by not using themselves as a source and relies on other people's viewpoints of an event instead.

The dependence of reporters on official sources is so great that ... 'even when the journalist is in a position to observe an event directly, he remains reluctant to offer interpretations of his own, preferring instead to rely on his news sources. For the reporter, in short, most news is not what has happened, but what someone says has happened.'¹³

Sources make up the backbone of every journalist's story, and "dependence on sources goes beyond the need to have someone to quote; it is one of the most ingrained features of modern journalism."¹⁴ Sources become the focal point that journalists shape the rest of their story around. Since sources become this focal point, sources become a more important factor in how a journalist will frame their article than personal bias would. Due to previous research, it becomes a conceived notion that war correspondents will be biased in their writings.

The Embedded "In Group"

As journalists joined their units, they were faced with a certain level of conformity. Journalists could not afford to ignore commands because they were forced into numerous life or death situations. As a result, the journalists became 'encultured.' Enculturation is the "process in which the members of an organization 'acquire the social knowledge and skills necessary to behave as component members.'"¹⁵ It became practically impossible for journalists to avoid some kind of bias as they survived combat situations with their units. More so, embedded journalists could not remain objective because they felt indebted to

soldiers for saving their lives. Therefore “it is the general force of social cohesion that pressures the reporter to not report negative things on the people he is living with and depending on for protection.”¹⁶ In essence, journalists embedded both in a military unit and its culture: the two are virtually inseparable. The process of enculturation in combat conditions ensures that, to some degree, embedded journalists will be affected by a military unit’s values, including: shared meaning, shared understanding, and shared sense making.¹⁷ While the government itself was not censoring journalists’ writings, reporters began to engage in a type of self- censorship.¹⁸ In addition to being encultured, journalists also had to fight feelings of belonging to an “in group” in order to remain objective.

Journalists not only relied on soldiers for protect, but they also looked to them for interpersonal communication during their time together throughout the war. For this reason, it benefitted journalists to become a part of the “in group” in this social context. This group affiliation provided a sense of worth, social value, and belonging for individuals who join this “in-group.”¹⁹ As a result, journalists formed an intergroup bias. Intergroup bias “refers to the way in which members of competing groups tend to show favor toward their own group rather than favoring members of another group. This behavior can take place as either in-group favoritism or outgroup derogation.”

²⁰ The form of activity the group engages in also matters because “the more competitive the activity, the more likely intergroup bias is to persist, and the more likely members of the groups are to show in-group favoritism.”²¹ There is not a more competitive activity than war where winning equals surviving and losing equals death. Anyone who was not a part of the unit would be perceived as the “outgroup” and would never be able to completely understand decisions the soldiers made based upon past experiences or the emotions they were feeling in a specific situation. With this thinking in place, it certainly makes logical sense that journalists would not want to report negatively on the soldiers in their units.

Meet the Journalists

The research for this project was conducted from looking at four war correspondents: Anthony Shadid, Steven Lee Myers, John F. Burns, and Dexter

Filkins. Filkins and Myers were both embedded journalists. Filkins traveled with the First Marine Division and Myers traveled with the Third Infantry Division, while Shadid and Burns were unilateral reporters. Only their articles from the *New York Times* or the *Washington Post* were chosen so differences in newspapers would not be a factor in researching the overall framing of the articles.

The time period examined for this study began March 20, 2003 and ended July 31, 2003. This four month time span was then broken down into four phases: the initial invasion (March 20–March 25), the battle of Baghdad (April 6th– April 11th), Bush’s claim of “Mission Accomplished” and the end of major combat operations (April 21th– May 3rd), and a continuation of fighting and the beginnings of insurgency (throughout all of June and July). The phases were broken down in this way to focus on major events occurring.

Phase I: Life in Baghdad- Burns and Shadid’s First Five Days of War

Both Burns and Shadid were stationed in Baghdad during the beginning course of the war. Burns and Shadid do not use any troops as sources during this time period because the American military soldiers have not yet reached Baghdad, but Baghdad is being bombed relentlessly in the first few days of the war by Allied forces. The unilateral journalists stationed in Baghdad focused on how the Iraqi government responded to American attacks. Due to these journalists’ location and their access to televisions, they reported on what the Iraqi government was putting on the air. On March 20th, when the United States’ invasion began, Hussein aired a television broadcast where he claimed “‘ God willing, we will take them to the limit where they lose their patience and any hope to achieve what they have planned and what the Zionist criminals have pushed them to do.’”²² However, after a U.S assassination attempt on Saddam, he appeared in another broadcast, yet was clearly more shaken this time. Burns observed that “the attacks appeared to have taken a toll on Mr. Hussein, whose somewhat disordered appearance on television shortly after the first raid left one Iraqi with the feeling that his leader had, as he put it, been exposed to a sudden, shocking blast of reality.”²³ Despite this more scattered showing from Hussein, the Iraqi government tended to only broadcast confident messages to convince the

Iraqi people to fight against the invading Americans. As American forces were slowed more than what initial U.S. officials had expected, Shadid reported “Hussein’s government emerged emboldened Sunday and claimed that its carefully laid plans to create a quagmire for U.S. forces were succeeding”²⁴ Burns also commented that “officials who had worried privately about a possible collapse of authority began talking as if the capture of the city could be held off for weeks or even months.”

²⁵ Iraqi officials were even welcoming the assault on Baghdad because they believed that the Americans would face a fierce battle within the city. “The Iraqi units, in holding out for days against British troops in at least some districts of [Umm Qasr], appears to make Baghdad’s leaders feel that the strategy could be the template for the fighting in Baghdad.”²⁶ Vice- President Taha Yassin Ramadan stated, “they are roaming in the desert, and in fact, we have allowed them to roam the desert. I tell you, we wish and beg that they come to Baghdad so that we will teach a lesson to this evil administration and all who cooperate with it.”²⁷ Even as Burns and Shadid reported the government’s confident claims that Baghdad would not fall without a bloody fight, they juxtaposed those claims with the tangible fears and doubts of Baghdad residents.

As the Iraq government attempt to espouse confidence despite airstrikes on the city, both Burns and Shadid observed the fear of the Iraqi people. As airstrikes hit the city, “a deep-rooted fear was palpable, a fear of being obliterated in an Armageddon deployed by the world’s greatest military power.”²⁸ Part of Iraqi’s fear was due to a lack of defensive preparations and “even in the heart of the government quarter...the most visible defenses have been the shoulder high, sandbagged bunkers that have sprung up at traffic intersections.”²⁹ The Iraqi government lacked the necessary weapons to stop U.S. missiles and protect Baghdad citizens. Even though the precision missiles usually hit their intended targets, not every missile was perfect. Missiles could hit civilian neighborhoods even if the neighborhood was not located near a military or government site. Such was the case with Adhimiya, a lower class neighborhood that was hit by a missile on the fifth day of the war.³⁰ At least three people died while an additional four people were wounded.³¹ Many Iraqis were infuriated by the

airstrikes but were also aware that they could not stop them or avoid them. One Iraqi citizen whose house had been hit by the missile said “he was resigned to his fate, a fate that could be decided by either the U.S. or his own government. ‘It’s not in our hands,’ he said, speaking in a vague vernacular so common here to speech in public. ‘We don’t have a choice.’”³² Despite Baghdad citizens’ realization that they could not affect the outcome of the war, Shadid and Burns found in interviews with Iraqi citizens that their Muslim identity, pride of Iraq, and distrust of the United States would lead them to oppose the U.S. invasion.

While many Iraqi citizens knew Hussein was a vicious dictator, that didn’t directly correlate to citizens being pleased with the American led invasion. During an interview conducted with a wealthy Baghdad citizen he acknowledged Iraq

Could never defeat the Americans and the British. It is a Third World country, and the U.S. is a superpower. But a U.S. victory would have to come as a cost- suicide perhaps, but with a sense of dignity. It was a sentiment, he said, that was rooted in his identity as an Iraqi and his faith as a Muslim. Not once did he mention President Saddam Hussein’s name.³³

This citizen had no particular favor of Hussein, nor was he a radical Muslim. He only possessed a need to not allow his country to be taken over by foreign invaders. Another man commented, “you can’t surrender easily; we should fight... our religion says we should fight for our honor. We fear God. We’re more afraid of God than we’re afraid of the Americans.” This citizen wanted to ward off American advances due to Westerners’ different way of life that many Muslims saw as “unholy.” In a different interview with a family where a government official wasn’t present and the family’s identity was kept anonymous, the family discussed how Iraqis are ready for change because they want more freedoms.³⁴ Despite the desire for new freedoms, “family members criticized anger at the U.S. government, which has promised to liberate them. They criticized Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his dictatorial rule, but insisted that pride and patriotism prevent them from putting their destiny in the hands of a foreign power.”³⁵ The father continued the theme of pride for Iraq when he stated “When

somebody comes to attack Iraq, we stand up for Iraq. That doesn't mean we love Saddam Hussein, but there are priorities... There are rumblings of dissent, but these rumblings don't mean: Come America, we'll throw flowers at you.'" ³⁶ Shadid and Burns captured a lot of Iraqis' acknowledgement that change needed to come to the country, but they also caught many citizens' anger at being invaded by the United States. While the reporters stationed in Baghdad saw citizens' unhappiness with the war America was creating, Filkins and Meyers saw Iraqi citizens greeting the U.S. soldiers with more enthusiasm.

Phase I: The race to Baghdad-Filkins and Meyers make moves

As American troops moved through the desert and began to take over villages, soldiers encountered jubilant responses from Iraqi villages. On the second day of the invasion, as Safwan became the first Iraqi village to fall, "happiness and dread rose together... where some of the first Iraqis to encounter American and British troops found the joy of their deliverance muted by the fear that it was too good to last." ³⁷ Many of Safwan's citizens ran up to the troops and told them how happy they were that Saddam would soon be gone. While Filkins could have been biased and only reported on the cheering Iraqis, he also includes a quote from an angered villager at the troops' destruction of Hussein's shrines. "How would you like it if I were to cut up a poster of President Bush?" ³⁸ Yet, while Filkins includes this quote, he qualifies it in the next sentence when he states, "but his remarks were quickly drowned out by catcalls." ³⁹ The inclusion of the quote from the angered Iraqi man shows Filkins' attempt to be as objective as possible and capture both sides. The differences in reporting for Iraqi citizens' reactions to the U.S. could also be a result of location. Safwan was "the heartache of a town that has felt some of the hardest edges of Saddam Hussein's rule." ⁴⁰ In Baghdad, many people wanted change from Hussein's oppression, but they had not experienced having family members murdered by Hussein's regime like some of the villagers in Safwan had. Another effect on the villager's reactions could be the presence of troops. The villagers may have wanted to seem more excited in front of the new foreign power. The troops also did not destroy the village, where in Baghdad innocent civilians were being killed by the airstrikes. This article about

Safwan is reflexive of many similar encounters that Filkins and Myers had as the invasion moved towards Baghdad.

Another theme in Myers and Filkins' articles in the first few days of the invasion was the lack of Iraqi resistance the invasion force faced. In his article, "Armored Units Sweep Unchallenged Across Iraqi Desert," Myers reported that his unit was ahead of schedule. ⁴¹ The Colonel of the unit described "Iraqi forces as 'relatively disorganized and sporadic.'" ⁴² U.S. commanders didn't expect the Iraqi units in the desert to be as tough as they believed that the fighting would be in Baghdad where they were anticipating "fiercer resistance from Republican Guard divisions considered more loyal to President Saddam Hussein than regular army units." ⁴³ Not only did American troops see a lack of resistance, they encountered many Iraqi troops who were surrendering to them. "Around Basra, where hundreds of Iraqi soldiers surrendered Friday, the Americans and British have constructed what appears to be a low- intensity siege." ⁴⁴ To avoid being slowed down on the way to Baghdad, the units weren't even taking all of the surrendered soldiers as prisoners of war. One Iraqi soldier said: "the Americans just said to us, 'Give us your guns and go home.'" ⁴⁵ This early lack of heavy resistance made many U.S. commanders hopeful for how the rest of the trip to Baghdad would go. Filkins and Myers had a relatively positive view on the first few days of the invasion because Iraqi resistance didn't give them much of a reason to report on the United States' movements in a negative manner. When skirmishes occurred the reporters mentioned them, but heavy fighting was lacking overall in the first few days of the invasion.

Phase II: A Shift in Sourcing

As the United States military units moved their way into Baghdad, intense fighting ensued. On the first day U.S. troops were there, over 1,000 Iraqi soldiers died as well as hundreds of civilians who got caught in the crossfire. ⁴⁶ At this point in the war, the embedded journalists have been with their military units for several weeks and have gained the trust of many of the soldiers in their units. As a result, the embedded reporters begin to show more of the soldiers' emotions in their articles. One soldier who commented on the close combat necessary to fight in Baghdad said, "it was hard to shoot, because you don't want to shoot the

civilians. It was hard to pick out the threat.”⁴⁷ Another soldier, upon seeing a family that had died in a car crash as they tried to avoid the fighting said, “being a dad myself, that’s the hardest part...I’ve got six kids at home, and I can’t imagine it. I’d just as soon die than see that happen to my kids.”⁴⁸ They make it very clear that many troops feel sadness and guilt as innocent civilians lose their lives. “‘It’s a little sobering,’ said Capt. Sal Aguilar, standing in a field with dead Iraqis all around him. ‘When you’re training for this, you joke about it, you can’t wait for the real thing. Then when you see it, when you see the real thing, you never want to see it again.’”⁴⁹ In another instance where U.S. troops fired on a family of ten, six of which were killed, “one marine, according to witness there, began to cry.”⁵⁰ The embedded reporters also see some of the trepidation the U.S. soldiers are feeling as they move into Baghdad. During a lull in the fighting, one Marine took time to phone home and “in a call to his parents, he only alluded to the dangers he had faced. ‘I’ll have some stories when I get home,’ Corpsman Smith said, ‘I love you, too, ma.’”⁵¹ As Marine units prepared to siege the city, a medic stated: “the guys are really tense.”⁵² In contrast, the unilateral reporters come to lack this kind of emotional response as they gained quotes from soldiers.

As United States military units arrive in Baghdad, this provided an opportunity for unilateral reporters to interview them. Unlike the embedded reporters who include more of an emotional side in some of their quotes from the American soldiers, the unilateral reporters tended to only focus on the strategic or rational information the soldiers can provide. One of the first quotes by a soldier to appear in an article by Shadid was about the United States’ plan for taking control of Baghdad.⁵³ Other quotes from U.S. soldiers discussed the increase in Iraqi resistance they had faced in Baghdad, the falling of Hussein’s government, and weapon seizures. Even civilian deaths contained more of a distant tone when soldiers talked about them. When a U.S. army vehicle fired at a car that had evaded a roadblock, it killed three out of the four family members. A major who was commenting on the incident said, “our soldiers have to make a split second decision on what to do when a car is rushing at them.”⁵⁴ This quote certainly presents a different side for how soldiers were represented after a family of civilians was killed by American troops than

what the embedded reporters were showing. While embedded reporters could be considered to be biased because of their presentation of soldiers’ emotions, they could also be seen as having access to a kind of source that the unilateral reporters do not. Even though both the unilateral and embedded journalists can interview troops during this time period because of the American troops’ location, embedded journalists have earned a relational kind of access to troops from traveling with them that unilateral journalists lack.

Phase II: The Toppling of a Statue

By April 9th, 2003, much of the Iraq government had fallen or fled Baghdad. Nothing captured the sentiments of the fall of Hussein’s rule more than the toppling of a large Saddam Hussein statue in Firdaus Square. Iraqi civilians stated the process of bring down the statue by tying a rope around the statue’s neck and by using a sledgehammer at the statue’s base.⁵⁵ Yet, the civilians could not get the statue to fall and they eventually enlisted the help of a U.S. tank, which ultimately brought the statue down. Every major American television news station covered this “historic moment” and both Shadid and Burns were able to attend the falling of the statue due to their ability to freely travel in Baghdad. Shadid described the scene as “what is likely to become the lasting image of the U.S. entry into Baghdad.”⁵⁶ Shadid depicted a jubilant crowd, who, when the statue finally fell, “converged, kicking it, pummeling it with a chain, rocks and a sledgehammer, and slapping it with shoes- a great insult in the Arab world.”⁵⁷ While the unilateral journalists were able to capture this moment, the embedded journalists hardly even commented on it in their writings. Myers makes only a passing comment about the fall of the statue in his writing. “The events in downtown Baghdad on Wednesday- the waving, happy crowds of Iraqis in the streets happened only a mile or two away, but they remained distant news to the Third Infantry Division’s engineers as they meticulously cleared hundreds of mines from the roadway this morning.”⁵⁸ If the overarching expectations is that embedded journalists would simply be biased and only show the United States in the strongest and most positive light, then how the two groups of journalists framed this event stands in direct contrast to that. Here, it is the unilateral journalists who are taking on an extremely positive outlook and

are looking for the Iraq conflict to draw to a close soon with the symbolic falling of the Hussein statue. On the other hand, the embedded journalists are showing that fighting is still going on across the city of Baghdad. While the embedded journalists did not report on the toppling of the statue in length because of their inability to be at the event due to their forced travel with their units, this instance demonstrates a clear event where the unilateral journalists take on a much more American bias tone than the embedded journalists.

Phase III: Shadid Shows Iraqi Distrust

At this point in the conflict, the U.S. considered the war to be over. Due to this perception, it is important to note that Burns and Myers do not produce any articles from this point on because they have been pulled out of Iraq. Despite the claims that the war is over because Hussein's rule has fallen, that does not mean that the United States had control of Baghdad, instead reality was quite the opposite. Shadid focuses most on Iraqi citizens as his main source during this time period. Many Iraqis' trust in the American forces is quickly fading due to the lawlessness and looting that has begun in the city. When asked about the looting of the National Museum of Antiquities, which held ancient artifacts from the Assyrian and Babylonian Empires, "many blamed U.S. forces for not intervening to stop the demolition—deepening their skepticism of the American presence."⁵⁹ An owner of an art gallery commented on the American failings at preventing the looting. "When I see an occupier, am I happy? Looting the museum, burning the National Library, robbing the Saddam Center for Arts? The great America is not able to exert control over a gang of thieves?"⁶⁰ Shadid captures Iraqis' growing distrust in the American forces and presents their cynicism that the U.S. is only there to liberate them from a dictator. Interestingly, the group of artists feared that religious groups would ultimately take power in the upcoming years, and they feared what censorship that would bring.⁶¹ One artist commented, "religious extremism is the biggest threat...it will come to the surface."⁶² This growing distrust also continues as the United States fails to repair the utilities of Baghdad. In contrast, Shadid also presents the viewpoint of religious Iraqis.

During this time, Shadid presents Iraq citizens' feelings on religion in terms of the American

occupation. From the time the American invasion began, many citizens had commented that their fate was not in their hands, but instead they felt that the outcome of their lives was inevitable because only God knew what would happen. The majority of the Muslims in Iraq belong to the Shiite sect, yet Hussein had been a Sunni Muslim who had enforced a secular regime. In Karbala, which is considered to be one of the most holy cities in Iraq for Shiite Muslims, a mass pilgrimage began after the fall of Hussein's regime because the government had forbidden it before.⁶³ As Hussein's party fell, it also presented a vacuum of power. In Karbala, the Shiite clergy attempted to fill that void and "were out in force directing traffic, overseeing crowds and providing first aid to pilgrims who entered under the banners of mosques and neighborhoods of Baghdad and cities across southern Iraq." Karbala represents one of many cities in southern Iraq where Iraqi clergy was attempting to take the opportunity to step up and provide a religious based government for a group of people who had been repressed for decades. Yet, for as much as the Shiite majority despised Hussein, there also lies a deep distrust of American forces. Part of that "bitterness at the United States lingers over its perceived failure to support a Shiite uprising after the 1991 Persian Gulf War; it was bloodily crushed weeks later by the Republican Guard."⁶⁴ In addition to the distrust of the Americans, there lies an uncertainty in what the Americans' true intentions are for the country. One citizen commented, "we still don't know what [the United States] wants in return for the overthrowing for the regime," while another citizen's skepticism leaked through as he asked "they did it for nothing?"⁶⁵ More important than the strong distaste for the U.S. occupation, Shadid also shows a willingness of Iraqis to possibly take action against American forces. Shiite Muslims in Karbala stated, "the decision was not theirs but instead in the hand of the Hawza, or perhaps clergy who spoke on its behalf."⁶⁶ One resident commented, "If they say make resistance, we will obey them."⁶⁷ Here Shadid represents more than just a dislike of the American occupation. He shows a willingness on the part of Iraqi citizens to resist the nation who overthrew a man they despised only two weeks earlier. Overall, in interviews with Iraqi citizens, whether they from secular artists and intellectuals in Baghdad or the more

overtly religious group in Karbala, Shadid presents Iraqi citizens who hold a strong distrust of the American forces.

Phase III: Filkins Presents a Paralleled Distrust from the Perspective of American Troops

Interestingly, as of April 21st, Filkins begins all of his articles with the overarching title “Aftereffects.” However, thousands of U.S troops still remain in Iraq. Even these troops begin to express frustrations and uncertainty for what lies ahead of them. A mass search begins to locate Hussein and execute him. American soldiers began to accept anonymous tips from civilians to aid in locating him. While many tips were perceived as unhelpful, one assertion from a male citizen caught the attention of Maj. Doug Davids, an American Special Forces officer.⁶⁸ He put together a group of soldiers to make a move on the tip, but, as the unit was about to head out, senior military officials canceled the mission. Filkins described the American commanders as “bristling” at what they believed was a missed opportunity to capture Hussein.⁶⁹ While commanders acknowledged the mission might have been terminated due to the proposed location already being surveillance by another branch of the American military, “officers on the scene also suggested that the operation had been canceled because of excessive bureaucratic inefficiency. They complained that they had not even been given the chance to explore the possibility that Mr. Hussein was there.”⁷⁰ Here, Filkins is presenting a side where it is not only Iraq’s citizens who are frustrated with the Americans handling of their time in Baghdad. This side of the war, the soldier’s frustration, is a side that would never have been presented if it were not for the use of embedded journalists. Yet, instead of being bias and presenting only a positive side of what the troops are doing in Baghdad, Filkins uses his access to soldiers to show their own frustrations with what is occurring in the aftereffects following the fall of Hussein’s regime.

Even after the U.S has taken over Baghdad, they still do not have total control in the area, and despite the end of major combat operations, American troops are still killing Iraqis, as was the case when eighteen Anti-American protesters were shot.⁷¹ Filkins comments “the war in Iraq has officially ended, but the momentous task of recreating a new Iraqi nation seems hardly to have begun...American troops are straining to manage the forces this war has unleashed:

the anger, frustration and competing ambitions of a nation suppressed for three decades.”⁷² In this article, Filkins parallels what Shadid found with Iraqi citizens gaining a larger and larger distrust of American forces. Educated Iraqi’s who were “eager for the American led transformation of Iraq to work that the Americans may be losing the initiative, that the single-mindedness that won the war is slackening under the delicate task of transforming a military victory in to a political success.”⁷³ This growing sentiment of American inadequacy for setting up a new, stable government is repeated in several of Filkins following articles.

In addition to losing Iraqis’ trust because of the killing of civilians, many of Baghdad’s citizens experienced a waning trust in the American forces due to a lack of basic utilities in the city. Piles of garbage lined the streets, electricity and running water were still down a majority of the time, and many storeowners were still too scared to reopen their shops.⁷⁴ While the lack of utilities represented the superficial issue at hand, Iraqi citizens were justified in questioning the United States’ dedication to rebuilding Iraq because of the small amount of troops there. In Baghdad, “only 12,000 American soldiers have been assigned” even though it is “a city of 5 million people. Only 150,000 American soldiers are being asked to maintain order across all of Iraq, population 25 million, and that number may be substantially reduced by the fall.”⁷⁵ The majority of Iraqi citizens did not want U.S forces in Iraq, yet they would tolerate them for a while if the U.S could help rebuild and bring order to the nation. However, Filkins shows a side where U.S forces are in a state of limbo; they are present in Iraq, yet there wasn’t enough American planning to have the proper amount of troops to handle the tasks of rebuilding. Once again, despite being embedded, Filkins frames his articles in a way that is not completely positive for the Americans. Instead, Filkins represents the very real concerns of Iraqi citizens that will ultimately lead to even more tensions between Iraqi civilians and American forces.

Phase IV: If We Thought Iraq had Issues Before, This Takes It to a Whole New Level

Throughout the months of June and July, U.S forces see a rise in American casualties as pockets of Iraqi resistance emerge. In an article by Filkins headlined “After the War: New Attack” an American soldier was killed in a bombing. Filkins’ headline

perfectly captures the tone of the time period because even though an end to the war had declared on the U.S side fighting was still going on. The bombing “resembled the many that have preceded it, and which have made the summer such a trying one for American forces. The attackers hit, ran and got away. No one was detained, and the Americans had no chance to return fire.”⁷⁶ Filkins interviewed a soldier who stated “‘I’m not supposed to talk to you, but it’s terrible,’ said a colleague of the victims, a soldier in the First Armored Division.”⁷⁷ Even though the soldier was not supposed to speak with Filkins about the incident, Filkins’ position as an embedded journalist privileged him to get this quote. This bombing marked the fiftieth death of an American soldier since Bush’s declaration for the end of combat operation on May 1st, and it was the fifteenth death in the past eight days.⁷⁸ Filkins did not attempt to provide a number for how many Iraqis had been killed during that same time period. Filkins was also able to provide additional information on the attack due to his position as an embedded reporter. He stated, “today’s death illustrated the relative sophistication of the attacks against the Americans. The metal shards left behind suggest that the bomb was larger than a grenade and the aim and timing of the detonation suggests no small competence on the part of the assailants.”⁷⁹ Once again, Filkins did not attempt to sugar coat or hide the growing issues U.S forces were facing. Instead, Filkins uses his access as an embedded reporter to gain more information on the situation.

Shadid focuses more on citizen’s responses during this time period as American troops begin to conduct more and more raids on civilian homes in the search for Saddam Hussein. In the small village of Thuluya in northwestern Iraq, Americans arrested more than 400 residents for being members to the Baath Party or a part of Hussein’s government.⁸⁰ One elderly resident angrily commented, “they carried out the raid here because we’re Sunni and Saddam was Sunni... after this operation, we think 100 Saddams is better than the Americans.”⁸¹ These raids created a growing animosity on the part of the Iraqis. They also show a shift in who the American officials see as criminals. Before, the Americans largely bypassed civilians and were concerned about the number civilian casualties. There was a clear line between the Iraqi soldiers and the regular citizens. By mid-June though,

the raids make it clear that almost any Iraqi civilian could be a threat to the Americans, and the raids show a lack of consideration for Iraq citizens’ right to privacy. Shadid travels to Baghdad and Samarra where similar raids are also happening. He finds similar sentiments from Iraq citizens in each city. Shadid’s position as a unilateral journalist allows him to travel between cities as long as he has hired an Iraqi translator and, possibly, a bodyguard. Since Shadid is not committed to one area of Iraq, he is able to gain quotes from Iraqi citizens in multiple areas. His access to residents from multiple cities allows him to frame multiple articles where civilians are angered by the American raids.

Concluding Thoughts

The Iraq War provides the first opportunity to view embedded and unilateral journalists’ writings to a large extent. While critics of the embedding program argued that bias would affect how embedded reporters wrote about the war, access to certain sources actually played a larger role in how journalists framed their stories. While it is true that in the first phase embedded journalists had a more positive outlook on the war, it was due to the lack of resistance American troops were facing at that time. During that phase, unilateral journalists had a more negative viewpoint on the war because of the devastation the American airstrikes were causing in Baghdad. In phase two, both the embedded and unilateral reporters have access to interview American soldiers, but embedded journalists present more of the soldiers’ emotions because they have gained their trust over the past few weeks. Despite expectations, some unilateral journalists have a more positive outlook on the United States’ takeover of Baghdad then some of the embedded journalists do. In phase three and four, Burns and Meyers have been pulled from Iraq, which indicates that U.S newspapers are allocating their sources to more “newsworthy” matters. In phase three, Filkins presents uncertainty on the American troops’ side for what lies ahead, as well as Iraq citizen’s growing distrust of the United States’ occupation. Shadid only focuses on Iraqi residents during this time period, and he indicates strong resentment from citizens whether they are religious or not. In phase four, many of the underlying emotions that were emerging in phase three completely come to the surface. Filkins shows more wariness on the part of U.S troops because of ambushes, and Shadid also

shows a more evident distrust that the Americans have formed for civilians with the increase in house raids. Shadid's ability to travel to multiple cities also allows him to capture the residents' feelings of resentment that grow because of the raids. Each phase of the war during the four-month time period examined allows the two different groups of journalists to have access to different sources, which affects how their articles are framed.

Overall, neither group of journalists is better than the other. Both groups become essential in presenting a full picture of the Iraq War. Embedded journalists were able to present a perspective of the war that had never been shown up-close before. Americans gained a better understanding of U.S military units as embedded journalists reported on their everyday tasks. However, embedded journalists could only provide a small slice of the war due to their forced travel with their units. On the other hand, unilateral journalists could remain in one area for an extended length of time to gain the information needed for their stories. As of now, it is unclear if the U.S Department of Defense will look to use the embed program in future foreign conflicts. Regardless, in terms of the Iraq War, both embedded and unilateral journalists were necessary to capture the whole story.

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- ⁶⁶ Ibid., 3.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid., 3.
- ⁶⁸ Dexter Filkins, “Aftereffects: Manhunt; In the Search for Hussein, a Mission Is Mysteriously Scrubbed after an Intriguing Tip,” *New York Times*, April 30, 2003, sec. A.
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- ⁷⁰ Ibid., 1.
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